Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

300. Telegram From the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic to the Department of State¹

4787/Depto 6024.

East Berlin, November 12, 1987, 1537Z

SUBJECT

• Deputy Secretary Whitehead’s Talk With Honecker.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: The Deputy Secretary was received by Honecker for a two-hour discussion November 11. Honecker confirmed the GDR’s desire to improve bilateral relations and said that he had instructed the Foreign Ministry to identify a figure that the GDR would be prepared to pay on Jewish claims, provided that trade conditions were created that would give it the prospect of earning more hard currency in the U.S. market. (It was unclear, however, whether he was referring to the up-front offer already made to Rabbi Miller or a new global figure.) He covered familiar ground on international affairs, expressing full support for U.S. and Soviet arms control movement. Honecker was optimistic that Gorbachev would succeed in his domestic reforms because he relied on a strong collective and recognized the limits of the politically possible, but he implied that, since every socialist state was different, the GDR had no need for glasnost and perestroyka. Honecker also strongly hinted that the shoot-to-kill order (Schiessbefehl) has been modified at the Berlin Wall and the FRG-GDR border. The Deputy Secretary reiterated U.S. desire to improve bilateral relations and our major concerns—claims, human rights, trade. He welcomed improved inner-German relations and said the U.S. had no concern that this would affect its close ties with the FRG. End summary.

3. The conversation, which was held at the Council of State, was also attended, on the U.S. side, by the Ambassador, DAS Bodde, and the Pol Counselor (notetaker); the other GDR participants were Foreign Minister Fischer, Heinz Eichler, Secretary to the Council of State, and Ambassador Birch, Deputy Director of the MFA’s U.S.A., Canada, Japan Department.

4. Bilateral Relations
The Deputy Secretary said that the Secretary had assigned him special responsibilities for Eastern Europe. The U.S. wanted better relations with all states of the region and particularly with the GDR. He said he would not repeat the full agenda that he had discussed in detail with the Foreign Minister (septel)² but highlighted three areas: claims (U.S. and Jewish) which had been an irritant for too long; human rights, which was always of special concern to Americans, and trade, which was extremely small but which should be expanded because this would be to mutual economic advantage and help build a relationship of interdependence and understanding that contributed to peace.

5. Honecker agreed that relations should move forward. He expressed admiration for the U.S. humanistic and anti-fascist tradition. He recalled that as a prisoner of the Nazis’ he had received with particular emotion the news that American troops had landed in Normandy in 1944, an operation in which he knew the Deputy Secretary had participated. He also retained on the shelf of his library the book on the 200th anniversary of the Constitution the Ambassador had given him.

6. Claims
Honecker spoke more forthcomingly about Jewish claims, which he said he had discussed at length with Rabbi Miller. He said that with the expansion of bilateral trade and the removal of restrictions, the GDR was prepared to use part of its further earnings to pay Jewish claims, which he knew were mostly the claims of elderly, needy people. Honecker said he had just instructed the Foreign Minister to ensure that a certain sum was available—he did not give the sum nor promise when we would learn it—in order to demonstrate that the GDR is serious about resolving the problem. He had nothing to add to the discussion of U.S. official claims that the Deputy Secretary held the previous day with the Foreign Minister. Comment: It was not possible to tell from Honecker’s remarks whether he envisaged the GDR making another offer to settle Jewish claims or whether he was referring back to the up-front offer already made to Rabbi Miller. End comment.

7. Human Rights
Honecker said the GDR attached the same importance to the principle as the U.S. This statement should be believed, he said, since it came from one who had spent ten years in prison for his political beliefs. The exercise of religion, for example, was unfettered in the GDR, he said. He had met with the Lutheran and Catholic bishops and representatives of the strong GDR Quaker community and the Baptists. He described his particular interest in the Jewish community, which he knew the Deputy Secretary had informed himself about the previous day.³ He also strongly defended the GDR’s political freedoms, noting that the same parties existed in the GDR as in the FRG. The only difference, he said, was that they had agreed to cooperate closely together in order to avoid the mistakes of the Weimar Republic that led to the Second World War and to build a new, socialist Germany.

8. Nevertheless, Honecker said, there were some different approaches to human rights in the two countries. The GDR, he suggested, placed greater emphasis upon certain economic and social rights: there was no unemployment, which was a dreadful problem in the West; every child had a right to full and free education regardless of social background or parents’ position, and since 1949, 1.9 million had studied at institutions of higher learning. The GDR also gave very high priority to building new apartments and to removing all physical as well as spiritual traces of the war.

9. Honecker accepted the Deputy Secretary’s explanation that much U.S. unemployment was the result of people moving between jobs, not true unemployment, but said that the problem was deep and structural in the FRG, as many West German politicians had confirmed to him. There it could only be resolved by an expensive program of investment to create new jobs, as he had seen when visiting his hometown in the Saarland, where 20 percent were unemployed, and whole traditional industries had disappeared.

10. The Wall and Travel
The Deputy Secretary said he raised the issue of the Wall not in a confrontational way but to make it clear that, right or wrong, this was almost all that many Americans knew of the GDR. Shootings at the Wall brought back for them memories of the Hitler era. Foreign Minister Fischer had said that the Wall would be torn down when the conditions that had made it necessary disappeared. The Deputy Secretary said he could understand this attitude, but that it was important for the GDR, as it moved toward improving relations with the U.S. and the West in general, to think of ways to have less need for the Wall.

11. Honecker said that West German politicians had suggested to him that the GDR adopt a free travel regime such as Hungary has begun. He said that Hungary was a close ally, the GDR’s most important trading partner in the Warsaw Pact after the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. He himself had close personal relations with the Hungarian leadership, and 600,000 East Germans vacationed in Hungary yearly. But the GDR did not need to fear comparisons on travel policy.

12. The GDR, Honecker said, could claim to be the country in Eastern Europe with the highest percentage of travellers. Some 4.2 million GDR citizens were travelling to the FRG this year. The only problem the GDR saw with this or even more travel, he said, was finding the means to finance it.

13. With respect to the Wall, Honecker said, he would not provide more information than he knew Foreign Minister Fischer had already given. He recalled, however, that the GDR had open borders to West Berlin and the FRG prior to August 1961, and it had been bled practically dry. It was in the interest of neither German state, he said, that the GDR economy lost the equivalent of 156 billion Marks in those years. Only when the Wall was built, could the GDR move forward economically and culturally.

14. Honecker said that what is called “the Wall,” is actually only a small part of the border protection system, which also included such devices as wire with electronic warning devices. This was, after all, a restricted military area, as it had to be given the fact that on either side there were strong NATO or Warsaw Pact forces.

15. Honecker said that in the past two years the GDR had taken certain other measures with respect to its borders which had not met with the appropriate response in the West. It had, for example, removed all mines and self-shooting devices at the same time as it was increasing the number of crossing points that travellers could use. Given the great movement of people across the border, this was significant.

16. Without elaboration, Honecker said that he had investigated recent protests and had discovered that several shots were fired but only because a rifle had not been properly secured. That was all that had happened, he said.

17. Comment: The West German press reported October 30 that the previous evening one individual had escaped over the Berlin Wall, that a companion had been captured, and that during the course of the escape attempt two shots were fired. The source for the claim was the successful escapee. West Berlin police were quoted as saying that a witness confirmed the shots. Honecker presumably was referring to this incident and subsequent protest statements by Senat and allied spokesmen.

18. Honecker’s elliptical comments to the Deputy Secretary probably represent an indirect confirmation that new, more restrictive orders of some sort have been given to border troops. Whatever the actual degree of carelessness of an individual guard, Honecker seemed to have been saying that the shots fired two weeks ago—the first since well before his trip to the FRG—were contrary to policy. This may be as close as the GDR will come for some time to acknowledging that it has a new policy. Our recollection is that it was similarly reluctant at the time to acknowledge directly that it had removed the automatic shooting devices that Honecker cited to the Deputy Secretary. End comment.

19. Trade
Honecker said he wanted more bilateral trade, which presently amounted to about $300 million, a small amount far from the potential of either side. He said that he knew American businessmen wanted to do more, and there were many possibilities that should be explored.

20. Honecker also briefly reviewed the pattern of GDR trade, which he said was 38 percent with the Soviet Union and 70 percent with the socialist world, including China. Much of the remainder—15 billion “Valuta Marks” a year—was with the FRG, which he regarded as positive because it made the two states aware of their interest in good relations, which contributed to peace and security.

21. International Affairs
The Deputy Secretary noted that he would go to Moscow during his trip to work on the human rights aspects of the December summit agenda.⁴ He expressed interest in Honecker’s views about developments in the Soviet Union from where the East German leader had just returned, as well as about inner-German relations.

22. Honecker came back repeatedly to the themes that the world was dangerous, that there was a need to move from zero solution to zero solution with one weapon system of mass destruction after another, and that the GDR supported Soviet arms control proposals. It also made its own contributions, he said, such as nuclear and chemical weapons-free zones in Central Europe, and welcomed bilateral U.S.-Soviet progress, especially the impending INF agreement. Honecker said that the GDR wanted to see early progress on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent, the strengthening of the ABM Treaty, and cuts in battlefield nuclear weapons.

23. The Deputy Secretary reviewed U.S. expectations for a December summit and for a spring summit. He said that the U.S. believed supporters of nuclear free zones were living in a “fool’s paradise,” because they were still exposed to nuclear weapons stationed outside the zones. It was better to pursue reductions. He said the U.S. was working hard on a treaty banning chemical weapons worldwide but that verification was very difficult. He also noted that no progress could be made with battlefield nuclear weapons until something was done about existing disparities in conventional forces. The two subjects had a necessary interconnection that would have to be addressed.

24. Inner-German Relations
Honecker said that the GDR’s interest in security proposals stemmed from both its sensitive geographical position at the dividing point between the two military alliances and its awareness of the historical burden it shared with the FRG that war must never again be allowed to begin on German soil. He had been pleased that during his visit to the FRG, all the political parties also recognized the FRG’s historical obligations in this regard. The effort to improve relations on the basis of the principles laid down in the communique issued with Chancellor Kohl, Honecker said, notably respect for sovereignty and inviolability of borders and non-interference in internal affairs, was important for European security.

25. Improved inner-German relations, Honecker said, was the GDR’s special contribution to construction of the common European house, which would have rooms for states with different social systems. This GDR policy, he said, was not meant to loosen U.S.-FRG ties, which was beyond the GDR’s power. Likewise, no one should think that improved inner-German relations would weaken the GDR’s ties to the Soviet Union. It was noticeable, however, that over time there had been a definite improvement in the European political climate, a trend which the GDR welcomed and wanted to advance.

26. Personally, Honecker said, he had many memories of his trip to the FRG. He recalled particularly laying a wreath to the victims of fascism at Dachau, including the Catholic and Jewish victims. He was optimistic that relations with the FRG would continue to improve. The devil was always in the details, but the GDR would be cautious not to stumble over those details. It was following a careful course of peaceful coexistence.

27. The Deputy Secretary welcomed Honecker’s assessment and said that he wanted to assure him that the U.S. in no way was nervous about or wished to stand in the way of better relations between the two states. The U.S. favored the development of better relations between the various parts of Europe, including the inner-German parts, as symbolized by Honecker’s visit. It would be glad to see further improvement in inner-German relations.

28. Glasnost and Perestroyka
Honecker spent much of the time when he was ostensibly giving impressions of his recent Moscow visit on arms control. He did say, however, that the GDR supported Soviet efforts at domestic renewal and that he believed Gorbachev could succeed because he could rely on a strong collective leadership and was a politician with a good sense of what was achievable, both abroad and at home. Gorbachev was able to distinguish between areas where one could move ahead and areas where one would get into difficulties, he said.

29. Glasnost and perestroyka, Honecker said, were necessary because of internal Soviet developments. The opposition which Gorbachev faced was not organized but resulted from the social conditions that had arisen over the years in the country.

30. At a later point in the conversation, Honecker returned to this theme, noting that the GDR had been making constant progress in developing socialism. What was apparent, Honecker said, when one looked around the world, was the great variety in the socialist countries. This had struck him particularly, he said, when he had recently been in China. Every country had to follow its own way. It was when this was not done that difficulties developed.

31. The Economy
The Deputy Secretary briefly described his view that the stock market drop did not reflect any basic weakness in the U.S. economy. It resulted from the fact that stock prices had gotten too high. The market had made an adjustment, but the economy had been prospering for six years, and there was no indication that this should change. To the contrary, most indicators were positive, such as new housing starts, car sales, and retail sales.

32. Honecker expressed appreciation for the assessment. He recognized that the Deputy Secretary was a stock market professional while he, Honecker, was an amateur. He said, however, that he shared the judgment that the world was not headed for another crisis like 1929. The party had received many inquiries and it had assured GDR citizens that they could relax. The situation was not the same. Honecker briefly described what he said was a strong GDR economy that would rely increasingly on high technology and improved labor productivity (seven-eight percent annually) to increase national income by four-five percent each year through 1996.

33. Conclusion
Honecker expressed appreciation for the visit and wished the Deputy Secretary success with the remainder of his trip. He said that he looked forward to more talks with U.S. leaders because though our systems were different, we should make all efforts to achieve a solid relationship. The Deputy Secretary agreed that it would never be possible to resolve all bilateral problems because some had their roots in system differences. Many, however, could be resolved, and he considered that his talks with Honecker and the other GDR officials he had met were a good beginning.

34. Comments
Honecker went only marginally beyond his Foreign Minister in discussing a few items like Jewish claims and the Wall, but he put on a strong performance, fielding tough human rights comments with aplomb, coming back to repeat that his objective is better relations with the U.S. and the FRG, and throughout demonstrating physical endurance and mastery of his brief.

35. His comments about internal developments in the Soviet Union were revealing. While he claimed a good personal relationship with Gorbachev, he made it rather clear that he considers the GDR should continue to follow its own domestic course and that an effort to copy glasnost/perestroyka here would lead to difficulties. His assessment that the General Secretary’s chances for ultimate success rest on his use of the collective leadership and appreciation of political realities seemed less than a ringing endorsement either of Gorbachev personally or of the staying power of some of his more radical reform ideas.

36. Moscow minimize considered.

Meehan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870932–0509. Confidential. Sent for information to Eastern European posts collective, Bonn, Moscow, Vienna, U.S. Army Field Station Berlin, and the U.S. delegation to the NST in Geneva.
2. See Document 299.
3. Telegram 4759 from East Berlin, November 11, reported that on November 10 Whitehead met with Dr. Peter Kirchner, the president of the East Berlin Jewish community. (Department of State, Official Correspondence of Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead, July 1982–January 1989, Lot 89 D 139, 11/87 EEur/USSR Trip—Memcons)
4. Reference is to the U.S.-Soviet Washington Summit, December 8–10.