169. National Security Decision Directive 2491
Washington, October 29, 1986
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CURRENT NST NEGOTIATING ROUND
The attached instructions2 supplement existing guidance for
the current round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which began on September 18, 1986, in
Geneva. They set forth in detail the proposals made to General Secretary
Gorbachev during my
meeting with him in Reykjavik, Iceland, and provide guidance for
building on the agreements we reached there.
Attachment
Telegram From the Department of State to the
Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva3
Washington, October 22, 1986,
0311Z
330271. Subject: (S) Additional Guidance for US/Soviet Nuclear and
Space Talks. Ref: State 2916344
1.–Entire text.
2. Following is additional guidance for the NST delegation for Round VI, reflecting discussions in
October 11–12 Reykjavik meeting. Washington continues to evaluate
how best to build upon positive accomplishments of that meeting and
will provide additional guidance [Page 750] shortly, including guidance on the concept of
eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles and its link to
obligations with respect to the ABM
Treaty. Previous guidance (Reftel) remains valid except as modified
below. Guidance for each of the three negotiating groups is being
provided septel.
3. U.S. objectives for the remainder of Round VI include:
—To build upon the positive accomplishments of Reykjavik by inducing
the Soviets to continue the seriousness and flexibility displayed
there.
—To present U.S. proposals for amplifying the understandings reached
in Reykjavik, as set forth in the instructions to each negotiating
group.
—To reject Soviet attempts to mischaracterize the understandings
reached in Iceland.
—To reject Soviet attempts to hold progress in one negotiating forum
hostage to progress in another. Delegation should vigorously object
to any Soviet characterization that progress in INF is once again linked to progress
in other areas, noting that this contradicts specific understanding
reached during Geneva summit to seek a separate INF agreement and to accelerate
progress in areas of common ground.
4. Should Soviets raise issue of elimination of all offensive
ballistic missiles by 1996, as proposed by President in Reykjavik,
delegation should note that the first step in the elimination of
ballistic missiles must be the 50-percent START reductions and significant INF reductions discussed in Reykjavik
and that it is more efficient to discuss these steps first. (FYI: Washington anticipates replacing
this guidance with detailed guidance on ballistic missile
elimination by 27 October.)
5. If the Soviets raise other, non-NST arms control issues, the delegation should respond
that these issues should be pursued in the appropriate fora, not
NST. Should the Soviets
specifically link nuclear testing and progress in NST, as suggested by General Secretary
Gorbachev in
Reykjavik, delegation should reply that the United States expressed
its readiness in Reykjavik to enter negotiations on nuclear testing
issues and that specific Soviet recommendations should be raised in
the appropriate channels. The delegation should resist any further
Soviet efforts to discuss limitations on nuclear testing in the
NST forum.
[Page 751]
Attachment
Telegram From the Department of State to the
Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva5
Washington, October 22, 1986,
0312Z
330273. Subject: (S) Additional guidance for START Negotiating Group. Ref: (A)
State 2916346 (B) State 2902107
1. Secret—Entire text.
2. Following is additional guidance for the START negotiating group in Round VI,
reflecting discussions in October 11–12 Reykjavik meeting.
Washington continues to evaluate how best to build upon positive
accomplishments of that meeting and will provide additional guidance
shortly, including guidance on timeframe for 50-percent reductions
and on the concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic
missiles.
3. It is the U.S. understanding that the following was agreed and,
therefore, the U.S. START
negotiating Group should confirm their acceptance by the
Soviets:
—A 1600 ceiling on ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers;
—A 6000 ceiling on warheads, to include ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and long-range ALCMs.
—All heavy bombers count against the SNDV limit. Each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs or
SRAMs would count as one
warhead toward the limit of 6000. Each ALCM carried by heavy bombers would count as one
warhead. (FYI: As part of the
negotiations on these provisions, accounting rules for implementing
them will have to be worked out, and Washington invites delegation’s
views on such rules.)
—Consideration of appropriate sublimits would continue.
—Heavy ICBMs would be significantly
reduced.
—The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to limiting
deployment of long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs. When such a solution is found, it will not
involve counting long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000/1600 limits. In this regard, the
delegation should seek [Page 752] out
details, especially details relating to verification, of the Soviet
position that would attempt to meet U.S. concerns.
4. In the context of the above agreement on counting gravity bombs
and SRAMs, the previous U.S.
proposal to limit heavy bombers to 350 is redundant and is no longer
a part of our position.
5. At Reykjavik, the sides understood that other provisions would
have to be added to what was agreed in order to make a complete
agreement. A number of sublimits were discussed but not agreed; it
was agreed the consideration of sublimits could continue. The U.S.
START negotiating group
should propose that there be sublimits on:
—Ballistic missile warheads;
—ICBM warheads;
—Warheads on all permitted ICBMs
except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads;
—While the preferred numbers for these sublimits remain 4500, 3000,
and 1500, respectively, the US START negotiating group is authorized to propose
sublimits of 4800 ballistic missile warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads, and 1650 warheads on
ICBMs except silo-based light
or medium ICBMs with six or fewer
warheads. (Note: This proposal results in no RPT no sublimit on ALCMs.)
—The aforementioned sublimits are the U.S. proposal for implementing
the Soviet offer in Reykjavik that heavy ICBMs be significantly reduced. The U.S. side
anticipates that such an approach will reduce heavy ICBMs significantly (e.g., by roughly
half) in an appropriate manner.
—All other elements of the 50-percent U.S. START proposal remain the same (e.g., the ban on mobile
ICBMs and the 50-percent
reduction in ballistic missile throw-weight).
6. The October 15 Soviet plenary statement cited the Soviet proposal
for 50-percent reductions in total SNDVs and weapons as well as in each category of
strategic system (i.e., ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers)
which was presented in Reykjavik and rejected by the U.S. Should
this formulation be tabled in Geneva, the negotiating group should
reject the proposal as follows:
—In Reykjavik the sides agreed in principle to 50-percent reductions
in strategic offensive arms, specifically to 1600 SNDVs and 6000 warheads appropriately
applied. Certain other elements of the initial Soviet formulation
proposed in Reykjavik were determined by the U.S. at the time to
result in an inequitable outcome and therefore were rejected. The
U.S. proposal for 50-percent reductions builds on those elements
mutually agreed at Reykjavik and provides for an agreed equitable
outcome.
7. Effective verification is essential to both sides. As agreed at
Geneva last year, verification measures should be negotiated
concur[Page 753]rently with
reductions and limitations. The two sides should seek to apply
progress made in INF with respect
to verification principles (see INF
instructions, para 4) to the negotiations on strategic offensive
arms.
8. Except as modified above, previous instructions remain
unchanged.
9. Paragraph 9a contains the text of the initial Soviet proposal made
in Reykjavik the morning of October 11. Paragraph 9b contains the
language agreed to by the U.S.-Soviet experts group during the early
morning of 12 October. Both are provided only for the information of
the negotiating group.
—A. Initial Soviet proposal, AM October 11. On strategic arms. An
agreement to reduce by fifty percent the strategic offensive arms of
the USSR and the USA taking into consideration the
historically formed distinctive features of the structures of the
parties’ strategic forces. Within this framework, reductions shall
apply to all types of offensive strategic arms, including heavy
missiles. A solution shall also be found with regard to limiting the
deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.
On all matters relating to the problem of strategic offensive arms
the parties will negotiate having regard for their mutual interests
and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach
agreement.
—B. Experts group agreed language, early AM October 12. On strategic
arms. An agreement would be prepared to reduce by fifty percent
strategic offensive arms to an equal number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers (approximately 1600) and
warheads (not more than 6000), taking into account historically
formed distinctive features of the structures of the parties’
strategic forces. Within this framework, reductions shall apply to
all types of strategic offensive arms, including a significant
number of heavy missiles. A mutually acceptable solution shall also
be found to limiting deployment of long-range nuclear-armed
sea-launched cruise missiles.
On all matters relating to the problem of strategic offensive arms
the parties will negotiate having regard for their mutual interests
and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach
agreement.
[Page 754]
Attachment
Telegram From the Department of State to the
Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva8
Washington, October 22, 1986,
0311Z
330272. Subject: (S) Additional Guidance for Defense and Space
Negotiating Group. Ref: (A) State 291909;9 (B) State 2956610
1. Secret—Entire text.
2. Following is additional guidance for the Defense and Space
Negotiating Group for Round VI, based on US proposals made to the
Soviet Union in Iceland meeting between the President and General
Secretary Gorbachev
on October 11–12. This guidance is in addition to, and does not
replace guidance for, D&S
Negotiating Group of reftels (a) and (b) and previous rounds, except
as specifically noted below.
3. The existing US proposal as contained in previous guidance and in
the President’s July 25 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev remains on the
table.
4. Paragraph (4a) contains the initial Soviet proposal made in
Reykjavik on the first day of the discussions. Paragraph (4b)
provides the text of the first US alternative proposal made by the
President to General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik on the afternoon of the
second day of discussions. Paragraph (4c) provides the text of the
Soviet counterproposal made that same afternoon. Paragraph (4d)
provides the text of the second and last US alternative proposal
made in writing by the President. These are provided for the
information of the Negotiating Group.
A. Soviet proposal, AM October 11. For the purpose of strengthening
the regime of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, which is of unlimited duration, an understanding
shall be reached that the USSR and
the USA undertake not to exercise their right to withdraw from that
treaty for a period of ten years, and to strictly comply with all
its provisions throughout that period. Testing in space of all
missile-defense space elements shall be prohibited except for
research and testing carried out in laboratories. This would not [Page 755] entail a ban on the
testing of such fixed land-based systems and their components as are
allowed under the ABM treaty.
Subsequently, within several years, the parties shall negotiate
further mutually acceptable solutions in this area. The parties deem
it appropriate to undertake additional efforts with a view to
achieve mutually acceptable agreements banning anti-satellite
systems.
B. First US proposal, PM October 12. Both sides would agree to
confine themselves to research, development and testing, which is
permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a
period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50 percent
reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved. This
being done, both sides would continue the pace of reductions with
respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal
of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the
end of the second five year period. As long as these reductions
continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will
continue to apply. At the end of ten year period, with all offensive
ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to deploy
defenses.
C. Soviet proposal, PM October 12. The USSR and the United States would undertake for ten
years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty, which is of
unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all
its provisions. The testing in space of all space components of
missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted
in laboratories. Within the first five years of the ten-year period
(and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two
sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five
years of that period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides’
strategic offensive arms shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996,
the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States will have been totally
eliminated.
D. Second US proposal, PM October 12. The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not
to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited
duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its
provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which
are permitted by the ABM Treaty.
Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through
1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be
reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that
period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides
shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic
missiles of the USSR and the
United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the
ten-year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose
unless the parties agree otherwise.
5. Guidance on the US proposals made at Reykjavik is under
consideration in Washington, including additional analytical work.
In the [Page 756] interim, the
Negotiating Group should avoid discussion of the specifics of either
of the US proposals.
6. If questioned about the US proposals made in Reykjavik, the US
Negotiating Group should respond that the US intends to build upon
the positive accomplishments of the Reykjavik meeting, and that the
US will be making a proposal in Geneva based on these
accomplishments shortly. If asked whether the additional commitments
suggested in the US proposals discussed in Reykjavik depend upon
other conditions, the Negotiating Group should note that in
Reykjavik it was clear by the terms of the proposals made that the
additional commitments included in the proposals tabled by the US
were strictly conditioned on the two sides’ reaching a mutually
satisfactory agreement now on a schedule of reductions resulting in
50 percent reductions in the strategic offensive forces of both
sides to equal levels by 1991 and total elimination of the offensive
ballistic missiles of both sides by 1996.
Attachment
Draft Telegram From the Department of State to
the Delegation to the Nuclear and Arms Talks in Geneva11
Subject: Additional Guidance for NST
Delegation. Refs: (A) State 33027112 (B) State 29163413
1. Secret—Entire text
2. Reftel a provided initial post-Reykjavik guidance for the NST delegation for Round VI,
reflecting discussions in October 11–12 Reykjavik meeting. This
cable provides additional contingency guidance on relationship of
SNF to the concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles.
Previous guidance (refs a and b) remains valid except as modified
below. Guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group is being
provided septel. There will be no additional guidance for START and INF Negotiating Groups this round.
[Page 757]
3. The U.S. proposal to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles,
of whatever range, involves SNF systems of ranges less than those
previously the subject of negotiations. Discussion of such systems
may require agreement on an appropriate negotiating forum. Only the
general concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles
should be introduced this round. Should the Soviets raise questions
on negotiating forum for SNF missiles in this regard, delegation
should note that at this time it is the U.S. opinion that the INF Negotiating Group may provide the
most logical forum.
4. Once delegation has reviewed these instructions and supporting
instructions to individual negotiating groups, Washington would
welcome delegation’s views on appropriate ending date for current
negotiating round.
Attachment
Draft Telegram From the Department of State to
the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in
Geneva14
Subject: Additional Guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating
Group. Ref: (A) State 291909;15 (B) State 293566;16 (C) State 33027217
1. Secret—Entire text.
2. Following is additional guidance for the Defense and Space
Negotiating Group for Round VI. It supplements the guidance provided
in Ref C. This guidance is in addition to, and does not replace
guidance for D&S Negotiating
Group of REFTELS (A), (B) and
(C) except as modified below. There will be no additional guidance
for START and INF negotiating groups this round.
3. In addition to the existing proposal in the President’s July 25
letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, which remains on the table, the US
negotiating group is authorized to present the following elements
[Page 758] for an agreement which
we proposed in Reykjavik as an alternative to the president’s July
proposal.
—The USSR and the United States
would undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right
of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty,
which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to
observe all its provisions while continuing research, development
and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.
—Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through
1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be
reduced by 50 percent.
—During the following five years of that period, the remaining
offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be
eliminated.
—Thus, by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the
USSR and the United States
will have been totally eliminated, and either side could deploy
advanced strategic defenses if it so chose, unless the parties agree
otherwise.
4. The above undertakings would be recorded in a new treaty.
5. In presenting the above proposal, the negotiating group should
make clear that the above commitment would be strictly conditioned
on the two sides’ reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement now, as
part of a new treaty, on a schedule of reductions resulting in 50
percent reductions in the strategic offensive forces of both sides
to equal levels by 1991 and total elimination of the offensive
ballistic missiles of both sides by 1996.
6. When presenting the position described in Para 3–5, the US
negotiator should make it clear that in not exercising its rights to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty,
neither side would be forfeiting its right to withdraw for reasons
of its supreme national interest, or to respond to a material
breach, or other circumstances recognized under international law.
He should indicate that:
—A blanket commitment to waive all rights of withdrawal is not
acceptable.
—The US is prepared to meet Soviet concerns through a more limited
commitment not to withdraw for the purposes of deploying advanced
defenses.
—New conditions for withdrawal would have to be negotiated and agreed
as part of the proposed treaty described in Para 4 and 5 above. We
would expect such conditions to include a material breach of that
treaty or linked agreements (e.g., failure to adhere to the schedule
of reductions provided in an associated START treaty).
—If the Soviets have other concerns, we are prepared to discuss
them.
7. If the Soviets question the use of the language in the President’s
proposal (i.e., “undertakes for ten years not to exercise their
existing [Page 759] right of
withdrawal from the ABM treaty”)
the negotiator should note that the President anticipated our
finding a solution with respect to the interpretation of the
non-withdrawal phraseology that acceptably accommodated both US and
Soviet concerns.18
