179. Memorandum From the Chief Negotiator on Strategic Offensive Arms (Lehman) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- START Instructions on Mobile ICBMs
For both political and substantive negotiating reasons, now is not the time to drop our ban on mobile ICBMs in Geneva. Making an “up-or-down” decision now on our mobile ICBM position puts the United States in a no-win situation. If the United States changes its position on mobile ICBMs, we will be making a concession to the Soviets that they have not earned, and we may signal that we are overly anxious because of the current political environment. If the United States again raises the mobile ICBM issue for decision and again maintains its current ban, elements in Congress and the press, who would otherwise be quiet, will now charge that the U.S. is not serious about arms control at a time when the Soviets are about to launch a new propaganda offensive.
As an alternative to a “black or white” decision at this time, I propose a third option which maintains our ban on mobile ICBMs, but gives the START Negotiating Group the authority to probe the Soviets on how they propose to resolve our verification and stability concerns associated with mobile ICBMs. In addition, the United States negotiators would be authorized to state that, if mobile ICBMs are to be permitted, the warheads on Soviet and United States mobile ICBMs [Page 790] would be included in the third warhead sublimit on particularly destabilizing systems. This approach would leave the United States the maximum negotiating leverage on the Soviet Union.
- Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, SR Box 094, NSDD 256. Secret.↩