Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

213. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassy in Yugoslavia¹

Secto 10043.

New York, October 6, 1983, 1407Z

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting With Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Mojsov.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: Mojsov’s main focus was upon the need to establish “collateral” channels of communication to compensate for what Yugoslavs see as temporary break-off of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. He agreed with the Secretary’s observation that recent Soviet statements suggest an unwillingness to engage in constructive dialogue, and said that the Soviets are unlikely to be more positive this year and are serious about INF counter-deployments. To provide “collateral” channel, the Yugoslavs have proposed to Swedish Prime Minister Palme that for the opening of CDE in Stockholm in January, Foreign Ministers from two or three smaller NATO and Warsaw Pact countries be invited, as well as all Foreign Ministers of the NNA group. Mojsov explained the GOY decision not to attend the IPU conference in Seoul² as a one-time, “pragmatic” step prompted by intense North Korean pressure on Belgrade, including a threat “almost to sever relations”. But he said that the Yugoslavs have informed the North Koreans they will attend the Seoul Olympic Games³ and other meetings in South Korea. On bilateral relations, Mojsov expressed appreciation for the Vice President’s visit to Belgrade last month⁴ and expressed gratitude for the U.S. role in the 1983 financial assistance package. End summary

3. Mojsov was accompanied by Ambassadors Loncar and Colob (U.N.) and FSFA notetaker Kostic. DAS Palmer and EUR/EEY officer Lang (notetaker) also attended on the U.S. Side.

4. U.N. meetings. Mojsov began by expressing appreciation for the U.S. approach to this year’s UNGA. He said the GOY was impressed by the constructive general assessment made in President Reagan’s address,⁵ which was virtually a “keynote speech.” In addition, the summit called by Mrs. Gandhi had provided a good opportunity for an informal, unstructured exchange of views, primarily on North-South issues, during which leaders of important Western countries (France, Canada, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands) demonstrated their sensitivity to the need to address important problems. (Later in the meeting, Mojsov said that problems of development, if unaddressed, could lead to economic and social upheaval). Taken together, these events demonstrate the continued importance of the U.N. as a place where dialogue can take place, despite its failure to deal with many problems and endless debate over resolutions. This is particularly important at times of difficulty in international relations.

5. U.S.-Soviet relations. The Secretary agreed with Mojsov that unstructured sessions often provide the best means to assess reality and begin to consider solutions to difficult problems. He asked for Mojsov’s assessment of the Soviet Union’s present relationship to the U.S. and the Western world as a whole. He said that our impression of Moscow’s reaction to the KAL incident, but even more the general tone of its responses to the President’s proposals on arms control, is that the USSR is unwilling to engage in the kind of constructive dialogue which Mojsov advocated. Mojsov agreed, stating that the most recent exchange following President Reagan’s speech⁶ had confirmed his view that “the end of the year” will witness a serious blow to relations. The Soviets will not be positive this fall and are serious about counter-deployment. In Mojsov’s view, this is a decision taken some time ago. Based upon his knowledge of “the Soviet diplomatic dictionary,” he has known for a long time that this would happen. Mojsov added that, while the KAL incident served as the “trigger” for the present impasse in relations, something else would have been found for this role if it had not occurred. What we are dealing with is a longstanding Soviet state of mind, not a new element. The consensus among East European Foreign Ministers with whom he has talked is that counter-deployments will proceed and that we are entering “a new ice age;” Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek, for example, told Mojsov that the GOC will have to mount an extensive public relations campaign to explain emplacement of Soviet missiles in Czechoslovakia to the Czechoslovak population.

6. Mojsov said that, given this situation, “collateral” channels of communication must be found to keep open discussion until U.S.-Soviet dialogue resumes, which, in his view, will be within a fairly short time. Along these lines, he said that the Yugoslavs have suggested to Swedish Prime Minister Palme in New York that the January CDE meeting in Stockholm open with Foreign Ministers from two–three NATO Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland, Norway) and two or three of the smaller Warsaw Pact countries—as well as all the NNA Foreign Ministers. This would provide a “bridge for dialogue” and help to calm European public opinion during a difficult period. The Secretary agreed that dialogue should be kept open, and noted that we have been trying to do so by sending our Ambassadors back to Geneva with new proposals. There has been no positive response, however; we have the impression that our proposals are being rejected even before they are made.

7. Seoul IPU conference. The Secretary said that the U.S. considers the Yugoslavs’ decision not to send a delegation to Seoul to be extremely regrettable. Mojsov said that the decision had been very difficult. It followed six months of internal debate within the GOY, balancing the desire of the Yugoslav parliamentarians to attend against intense pressure from the North Koreans not to send a delegation. They even had sent Vice President Zarkovic to see Kim to try to convince him that Yugoslavia should attend. But Kim had been adamant including a threat “almost to sever relations” if the Yugoslavs went. The “crux of the problem,” in the GOY’s view, was that the Yugoslavs, dating back to the Tito-Kim personal relationship, have been trying to bring North Korea into a position of nonalignment with respect to the USSR and China, or, as the North Koreans express it, into a policy of “self-reliance.” The Yugoslavs feared that the North Koreans, in retaliation for sending a GOY delegation to Seoul, would “turn to alignment” and jeopardize the political/military balance in that part of the world, which recent events have shown to be very important. Mojsov stressed that this decision had nothing to do with Soviet views on the IPU conference. The Soviets, he said, had decided quite early to send a delegation and had urged the Yugoslavs to do likewise. By contrast Yugoslavia had been considering what to do for six months. Mojsov said that the Yugoslav decision not to go to Seoul was a “pragmatic” decision, not “a principled Yugoslav position,” and would not be repeated; the Yugoslavs have informed the North Koreans that they will participate in the Seoul Olympic Games and in other future meetings in South Korea.

8. Bilateral relations. Mojsov expressed appreciation for Vice President Bush’s visit to Belgrade in September and noted that the full Presidency had been very pleased with the outcome. He said that the GOY was especially pleased with President Reagan’s invitation to President Spiljak to visit the United States next year. Mojsov then expressed gratitude for the United States’ role in the 1983 financial assistance package to Yugoslavia. He said that Yugoslav industrial production has shown signs of positive growth in the second half of the year after flat performance during the first half, the crop was good and foreign trade results have been positive. There therefore is reason to hope for a surplus in 1984. Despite these favorable developments, however, there will be a need to repeat Western financial assistance along the same lines to keep Yugoslav economic stabilization proceeding on course. The Secretary observed that the prognosis is more favorable than at this time last year not only because this year’s assistance package is in place and the Yugoslav situation is better but also because there now are signs of a worldwide economic upturn—which will be beneficial to both our economies.

Shultz

1. Source: Reagan Library, Secretary George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (10/6/1983) (1). Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Zagreb, the mission to the UN, Seoul, Moscow, Stockholm, Prague, Bonn, Paris, and London. Drafted in EUR/EEY; cleared by Palmer and James Covey (S/S); approved by Shultz. Shultz was in New York for the UN General Assembly meeting.
2. The Inter-Parliamentary Union conference was held in Seoul October 3–10.
3. The games were scheduled for September 17–October 2, 1988.
4. See Documents 211 and 212.
5. The text of Reagan’s September 26 speech is printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book II, pp. 1350–1354. It is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 169.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 120.