Attachment
Draft Telegram From the Department of State to
the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in
Geneva3
Subject: (S) Overall instructions for Round VII of US/Soviet Nuclear
and Space Arms Talks Ref: (a) Presidential letter to US negotiators
for December 2–5 meeting with Soviet counterparts;4 (b) State 336325;5 (c) State 330271;6 (d) State 2916347
1. Secret–Entire text.
2. Following is guidance for US delegation for the seventh round of
negotiations with the Soviet Union beginning on January 15, 1987.
Guidance from previous rounds and special December meeting remain
[Page 798]
in effect, except as
modified below. Specific guidance for each of the three negotiating
groups is being provided septel.
3. Principal objectives for Round VII include:
—Continue to seek prompt and forthcoming Soviet responses to new US
proposals as set forth in applicable instructions for US delegation
and each of the negotiating groups, and presented in Round VI and at
December limited composition meetings. US del should emphasize, as
appropriate, that new proposals represent US efforts to build on
areas of convergence and reach agreement based on Reykjavik, to
respond to expressed Soviet concerns, to lay out our ultimate goal
and to identify practical near-term steps to achieve those
objectives.
—Continue to seek Soviet agreement to the text of documents reflected
in the specific instructions to the three negotiating groups for
Round VII.
—Reject Soviet attempts to hold progress in one negotiating forum
hostage to progress in another, while, at the same time, making
clear those areas where, in the US view, substantive
interrelationships exist. In particular, delegation should continue
to rebut Soviet efforts to mischaracterize the understandings
reached at Reykjavik, to link progress in INF to progress in other areas, or to portray SDI as an obstacle to arms
control.
—In countering possible Soviet allegations that the US agreed to
eliminate strategic offensive arms in ten years and Soviet
insistence on resolution of this issue as a threshold matter, point
out that achieving 50 percent reductions in START and significant INF reductions as agreed in Reykjavik
are vital first steps in a process leading to the elimination of
offensive ballistic missiles and are areas where considerable common
ground exists and, thus, should be focus of current
negotiations.
4. In elaborating on US proposals, delegation should make clear that
measures for effective verification conforming to the three
principles agreed at Reykjavik must be addressed and agreed
concurrently with negotiations on reductions and limitations.
5. If Soviets raise other, non-NST
arms control issues, delegation should respond that these issues
should be pursued in the appropriate fora, not NST. If Soviets specifically link
nuclear testing and NST, delegation
should respond as per para 5 of Ref C.
6. The delegation should continue to emphasize the need for
compliance with existing arms control agreements, noting obstacles
place in the path of achieving arms reductions by Soviet
noncompliance. If Soviets raise matter of US exceeding SALT limits, delegation should
underscore that US policy decisions on the SALT I interim agreement and SALT II in large part resulted from Soviet
noncompliance with
[Page 799]
these
agreements. The delegation should stress that these agreements are
behind us, both as a matter of legal obligation and as a matter of
policy commitment. The US has made a standing offer of establishment
of a new interim framework of mutual restraint for strategic
offensive weapons. Our focus, however, should be on progress in
NST toward early agreement on
radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals
of both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Attachment
Draft Telegram From the Department of State to
the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in
Geneva8
Subject: (S) Instructions for START Negotiating Group. References: (a) 86 State
330273;9 (b) 86 State
290210;10 (c) 86 State
138816;11 (d) 86 State 54773;12 (e) 86 State
12554;13 (f) 85 State 288129;14 (g) 85 State 162424;15 (h) 85 State
7268416
1. Secret–Entire text.
2. Following is guidance for the U.S. Negotiating Group on Strategic
Offensive Arms for Round VII. Except as modified below, previous
instructions remain unchanged.
[Page 800]
3. Overall objective. The negotiating group’s objective remains an
equitable, verifiable, and stabilizing agreement deeply reducing
strategic offensive arms. The negotiating group’s chief objective
for Round VII is to seek agreement to a basic framework, including
numerical sublimits. To aid that process, the negotiating group
should seek Soviet agreement in Round VII to key elements of an
agreement for reductions in strategic offensive arms, as detailed
below, based on the areas mutually agreed to during the Reykjavik
meeting and the additional U.S. elements tabled during Round VI.
4. Key elements of an agreement. The Negotiating Group is authorized
to table early in Round VII the following U.S. proposal for key
elements of an agreement.
Begin text of key elements:
Key elements of an agreement for Reductions
in strategic offensive arms
Reductions
The sides shall reduce their strategic offensive arms as follows:
1600 SNDVs/composition of
forces
—The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers to a level
not to exceed 1600. There shall be constraints on non-deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs.
6000 warheads
—The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of warheads on deployed
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers to a level
not to exceed 6000. For the purposes of counting warheads pursuant
to this limit, each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs or
short-range attack missiles shall count as one warhead and each
long-range ALCM carried by a heavy
bomber shall count as one warhead.
Sublimits
—There shall be sublimits not to exceed 4800 ballistic missile
warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads, and
1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs,
except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.
Mobile ICBMs
—Mobile ICBMs shall be banned.
Throw-weight reductions
—Strategic ballistic missile throw-weight shall be reduced by 50
percent from the highest of the two sides’ levels. This throw-weight
reduction shall be codified through direct or indirect limits.
Verification
—The sides in the course of negotiating a treaty to codify the above
reductions and limitations shall concurrently negotiate measures
which
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permit effective
verification of compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific
verification measures shall include, inter alia:
(1) An exchange of comprehensive and accurate data, both prior to
reductions and thereafter,
(2) On-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels,
(3) Effective monitoring of the remaining inventories and associated
facilities, including on-site inspection, and,
(4) Non-interference with NTM and other agreed measures.
Schedule of Reductions
—These reductions will be carried out in a phased manner and
completed by the end of 1991.
SLCMs
—The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question
of limiting deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. When such a solution is found,
it will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and
1600 SNDV limits.
End text of key elements.
5. In presenting during Round VII the key elements proposal as a
document for agreement, U.S. negotiator should stress the importance
the U.S. places on the negotiation of appropriate sublimits and
state that agreement on the three U.S.-proposed sublimits, could
help resolve some of the most important remaining differences
between the sides. The U.S. negotiator should emphasize that, in the
past, the Soviet proposal would have effectively included sublimits
in two of the three categories proposed by the United States. The
negotiator should also state that, as previously proposed, the U.S.
prefers sublimits of 4500, 3000 and 1500. However, if the Soviet
Union is prepared to accept the U.S. approach of these three
categories of sublimits, the United States is prepared to accept the
higher numbers of 4800, 3300 and 1650 as tabled on October 22 and
contained in the key elements document, in an effort to split the
difference between the preferred U.S. sublimits and the previously
proposed Soviet percentage sublimits that would be applicable to
ballistic missile warheads. These higher sublimits therefore
represent, together with 1600 SNDVs and 6000 warheads, a numerical framework on which
final agreement should be reached. The negotiating group should
present rationale for the U.S. key elements proposal by reiterating
the justification for its proposals presented in previous rounds,
particularly those in favor of the three U.S. warhead sublimits, as
well as arguments against the elements of the Soviet approach that
do not provide for an equitable outcome. The negotiating group
should vigorously reject as untrue any Soviet assertions that the
U.S. agreed at Reykjavik to discard the U.S. proposed sublimits or
that the U.S. agreed to eliminate all strategic offensive weapons by
1996.
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6. Heavy ICBM sublimits. Should the
Soviets raise their proposal for a 50-percent reduction in heavy
ICBMs as an acceptable
alternative to the U.S. package of sublimits, the U.S. negotiating
group should respond by stating that the Soviet willingness to
reduce heavy ICBMs is a welcome
step that helps to create additional common ground and addresses
some of the concerns represented in the U.S.-proposed 1650 sublimit.
However, it does not address the question of sublimits on total
ballistic missile and ICBM
warheads and only partially takes into account U.S. concerns
represented in the third U.S. proposed sublimit. The Soviet proposal
for a 50-percent reduction in heavy ICBMs therefore cannot substitute for the three
U.S.-proposed sublimits.
7. Heavy ICBM modernization. On the
question of heavy ICBM
modernization, the negotiating group may reiterate that the U.S.
position is that the sides shall establish constraints that ban the
development, production, flight-testing or deployment of new or
modernized versions of heavy ICBMs
as well as prohibit production and additional deployments of
existing types of heavy ICBMs.
8. Strategic arms reductions in second five years. If the Soviets
raise this issue of the U.S. defense and space proposal for the
elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996, the
Negotiating Group should state that the START group should give the highest priority to the
necessary first step in a process leading to the elimination of
offensive ballistic missiles—that is, the reductions in strategic
offensive arms to 6000 warheads on 1600 SNDVs in the first five years, which is an area where
considerable common ground exists.
9. Mobile ICBMs. The Negotiating
Group should avoid discussing recent U.S. decisions concerning the
future of the U.S. land-based missile forces except to state that
the U.S. government still proposes a ban on mobile ICBMs due to verification
difficulties and the military implications of such difficulties. The
Negotiating Group should make clear to the Soviets our willingness
to listen to their proposals on mobile ICBM verification while noting that their proposals to
date have been inadequate. Until agreement on offensive reductions
is reached and implemented, the U.S. is free to develop and deploy
ICBMs in mobile basing
modes.
10. START verification regime. The
U.S. negotiator may, at his discretion, address the issue of a
START verification regime.
Recalling the verification principles agreed at Reykjavik, the
Negotiating Group should note that these elements are also relevant
to START and present the
following as elements of a verification regime for START (FYI: these elements are not necessarily inclusive of
all verification provisions a START agreement would require):
—An exchange of comprehensive and accurate data both prior to
reductions and thereafter;
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—On-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels
(negotiating group should probe for rationale for the exclusion of
this element from the Soviet November 7 proposals);
—Effective monitoring of remaining inventories and associated
facilities, including on-site inspection;
—Interference with agreed measures or with national technical means
of verification will be prohibited, as will concealment measures
which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the
agreement
—The encryption of telemetry on systems subject to the provisions of
the agreement will be prohibited; and,
—On board engineering test measurements shall be made, and all such
measurements shall be broadcast using unencrypted telemetry, during
each test flight or training flight of an ICBM or SLBM.
