181. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan1

SUBJECT

  • Guidance for the Upcoming Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) Negotiating Round

Issue

To approve instructions for the seventh round of Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva.

Background

The Nuclear and Space Talks resume in Geneva on January 15.

Discussion

Overall negotiating instructions (Tab A) and specific negotiating instructions for Defense and Space (Tab B), START (Tab C) and INF (Tab D)2 have been prepared by the normal interagency process. I have attached a summary sheet for you to record your approval on each set of instructions. The overall instructions and the Defense and Space instructions are agreed to by all agencies. One major and three minor disagreements exist with respect to the START and INF instructions. Minor issues and my recommendation are noted on the appropriate summary sheet.

The major issue concerns our position that mobile ICBMs should be banned for verification and stability reasons. Paul Nitze believes that the recent PEACEKEEPER decision means that our modernization program and negotiating position are inconsistent and that, therefore, we should alter our negotiating position to permit mobile missiles. His arguments are in a memorandum to you at Tab F,3 along with contrary views of your other senior arms control advisors.

All other agencies oppose changing position now. I agree. We have been stressing verification of mobile missiles; the Soviets have not been prepared to discuss the subject seriously. If we now accept mobile [Page 793] missile deployment, with no quid from the Soviets and no progress on verification, we will lend credence to the erroneous view that the Administration has been wounded by Iran and is eager for an agreement to restore its prestige. Therefore I recommend our position remain unchanged.

The draft NSDD at Tab E 4 documents your approval of the instructions to our negotiators. It includes as attachments the individual instructions you have reviewed in Tabs A through D.

Recommendation

OK NO
That you review and initial each set of the proposed negotiating instructions indicating your approval and sign the attached NSDD documenting that approval.5

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council 6

Overall Instructions—Round VII

Discussion

The attached instructions7 are agreed to by all agencies. They provide overall guidance not unique to specific negotiating areas. They direct the delegation to:

—Continue to build on past efforts to gain Soviet agreement to the text of documents recording areas of agreement.

—Reject Soviet attempts to hold progress in one area (especially INF) hostage to progress in other areas.

—Give priority to 50% strategic reductions and significant INF reductions rather than debate Soviet allegations that the United States agreed in Reykjavik to eliminate all strategic offensive arms.

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—Stress the importance of verification measures being negotiated concurrently with agreements on reductions.

—Stress the importance of Soviet compliance with existing arms control agreements.

—Reject Soviet efforts to introduce new areas (especially nuclear testing) into these negotiations.

There are no issues involved with these instructions.

Recommendation

OK NO
That you approve the proposed overall negotiating instructions.8

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council 9

START Instructions—Round VII

Discussion

The attached START instructions10 are agreed to by all agencies. They reiterate our existing START proposal, based on your Reykjavik discussions, for a 50% reduction. Our proposal includes the following key features:

—A ceiling of 1600 strategic nuclear deliver vehicles (SNDVs) (ballistic missiles plus heavy bombers)

—6000 total warheads (RVs plus ALCMs plus heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs or Short Range Attack Missiles), with sublimits of:

—4800 ballistic missile RVs

—3300 ICBM RVs

—1650 RVs on ICBMs other than silo-based medium or light ICBMs which carry less than 6 RVs.

—Mobile ICBMs banned (DISAGREEMENT: SEE BELOW)

—50% throw-weight reduction

—Verification including:

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—Data exchange

—On-site observation of reductions

—Monitoring (including on-site inspection) of remaining inventories

—Non-interference with national technical means of verification

—Phased reductions to be completed by 1991

—A mutually acceptable solution to limiting sea-launched cruise missiles which does not include them in the 1600/6000 limits noted above.

The instructions stress the importance the U.S. attaches to sublimits, provide for banning heavy ICBMs, and avoid discussion of the complete elimination of ballistic missiles since these initial reductions are our highest priority and because, for tactical reasons, we have determined the complete elimination of ballistic missiles should more appropriately be discussed in the Defense and Space forum.

Issues

The attached instructions are not agreed by all agencies. Two issues exist. The first concerns our position that mobile ICBMs should be banned for verification and stability reasons. State believes that the recent PEACEKEEPER decision means that our modernization program and negotiating position are inconsistent and that, therefore, we should alter our negotiating position to permit mobile missiles. All other agencies oppose changing position now. We agree.

We have been stressing verification of mobile missiles; the Soviets have not been prepared to discuss the subject seriously. If we now accept mobile missile deployment, with no quid from the Soviets and no progress on verification, we will lend credence to the view that the Administration has been wounded by Iran and is eager for an agreement to restore its prestige.

As a possible compromise, Ambassador Lehman has suggested language authorizing detailed discussions of how mobiles might be treated if allowed. We believe that sufficient flexibility now exists to do this and that we should retain the existing instructions for now.

The second START issue is minor and involves the wording of a prohibition against concealment. CIA favors a ban on concealment which impedes verification; OSD says that is too similar to SALT II and thus too ambiguous. They favor a ban on any concealment of systems limited by START. While the OSD concern is real and will need to be considered when we address treaty text, their formulation is excessive and would impinge on legitimate military practice. Thus we favor the CIA formulation.

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Recommendations

OK No
That existing guidance to ban mobile missiles be retained.11
That guidance on concealment accept the CIA formulation banning only concealment which impedes verification.12
That you approve the proposed START negotiating instructions as modified above.13

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council 14

Defense and Space Instructions—Round VII

Discussion

The attached instructions15 are agreed to by all agencies. They reiterate our existing Defense and Space proposal, based on your Reykjavik discussions, including the conditions under which we would accept a commitment through 1996 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in return for a 50% reduction in strategic forces in five years, the complete elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996, and the right to deploy advanced strategic defenses after that time.

There are no issues involved with these instructions.

Recommendation

OK No
________ ________ That you approve the proposed Defense and Space negotiating instructions.16
  1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, SR Box 094, NSDD 256. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks. Copied to Bush and Regan. Brooks, Mahley, Tobey, Kraemer, and Steiner sent the memorandum and attachments to Carlucci for his signature under a covering memorandum of January 12. (Ibid.) (S)
  2. Attached but not printed, at Tab D, are the INF instructions.
  3. Nitze’s memorandum and the contrary views expressed by Rowny, Lehman, and Weinberger are printed above as Documents 178, 177, 179, and 180.
  4. Printed below as Document 182.
  5. Carlucci initialed approval on behalf of Reagan, and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “Instructions handled at 10:30 mtg w/ President 1/14/87.” No minutes of the meeting were found.
  6. Secret. Prepared by Brooks.
  7. Attached but not printed is a draft telegram transmitting the overall instructions.
  8. Carlucci initialed approval on behalf of Reagan.
  9. Secret. Prepared by Brooks.
  10. Attached but not printed is a draft telegram transmitting the START instructions.
  11. Reagan initialed his approval.
  12. Reagan initialed his approval.
  13. Reagan initialed his approval.
  14. Secret. Prepared by Tobey.
  15. Attached but not printed is a draft telegram with instructions on Defense and Space.
  16. Carlucci initialed approval on behalf of Reagan.