180. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- Mobile ICBMs and Arms Control (U)
(S) The Department of State is proposing that you drop at this time the ban on mobile ICBMs which has been a central element of our START proposal for some time. I believe that to do so would be ill-advised. Nothing has happened to alter the requirement for such a provision in a strategic arms reduction agreement: the same problems with verifying mobile ICBMs exist today as existed when we first tabled this proposal. If anything, the Soviets’ introduction of two mobile ICBMs has made matters worse.
(S) The Soviet Union has a proven capability to hide mobile ICBMs. They did so in the case of the mobile SS–16, where after 8 years we were still only able to determine “probable” deployment. Our alleged ability to count SS–25s is based on the unfounded assumption that there will be a garage for each launcher. We have not yet even identified the mobile launcher for the Soviet 10-warhead SS–X–24.
(S) Soviet cheating through covert production of mobile ICBM launchers and additional missiles for refire could largely negate the warhead reductions we propose. Mobile ICBMs are simply incompatible with a 50% reduction agreement, for cheating by the Soviets could give them a highly destabilizing advantage. Without an ability to verify a clearcut treaty violation, the U.S. would find it impossible as a political matter to terminate its obligations under the treaty.
(S) There is absolutely no inconsistency between our proposed ban on mobile ICBMs and the decision to proceed with development of mobile basing for the Peacekeeper and the small ICBM. We seek to ban mobile ICBMs under a 50% reduction agreement because of the [Page 791] instability that would arise from our inability to monitor mobile ICBM production and deployment. Of course, in the absence of a START agreement, we will continue to structure our strategic forces as our security needs dictate including, if appropriate, exercising the option of mobile basing for U.S. ICBMs. Therefore, unless and until an arms reduction agreement is ratified, we must continue our own programs for mobile ICBM basing. Moreover, the existence of these programs gives us leverage in the negotiations with the USSR, even as it assures us our continued security if the negotiations fail.
(S) Clearly, were we to make a concession by allowing mobiles, it would be a major one. Consequently, should we ever choose to make this move, we should not make it lightly. Even if we were to determine that such a major concession is called for, it should not be made when the Soviets are stonewalling—as they are now—but when they are negotiating in good faith, and then only if we get a real quid-pro-quo from the Soviets as part of a bargained exchange.
(S) Finally, I would note that partial changes to the current U.S. position on banning mobile ICBMs would not prove a useful step at this time. We should not go forward to the Soviets with phrases such as “if mobile ICBMs were to be allowed”, for this would only erode our position. I believe that such a move would result in a catastrophic loss of bargaining leverage, for it would strongly convey that we lack confidence in the soundness of our position.
(S) If you agree, I think it would be important for the President to have these views.
- Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, SR Box 094, NSDD 256. Secret.↩