Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

312. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

EUR M 89–20135

Washington, July 6, 1988

East Germany: Dissent and Change [portion marking not declassified]

Summary

East Germany’s fledgling dissident movement has become more outspoken against regime policies in the past year, with actions ranging from a public march to protest Berlin Wall shootings to challenges of this May’s local elections. The regime had worried that dissident activities would mar the pre-cooked electoral outcome, and the unusually high rate of abstentions and negative votes apparently confirmed its fears. The small number of GDR dissident activists, their failure so far to address popular economic grievances, and poor organization currently keep the opposition from posing a serious threat to the regime. But if, as seems likely, the authorities continue to vacillate in handling dissent and it builds—due partly to the spread of reform in the Bloc and local economic stagnation—the dissident movement in East Germany could pick up significant momentum. [portion marking not declassified]

DISCUSSION

East Germany’s small dissident movement—about 1000 activists—came under severe attack roughly eighteen months ago when the Communist leadership launched its harshest crackdown in more than a decade. East Berlin authorities raided the church premises of an environmental action group and arrested both its leaders and members in November 1987, and in early 1988 arrested other prominent dissident activists and expelled them to West Germany. Mainstay periodicals of the movement, such as the magazine Grenzfall (Borderline Case) issued by an environmental protection group, ceased publication. [portion marking not declassified]

Beginning last summer, the regime extended its crackdown to the East German Evangelical Lutheran churches, which had been providing physical shelter and a forum for dissidents since the early 1980s. The Honecker leadership froze the dialogue it had conducted with the church for almost a decade and imposed harsh new censorship restrictions on church publications. State security forces meanwhile seized the opportunity to issue a warning that even when dissident activities were confined to services and vigils within church walls, religious leaders and their congregations might still be subject to reprisals. [portion marking not declassified]

Renewed Dissident Activism . . .

Even in the face of this crackdown, several dissident groups have regrouped their forces and renewed their activity over the past year. Two East Berlin groups publicly condemned the new censorship restrictions on church publications, and last fall activists organized an anti-censorship demonstration that resulted in a clash with state security forces. The underground press which serves as the dissidents’ public voice has been showing new signs of life. By the end of last year two new dissident journals had appeared in Leipzig, East Germany’s second largest city, and in January this year the journal Grenzfall resumed publication. [portion marking not declassified]

Dissident activities this year have also displayed a somewhat greater range than in the past, owing only partly to the opportunity provided by this May’s local elections. Protests against official policies have included:

• The first-ever public demonstration in the GDR against shootings at the Berlin Wall.

• Public calls for competing candidates in the normally uncontested local elections and denunciations of undemocratic electoral procedures.

• Fliers distributed on election eve in several East German cities urging voters to strike the names of official candidates from the ballots as a sign of disapproval.

• Post-election demonstrations of between 500 and 1000 persons in Leipzig to protest both regime tampering with election results and the arrest of protesters from an earlier demonstration.

• Warnings sent to 12,000 GDR households by East German environmental activists that spell out specific environmental threats from regime policies in mining and forestry. [portion marking not declassified]

East German dissidents have also become bolder in protesting abuses elsewhere in the communist world. This spring over 170 writers signed a GDR Pen Center resolution protesting the trial and imprisonment of the Czechoslovak dissident Havel,² eliciting an official protest from Prague to East Berlin. Dissidents also organized a “Czechoslovak Action Day” in March to show solidarity with human rights activists arrested by Prague earlier this year. By mid-June at least four public protests against the massacre of civilians by Chinese army troops in Beijing had taken place, despite arrests and heavy fines levied against the demonstrators, and a letter of protest with several hundred signatures was handed over to the GDR’s Council of State. [portion marking not declassified]

. . . But Limited Influence

Despite bolder and more diverse types of political actions, dissident groups in the GDR are still far from being an effective reform movement. German traditions stressing deference to authority and respect for law and order as well as an effective internal security apparatus undoubtedly constrain GDR dissidents, as does the regime’s ability to deliver the highest living standards in the Bloc. But the chief brake on these groups’ activities remains the unique feature of a divided Germany: the most able among the discontented usually think first of emigrating to the Federal Republic and only then of struggling against tremendous odds for reforms at home. And for those who would not think of leaving voluntarily, the GDR regime always retains the option of expelling them to the West. [portion marking not declassified]

East Germany’s dissident movement is further weakened by internal fragmentation. Many of the estimated 200-odd groups have fewer than a dozen members. There is no national umbrella-type organization, except for the ties most groups have to Evangelical Lutheran churches which are themselves only loosely federated. [portion marking not declassified]

Equally important, dissident groups by and large target broad human rights issues, including restrictions on travel and emigration and the regime’s refusal to accept civilian service in lieu of the military service obligation. They have not, however, addressed economic issues—such as a low and stagnating standard of living compared to West Germans or the poor quality, high prices and insufficient quantities of consumer goods other than basic necessities—which various reporting indicates underlie most popular dissatisfaction with East Germany’s Communist regime. [portion marking not declassified]

A Worried Regime Wavers

Despite the dissidents’ small numbers and lack of a mass following, a variety of reporting indicates that the East German leadership is increasingly worried by what it perceives as a threat to stability. Early this year the Communist party’s workers’ militia shifted the emphasis of its military training from alleged foreign “threats” to domestic unrest. The regime also revived the pre-War atheistic “Freethinkers’ Association” to challenge the increased activism of the Lutheran Church and to combat the appeal of dissident ideas to East Germany’s intelligentsia. [portion marking not declassified]

As the May local elections drew closer, the regime reportedly considered more drastic measures, including eliminating from the lists of eligible voters the names of all citizens who had applied to emigrate or had been identified as participants in protest activity. The object was to ensure the “normal” high show of support for the regime’s handpicked candidates. [less than 1 line not declassified] emigration applications were processed with unusual speed during the first quarter of this year, probably with an eye to getting rid of malcontents before elections got underway. Nevertheless, the post-election reports from private monitoring groups indicated both a negative vote (12 per cent in some areas) and abstention rate (10–20 per cent) that were unusually high by GDR standards. [portion marking not declassified]

The regime, meanwhile, is wavering between harsh repression and conciliatory measures in its struggle to keep the lid on dissent. For example, most of the 200-odd activists arrested after an unofficial demonstration during the January 1988 commemorative ceremonies honoring the founders of the German Communist party were released the next month with no formal charges filed. Several of the half dozen dissident leaders summarily expelled to the West in the spring of 1988 were allowed to return quietly to the GDR late last summer. Members of the Environmental Library group, whose facilities were raided in late 1987 and who were denounced as “anti-socialist,” met this past March with the officials from the GDR’s environmental ministry to present arguments against a proposed waste processing facility. Most recently, those individuals arrested following May’s election protests were released without charges being filed. [portion marking not declassified]

Such vacillation suggests divisions within the normally monolithic leadership. Hardliners—including defense minister Heinz Kessler, minister of interior Erich Mielke, and party secretary for security affairs and possible heir apparent Egon Krenz—probably favor tough policies to deal with dissent. A more pragmatic group—which reportedly includes East Berlin party chief and succession contender Guenter Schabowski and party chief Erich Honecker himself—reportedly supports conciliatory measures. The latter probably fears that a crackdown would deal a severe blow to the GDR’s drive for international respectability and damage economic ties to West Germany. The internal conflicts in the regime’s handling of dissent became unusually sharp last fall when Krenz reportedly took the lead in making a public example of four East German teenagers who had questioned the need for military education in East German schools. At his urging the youths were summarily expelled and denounced by the GDR media. Schabowski, by contrast, reportedly helped those teenagers, who did not subsequently emigrate with their parents, find alternative academic placements. [portion marking not declassified]

Outlook and Implications

Division within the GDR leadership over the handling of dissent will increase as maneuvering over a possible successor to the 76-year-old Honecker intensifies in the runup to the May 1990 party congress. Growing signs of indecision at the center probably would embolden dissidents to speak out more forcefully for reform and could encourage them to organize public protests with diminished fears of reprisal. Meanwhile, Solidarity’s stunning electoral victory in Poland and the emergence of officially sanctioned opposition political parties in Hungary probably will encourage the GDR’s dissidents to press their demands more openly. In early June East Berlin activists were still mounting public demonstrations to protest fraud in May’s local elections, despite arrests and the imposition of heavy fines by the authorities. Likewise, detentions and fines in late June did not deter those protesting against the repression in China. [portion marking not declassified]

The dissidents’ ability to challenge the orthodox leadership and to press effectively for liberalizing reforms ultimately will depend on their success in overcoming two important obstacles:

• The absence of a national organization to coordinate the activities of diverse groups scattered among East German cities and to operate independently of—but in cooperation with—reformist groups within the Evangelical Lutheran Church.

• Isolation from the population at large and the absence of any program for economic reform that would appeal to a populace increasingly dissatisfied with the widening gap between East and West German living standards. [portion marking not declassified]

A change of leadership in Czechoslovakia, the GDR’s conservative ally, and concessions to reformers by the Prague authorities probably would provide a major stimulus to the GDR’s dissident movement. The East Berlin leadership almost certainly would feel more isolated and vulnerable, and it probably would be more inclined to seek some sort of modus vivendi with domestic dissidents. Similarly, activists in the GDR would be especially encouraged by concessions from Prague to their Czechoslovak counterparts, who, in East German eyes, labor under difficulties similar to their own. [portion marking not declassified]

GDR activists undoubtedly would be emboldened by any further successes of their Hungarian and Polish counterparts and by a post-Honecker leadership that felt obliged to follow—albeit haltingly—in the more reformist footsteps of its Bloc neighbors. A continuing decline in East German living standards, which seems likely without reform, also would boost popular support for the dissidents and improve their chances for mounting more and large-scale protests. But the dissidents’ ability to exact major liberalizing reforms ultimately will depend on stronger leadership and better organization plus a coherent program for economic change. [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Presidential Records, National Security Council, Robert L. Hutchings Files, Country Files, GDR—Intelligence Reports [OA/ID CF01413–009] withdrawal 02. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of European Analysis.
2. Reference is to Vaclav Havel.