Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

216. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, February 29, 1984

SUBJECT

• NSDD on “U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia”

In accordance with NSDD–54 (U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe), a separate directive has been drafted on Yugoslavia (Tab A).² The attached directive reaffirms U.S. support of Yugoslavia’s independence, territorial integrity and national unity. It asserts that the following steps be taken by the USG:

— Expand economic relations in mutually beneficial ways and foster a market-oriented economic structure in Yugoslavia.

— Continue to encourage Yugoslavia’s moderating role in the non-aligned movement.

— Review arms transfers to Yugoslavia on a case-by-case basis and subject to the appropriate technology safeguards.

Since interagency clearance has been obtained (with the exception of one paragraph on arms transfers), a memorandum from you to the President is attached at Tab I.³ The arms transfer issue on which State and Defense disagreed has been partially resolved. (See State/DOD papers, Tab II).⁴ That is, both State and Defense have agreed on the proposed NSC compromise language (Tab A, page 2) which embodies the June 1, 1981, White House memorandum on arms transfers to Yugoslavia (Tab III),⁵ and specifies that all arms transfers will be subject to case-by-case review and related technology safeguards.

However, agreement has not been obtained on one of Defense’s proposed subsections to the paragraph on arms transfers. Specifically, in the summer of 1983, DOD recommended two additions—that a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSMIA) and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) be negotiated with Yugoslavia. As there were fundamental differences between State and DOD assessments of Yugoslavia’s willingness to accept various military agreements, all agencies agreed it would be desirable for DOD to consult first with the Yugoslavs. The directive would not be forwarded to the President until these agreements were either discussed or negotiated with Yugoslavia. This delay was feasible for the June 1981 White House memorandum already provided a framework for U.S. policies toward Yugoslavia. Subsequently, during the summer and fall of 1983, DOD negotiated the GSMIA. It is expected to be signed in March.

The MOU issue, however, is still outstanding. It was agreed that during President Spiljak’s visit to the U.S., Secretary Weinberger would raise this matter in their meeting. Apparently, President Spiljak was receptive to the idea of signing a new MOU, but indicated that Yugoslavia’s acceptance of more stringent safeguards was contingent upon the transfer of sophisticated technology.

Both State and DOD want to convene an interagency meeting which would decide what type of MOU the USG should try to obtain from Yugoslavia. There are clear differences between the two agencies as to whether the existing MOUs require modification. State contends that the existing MOUs with Yugoslavia are adequate to insure against unauthorized transfers of technology. Conversely, DOD maintains that the existing MOUs belong to a period when only simple and non-critical technology had been transferred and thus, need to be updated. DOD believes that existing MOUs with Sweden and Austria provide a standard of minimum acceptable safeguards. Subsequently, both agencies have provided different language (Tab B).

NSC proposes language which combines the key points of both State and Defense recommendations, but does not set forth a bias as to whether the existing MOUs need modification or not (Tab B). The NSC proposed language also does not prejudge as to whether the Austria and Swedish MOUs alone should serve as a minimum standard. Rather, NSC recommends that the existing MOUs be examined and compared to those the U.S. presently has with Austria and Sweden.

At Tab IV⁶ is a memorandum from you to the agencies involved forwarding the approved NSDD on Yugoslavia. Don Fortier, Jack Matlock and Roger Robinson concur.⁷

RECOMMENDATION:⁸

1. That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

2. That you forward the memorandum to the involved agencies once the President has approved the proposed NSDD at Tab A.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁹

NSDD ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA

Defense/State/NSC proposed language on MOUs

Defense

— The U.S. Government will review the existing Memoranda of Understanding with Yugoslavia¹⁰ in the light of current standards for transfer of technology which are more stringent than those of the late 1970s. The MOUs with Sweden and Austria represent a minimum standard of control by industrially developed, neutral countries. The U.S. Government will then inform the Government of Yugoslavia whether the existing MOUs require modification or whether a new MOU must be negotiated before the United States can approve the transfer of more advanced technology. (S)

State

— The U.S. Government will conduct an interagency review of the adequacy of the MOU with Yugoslavia, and specifically will compare it to the Swedish and Austrian MOUs. The U.S. Government should then seek a meeting with the Government of Yugoslavia which will, at a minimum, seek to reaffirm the significance of the current agreement. (S)

NSC

— The U.S. Government will review the existing Memoranda of Understanding with Yugoslavia regarding transfer of technology in light of current standards, which are more stringent than those of the late 1970s. In this regard, the U.S. Government will conduct an interagency review of the adequacy of the MOUs with Yugoslavia and, specifically, will compare them to the Swedish and Austrian MOUs. The U.S. Government will then inform the Government of Yugoslavia whether the existing MOUs require modification or are adequate. (S)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Chron February 1984 (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A copy was sent to deGraffenreid.
2. Attached but not printed. Tab I included Tabs A and B. Tab B is printed below.
3. Attached but not printed. See Document 218.
4. Attached but not printed. See Documents 207 and 210.
5. Attached but not printed. See Document 191.
6. Attached but not printed.
7. Matlock and Robinson initialed their concurrence.
8. McFarlane did not indicate his preference with respect to either recommendation. However, on the copy of this memorandum in the NSC Executive Secretariat Files, both recommendation 1 and 2 were checked “Approve.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) Records, NSDD 133 3/14/1984 (2))
9. Secret; Sensitive.
10. The existing memorandum of understanding with Yugoslavia was signed in December 1978. The text of the MOU is in the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D780497–0807.