Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

311. Telegram From the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic to the Department of State¹

3789/Depto 3020.

East Berlin, June 13, 1988, 1324Z

SUBJECT

• Deputy Secretary’s Meeting With GDR Leader Erich Honecker.

REFS

• EmbBerlin 3707 and Subsequent.²

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: Honecker met with Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead for 90 minutes June 11 immediately preceding the reception he gave in Berlin for participants in the Potsdam Conference on new approaches to East-West security. The Deputy Secretary briefed the GDR leader on the summit³ and raised bilateral issues including the Wall, claims/trade and terrorism. Honecker commended the President for his efforts to produce the successful summit. He said the GDR assessment corresponded closely to the American. He implied more explicitly than he had when the Deputy Secretary saw him in November that the shooting policy at the Wall had been changed, and he said that the GDR would continue to resolve all U.S. humanitarian cases. Though he defended the Wall as a sovereign GDR matter and not different in principle from the U.S.-Mexican border, he indicated that freer travel would continue, at least as long as relations with the FRG developed positively. He made generally positive noises about improving bilateral relations, including on terrorism, but did not get into specifics on claims/trade. End summary.

3. Honecker was accompanied by Foreign Minister Fischer, Ambassador Barth, the Director of the MFA’s Office of U.S., Canada, Japan and Australia Affairs, a notetaker from his staff, and an interpreter. The Deputy Secretary was accompanied by DAS Bodde, the Ambassador, D staff member Kelly and Political Counselor Greenwald (notetaker). Following the conversation, the Deputy Secretary went through the reception line first and left for West Berlin.

Summit Briefing—Arms Control and Gorbachev

4. Mr. Whitehead’s briefing and Honecker’s response occupied slightly more than half the meeting. The Deputy Secretary provided an overview of the summit, calling it a solid success, an important and positive step in the general upward trend of U.S.-Soviet relations. He explained the President’s desire to build a stable framework his successor could continue and to avoid the roller-coaster ups and downs which had characterized much of the post-war period. He likewise reviewed the positive steps in each of the four agenda items—human rights, arms control, regional problems, bilateral issues. He said that Gorbachev had been impatient that the U.S. was not prepared to do more faster, but the President believed he had set a prudent course that was moving the relationship forward with all due speed. Another summit was possible in the life of the administration but not certain. It would depend on the “START” negotiations.

5. Honecker said the GDR agreed the summit had been a solid success. The most important fact had been INF ratification, the initial step toward real nuclear disarmament. He hoped there would be more arms control progress soon, particularly a “START” agreement. He had watched live on television when the President, whose efforts he applauded, had explained that there were already several hundred pages in the draft agreement. This was a good sign. The parties should go forward.

6. Perhaps Gorbachev had been forceful during the summit when he urged that more should be done and at a faster pace, Honecker said, but he knew Gorbachev to be a man who realized that progress must come through a step-by-step process.

7. Honecker said he valued highly the advances that appeared to have been made in other areas of arms control, including nuclear testing and a global ban on chemical weapons. Unfortunately, the Warsaw Pact summit in Warsaw next month would probably have to note that there were other areas where progress was less apparent including conventional force reductions and the related matters of dual capable weapons systems and tactical nuclear missiles. A step-by-step advance was also the only way in these areas, he said, but positive processes had been set in motion. The NATO-Warsaw Pact dialogue would have to deepen, he said, but the Warsaw Pact knew that more would have to be done to reduce asymmetries and then to cut forces until no offensive capability remained.

8. The GDR, Honecker said, was optimistic about the international scene. Five years ago it was inconceivable that so much would have been achieved. It was prepared to make whatever contributions it could to the improving U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Summit Briefing—Regional Issues

9. Mr. Whitehead said that the U.S. considered the GDR had a meaningful relationship to several of the regional issues which were being discussed with the Soviets. There was a GDR military presence consisting of advisers and equipment, especially in Angola and Nicaragua. The U.S. had not previously raised this directly with the GDR, but if the GDR wished, the U.S. would welcome including the GDR in certain aspects of the talks which were moving ahead positively with the Soviets. We would also understand if the GDR did not wish to be involved.

10. Honecker said that the Soviets had been authorized to speak for all the Warsaw Pact allies on these issues. The Deputy Secretary’s assessment of the regional discussions at the summit matched the report the GDR had received from the Soviets.

11. The GDR, Honecker said, supported the efforts to resolve regional conflicts by peaceful means. It welcomed the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, but it was concerned the Pakistani President was making a mistake by allowing assistance to continue to go to the counterrevolutionaries. The best course was that of national reconciliation, as urged by the Afghan government.

12. National reconciliation, he said, was also the only sensible way in Kampuchea. The GDR supported this policy and believed that only the Pol Pot people should be excluded. Just the day before, he had watched on West German television a program on the horrors that Pol Pot had perpetrated. He had spoken with the Vietnamese and was pleased that they were withdrawing 50,000 troops and placing the remainder of their forces under Kampuchean control.

13. On Angola, Honecker said he fully supported the talks involving the U.S. and all the interested parties, which could create the conditions for a just settlement. The GDR was ready to make a contribution.

14. With respect to the Middle East, Honecker said, he followed Secretary Shultz’ shuttle diplomacy closely and with admiration for the Secretary’s personal commitment. The GDR still believed, however, that a UN conference with the participation of all parties, including the Palestinians, and with the objective of establishing a Palestinian state, was necessary. Of course Israel would then have to be given guarantees.

15. Honecker said that the believed the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf should be replaced by a UN presence, but basically he agreed with the U.S. that the extremely dangerous conflict had to end, and Iran was the biggest obstacle.

16. On one point, Honecker said, he disagreed with the Deputy Secretary. The GDR had no military presence at all in the Third World. It sent no military advisers, and it did not manufacture weapons. What it sent was youth brigades, who worked only in the civilian sector, providing economic and humanitarian assistance. He had seen this himself in Angola. He agreed with Mr. Whitehead that it would be good for the two sides to expand their dialogue on such subjects in order to avoid possible misunderstandings.

Bilateral Relaions—Humanitarian Cases, Cultural Ties

17. The Deputy Secretary recalled that in November he and Chairman Honecker had considered a number of steps that should be taken to advance the relationship, some small, others larger, but all designed to remove irritants. He said that he had just reviewed with the Foreign Minister several important positive developments. The U.S. was pleased that almost all cases on its humanitarian list had been resolved. We also were pleased that the GDR had assisted us in finding a good site for the USIA film making exhibit, which had been a considerable success. We hoped we could do something similar again.

18. Honecker said that he had been surprised to hear the Deputy Secretary say almost all U.S. humanitarian cases had been resolved. His impression was that they had been solved. If some were still pending, of course they would be settled also.

19. Honecker said that he favored more cultural events such as the film-making exhibit. He implied that he had personally approved the decision that the exhibition be facilitated, as he had personally approved taking the risk of trans-oceanic shipment of the Splendors of Dresden exhibition which had been so successful in the U.S. in the late 1970’s. He wanted to see the U.S. and the GDR develop more exchanges, including cultural, youth and academic exchanges, along the lines of what the Deputy Secretary said the U.S. and the Soviets had agreed at the summit. Some of this was already happening, but more should be done. It could be especially useful since the nature of our bilateral relations suggested there was a deficit of knowledge about the GDR in the U.S.

Claims/Trade, Relations with the Jewish Community

20. There had been some progress on both Jewish and official claims in the past six months, the Deputy Secretary said, but it had not been definitive. He and the Ambassador had made some suggestions during their detailed discussion earlier that day with the Foreign Minister (septel)⁴ which might open the way for next steps. The U.S. wished to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion before the end of the year. Otherwise, much of the work would have to start all over again with new people under a different administration.

21. Following Honecker’s spontaneous intervention “that would be very bad,” the Deputy Secretary elaborated that the U.S. wanted to find a way to resolve claims on one side and to spur bilateral trade on the other. Quite apart from the connection which was understood to the claims/trade package, the U.S. sought to increase trade with and investment in the GDR. It was not right that our involvement with the GDR was perhaps the lowest with any country in Eastern Europe, except Albania, although the GDR was a highly developed economy. We hoped that the narrow discussions related to the desire also to resolve the claims questions could grow over time into a broader discussion on improving trade substantially.

22. Honecker indicated briefly that he, too, desired to see trade and investment expand and claims questions resolved. On these and other matters, he said, he directed Foreign Minister Fischer to follow up. He digressed into more general questions respecting the GDR’s relations with Jews. He said he had discussed the manner in which the 50th anniversary of the Kristallnacht pogrom should be commemorated in November with Rabbi Miller, of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims, as well as, very recently, the leaders of the GDR and West German Jewish communities, Rotstein and Galinski. The latter two had agreed that an international foundation should be established to rebuild the Jewish synagogue in Oranienburgerstrasse (Berlin’s largest) and take over the Weissensee Jewish cemetery (Europe’s largest). He also agreed with the proposal to convene a special session of the Volkskammer both to honor the dead and to remind the living around the world that such terrible things must never happen again (reftels).

The Wall

23. The Deputy Secretary said that because it exercised such an influence on our relationship, he would repeat his comment from last November. The Wall was a very emotional subject to Americans, who could not understand why a country would build such a structure to keep its citizens in. Americans found shootings particularly hard to understand.

24. In November, Mr. Whitehead said, he had gained the impression from their conversation that Chairman Honecker had similar concerns about shooting. He understood why the GDR could not announce a termination of its shooting order but might instead simply change its policy. He would appreciate being brought up to date on the current situation with respect to shooting at the Wall. Every country had symbols, he said, and given the history of American involvement with Berlin, including the airlift, the Wall remained a reprehensible symbol to us. It was important for the GDR to understand how our people felt as we pursued the relationship.

25. Honecker said that it was important for the U.S. to realize that the Wall was a sovereign matter for the GDR, an element of the normal effort by a state to secure its borders. The U.S. had something similar on its border with Mexico. He understood that it was said the purpose was different, it was directed at keeping improperly documented Mexicans out, but there was a certain similarity in principle, and “your wall is a meter higher.”

26. Although Honecker agreed that the Wall was not a beautiful structure, it had been necessary to erect it in 1961 by which time the GDR had suffered 100 billion Marks in damages as a result of the way in which its people and wealth were drained. The speculators had to be shown that the GDR would not allow this to happen again. But it was also important to note, Honecker said, that times had changed. It was no longer 1961. The GDR had gone through a considerable development. As the GDR had prospered and the international climate had improved, so had travel through the Wall increased. Genscher had said a European house with walls had to have doors. There were 14 doors in the Wall and more than 5 million East Germans travelling. The intensity of travel between the GDR and the FRG and West Berlin was unique.

27. The Deputy Secretary had referred to shooting at the Wall, Honecker said. To be candid between us, he said, not a single shot had been fired for one year. The GDR did not want to publicize this. To the Deputy Secretary’s interjection that there had been reports of shooting, Honecker replied that the press sometimes wrote such stories, but it was useful to exchange factual information. The GDR had looked into each case of reported shooting.

Terrorism

28. The Deputy Secretary said that he understood the GDR condemned terrorism. The U.S. wanted to cooperate with it, to have a program which would feature a confidential exchange of operational information among experts, such as it had with many other countries. Unfortunately, when our expert responsible for cooperation in Eastern Europe visited Berlin, he had been disappointed at what he assessed as a complete lack of interest. Mr. Whitehead raised the subject again in the hope that it would be possible to try again to develop meaningful, practical cooperation in an area where we both said we had the same objectives.

29. Honecker, who had said “it’s dreadful” under his breath when Mr. Whitehead first stated that terrorism was an international evil, said that Foreign Minister Fischer had briefed him on his conversation with the Deputy Secretary that morning. Honecker said he had written an article condemning terrorism as a young man in 1932. He agreed with what the Deputy Secretary had said about terrorism and that it was important for there to be actions as well as words in the fight against it.

Comment

30. The most significant aspects of the meeting may have been that it occurred and lasted a full hour and a half. By receiving the Deputy Secretary for so long on a weekend, after a strenuous two-day Central Committee Plenum, just before he was to host a reception for 200 guests, and when a number of other prominent persons from the Potsdam Conference wanted time with him, Honecker signalled the importance he attaches to improving the bilateral relationship. Little that he said specifically, except perhaps about our humanitarian cases, however, gave much new concrete substance to the intent.

31. His remarks on terrorism and exchanges warrant careful exploration, but he was less than even general on claims and trade, saying nothing, for example, about his reported $100 million comment on Jewish claims to Galinski earlier in the week. Some of the vagueness may have been attributable to the relatively little time that was available for bilateral issues. More likely, it indicates that the GDR is still waiting for us to make up our minds on the trade component of a package before it shows more of its hand.

32. Honecker was slightly less Delphic about shooting at the Wall than in November but still less than candid. He may have meant to imply that no authorized shots have been fired since last summer. At least he seems to have indicated that a less lethal policy is in effect. Obviously when there are shots, the U.S. must continue to condemn them, but our estimate is the message about the harm such incidents do to the GDR’s image is getting through, and Honecker is trying to lessen the damage by implementing unannounced changes.

33. Honecker continues to look remarkably fit for his age. Although some of his comments rambled, he retained his habit of taking careful notes on a small pad and making the points he seemed to wish to make without once referring to a briefing paper. His movements are spry, his handshake firm, and his reactions to conversation lively.

34. He was less caustic about Gorbachev than he had been (albeit indirectly) in his November meeting with the Deputy Secretary, but he did not go out of his way to praise the Soviet leader. His comment that Gorbachev might have seemed impatient at the summit but he knows success comes from small steps sounded suspiciously like the wish being father to the thought, an example of Honecker’s own conservative preferences superimposed on the Moscow political scene. Honecker did not touch directly upon either Soviet reforms or the relative lack of GDR reforms, however, two topics which are on everyone’s minds and few public figures’ tongues here.

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880832–0864. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Eastern European posts collective, Bonn, The Hague, Vienna, Cape Town, USAFSB Berlin, and USDel NST Geneva.
2. See footnote 2, Document 310.
3. Reference is to the Moscow Summit May 29–June 1. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 156–164.
4. See Document 310.