Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

170. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Geneva, October 31, 1986

SUBJECT

• Admiral Crowe’s Reaction to the Draft Vienna Talking Points

I saw Admiral Crowe at 4:00 p.m., Thursday, October 30th. I said that you were anxious to get his thoughts on the talking points we had prepared for your use in your talk with Shevardnadze on NST issues in Vienna.² He read the talking points and commented as he went along. He said that numbers in the proposal seemed consistent with his understanding of where we were. His concern was specifically with the 10-year period as it affected the elimination of either ballistic missiles, offensive strategic systems, or nuclear weapons. He pointed out that if we abided by the restriction in the ABM Treaty throughout the 10-year period we would be in no position to deploy advanced defenses in less than another 3–4 years even if all the technology would have been proven out earlier. He expressed surprise and resentment that after Reykjavik no one at the White House had asked him for the Chiefs’ view as to whether we had “sold the store.” He said that the work that led up to his comments at the NSPG³ had been purely at his own initiative. He said that after the NSPG meeting, Poindexter had telephoned him and had protested that what he had said was not helpful in carrying out the President’s decision.

He made a particular point of the fact that today the sole mission of the Soviet’s submarine fleet, and in fact of their entire Navy, is to protect their SLBMs. If SLBMs were to be eliminated, their 340 submarines and other Naval assets would be devoted to other purposes, making our Naval tasks complicated. He also emphasized the necessity of preserving deterrence phase by phase.

I asked him whether a longer time-period for elimination of ballistic missiles, say 12 years, would be better from the Chiefs’ standpoint. He suggested one might leave the nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty at 10 years and provide for the elimination of ballistic missiles over a somewhat longer period of time—say 12 years. This would leave a lesser gap in time. I suggested that one might also reduce the time gap by proceeding earlier to deploy a limited ABM defense at Grand Forks, ND. This would give one experience with the operational deployment of at least one element of an advanced defense. I suggested one also might proceed with development and deployment of anti-tactical ballistic missiles, or defense permitted under the ABM Treaty. He thought this was a constructive suggestion.

I asked him whether the Chiefs would approve a program for the second five-years which would result in a further reduction of 90% in offensive strategic systems; i.e., leaving no more than 600 RVs plus long-range ALCMs. He said he was confident that the Chiefs would back such an alternative.

I did not leave the talking points with him.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 8, Binder—Bkgnd for Vienna Mtg. Secret; Nodis.
2. The talking points were not found. Shultz and Shevardnadze’s meetings in Vienna, November 5–6, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 6 and 7.
3. See Document 168.