218. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan1

SUBJECT

  • NSDD: U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia

Issue: NSDD on U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia.

Facts: In accordance with NSDD–54 (U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe), a separate directive has been drafted on Yugoslavia. The attached directive (Tab A)2 reaffirms U.S. support of Yugoslavia’s independence, territorial integrity and national unity. Specifically, it asserts that the following measures be taken by the USG: expand economic relations in mutually beneficial ways, foster a market-oriented economy in Yugoslavia, encourage Yugoslavia’s moderating role in the Non-aligned Movement, and review arms transfers to Yugoslavia on a case-by-case basis and subject to the appropriate technology safeguards.

Discussion: The directive (with the exception of one paragraph on arms transfers) has been cleared by all the appropriate agencies (State, Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, OMB, CIA, USTR, JCS). Agreement has not been obtained on one of Defense’s proposed subsections to the paragraph on arms transfers. Specifically, in 1983, DOD recommended two additions—that a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSMIA) and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) be negotiated with Yugoslavia. In December 1983, DOD completed its negotiations on the GSMIA which is expected to be signed in March.

However, State and Defense differences still center on whether the existing MOUs require modification. Both want to convene an interagency meeting which would decide what type of MOU the USG should try to obtain. State contends that the existing MOUs3 with Yugoslavia are adequate to insure against unauthorized transfers of technology. Conversely, DOD maintains that the existing MOUs belong to a period when simple and non-critical technology have been transferred and thus needs to be updated. It believes that existing MOUs with Sweden4 [Page 643] and Austria5 provide the standard of minimum acceptable safeguards. Subsequently, both agencies have provided different language (Tab B).6 Also at Tab B is the NSC’s proposed language, which combines the key points of the State/Defense recommendations but does not set forth any bias as to whether the existing MOUs need modification. The proposed NSC language also does not prejudge whether the Austrian and Swedish MOUs should serve as a minimum standard.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the National Security Decision Directive (with the NSC compromise language) at Tab A.7

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) Records, NSDD 133 3/14/1984 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Bush. “The President has seen” is stamped in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. The memorandum is also stamped “signed.”
  2. Not found attached. See Document 216.
  3. See footnote 9, Document 216.
  4. See footnote 7, Document 210.
  5. See footnote 8, Document 210.
  6. Not found attached. See Tab B, Document 216.
  7. Reagan checked and initialed “OK.”