183. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1

2358. Subject: Nitze-Vorontsov Conversation Saturday, February 28, 1987. Ref: Geneva—23562

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Vorontsov began by telling me about Mr. Gorbachev’s speech announcing their decision to separate INF from the other subject matters. He emphasized the importance of this decision and their intention concurrently to move forward as rapidly as possible with START and “space-based weapons.” I said that Max Kampelman had told me of their discussion at 6:00 P.M. today. I said I thought this was a constructive move and that it was important that it constitute a foundation for more rapid progress in START and Defense & Space as well.

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3. Vorontsov then said he wished me to understand how these matters were viewed in Moscow. They were confused as to what was going on in Washington. They did not know what the President’s intentions were; was he really determined to violate the ABM Treaty or was the discussion of early deployment merely meant to bring pressure upon them? They understood what Secretary Weinberger was attempting to do, but they did not know whether this reflected the President’s policy. He said that Max Kampelman had been unwilling or unable to enter into a serious discussion of the space-based weapons issue. He understood from the press that Max was under instructions not to have serious discussion on this issue.

4. I interrupted to say that Max Kampelman had the full confidence of the Secretary of State and of the President, and he was fully authorized to discuss and negotiate within the clear meaning of the ABM Treaty. We considered the Soviet position of demanding a ban on research outside laboratories to bear no relationship to the treaty. Neither the word “research” nor “laboratory” was mentioned in the treaty. Max was not authorized to negotiate amendments to the treaty. Vorontsov said they had no intention of proposing any amendment to the treaty.

5. Vorontsov went on to protest that I was consulting with the Congress and with our allies and was not prepared to discuss anything with them. I said that some time ago the President had suggested that I explore ad referendum with somebody nominated by their side the possibility of arriving at some package of mutual concessions which we could recommend to both sides for their consideration. His side had not reacted favorably to that suggestion but instead had appointed him to head their negotiating team and Max Kampelman had the position of being his opposite number. It seemed to me that there should be no confusion as to authorized channels for negotiation. I commented that Velikhov had asked to see me in Washington, and I had so done, on an hour’s notice. I gathered that Velikhov was annoyed that I had said that the only approved channel for negotiation at this time was between him and Kampelman, but that was a fact. Vorontsov said that Velikhov had talked his views over with people in Moscow and had been authorized to explore them with me but not to negotiate on the subject. Velikhov had told him that he had been surprised because I had two others with me; I noted that Velikhov had arrived with two others, Rogov and another man from their embassy.

6. Vorontsov asked me whether I ever saw Dubinin. I said I had recently had lunch with him; I found he could ask questions and explain the Soviet position, but that discussion was not very fruitful. Vorontsov said they agreed; Dubinin was not yet deeply acquainted with the business but was learning.

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7. He returned to the subject of my consultations with the Congress and our allies. He said they did not understand why we should consult with them rather than negotiate with the Soviet Union. I said we were doing both. I said that in a coalition of democratic countries close consultation was essential. He again referred to talk of early deployment. I noted that the President had decided against early deployment.

8. The discussion turned to Regan’s replacement by Howard Baker.3 I said that this was important; you, Max and I all had good relations with Baker.

9. Discussion then turned to INF. He said he saw no reason why a treaty text couldn’t be gotten into form so that both sides could sign it reasonably promptly. He said that they foresaw a trip by Secretary Shultz to Moscow. Thereafter, it was possible to foresee a signing ceremony at which an INF treaty text, together with agreements in principle on the other two subjects, could be signed. He said this could be quite an important ceremony.

10. I said that Mike Glitman had been working hard to work out a draft text for early tabling. I thought he should be able to do so shortly. Vorontsov said there were only a few remaining issues to be worked out. I mentioned SRINF systems. He said he had great difficulty in understanding the reasonableness of our position on conversion. He said this should be viewed not just technically but politically. Would it be politically acceptable to have the P–II’s removed while in fact nothing changed? I said there would be an important change. There would be a change from LRINF missiles to SRINF. He asked how one could tell the difference. I said there would be two stages, not three. He said it would still be possible to modify those two to give the missile greater range. I suggested that perhaps the solution would be to accelerate the projected negotiations six months later for the total elimination of SRINF missiles. He said this could be considered; in any case, he thought it important to get away from the complexities involved in conversion. I noted that if one were interested in getting away from complexities, one way in which that could be achieved would be to eliminate all the INF missiles rather than retaining 100 warheads on each side. He noted that would please the Chinese; I asked whether that would be too bad. He said, maybe not.

11. We then turned to the subject of START. He said that as they saw it in Moscow, we were interested in restructuring Soviet strategic forces. I said this was not true. The limits would be equal for both [Page 806] sides. He said, “but only we are above some of these limits and therefore the only ones to be affected.” I noted the continuing discussion that Kvitsinskiy and I had had about the comparable INF problem. Kvitsinskiy had argued that only they at that time had INF missiles and therefore our INF proposals were aimed solely at actions by their side. I said that just because the two sides started from unequal positions was no reason why those positions should remain unequal. No agreement would be sound if it were based on inequality between the two sides. Vorontsov indicated that he really didn’t think we were too far apart with respect to START. Their problem was that we were not prepared to deal with what interested them, and that was limitations on space-based weapons. I said it was our view that space defense matters and START were matters which should be addressed concurrently, and that was what we were attempting to do.

12. I said I would discuss these matters with Secretary Shultz when he returned to Washington at the end of the week. He asked whether I anticipated returning to Europe. I said I did. He asked whether I would be prepared to talk to him again when I did so. I said I would be delighted to do so.

13. Below is text of the paper given to Kampelman by Vorontsov at their meeting on February 28, 1987 (reftel): Begin text:

Today on behalf of the Soviet leadership, I am announcing the following decision.

The Soviet Union proposes taking the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe out of the block of issues and concluding a separate agreement on this subject, which should be done without delay. We have more than just a basis for doing it, we effectively have a fully prepared accord. It was agreed at Reykjavik that over the next five years the Soviet Union and the United States would eliminate all of their medium-range missiles in Europe. Within the same time-frame, the number of Soviet missiles of this class would be reduced in the Asian portion of Soviet territory to 100 warheads, on the understanding that the United States could retain the same number of medium-range missile warheads in its national territory.

As soon as the agreement has been signed on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR will withdraw from the G.D.R. and Czechoslovakia, by agreement with the governments of these countries, its longer-range operational-tactical missiles which were stationed there in response to the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. As to other operational-tactical missiles, we are prepared to enter immediately into negotiations to reduce and completely eliminate such missiles.

Thus, there exists a realistic opportunity to remove much of the nuclear burden from our common home, which is Europe. This would [Page 807] be a real and major step toward fully ridding Europe of nuclear arms. We are tabling our proposals at the negotiations with the United States in Geneva.

We were told more than once that if the USSR took the question of medium-range missiles out of the Reykjavik package, reaching agreement on their elimination in Europe would pose no problem. Here is a good opportunity to prove it by deeds. This is what Europeans and nations of other continents desire, this is what should be done in the best interests of today and tomorrow.

While singling out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet government continues to believe that it is very important to reach an agreement to substantially reduce and subsequently eliminate strategic arms. The conclusion of such an agreement, as was repeatedly stressed, should certainly be contingent on an outcome precluding the stationing of weapons in space in view of the organic interrelationship between these issues.

The Soviet Union is again demonstrating its determination, despite all the difficulties and artificial logjams, to solve the problem of nuclear disarmament. New way of thinking means being able to heed the voice of the public—in Europe and all over the world, —to understand the interests and concerns of other peoples and not to separate one’s own security from that of one’s neighbors in this interrelated world.

This historic chance must not be missed. We are looking forward to an early and positive response. End text.

13. Moscow minimize has been considered. Nitze.

Kampelman
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870467–0501. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to the Mission to NATO and USNMR SHAPE. Sent Priority for information to Moscow.
  2. In telegram 2356 from NST Geneva, February 28, the Delegation reported that Vorontsov had met with Kampelman to inform him “that Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev was announcing on television tonight that the Soviets propose separating the INF negotiations here from the D&S and START talks and that INF proceed ‘without delay.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870467–0485)
  3. On February 27, Reagan announced the resignation of White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan and the appointment of his replacement, former Senator Howard Baker. (“Statement on the Resignation of Donald T. Regan and the Appointment of Howard H. Baker Jr., as Chief of Staff,” Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, vol. I, pp. 185.)