426. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)1
SUBJECT
- King Leka
King Leka called today and I gently told him that we had studied his request carefully and had decided against making the approach he recommended—i.e., asking the Saudis to help bankroll his Albania liberation project. He then asked me if this meant we would discourage “them” (the Saudis) if they came to us. I replied that this was not the decision he had asked for (he didn’t dispute this point) and that I would have to get another reading on the latter scenario; however, I did tell him we had fundamental problems with the whole project. I went on to explain that while we appreciate his personal dedication to his goal, he must understand that we had a number of other factors to consider in making our decision. (I did not tell him who made the final decision.)
King Leka seemed resigned to my reply, which he probably expected, and asked if it would be all right for him to contact me or Bud Nance in the future. I told him it would, of course, be all right, but that it might be better if he just contacted me. (I tried to spare Bud the numerous calls I’ve been getting from His Highness.)2
I have one nagging concern about the telephone exchanges I’ve had with the King: the high probability that our calls were monitored by the Soviets here. I tried to steer clear of specifics, but the Soviets can put two and two together, especially since I could control only one end of the conversation. I did tell Leka that our calls were probably monitored which made him fairly cautious.