Office of the Historian

207. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Stanford) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer)1

Washington, March 15, 1983

SUBJECT

  • Revised Policy Study, Summary and NSDD on Yugoslavia (U)

(S) The Department of Defense cannot concur with the draft NSDD2 because it fails to ensure that adequate safeguards to protect U.S. technology transfers to Yugoslavia will be put in place.

(S) Yugoslavia has a long history of close ties to the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact countries, including transfers of Western technology. We have no satisfactory agreement with the Yugoslavs to ensure that future transfers of U.S. technology in either civil or military areas will be sufficiently protected. We believe that, at a minimum, a Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Government and the Government of Yugoslavia needs to be concluded similar to those we have negotiated with Sweden and Austria, that would secure Yugoslav Government commitments that sensitive manufacturing and end-use technologies will be safeguarded. Efforts to obtain Yugoslav agreement to a General Security of Military Information Agreement should be revived and further transfer of classified military equipment should be contingent upon Yugoslav adherence.

[Page 599]

(S) We believe that the CIA evaluation of December 10, 19823 fails to address the real risks of future sensitive technology transfers to Yugoslavia. In particular, that study apparently focuses on a period in which little sensitive military technology had been transferred to Belgrade. Moreover, since 1975 large amounts of sensitive COCOM controlled dual-use technology have been sold to both Yugoslav industry and military facilities with very little review or monitoring. Therefore, there has been no real test of Yugoslav intentions or capabilities to protect such technologies.

(S) We believe that a highly cautious attitude toward technology transfers to Yugoslavia should be indicated in the text of the NSDD. The NSDD should contain clear language indicating the necessity of a credible Yugoslav assurance that they will protect our technology prior to any transfer taking place.

John H. Stanford4

Colonel, USA
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) Records, NSDD 133 3/14/1984 (2). Secret.↩
  2. Bremer sent the revised draft NSDD to the Interagency Group on Yugoslavia under cover of a March 1 memorandum. He also forwarded a draft summary of conclusions of a SIG meeting, noting that it had been decided “to set aside the IG study, much of which has been superseded by the ongoing effort to provide multilateral financial support for Yugoslavia.” (Ibid.) For the IG study, see Document 202.↩
  3. Not found.↩
  4. Stanford signed “John Stanford” above his typed signature.↩