181. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Carlucci) to
President Reagan1
Washington, January 14, 1987
SUBJECT
- Guidance for the Upcoming Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) Negotiating Round
Issue
To approve instructions for the seventh round of Nuclear and Space Talks
(NST) in Geneva.
Background
The Nuclear and Space Talks resume in Geneva on January 15.
Discussion
Overall negotiating instructions (Tab A) and
specific negotiating instructions for Defense and Space (Tab B), START
(Tab C) and INF (Tab D)2 have been
prepared by the normal interagency process. I have attached a summary
sheet for you to record your approval on each set of instructions. The
overall instructions and the Defense and Space instructions are agreed
to by all agencies. One major and three minor disagreements exist with
respect to the START and INF instructions. Minor issues and my
recommendation are noted on the appropriate summary sheet.
The major issue concerns our position that mobile ICBMs should be banned for verification
and stability reasons. Paul Nitze believes that
the recent PEACEKEEPER decision means that our modernization program and
negotiating position are inconsistent and that, therefore, we should
alter our negotiating position to permit mobile missiles. His arguments
are in a memorandum to you at Tab F,3 along with
contrary views of your other senior arms control advisors.
All other agencies oppose changing position now. I
agree. We have been stressing verification of mobile missiles; the
Soviets have not been prepared to discuss the subject seriously. If we
now accept mobile
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missile
deployment, with no quid from the Soviets and no progress on
verification, we will lend credence to the erroneous view that the
Administration has been wounded by Iran and is eager for an agreement to
restore its prestige. Therefore I recommend our position remain
unchanged.
The draft NSDD at Tab E4 documents your approval of the instructions to
our negotiators. It includes as attachments the individual instructions
you have reviewed in Tabs A through D.
Recommendation
| OK |
NO |
|
|
That you review and initial each set of the proposed
negotiating instructions indicating your approval and sign the
attached NSDD documenting that approval.5 |
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the National Security
Council6
Overall Instructions—Round VII
Discussion
The attached instructions7 are agreed to by all agencies. They provide
overall guidance not unique to specific negotiating areas. They
direct the delegation to:
—Continue to build on past efforts to gain Soviet agreement to the
text of documents recording areas of agreement.
—Reject Soviet attempts to hold progress in one area (especially
INF) hostage to progress in
other areas.
—Give priority to 50% strategic reductions and significant INF reductions rather than debate
Soviet allegations that the United States agreed in Reykjavik to
eliminate all strategic offensive arms.
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—Stress the importance of verification measures being negotiated
concurrently with agreements on reductions.
—Stress the importance of Soviet compliance with existing arms
control agreements.
—Reject Soviet efforts to introduce new areas (especially nuclear
testing) into these negotiations.
There are no issues involved with these instructions.
Recommendation
| OK |
NO |
|
|
That you approve the proposed overall negotiating
instructions.8 |
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the National Security
Council9
START
Instructions—Round VII
Discussion
The attached START
instructions10 are
agreed to by all agencies. They reiterate our existing START proposal, based on your
Reykjavik discussions, for a 50% reduction. Our proposal includes
the following key features:
—A ceiling of 1600 strategic nuclear deliver vehicles (SNDVs) (ballistic missiles plus heavy
bombers)
—6000 total warheads (RVs plus ALCMs plus heavy bombers carrying
gravity bombs or Short Range Attack Missiles), with sublimits
of:
—4800 ballistic missile RVs
—3300 ICBM
RVs
—1650 RVs on ICBMs other than silo-based
medium or light ICBMs which
carry less than 6 RVs.
—Mobile ICBMs banned (DISAGREEMENT:
SEE BELOW)
—50% throw-weight reduction
—Verification including:
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—Data exchange
—On-site observation of reductions
—Monitoring (including on-site inspection) of remaining
inventories
—Non-interference with national technical means of
verification
—Phased reductions to be completed by 1991
—A mutually acceptable solution to limiting sea-launched cruise
missiles which does not include them in the
1600/6000 limits noted above.
The instructions stress the importance the U.S. attaches to
sublimits, provide for banning heavy ICBMs, and avoid discussion of the complete elimination
of ballistic missiles since these initial reductions are our highest
priority and because, for tactical reasons, we have determined the
complete elimination of ballistic missiles should more appropriately
be discussed in the Defense and Space forum.
Issues
The attached instructions are not agreed by all agencies. Two issues
exist. The first concerns our position that mobile ICBMs should be banned for
verification and stability reasons. State
believes that the recent PEACEKEEPER decision means that our
modernization program and negotiating position are inconsistent and
that, therefore, we should alter our negotiating position to permit
mobile missiles. All other agencies oppose
changing position now. We agree.
We have been stressing verification of mobile missiles; the Soviets
have not been prepared to discuss the subject seriously. If we now
accept mobile missile deployment, with no quid from the Soviets and
no progress on verification, we will lend credence to the view that
the Administration has been wounded by Iran and is eager for an
agreement to restore its prestige.
As a possible compromise, Ambassador Lehman has suggested
language authorizing detailed discussions of how mobiles might be
treated if allowed. We believe that
sufficient flexibility now exists to do this and that we should
retain the existing instructions for now.
The second START issue is minor
and involves the wording of a prohibition against concealment.
CIA favors a ban on concealment
which impedes verification; OSD
says that is too similar to SALT
II and thus too ambiguous. They favor a ban on any concealment of systems limited by START. While the OSD concern is real and will need to
be considered when we address treaty text, their formulation is
excessive and would impinge on legitimate military practice. Thus we
favor the CIA formulation.
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Recommendations
| OK |
No |
|
|
That existing guidance to ban mobile missiles be
retained.11 |
|
|
That guidance on concealment accept the CIA formulation banning only
concealment which impedes verification.12 |
|
|
That you approve the proposed START negotiating instructions as modified
above.13 |
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the National Security
Council14
Defense and Space Instructions—Round VII
Discussion
The attached instructions15 are agreed to by all agencies. They reiterate our
existing Defense and Space proposal, based on your Reykjavik
discussions, including the conditions under which we would accept a
commitment through 1996 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in return for a 50%
reduction in strategic forces in five years, the complete
elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996,
and the right to deploy advanced strategic defenses after that
time.
There are no issues involved with these instructions.
Recommendation
| OK |
No |
| ________ |
________ |
That you approve the proposed Defense and Space
negotiating instructions.16 |
