Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

310. Telegram From the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic to the Department of State¹

3788/Depto 3019.

East Berlin, June 13, 1988, 1310Z

SUBJECT

• Deputy Secretary’s Meeting With GDR Foreign Minister Fischer.

REFS

• EmbBerlin 3707 and Subsequent.²

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: Deputy Secretary Whitehead and GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer met twice, June 10–11, on the edge of the Potsdam Conference on new approaches to East-West security to discuss bilateral issues. Their talks, which concentrated on the claims/trade package and terrorism, lasted approximately 90 minutes.

3. Fischer said the GDR wanted to move the claims package to completion but was awaiting a response to its proposal to open trade negotiations. If they were not possible, the U.S. and GDR had wasted many years. Mr. Whitehead said the U.S. wished to bring both the claims and the trade talks, which were parallel but independent, to conclusion. There had been progress on both tracks—more on claims to date—but trade presented special sensitivities. Ambassador Meehan urged the GDR to confirm the willingness to pay $100 million on Jewish claims that Honecker had apparently indicated to West German Jewish leader Galinski June 6. That would make a positive contribution to the climate in which the package was being worked. Fischer said he had not yet been able to inform himself on the Honecker-Galinski conversation but would do so quickly and come back to us.

4. The Deputy Secretary said the U.S. wanted cooperation from the GDR on combatting terrorism. The relationship on this important issue was the worst we had in Eastern Europe. Fischer said the GDR opposed terrorism and wanted a cooperative relationship. He would look into whether there had been misunderstandings and whether more could be done. End summary.

5. The Deputy Secretary was accompanied by DAS Bodde, Ambassador Meehan, Mr. Kelly from his staff, and Political Counselor Greenwald (notetaker). The Foreign Minister was accompanied by Manfred Niklas, head of his personal office in the MFA, Ambassador Herbert Barth, Director of the Office of U.S., Canada, Japan and Australia Affairs, and an interpreter.

Attitudes Toward Reform

6. Fischer began by contrasting Mr. Whitehead’s remarks to the conference—jointly sponsored by the Institute for East-West Security Studies and the GDR Foreign Ministry—with his own. The Deputy Secretary’s theme seemed to be, Fischer said, Eastern European countries should change, and then everything would be okay. His own point had been that East and West should respect each other for what each was and work together as practical possibilities arose.
If his impression of the contrasting themes was correct, it would raise questions about the compatibility of the two sides’ understanding of the framework for bilateral relations.

7. Mr. Whitehead said that his speech had addressed openness—glasnost—the concept that was being developed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He had expressed U.S. willingness to assist in this process. We were positive about the process that was underway, and he had meant his talk as an encouragement to the Soviets and Eastern Europeans to move forward with the changes that Gorbachev has proposed. Fischer said he realized his initial impression was exaggerated. The Deputy Secretary’s explanation made it easier to discuss the bilateral relationship.

State of Relations

8. The GDR desired, Fischer said, to continue step-by-step progress. The high level political contacts, including the Deputy Secretary’s two visits, the just completed annual political consultations,³ and Politburo member Axen’s visit to the U.S. in May constituted appropriate forums within which the relationship was going forward. The four point non-paper⁴ which Axen had given Secretary Shultz provided a framework. The GDR wanted to build a stable and solid relationship which would carry through the change in administration without pause or retrogression. Mr. Whitehead agreed that the relationship would be built not with grand statements but with small steps that had concrete effects.

9. In November, the Deputy Secretary said, he and Fischer had identified a number of steps that should be taken.⁵ He was pleased that there had been some progress. Most cases on our divided family list had been resolved, and the others appeared to be on the way. The USIA film-making exhibit had been a great success. Fischer responded that the GDR’s positive attitude toward humanitarian cases was proved by the facts. It welcomed the success of the film exhibit. There had been great public interest, and it proved to be a spectacular event. Perhaps during the next administration it would be possible to consider how the GDR could put on a similarly significant exhibition in the U.S.

Claims/Trade

10. The Deputy Secretary said that there had been good progress on both official and Jewish claims. We wanted to wrap them up so that we could move on to other matters. Fischer responded that both sides should continue to work on claims. He had kept the Jewish claims negotiation in his hands because he considered it very important. He would, of course, keep up his contacts with Rabbi Miller when he went to the UNGA this fall. He was not responsible for the official claims talks, which were led by Professor Supranowitz of the Office for the Legal Protection of State Property.

11. Nevertheless, Fischer said, he was working with his colleague, Minister of Foreign Trade Beil, for the resolution of the full complex of issues. Both sides knew how a solution would have to look. The GDR was awaiting a sign from the U.S. At this point in time, however, he was uncertain what more could be done and whether negotiations could usefully continue in the present mode.

12. Specifically, Fischer said, after the GDR had given the U.S. a product list and proposed to open trade negotiations, everything went still on the U.S. side. The GDR appreciated the humanitarian point that the Deputy Secretary had made—that claimants were growing old, and there was a time urgency about helping—but it could not reach into an empty pocket.

13. The GDR wished also to be clear on one point, Fischer said. The Deputy Secretary had spoken about an obligation the GDR had to repay people for what they had lost because of the Nazi’s and the war. The GDR did not have a legal obligation. It had met its reparations obligations within the framework of the Potsdam Agreement. It was willing to help, on a humanitarian basis. That was why it was discussing Jewish claims. The reparations track was closed. The track of humanitarian assistance, including the time factor, was open.

14. The GDR saw a second open track, the trade track. For practical reasons, these tracks needed to intersect. Minister Beil was authorized to produce concrete results if the U.S. engaged in trade negotiations. If such negotiations were not possible, then the GDR would have to consider that many years of effort had been lost. The two sides would have to come up with new ideas. At this time, however, Fischer had no such new ideas.

15. The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation for Fischer’s candor and repeated that the U.S. wanted to improve trade, both ways, with the GDR. It also wanted to resolve the two sets of claims. There was a certain connection between all the issues, but each was also independent of the other. The question was how we could go forward.

16. At the Deputy Secretary’s request, the Ambassador developed the subject further. He cited the progress that had been made on both claims and trade, but agreed with Fischer that the ball was now in the U.S. court on the trade component. On Jewish claims, however, the GDR should consider taking an important step.

17. The Ambassador recommended that the GDR consider confirming the $100 million figure which the Western press had reported Honecker mentioned to West German Jewish leader Galinski (reftels) June 6. That would represent substantial positive movement and have a positive impact on public opinion and the Congress, as well as the executive branch. Though there were no guarantees, it could give a useful impulse to a process that would facilitate agreement on all elements of the package, including trade and official claims. Such a step should entail no unacceptable rise for the GDR because it would clearly be conditional on satisfaction of GDR trade desiderata.

18. Fischer said that he understood the point to be that, on the assumption that $100 million had played a role in the Honecker-Galinski talk, it was possible that confirmation of that figure subject to adequate resolution of the bilateral trade complex, could help move the package forward. He said that he was still uninformed on the Honecker-Galinski discussion since he had been out of the country at the time. He would inform himself promptly and get back to us.

Terrorism

19. The Deputy Secretary expressed the strong U.S. opposition to international terrorism. He said that the U.S. had been able to develop cooperative programs with the Soviets and other Eastern European countries. The core of this cooperation was confidential exchange of information at the expert and operational level. This was a very important factor in combatting terrorism. The visit of Ambassador Adams,⁶ who was responsible for our cooperation with Eastern Europe, had not gone well. He had found an unwillingness to discuss the subject openly. The conversations had been more legalistic than substantive. Mr. Whitehead asked the GDR again to consider engaging in such a cooperative program with the U.S. The two countries should be able to help each other to combat what they both said was an evil.

20. Fischer said that he had explained the GDR’s principle of opposing all forms of terrorism last fall. He would not repeat himself, but the GDR considered terrorism a cancer. He promised that he would study and follow up the Deputy Secretary’s remarks and see whether more concrete results could be produced. In particular, he would examine whether there had been something the GDR did not say openly enough or whether it had created an unintended impression. The GDR wanted to leave no one in doubt that it had no use for terrorism and opposed it firmly.

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880832–0819. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Eastern European posts collective, Bonn, The Hague, Moscow, Vienna, Cape Town, USAFSB Berlin, and USDel NST Geneva.
2. Telegram 3707 from East Berlin, June 9, outlined Honecker’s meetings with Jewish leaders and efforts to determine a claims settlement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880492–0671)
3. A summary of the political consultations is contained in telegram 3072 from East Berlin, May 13. (Reagan Library, Nelson Ledsky Files, Subject File, Germany, East: (German Democratic Republic) [1988 Cables (03/18/88–0630/88)])
4. Telegram 148211 to East Berlin, May 10, contained the non-paper that Axen presented to Shultz. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880400–0633)
5. See Document 300.
6. Telegram 703 from East Berlin, February 6, reported Adams’s February 1 consultations on counter-terrorism. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880629–0035)