Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

272. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 19, 1984

SUBJECT

• The German Question and U.S. Policy

Recent developments in inner-German relations have raised new questions about the longer-term evolution of the two German states. Much of this attention has been stimulated by East Germany’s increased assertion of its “national” interests vis-a-vis Moscow, in pursuing its own Westpolitik with Bonn. Together with uncertainties about FRG foreign policy and West Germany’s search for national identity, these events suggest new wrinkles on the post-war German question and raise new issues for U.S. policy.

This paper analyzes the inner-German relationship and the advisability of adjustments in U.S. policy toward the GDR. It counsels caution on this score. It also examines the sources of current West German frustration and suggests the need for a U.S. initiative in the economic/technological field to revive US/FRG relations and strengthen broader Western cooperation.

Inner-German Dealings

The FRG plan to extend another major loan to the GDR reflects Kohl’s continued attempts to insulate inner-German policy from the vicissitudes of East-West relations and to breathe new life into detente. Fundamentally, Bonn views these loans as a tool to obtain GDR cooperation in establishing closer relations between the two Germanies.

Recent events suggest that this policy may be working:

— The GDR has increased significantly (albeit erratically) the flow of emigration to West Germany.

— Honecker has voiced displeasure with the Soviet reaction to INF deployment, a remarkable reaction from one of Moscow’s most rigid allies, who had earlier threatened an “ice age”.

— Honecker still plans to visit the FRG later this year, an event that will unnerve Moscow at least as much as the other states of Eastern and Western Europe, none of which have any desire for basic changes in post-war arrangements concerning Germany.

We will need to monitor the evolving inner-German relationship to ensure that it does not move in directions incompatible with U.S. interests or with our quadripartite rights and responsibilities in Berlin and Germany. We have adequate mechanisms available, in the Bonn Group and other channels, to keep close track. The Soviets also will be closely observing these events and will not hesitate to move if they think the GDR is going too far. So far, we have no reason to suspect FRG motives in this dialogue, but we should be aware that Bonn occasionally has turned off the consultation valve when pursuing its own agenda with the East Germans.

US/GDR Relations: Need For A New Policy?

These developments have raised the question of whether adjustments are advisable in US/GDR relations. Proponents of this course argue that improving our relations with the East Germans could have several advantageous results for the U.S. and the West:

— First, and above all, it is argued that closer US/GDR relations could undercut the solid Soviet hold over East Germany and enable us to coax the East Germans slowly toward the West. In a word, we would seek to destabilize the Soviet empire at its core, along the inner-German dividing-line, much as Moscow seeks to undermine the FRG role in NATO.

— Second, we could use a US/GDR connection to caution the FRG against ignoring U.S. interests in its inner German dialogue. More active US/GDR relations, so goes the argument, would afford us the possibility of reacting to Bonn with signals of our own.

— Third, more normal US/GDR relations allegedly would represent a step toward stability in Central Europe by enhancing the GDR’s incentive to act with restraint on Berlin. Similarly, strengthened U.S. commercial ties with East Germany, the leading industrial nation of Eastern Europe, could serve U.S. economic interests and, it is asserted, induce East Berlin to respond to U.S. interests on Jewish claims and other bilateral matters.

— Finally, some contend that the GDR has earned the reward of positive differentiation, given its increased foreign policy independence, and that the weakening of Soviet control over East Germany could have far-reaching repercussions for Moscow’s relations with its more independent East European allies, thereby furthering the goals of our differentiation policy.

Grounds for Caution

This menu of motives makes an American fling with the East Germans a tantalizing prospect. There certainly is no doubt that the Communist successors to Bismarck’s Prussia would greatly welcome such a U.S. initiative as a key to GDR international legitimacy. This is no small matter for what may be Europe’s most insecure state.

But there are real grounds for caution that weigh strongly against such a course:

— First, and above all, the key goal of destabilizing Soviet/GDR relations is probably unattainable and the effort could pose great risks:

• It is illusory to imagine Moscow would permit the East Germans to play the role of Romania with its U.S. superpower adversary or, for that matter, with their West German brothers. Keeping Germany divided, and the GDR in Moscow’s pocket, has been the very essence of Soviet European policy for 40 years. There are strict Soviet limits on GDR foreign policy.

• As to the GDR itself, Honecker and his fellow East German apparatchiks know full well that their leadership positions rest squarely on the shoulders of the 20 divisions of Soviet occupation forces. While they would like the commercial and political benefits of U.S. trade, they share Moscow’s fear of the contagion of Western ideas. Honecker is, after all, the inventor of East Germany’s earlier policy of Abgrenzung, or separation of the two German states.

• Coaxing the GDR also could prove risky. The destabilization of post-war arrangements defining Germany’s division, to Moscow’s disadvantage, could be a casus belli for the USSR. At the very least, long before we began to undercut GDR loyalties, the Soviets would use their leverage on the Berlin access routes to challenge U.S. interests and threaten West Germany. Instead of destabilizing East Germany, we would end up with a crisis that we probably could not sustain.

— Second, playing a U.S. East German card in order to limit the FRG’s inner-German dialogue would also be counter-productive and risky:

• counter-productive, because US/GDR detente would legitimize rather than limit the FRG’s efforts in that direction, thereby intensifying the inner-German relationship and probably ultimately heightening FRG dependence on East Germany’s Soviet controller;

• risky, because serious US/GDR engagement would raise profound uneasiness in Bonn concerning a basic element of the US/FRG alliance at a time when Moscow will be acting to keep East Germany nailed to its mast. For 40 years, the stronger German state has been in our camp and the weaker one has remained beyond our influence. Flirting with the East Germans could threaten US/FRG ties with little to show with the GDR.

— Third, there may be some gains to be pursued with the GDR in the commercial field and on other bilateral matters, but these are marginal. Trade relations are limited by the Jackson-Vanik prohibition of MFN;² this is unlikely to be changed by recent GDR emigration practices, given the continued existence of the Berlin Wall. We deal with Berlin issues with the USSR rather than the GDR. On other bilateral matters, we have had little luck gaining East German cooperation since establishing relations a decade ago.

— Finally, if our differentiation policy aims at enhanced internal liberalization and foreign policy autonomy, it is hard to find that the GDR has earned preferred treatment. Besides the Berlin Wall and the strict internal repression, East German foreign policy operates in close concert with Soviet strategy. The GDR is currently supplying 25% of Warsaw Pact aid to Nicaragua as well as revamping the Sandinista National Liberation Front into a Communist political structure. The GDR has a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Cuba. Similar treaties of friendship and cooperation enable the GDR to provide intelligence and security training to Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan, as well as to Syria. The GDR has even provided broadcast facilities for the Iranian Tudeh Party, the Greek Communist Party and clandestine radio facilities for the Turkish Communist Party. Thus, in the Near East, Africa, and, increasingly in Central America, the GDR is a spearhead of Soviet policies, in direct opposition to U.S. interests and objectives.

Reviving West German Cooperation

The main problem confronting our German policy is not a reassessment of our policies toward the GDR but how to handle the sense of frustration prevalent in the FRG. The post-war era has been marked by such astounding FRG successes as the economic miracle, acceptance into the club of western democracies, increased international power and influence, and a bold effort at East-West detente.

For the most part, these FRG achievements have served our interests well. Indeed, FRG acceptance in the 1950s of NATO and the European Community as channels for German national energies greatly strengthened the West and eased the psychological and political burden of Germany’s division. Maintaining these arrangements, through all the post-war turmoil and crises, has been one of the cardinal successes of American foreign policy.

Sustaining a strong US/FRG alliance in the future will be a far tougher task. The West Germans are asking basic questions about their national vocation. It would be wrong to view this debate primarily in left/right terms: Egon Bahr and Franz-Josef Strauss are West Germany’s two most nationalist political leaders. Nor is it mainly a matter of nuclear weapons neuralgia. The debate turns, instead, on how to define West Germany’s future national aspirations and how to reduce FRG foreign policy dependence. That is why Kohl and Strauss vie with SPD leaders to strengthen bonds with East Germany, and go so far as to speak of common German responsibilities and political arrangements for ensuring peace in Europe.

Bonn’s problem is that, 40 years after World War II, its post-war successes have turned sour and the future seems bleak. Beyond the normal German Weltschmertz, the FRG is surrounded by frustrations:

— Reunification and inner-German detente remain remote. Despite the current loan deals and Honecker’s scheduled visit, Kohl knows the limits. The recent public Soviet “memorandum” warning against FRG “rearmament,” and recalling the Potsdam Agreement, has underscored these realities.

— Dependence on America is growing less attractive as a basis for FRG policy. West Germans know they remain fundamentally security-dependent on us and see no real alternative, but don’t like it. They also are concerned by the volatility of U.S. foreign and domestic politics over the last 15 years. The Nunn amendment³ is a sharp reminder of how quickly FRG security can be endangered.

— The European connection, grounded in Franco-German reconciliation and the European Community, has been more or less stalled for a decade.

— Ostpolitik was designed to give Bonn re-insurance in case the U.S. security guarantee flagged. It has brought stability in Berlin and some humanitarian gains. But short of a giant Faustian gamble with Moscow, it presents no safe alternative to current security arrangements.

— The economic miracle, which carried Adenauer and Erhard through all the Soviet threats and crises, has been deflated. The Germans now face high unemployment, a sagging D-Mark and structural economic problems. Bonn also dreads the technological challenge from America and Japan.

These developments are deeply worrisome to FRG leaders. Even if the economic situation improves, the sources of political frustration probably will remain and may even deepen over the next 10–20 years. Moreover, history teaches us that frustrated Germans have sometimes pursued their bent for political romanticism. While that may not be an immediate concern, we have just experienced a phase of nuclear romanticism in their reaction to INF deployments.

Conclusion

The policy issue for the United States and its Western partners is how to respond to current FRG frustrations and to re-channel West German energies into allied cooperative ventures that are relevant to central FRG concerns. For the last several years, arms control has been a key part of the answer to this question, in order to secure INF deployments. Arms control will continue to be an important element in our relations, but also may continue to be a greater source of division than unity.

I believe we need to increase our focus on the economic dimension, especially cooperation in science and technology. West Germany’s future as an economic and security partner will depend to a critical degree on its ability to revive, restructure, and modernize the German economy. It is exactly in this field that the U.S. enjoys its largest comparative advantage vis-a-vis the Soviets and the West Europeans. Bolstering U.S. (and Japanese) technological cooperation with Western Europe would greatly strengthen the West as a whole and ease some of the West Europeans’ malaise about their economic and political future.

For these reasons, I believe we should, as part of our Looking Ahead exercise, undertake a systematic USG examination of the possibilities of Western technological cooperation, with the aim of raising this topic as major initiative at next summer’s 7-nation summit in Germany. Together with a sound program to restore NATO’s conventional defense posture—which we are already undertaking—such an approach could go far to address West German national concerns, to revive US/FRG relations, and to strengthen the West.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Secretary George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (07/18/1984–07/23/1984). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Philip Kaplan (S/P) and Barry Lowenkron (S/P). McKinley initialed and wrote “19 July” on the memorandum.
2. Reference is to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, part of the Trade Act of 1974, which prohibited the U.S. Government from providing most-favored-nation status to any non-market country that did not allow for the free emigration of its citizens.
3. The Nunn amendment to the Omnibus Defense Authorization Act of 1985 (S. 2723) threatened to reduce U.S. troops in Europe if defense improvements were not made by other NATO members. For additional information, see Congress and the Nation, vol. VI, 1981–1984, p. 241.