424. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Summary of NSC Advisor’s Meeting with Leka I (C)

PARTICIPANTS

  • Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • James W. Nance, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Janet Colson, Executive Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Paula Dobriansky, NSC Staff Member
  • Leka I of Albania
  • Abedin Mulosmanaj, Minister of Court

Admiral Nance opened the meeting by asking Leka I to provide background on his current situation and his views of the present Albanian regime. (C)

Leka I remarked that after his father’s death in 1961, he became the leader of his father’s Albanian exile network. Thus, in the mid-1960s, he started to coordinate liberation efforts abroad and internally. He travelled extensively and finally settled in South Africa. One of his main achievements, he said, was the formation of the Military Council for the Integration of Albanians. Leka I then went on to characterize Albania’s current regime under Enver Hoxha as unstable, as it was enduring considerable economic difficulties. Moreover, he asserted, Albania’s domestic situation has been further exacerbated by Hoxha’s poor health which has essentially precipitated a succession struggle. (C)

In light of Albania’s present internal situation, Leka I contended that he could overthrow the current regime with minimal time and international repercussions. However, to do so, he stated he must secure moral and psychological support from the U.S. He mentioned that the previous Administration requested that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States not give support to Leka I’s operation; subsequently, their aid was halted. Thus, Leka I requested that the United States reverse this policy. He asserted that his organization has the [Page 1402] manpower, penetration capabilities and even a military base—so they are not seeking material support from the U.S., only moral support and a clear signal to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States to financially support their operation. (C)

Admiral Nance asked what would be the ramifications and the anticipated East European reactions if Albania were to be liberated. (C)

Leka I responded that he could foresee no negative consequences because Albania is geographically and ideologically isolated, and the USSR is currently occupied with the Polish crisis. He added that the possibility of Yugoslav intervention is unlikely due to its internal problems. Moreover, he maintained that even though the Albanians in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia want liberation and hope to be reunited with their homeland, they will not simultaneously revolt. He stated that he particularly wanted to allay our fears of imminent destabilization resulting in Yugoslavia due to the liberation of Albania. Leka I also mentioned that a change of government would be advantageous for the US because Albania could then permit us to utilize their four ports.

Richard Allen arrived at this point, and after exchanging amenities, asked Leka I to provide an overview of Albanian alignment, communications, and trade.

Leka I characterized Albania as an “orphan of the communist world” for it has cut off its political ties with the USSR and China. In regard to Albania’s communications, Leka stated that there are air flights from Belgrade and Athens to Tirana. He also cited Yugoslavia as Albania’s prime trading partner.

Allen then queried Leka I on what specifically is his liberation strategy and time frame, how much financial support he needs, and has South Africa provided any assistance, how long has this effort been in progress, and what kind of government did Leka I envision for Albania?

Leka I replied that his network has been operative since 1965–66. They have drawn up eight different plans by which they seek to foment internal revolution in Albania within the next 2–3 months or during the next 1–2 years. However, there is a need for a catalyst within Albania. He mentioned that he will be moving to Egypt relatively soon. This will put him in proximity to Albania and enable him to better assess their various options and determine a conceivable catalyst. Moreover, he said he would be more readily in touch with their Middle East military base where they are training special teams to invade Albania. Financially, Leka I stated no aid has been received from South Africa, but due to Albania’s 75 percent Moslem composition, monetary assistance was given by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. He estimated that they needed $20 million, with a $5 million reserve to implement [Page 1403] their operation successfully. However, he pointed out that this did not constitute their current operating budget. Lastly, Leka maintained that Albania’s future government would be determined by a referendum. Ergo, whether Albania is to become a republic or monarchy depends on the Albanian people.

Richard Allen further questioned Leka I about how well known he is, what exactly is the number of his supporters, and what would be the impact of this liberation movement on Yugoslavia. (C)

Leka I asked the Minister of Court to respond to the first question. (C)

Mulosmanaj maintained that Leka is quite well known and respected among Albanians. (C)

Leka I then refused to divulge the exact number of his supporters for security reasons. However, he went on to maintain that the contention that a liberation of Albania would precipitate an explosion in Yugoslavia and would bring in the Russians is erroneous. Rather, he asserted that the Albanians in Yugoslavia will remain calm and not revolt. [less than 2 lines not declassified] However, he still sought an answer from Mr. Allen in regard to our conceivable support. (C)2

Richard Allen responded that Leka I will get an answer. (C)

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Country Files, Albania 1981–1982. Confidential. Drafted on March 26. The meeting took place in room 375 of the Old Executive Office Building.
  2. The final sentence, was scribbled through by an unknown hand.