Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

273. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 17, 1984

SUBJECT

• The German Question and U.S. Policy

In response to our July 19 memorandum to you on this subject (Tab 1),² Mike Armacost asked us what specific steps were being urged by proponents of a more forthcoming U.S. policy toward the GDR. Subsequently, Rick Burt sent you John Kornblum’s paper,³ which sets forth in general terms a new U.S. approach to inner-German relations, including US-GDR relations. The essence of that position is as follows:

— West Germany has moved from its post-war exclusive Western orientation to the traditional search for German identity that has characterized German political life for more than three centuries; there is little we or anyone else can or in fact should do to lure the West Germans back.

— West Germans (and East Germans) must come to terms with their identity, joint interests and existence as separate states within a single nation before the FRG can become a stronger, more self-confident and cooperative ally.

— We will have to be especially sensitive to FRG concerns about their “rightful” role in Europe and the world, and to their sense of the importance of ties to the East, especially the GDR. Indeed, it will be essential that the U.S. establish itself as sponsor of realistic inner-German reconciliation.

— We also must take account of the changing needs of the GDR, whose pressing economic, scientific and technological imperatives can only be met by the U.S. and the West. Helping the GDR is important to avoid instability and a breakdown in inner-German relations, and because the GDR also may be “one of the best ways to send messages to Moscow.” There is no need for dramatic initiatives at this point. But we should expand US/GDR bilateral relations even though the East Germans must remain a loyal Soviet ally and have not met the criteria of our differentiation policy.

I confess to being rather concerned by this line of argumentation:

— Bonn’s “exclusive Western orientation” in fact ceased at the moment of Brandt’s 1970 Moscow treaty.⁴ This was designed to buy re-insurance against an ostensibly unreliable U.S. protector and to lay the basis for a more independent West German foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger were in fact apprehensive that Ostpolitik would erode FRG Alliance ties. The change in West German policies over the last decade (now under the CDU as well) has borne out those concerns.

— The FRG’s current inner-German romance builds on its 1972 normalization treaty with the GDR.⁵ The FRG hopes to promote a common German approach to sustaining detente and deepening internal bonds between the two German states, a kind of long-term de facto re-unification. This Ostpolitik-II can make West Germany a permanent demandeur with East Germany, which will drive tough bargains that Bonn may not be able to refuse. (Note how the FRG capitulated on the Berlin clause in Honecker visit negotiations.) The Soviets also will set their own price for allowing this process to continue, even within tight bounds. Moreover, there is no final inner-German modus vivendi for Bonn short of re-unification that would theoretically facilitate resumption of a stronger Alliance role. (In fact, it would shatter NATO.) Since the Soviets will not permit German re-unification on any terms, a West German preoccupation with inner-German identity is a factor for long-term FRG distraction from Alliance responsibilities.

— It is one thing to remain sensitive to West German needs (as we have), another thing to be politically neutral on Bonn’s inner-German dialogue (as Nixon and Kissinger were), and something else yet again to sponsor such a process. I believe this process is contrary to U.S. interests and would advise strongly against such a favorable position.

— We have no national interest in meeting the needs of the GDR, which is the hard core of Moscow’s East European empire. The Soviets will not permit East Germany to be lured away. West German efforts to do so could threaten central European stability, leading the USSR to crackdown on the GDR directly or on us through the sensitive nerve of Berlin. Honecker and the East German leadership, while cautiously testing Soviet limits, already are using these Soviet pressures to draw new concessions from Bonn, while giving little in return. Finally, after our experience of the FRG’s playing “intermediary” with Moscow, the notion of a GDR middleman frankly strikes me as ludicrous.

Policy Implications

The prospect of exploiting centrifugal forces in East Germany is intriguing but, in terms of central U.S. interests, I believe we should be very wary about the consequences of a free-wheeling Germany in the center of Europe. I can see the point, in Rick’s August 11 memo,⁶ of tactically allowing the current inner-German process to “play itself out” with our general support for Kohl’s stated goals, while refusing to comment publicly on details. Soviet media attacks on the two Germanies already are antagonizing West (and East) German opinion, with prospective gains for us. Nonetheless, as Rick comments, this situation is not without dangers. We will have to keep the West Germans aware of U.S. interests in Berlin and elsewhere, and on our central goal of improving Western cooperation.

The fact is that all our allies, especially France, are nervous and share our interest in channelling FRG energies toward the West. They, as well as all the East Europeans, will want to keep Germany divided. (The Yugoslav DCM told Phil Kaplan that Jaruzelski recently expressed profound Polish concern over the inner-German process to the visiting Yugoslav President.)

It is true that a more credible East-West negotiating process will ease the West German frustrations that have helped stimulate their latest search for identity. We will, of course, seek to explore this terrain with Moscow after our elections, including the arms control field. But our purpose here is to enhance East-West stability—not, in EUR’s words, “working with the Germans to deal with their national dilemma”. Far less is it to sponsor or encourage deepening of an inner-German entente which proclaims common declarations on the route to European peace. A “community of responsibility” between the two German states is a phenomenon that will lead over time either to (1) deeper West German political dependence on the Soviet Union and dilution of FRG Alliance responsibility (note how Genscher was foreshadowing a joint German statement on “non-use of force” in Bonn the same day the FRG NATO mission was criticizing that idea in Brussels and on the eve of the Molotov-Ribbentrop anniversary); or (2) to Soviet intervention that could revive the German and Berlin crises of 1958–62.

Our real goal, instead, must be to work steadily with West Germany to re-channel Western German energies into Western cooperative ventures that are relevant to central FRG concerns. As one example, at Mike’s suggestion, we are working on ideas for a possible initiative on European technological “decline” for the next 7-nation summit in Germany.⁷

Meanwhile, the inner-German process may continue, with further West German concessions that marginally damage FRG interests and gradually undercut West German public support. If Bonn starts to go more seriously off-course, we will need to caution Kohl privately. If Honecker is in fact pursuing pan-German illusions, Moscow will crush him, and, in the process, jolt West Germans back toward their Western orientation.

The bottom line: The United States should not encourage West German dreams and should leave it to Moscow to dash them.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, Lot 92 D 52, ES Sensitive August 17–24 [1984]. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kaplan.
2. Attached but not printed. See Document 272.
3. Not found.
4. For the text of the treaty, signed August 12, 1970, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1103–1105.
5. For the text of the treaty, signed December 21, 1972, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1215–1230.
6. Not found.
7. May 2–4, 1985.