140. Memorandum of Conversation1
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U.S. PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Ridgway
- DAS Simons
- Ambassador Matlock (NSC)
- Mark Parris (SOV)
- Bruce Burton (SOV) (notetaker)
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SOVIET PARTICIPANTS
- Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh
- DCM Sokolov
- Second Secretary Vitaly Churkin
Ambassador Ridgway welcomed Bessmertnykh to Washington. She recalled the all-night negotiating session with Bessmertnykh at the summit and hoped we wouldn’t have to go through that again. The purpose of the meetings in Washington was to organize our work and set the stage for a meeting between ministers and ultimately by our leaders at the summit. The Soviet side has said it wants a summit with concrete results. So do we. We understand the Soviet side has some detailed ideas on how to organize efforts in the weeks ahead. We’re eager to hear them and have some ideas of our own.
Bessmertnykh said he was glad the two sides had come to the same conclusion on preparations for a good meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Gorbachev’s June 19 letter2 had suggested steps for moving ahead, and the Soviet side very much appreciated U.S. acceptance of these ideas for arranging meetings. It was good to have talked with Ambassador Hartman and to have come to agreement on this point.
Bessmertnykh continued that it was important to arrange meetings over the next few weeks so that time is not wasted. There can be a number of meetings in Washington and Moscow on a number of subjects. The Soviets are quite open to U.S. suggestions. “We want to finish the job with you here so we have a complete program.”
[NOTE: At this point, the two sides then covered, in order, Security and Arms Control, Regional Issues, and Bilateral Affairs.]
SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL
Nuclear and Space Talks
Bessmertnykh said this subject was paramount and we should not wait until the opening of the next NST round to discuss it. Thus, the Soviets want a “working-type meeting” between representatives of the two sides. This should not simply be a repetition of Geneva plenaries; there is no time for that. The idea is to get together in small groups, not delegations. One person should be in charge, and have two or three others with him. These representatives would, in effect, say: We know each other’s principled positions. Do we have any common ground? Are there grounds for a summit? Their slogan should be: “Let’s be practical”. If they find there is no common ground, they can say, well all right, let’s not trouble with it at a ministerial meeting. If they agree that ministers “should dwell on it,” they would recommend more formal treatment.
Saying she wanted to make sure we were clear about the Soviet proposal, it was her understanding that this small group would get [Page 557] together and make recommendations to foreign ministers. Would the group recommend further work?
Bessmertnykh replied, “Yes.” The group could look at possible communique language, or foreign ministers could declare they would like the subject worked out in the negotiations, through diplomatic channels or through other means.
Ridgway said that, on the matter of a communique, we would be under “the same injunction as of last fall.” The Secretary had told Dubinin that one thing the Secretary and Shevardnadze should take up is how to record the results of a summit.
Ambassador Matlock said that, speaking ad referendum, there would probably be no particular problem if we were at the point of exchanging language, so long as we don’t call it a communique. The President has indicated that he doesn’t want staffs pre-negotiating an outcome, which he wants to determine. But this may be a matter of semantics or form. We can work at recording what both sides are discussing.
Bessmertnykh agreed that it might just be a matter of form. We could try to develop a joint statement or perhaps separate language on individual issues. This is a matter for consideration after September.
Ridgway and Matlock agreed.
DAS Simons said there was a third possibility: having a piece of paper that is something between a communique or individual elements. Ridgway commented that the President knowls perfectly well that the language of the Geneva joint statement wasn’t done in one night.
Bessmertnykh said the working meetings should be confidential. Matlock asked if that applied just to the NST working meeting; Bessmertnykh answered, all working meetings.
Parris asked if Bessmertnykh meant the existence of the working meetings was to be confidential, or their content? Bessmertnykh said he recognized that the existence of the meetings was likely to become known, so he was referring to their content.
Bessmertnykh continued that the representatives should have a mandate to explore ideas, “not be frozen into known positions.” If the U.S. is prepared, the Soviets would like to give them freedom to explore—“How about this? How about that?” He said the meetings should not be prolonged. The groups would meet for two or three days, go back to Ministers, then meet again. If they go too long at one sitting, such as two weeks or so, they would become like negotiations, with the representatives requesting instructions from capitals. The working meetings should decide how to handle further meetings. “This will create a flow of business.”
Ridgway asked where the meeting might take place. Bessmertnykh said he would go through that.
[Page 558]Bessmertnykh said the Soviets envision one person in the chair, with perhaps one expert for each of the broad NST subjects, space, strategic arms, medium-range arms.
Matlock asked if Karpov would head the Soviet team. Bessmertnykh said this was possible, but he personally had in mind someone else.
Simons asked if the groups would be of equal size on both sides. Bessmertnykh said they should not be terribly asymmetrical, with three or four on one team, and a dozen on the other.
Ridgway said she could not say much today about the Soviet suggestion, since we are looking over ideas. To recap, the Soviets have in mind a small group, with one person in charge, but not necessarily “experts” in the technical sense.
Bessmertnykh said that’s right. Four representatives would be the maximum. He said the Soviets do not exclude having heads-of-delegation, but Bessmertnykh personally believes that is not a good idea. We shouldn’t close the door to other arrangements.
On time and venue, Bessmertnykh said the talks should be held in Moscow or Washington between August 10–15. The Soviets are prepared to host the U.S. group in Moscow; the second round would be in Washington.
In answer to a question from Simons, Bessmertnykh said they want to hold the sessions in Moscow or Washington, and not in Geneva or some other capital, because they do not want cable traffic on the discussions.
Matlock said we will try to have an answer to Bessmertnykh on Monday or before he departs Washington.
[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]
- Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, 1986 July–Aug. Secret; Sensitive.↩
- See Document 136.↩