Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

425. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, April 10, 1981

SUBJECT

• Assistance Requested by King Leka I of Albania

King Leka wants us to ask the Saudis to provide him with $20 million to help him finance the liberation of Albania. I recommend that we tell him that we do not consider it to be in the U.S. national interest to do so.²

I had a long talk with Leka, consulted with a CIA expert on Albania and did a lot of soul searching before I arrived at this decision. Leka is a sympatisch and persuasive advocate of his cause, which in isolation is certainly a good one. (I am also reminded that Richard Bissell³ was reportedly a very persuasive advocate of the Bay of Pigs invasion.)

Without doubt, no European country has been more oppressed by Communism and deserves more to be liberated than Albania, the last stronghold of Stalinism. From a human rights point of view, we should do anything and everything to revive freedom in that tragic little country. Unfortunately, there are other overriding factors which led me to my negative conclusion:

— Albania is the most staunchly anti-Soviet country in Europe. Our strategic interest in that country revolves around its key position at the entrance to the Adriatic. While the Tirana leadership is also staunchly anti-U.S. (and anti-capitalist in general), I find it hard to believe that the Albanians would try to deny NATO forces entry into the Adriatic in case of actual or threatened hostilities. For one thing, they hardly have the capability. They still have the two Soviet submarines they kept when they threw the Soviets out in the early 1960s, but not much else.
Leka replies to this by insisting that a liberated Albania (supported by NATO) could more effectively repulse a Soviet invasion. Maybe, but also maybe not. If Leka’s efforts failed—as I believe they would—the slight prospects for bringing Albania closer to the West would become even slighter. Nobody would gain from this.

— I cannot believe that a serious effort to liberate Albania would have no impact on the rebellious Albanians under Belgrade’s rule. Despite Leka’s protestations to the contrary, one cannot divorce any operation in Albania from possible repercussions in Yugoslavia and even Bulgaria. As you know, Belgrade has been having serious problems with its Albanian province Kosovo. If Yugoslavia were located on the Iberian Peninsula, I would enthusiastically promote further unrest and instability in that country; however, given Yugoslavia’s precarious geographic location, we have an unhappy stake in its stability. If it fragments, guess who is going to try to pick up the pieces?

— Despite the absence of direct U.S. support or funding for Leka’s project, I have little faith that even our indirect role will remain secret. For example, how can we be sure that our looking favorably upon a liberation effort won’t be used to inspire those called upon to risk their lives in this endeavor? (Allah and Reagan are on your side!!) Word of U.S. involvement in Albania is all we need at this time. Look at the hue and cry about El Salvador.

— How will this affect our relations with the Saudis? If we ask them to support Leka, we will owe them one politically. I’d rather get their funds for UNITA or some other cause—if we ever wanted to go that indirect route.

— Last and perhaps least, I do not think Leka’s plan has a prayer of success. Despite the mountainous terrain favoring guerrilla activities, they will have to cope with the tightest security in Europe, if not the world. (A friend of mine visited Albania in the early 1960s and was literally tailed in the water when he swam in the Adriatic.) Guerrilla movements cannot, in my opinion, ever completely succeed against a determined well-integrated army. (At least so far they have succeeded only against demoralized and disintegrated regular forces.) Leka thinks he can get part of the Army to defect. I think he is dreaming. Even if Leka succeeded, I don’t believe the game would be worth the candle for all the reasons cited above.

RECOMMENDATION

That I call King Leka I and tell him we are unwilling to approach the Saudis on his behalf.⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Country File, Albania 1981–1982. Secret. Sent for action. “RVA has seen,” is stamped in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. In the margin adjacent to this paragraph, Colson wrote, “a little different from what he told us. JC.”
3. Deputy Director for Plans at the Central Intelligence Agency during the Kennedy administration.
4. Nance wrote a note to Stearman beneath the recommendation, “Bill—Request you call me. Bud.” Allen checked the “Approve” option and wrote, “Wait until he calls. Then turn him down gently. RVA 4/14.”