Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

214. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

768–AR

Washington, January 31, 1984

(U) YUGOSLAVIA: THE MUSLIM NATIONALIST PROBLEM

(C) Summary

Yugoslav and Bosnian officials are concerned over the growth of Muslim nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, particularly in the ethnically diverse republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, where Muslims are the largest nationality/religious group. The trials of a dozen Islamic extremists in Sarajevo last summer underscore the regime’s effort to curb domestic Muslim militants and the influence of radical fundamentalist Islamic/Arab countries on Yugoslavia’s Muslim population.

Muslim nationalist and religious activity hostile to the regime appears to have abated since the trials in Sarajevo and currently poses no threat to internal stability. However, the regime must still cope with historic nationality/ethnic frictions and animosities—which have undeniably increased since Tito’s death in May 1980. Regime attempts to deal with serious political and economic problems have at times had the effect of exacerbating these frictions and of intensifying republic-federal differences over constitutional prerogatives and policy formulation.

* * *

Muslims in Yugoslavia: A Historical Perspective

(U) Migrant Serbs settled parts of the area now known as Bosnia-Hercegovina in the seventh century A.D. From the 10th through the 15th centuries, the area was in constant turmoil as the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches fought to proselytize the inhabitants. This situation was further complicated by the introduction from Bulgaria of Bogomilism, an ascetic heretical Christian cult, during the 12th century. The chaos created by this internecine religious struggle made Bosnia-Hercegovina a tempting prey for the Ottoman Turks, once they defeated the Serbs in 1459.

(U) The Turks conquered Bosnia in 1463 and Hercegovina in 1482. For more than four centuries Bosnia-Hercegovina served as the European outpost of the Ottoman Empire. While under Turkish rule, many Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs, and Bogomils converted to Islam and adopted Turkish customs, dress, cuisine, etc., largely to ease their living conditions. There was, however, little intermarriage between Turks and Slavs.

(U) In 1875, Bosnian peasants revolted against the Turks. Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey, hoping to annex territory in the event of victory. At the final peace settlement at the Congress of Berlin (1876), however, Bosnia-Hercegovina was placed “temporarily” under the administration of Austria-Hungary, despite Serbia’s protests. Vienna annexed the province in 1908 and made it part of the empire. This unilateral action precipitated an international crisis: Serbia and Montenegro mobilized for war, but backed down when Russia failed to support them.

(U) World War I impelled many members of the three main religious communities in Bosnia-Hercegovina to choose sides: Catholics leaned toward Catholic Croatia, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; Orthodox Serbs favored the Kingdom of Serbia, which sided with the Allies against Austria-Hungary; and the Muslims (some 1 million of them at the time) appeared divided—depending largely on whether they identified with their Croat or Serbian antecedents. As had been true for hundreds of years, Serbs and Croats vied for the loyalty of these Muslim Slavs.

(U) Serb-Croat rivalry in Bosnia-Hercegovina continued during the interwar period, mirroring the political and religious differences between the two states. In 1941, the Nazis invaded Yugoslavia; Bosnia-Hercegovina became part of the “independent” state of Croatia. From the outset, the Ustashi rulers adopted an anti-Serb policy of massacres, expulsions, and forced conversion to Catholicism. (Almost one-third of the 6.3 million inhabitants of the reconstituted Croatian state were Serbs.) Some Bosnian Muslims supported the Croats and joined in the pogroms against the Serbs; these Muslims subsequently were condemned as fascist collaborators and criminals.

(U) The 1941–45 civil war in Yugoslavia was at once political, religious, and ethnic in nature—not only in Bosnia-Hercegovina but elsewhere in the country. All factions committed atrocities: some estimates allege that half of the 1.7 million Yugoslavs killed were direct victims of civil war.²

(U) After World War II, Serb-Croat rivalry for the allegiance of the Bosnian Muslims continued (while some communists were boasting that the regime would forever resolve the nationality problem). In an effort to end the Serb-Croat struggle over the Slav Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Yugoslavia’s Muslims were granted separate nationality status: A 1971 law gave them parity with the Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Slovenes.³

(U) The creation of a Muslim nationality added a new dimension to the regime’s nationality problems; Yugoslavia’s Muslims began to take a more active interest in Islam and in asserting their political rights and potential. This activism was particularly evident in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where Muslim nationalists tried to enhance their political influence at the expense of the Serbs and Croats.

(U) Some Muslim leaders gained prominence by demanding greater Muslim representation in party and state bodies. There were also demands that separate Muslim institutions be established in Bosnia-Hercegovina to promote Muslim interests there (i.e., distinct from Serb and Croat interests). Even though Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina were the largest nationality group, their representation in the bureaucracy at both the federal and republic levels had not been commensurate with their numbers. It was not until 1979 that a Muslim from Bosnia-Hercegovina was appointed to the Yugoslav party presidium; until then, the Bosnians in top party positions had been Serbs or Croats. This 1979 appointment was reported to have been made only after strong protests and pressures from Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

(C) Since acquiring full nationality status, Bosnian Muslims have markedly increased their influence in the party and government apparatus in Belgrade (federal level) and in Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia-Hercegovina. (Muslims from other republics and autonomous provinces have served in the party and government hierarchy: e.g., the late Premier Dzemal Bijedic was a Muslim from Montenegro. Various ethnic Albanians from Kosovo also serve in the federal bureaucracy, but it would have been impossible to exclude Albanian Muslims from office because the population of Kosovo is almost 80 percent ethnic Albanian.) Yet despite the improved representation, resentments undoubtedly still exist among Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina that Croats and Serbs (particularly Serbs) exert undue influence and enjoy privileged representation in the higher party and government ranks—despite progressive declines in the Serb and Croat population in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

(U) The Muslim Population in Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia’s 4 million Muslims constitute 18 percent of the population and the country’s third largest religious denomination. They are concentrated mainly in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo and in the border regions of western Macedonia, southern Serbia, and Montenegro (i.e., areas contiguous to Albania). These Muslims are divided between almost 2 million Slavic Muslims and 2 million Albanians and Turks (1.1 million Albanians in Kosovo, 350,000 Albanians in Macedonia, and another 230,000 Albanians in southern Serbia and Montenegro). About 90 percent of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia are said to profess Islam as their religion.⁴

Almost half of the 4 million Muslims specifically opted for a Muslim nationality; 1.7 million others declared themselves to be Albanian by nationality; and another 100,000, Turkish. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1,629,000 persons declared themselves to be Muslim by nationality: The proportion of Muslims in the republic’s population increased to almost 40 percent while that of the Serbs declined from 37 to 32 percent and of the Croats from 20 to 18 percent between the 1971 and 1981 censuses.

Official Attitudes Toward Muslim Activism

(U) Once full nationality status was obtained (removing, in effect, the taint of being second-class citizens in a Christian state), Yugoslavia’s Muslim community felt more encouraged to pursue political aims and practice its religious beliefs. Muslim religious leaders gained a wider audience and enhanced their influence as they defended Islamic interests. However, the activities of some of the more dogmatic brought warnings from Yugoslav authorities, who, in turn, began to pay closer attention to the Muslim community.

(U) Despite occasional official and media criticism of perceived Muslim excesses, Yugoslav authorities appeared reluctant in the early 1970s to move forcefully against the community, in part because of Belgrade’s close ties with the Arab and Islamic world. During the late 1970s, however, Yugoslav officials and media were more willing to criticize Muslim clergy for “abuse of religion for nationalist, anti-state purposes.” The Mufti of Belgrade, for instance, was one of several high-ranking Muslim religious leaders warned for allegedly seeking to disrupt national unity. Also issued were warnings that religious functions and gatherings must not be used to disseminate pan-Islamic, nationalist ideas or to create religious and ethnic tensions among the population.

(U) Hamdija Pozderac—the first Muslim from Bosnia-Hercegovina to serve in the Yugoslav party presidium and currently chairman of the republic party—in 1979 condemned the misuse of Islam for political purposes and rejected the concept of pan-Islamic nationalism. Pozderac was the first Bosnian Muslim political leader to attack zealots in the Muslim community. A Bosnian party secretary, also a Muslim, charged that some Muslims in Bosnia were abusing Islam to gain supremacy in the republic and to “degrade Serbs and Croats to the role of intruders in Bosnia.”⁵

(U) The theme of reactionary religious forces abusing religious feeling for nationalist/political purposes has been employed by the Yugoslav regime against Catholics, Orthodox Serbs, and Muslims since the end of World War II. Its fears on that score are well founded, because religious affiliation generally has been synonymous with ethnic, nationality, or republic interests in Yugoslavia. Not only has this led to fratricide among the country’s religious communities and peoples, but it also has complicated church-state relations.

(C) After the 1981 Albanian riots in Kosovo, regime authorities were concerned that the “irredentists” might establish ties with other Muslim militants in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and other areas. Closer attention was paid to Yugoslavia’s Muslim population, particularly as the regime was forced to cope with the nationalist spillover of the riots—including concern among various Yugoslav republics and nationalities over rising Serbian nationalism and Serbian perceptions that federal authorities had mishandled Kosovo from the outset and that stricter controls had to be instituted over the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, etc.

(U) The nationalist arguments also involved media polemics between Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. In 1982, for instance, a Serbian professor in Belgrade charged that Muslim nationalists in Bosnia-Hercegovina wanted to establish a Muslim republic and link it to foreign pan-Islamic centers. He further charged that these Bosnian Muslim nationalists enjoyed powerful political support from certain Bosnian political leaders.

(U) In response to criticism from Serbs, Bosnia’s political leaders denied that Muslim nationalism and Islam constituted a threat to Yugoslavia. Mikulic, among others, refuted press and other unofficial charges that Muslim nationalism was a special problem in Bosnia-Hercegovina. His March 22, 1983, speech, however, launched an official and media offensive against Muslim nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism.

(U) Campaign Against Muslim Nationalism and Islamic Fundamentalism

Eleven Muslim activists—including two imams—were arrested in Sarajevo on April 8, 1983, on charges of engaging in “hostile propaganda” and maintaining links with “reactionary circles abroad” which sought to undermine the Yugoslav Federation. The arrests coincided with an escalating media campaign against “greater Muslim nationalism,” “Islamic clericalism,” and “pan-Islamic fundamentalism.” The arrests were announced on the same day that Mikulic had a “long talk” with the head of the Islamic community in Yugoslavia and the Bosnian party presidium discussed the “activities of hostile elements from positions of nationalist chauvinism.” The presidium concluded that, although increasing numbers of Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian nationalists were being exposed, individuals and groups continued to act from “clericalist and nationalist positions.”

Pozderac added his voice to the media campaign. He claimed Muslim nationalism was increasing and criticized Muslim intellectuals who denied that Muslim nationalism was a threat to Yugoslavia. He also accused those who maintained that Bosnia-Hercegovina was an “artificial creation” of essentially refuting the existence of a Muslim nationality. Such an attitude, he said, contributed to resurgent Muslim nationalism. He warned of the growing secular impact of pan-Islamicism on Bosnian Muslim youths who were susceptible to hostile foreign influences. Finally, he accused Islamic religious officials in Bosnia-Hercegovina of “passivity” toward militant Muslims and complained that Muslim intellectuals in Sarajevo had too much influence in the universities, publishing houses, and press.

In addition to official and media denunciations were those by mass organizations, which met to condemn Muslim nationalism, along with other efforts by domestic religious and secular groupings to sow dissension among the population and interfere in Yugoslavia’s relations with Arab and Islamic countries.

Trials of Muslim Activists

(U) The trials of 12 Muslim militants began in Sarajevo on July 18, 1983. (A 13th person initially had been arraigned but was not tried because of ill health.) Four of the defendants had served prison terms for involvement in the Mladi Muslimani (Young Muslims)⁶ and “for serious criminal offenses against the people and the state.” The defendants were mostly middle-aged intellectuals; they were accused of seeking to create an “ethnically pure Bosnia as a theocratic Islamic state, in line with the aims of extreme pan-Islamic fundamentalism and its ambitions to create a Muslim state extending from Bosnia to the Philippines.” The group was further charged with links to “foreign reactionaries” and émigrés hostile to Yugoslavia.

(U) During the month-long trial, the prosecution presented 58 witnesses. Much of its case centered on the “Islamic Declaration,” written in 1970 by one of the main defendants, and on confiscated literature. The declaration allegedly demanded the Islamization of Yugoslavia’s Muslims, proclaimed that Muslims and non-Muslims were incompatible, and called for the excommunication of all Muslim communists. It declared that the Islamic revolution could not succeed without a political revolution.

(C) The prosecution reportedly sought to appeal to the traditional prejudices and fears of non-Muslim Slavs, particularly the Serbs. It linked Bosnian Muslim fundamentalism with Albanian Muslim disturbances in Kosovo. The defendants were said to have called for the establishment of an “ethnically pure Islamic state” that would have incorporated Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, and parts of southern Serbia. In order to realize this aim in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croats were to be expelled to Croatia and Serbs were to be killed.⁷

Defendants Deny Charges; Harsh Sentences Meted Out

(U) The author of the “Islamic Declaration,” a retired lawyer, defended himself vigorously. He denied all the charges against him, claiming that not a single word in the declaration applied to Yugoslavia but only to other Islamic countries. He said that he had never participated in any discussions that were not religious in nature and denied ever having seen five of the defendants.

(U) Other defendants—represented by lawyers from Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo—maintained that their trips abroad had been only for tourist purposes. They denied seeking foreign support for their cause. One defendant, however, voiced opinions similar to those expressed in the Islamic Declaration: He said that Muslims in Yugoslavia were “endangered and exposed to constant pressure from Serbs and Croats,” endured endless humiliation, and were denied promotions regardless of “expertise.”

(U) The trials ended on August 20. Eleven defendants were sentenced to prison terms; the 12th received a probationary sentence of six months but was released at once. Even though various defendants were charged with the same criminal offense, their differing sentences appeared to depend on their conduct in the courtroom and the strength of the case against them. The two main defendants were sentenced to 14 and 15 years, respectively, for counterrevolutionary activities; four got sentences ranging from 6 to 10 years for membership in a hostile organization; and six got sentences ranging from 5 to 6½ years for hostile propaganda.

(C) Despite the denials of Yugoslav officials and media, the defendants were sentenced for their religious, political, or ideological beliefs, not for actual physical violence against persons or sabotage against the regime. The prosecution admitted that no violence had taken place but charged that the group was preparing to move from political and religious propaganda to more violent acts, including terrorism. The heavy-handed action of the prosecution and tendentious press coverage of the trials reportedly aroused some sympathy for the defendants among Muslims in Sarajevo and even Serbs in Belgrade.⁸

(U) The presiding judge—a Slav Muslim—maintained that the defendants had been prosecuted not for their religious convictions but for political goals disguised with religious rhetoric. He claimed that they had propagated “national intolerance and hatred” and that their trips to an Islamic country (read Iran) had been of an “exclusively inimical character,” not for religious or tourist purposes.

(U) Tanjug declared that the judge’s verdicts were not merely a defense of the Yugoslav Constitution but also were intended to preserve the traditional good relations between Yugoslavia and the nonaligned countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Other press articles strongly endorsed the verdicts but became defensive when forced to counter charges from some Islamic countries (e.g., Iran, Libya, and Pakistan) that Muslims in Yugoslavia encountered religious and political discrimination.

(C) Official Concern Over Foreign Contacts of Muslim Activists

The Islamic militants indeed had established active contacts with Iran—not only with Khomeini’s ayatollahs in Tehran but also with the Iranian Ambassador in Vienna.⁹ Some had made several trips to Tehran; it was after one such trip that the arrests were carried out and large quantities of “hostile subversive literature” confiscated. Although the literature from Iran did not directly attack Yugoslavia, it called for the establishment of pure Islamic states, eventually to be united in a world Muslim federation. As such, it was seen as aimed against the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

Although Yugoslav officials and media did not explicitly accuse Iran of complicity, widespread criticism of “Khomeini-style Islamic fundamentalism” before and during the trials left no doubt that the authorities were fully aware of the contacts between the Iranians and the defendants. In addition, some Yugoslav officials claimed the defendants had links to foreign intelligence services that sought to destroy the Federation. Other Muslim nationalists were linked to Croatian, Serbian, and Albanian nationalists and to Bosnian/Islamic émigré groups allegedly collaborating with Chetnik and Ustashi émigrés.

Little information is available on the financial and other support that Bosnia’s Islamic militants have received from Iran, Libya, or other radical Arab/Islamic countries—although some have provided direct financial assistance for the construction of mosques and for travel and study abroad by Yugoslavia’s Muslims. Many Bosnian Muslim students have attended Middle Eastern universities, and clerics have been trained in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Egypt. Some of the students and clerics undoubtedly have returned to Yugoslavia strongly influenced by Islamic fundamentalism and determined to propagate it.

(C) Muslim Nationalism Currently Under Control

Since the Sarajevo trials, Muslim nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist activities appear to have abated—perhaps because the most active and potentially dangerous threat to stability in Bosnia-Hercegovina has been eliminated with the regime crackdown. There is no evidence that the convicted militants commanded widespread support. No protests or demonstrations in their behalf have been reported, underscoring the view of some Bosnian officials that Muslim political/religious activism has been largely restricted to a few intellectuals and religious zealots. Moreover, the failure of Muslim activists to attract broad support among the Muslim community in Bosnia-Hercegovina perhaps explains the absence of dismissals, purges, and other disciplinary measures in political, economic, religious, and cultural institutions—unlike the purges in Croatia during 1971–72 and in Kosovo following the 1981 riots. (The political and security situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina bears no comparison to that in Kosovo—with its almost daily reports of graffiti, dissemination of antiregime literature, incidents involving Albanians and Serbs, arrests and trials of “nationalists and irredentists,” high-level party and government meetings in Belgrade, Pristina, and elsewhere to discuss emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins, etc.)

Although Muslim nationalism currently poses no threat to the authorities, there is still apprehension over its potential to do so under certain conditions. Given the Bosnia-Hercegovina Muslims’ undoubted perceptions that they long have been victims of political and religious discrimination, they remain susceptible to nationalist appeals, particularly if adverse economic and political developments appear to affect them more than other nationalities, above all Serbs and Croats.

(C) Nationality Divisions and Their Impact on Regime Stability

Nationality divisions remain a potential threat to stability, particularly at a time of economic crisis. Vast economic disparities exist among ethnic groups and geographic regions in Yugoslavia. Efforts by federal authorities over the years to narrow them have not been successful. The austerity and stabilization measures implemented by Tito’s successors have adversely affected some groups and regions more than others and have provoked resentment that economic burdens are not being shared equitably.

Yugoslavia’s youth has been hard hit by the economic crisis. Widespread unemployment and bleak employment prospects over the next several years have increased discontent and alienation with the system. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, for instance, 85 percent of the 180,000 unemployed are 17–27 years of age (16 percent of the republic’s population is unemployed). Bosnian officials have warned that some Muslim youths are susceptible to foreign ideologies and nationalist demagogues. As in Kosovo, growing numbers of university-trained, but unemployed, young people constitute a reservoir of opposition and a priority target for antiregime elements.

Official Bosnian concern over the potential threat that unemployment poses to stability may in part be reflected in the opposition of Bosnian political leaders to various economic reform proposals from Belgrade which would have the effect of temporarily increasing unemployment but eventually leading to greater economic efficiency or improving future employment prospects. In addition, some Bosnian leaders, among the most conservative in Yugoslavia, probably object to some economic reform proposals because the Serbs support them; the Bosnians suspect Serbian support is but a stratagem to centralize the regime and, thereby, enhance Serbian “hegemony” over the Federation.

On the other hand, Yugoslavia’s Serbs, already apprehensive over Kosovo, fear that Muslim assertiveness in Bosnia-Hercegovina threatens the Serbian community there. As a result, most Serbs likely would favor close surveillance and possibly tighter controls over Yugoslavia’s Muslims, whether in Kosovo, Macedonia, or Bosnia-Hercegovina. Since the 1981 Kosovo riots, Serbs have charged that ethnic Albanians have accelerated their efforts (begun after the fall of the Serb Rankovic in 1966¹⁰ and the Albanian riots in 1968) to expel Serbs and Montenegrins in order to attain an “ethnically pure Kosovo”—similar to charges that Muslim extremists seek an “ethnically pure Bosnia.” Although Serbs maintain that they merely want to exercise their constitutional rights vis-a-vis the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina and to protect their Serb brethren in other parts of the Federation, non-Serbs have countered with allegations that the Serbs are again trying to dominate Yugoslavia. Insinuations also have been made that Serbs in Belgrade and in Bosnia-Hercegovina instigated the attacks on Bosnia’s Muslims and Croats in order to regain a preeminent position there.

Although the Serbs are the bete noire of Yugoslavia’s Muslims—above all, the ethnic Albanians—there is little likelihood that the Slavic and Albanian Muslims would ever cooperate closely against the Serbs. Bosnia’s Slav Muslims have a tendency, as do Yugoslavia’s other Slavs, to regard Albanians as primitive and inferior. (Similarly, other Yugoslavs regard the Bosnians as primitive.) Despite concern of some authorities over possible common action by Slav and Albanian Muslims for antiregime purposes, little evidence exists that any such cooperation has been achieved—although isolated efforts to establish contacts for essentially antiregime purposes cannot be discounted.

Albanian “nationalism and irredentism” currently constitute Yugoslavia’s most serious and insoluble nationality problem, given the historic hatreds and suspicions between Serbs and Albanians. But the Albanian problem is containable and by itself poses no immediate threat to Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, if only because all the country’s Slavs seem determined to thwart Albanian demands for republic status or for union with Tirana. If another ethnic group or republic (e.g., Croats and Croatia) were to come to the assistance of the Albanians vis-a-vis the Serbs, however, the threat to Yugoslavia’s stability and territorial integrity would increase considerably.

Serb-Croat rivalries and a resurgence of a virulent Serbian nationalism pose a much greater threat to regime stability and national unity than do Albanian or Muslim nationalism. As a result, federal officials—to the extent that they are able to exercise authority—can be expected to monitor closely and control all manifestations of nationalism.

Nationality, ethnic, and republic-federal differences over constitutional prerogatives and political/economic issues have increased since Tito’s death in May 1980. These differences have played a direct role in eroding the authority of the post-Tito leadership, especially at the federal level. The inability to resolve them has even raised doubt within Yugoslavia and abroad about Yugoslavia’s continued existence as a viable multinational state. Given the pragmatism and flexibility that have characterized the Yugoslav leadership since the 1948 break with the USSR, however, there is cogent reason to assume that a viable solution to the country’s political, economic/financial, and constitutional problems will be obtained without threat to Yugoslavia’s independence and unity.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Yugoslavia (5). Confidential. Drafted by Paul J. Costolanski and Viktoria Herson; approved by Mautner.
2. (U) On November 19, 1983, Bosnian party leader Branko Mikulic claimed that 700,000 persons (one-third of the World War II population of Bosnia-Hercegovina) lost their lives through Nazi occupation and civil war. He stated that entire families were massacred simply because they were Serbs, Croats, Jews, etc. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. (U) Albanians, Romanians, Slovaks, Turks, Hungarians, etc., in Yugoslavia do not have the same status. Although all nationalities and minorities have the same rights to cultural, religious, and political expression, the regime claims that the “matrix” of these minorities exists outside Yugoslavia’s frontiers—i.e., in the states of Albania, Hungary, Romania, etc. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. (C) The ethnic Albanian who practices Islam is less likely to pose a political-security problem for Yugoslav authorities than the one who owes allegiance to Marxism-Leninism and Albanian party leader Hoxha. While the Islamic Albanian well may be disaffected and disgruntled over living conditions and perceive himself to be a second-class citizen in a predominantly Slav state, he has not been the main instigator of the turmoil and unrest that have wracked Kosovo since the 1981 riots. The Albanian “nationalists and irrendentists” who provoked the riots and engage in subversive, antiregime activities derive their inspiration mainly from Marxism and from the Stalinist Hoxha who has formally outlawed all religion in Albania. Moreover, the avowed aims of the ethnic Albanian dissidents in Kosovo and Macedonia are almost wholly political, e.g., raising the status of Kosovo from that of an autonomous province to that of a republic, merging Kosovo and other Albanian-inhabited areas of Yugoslavia with the Tirana regime into a “Greater Albania,” or realizing an “ethnically pure Kosovo” by forcing the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from the province. [Footnote is in the original.]
5. (U) Some Bosnian Muslims feel that their religion and cultural heritage is superior to that of the Christian Serbs and Croats. The Muslims consider themselves the original inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Serbs and Croats as subsequent interlopers. As a result, these Muslims have steadfastly resisted assimilation by the “inferior” Serbs and Croats. [Footnote is in the original.]
6. (U) The Young Muslim movement was active as a militant organization during the interwar period. It has a reputation of terrorism and of supporting the Nazi occupiers. In the immediate postwar period, the movement opposed the communists, and some of its members were forced into exile. [Footnote is in the original.]
7. (U) The difference in treatment allegedly to be meted out to Serbs and Croats underscores the fact that relations in Bosnia-Hercegovina between Muslims and Croats traditionally have been better than those which either maintains with the Serbs. [Footnote is in the original.]
8. (C) As in many of its punitive measures against perceived or actual dissidents, the regime may well have overreacted. In Kosovo, for instance, young ethnic Albanians have been arrested and tried and received sentences out of all proportion to the offenses committed. This has proved counterproductive: Not only have the convictions produced a new group of Albanian “martyrs” and even more intransigent opponents, but they also have increased the resentment of Albanians vis-a-vis Serbs and Montenegrins, who are seen as instigators of the trials, political purges, and other anti-Albanian actions in Kosovo. The hardening Albanian “irredentism” in turn has definitely provoked a Serbian nationalist backlash. This has raised fears among some Croats, Bosnians, Macedonians, Slovenes, and Hungarians in Vojvodina that the Serbs again are trying to exert hegemony over other nationalities and republics in Yugoslavia. [Footnote is in the original.]
9. (U) Members of the group appeared to be attracted to Khomeini’s brand of fundamentalism for secular reasons, i.e., because they were Sunnis rather than Shiites. Almost all of Yugoslavia’s Muslims are Sunnis—including the Young Muslims. [Footnote is in the original.]
10. Aleksandar Rankovic, Tito’s heir apparent, was expelled from the Executive Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party on July 1, 1966, and from the Party on October 4, 1966. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Document 183.