Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

212. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State and the White House¹

7788.

Belgrade, September 22, 1983, 0936Z

SUBJECT

• Vice Presidential Visit to Yugoslavia: Talks With President Spiljak.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary. In a meeting otherwise devoted to the Middle East, President Spiljak expressed genuine pleasure at receiving President Reagan’s invitation to visit the U.S., which he accepted straight away. Spiljak said the Yugoslavs regarded interference by Arab states as “the greatest danger” to Yasser Arafat’s political position. Still, Arafat remains a political factor in the Middle East. However, in the Yugoslav view he is stymied in finding a peaceful political solution to the Palestinian question. The Vice President countered that Arafat has one more crucial card to play, namely renunciation of the pledge embedded in the Palestinian national charter to “destroy” Israel. This renunciation, said the Vice President, would gain for Arafat a direct Palestinian dialogue with the U.S. and a political standing and credibility in the U.S. which the Palestinians do not now have. The Vice President also stressed that the Lebanese situation had become so acute that it must be brought under control before further progress could be made on the Palestinian issue. The Yugoslav side noted there had been a number of frustrating failures to mediate the Iran-Iraq war and that now the best hope was that both sides would simultaneously exhaust each other and the conflict would dwindle away into a “propaganda war.” End summary.

3. Spiljak opened the meeting by warmly accepting straight away President Reagan’s invitation to visit the U.S., which he said could be arranged at a mutually convenient time.

4. Middle East—Palestinian issue. Spiljak gave an appreciation of Arafat’s political strengths and weaknesses. During his visit to Belgrade July 27–28, Arafat had been preoccupied with “pressure and interference” from Syria and Libya which had exacerbated tensions and disagreements within Fatah ranks. Arafat had successfully blunted Libyan efforts to undermine him. However, the Syrians remained a problem. Arafat did not deny that he would have faced internal difficulties in any case but made it plain that they would have been “far less without Syrian interference.” Spiljak said the Yugoslavs regard the interference by Arab states as “the greatest danger” to Arafat’s political position. Nevertheless Spiljak said that Arafat had managed to preserve his organization and deepen the support of Palestinians in the occupied territories and thus, in the Yugoslav view, Arafat remains a political factor in the Middle East.

5. Arafat also told the Yugoslavs that he drew back from agreeing to deputize King Hussein to represent the Palestinians in negotiations with Israel because he, Arafat, feared he could not sustain the Palestinian unity that Arafat sees as essential to achieve the goals of the Palestinian people. Moreover, Arafat said, the interference of Arab states had increased the dissatisfaction within Palestinian ranks and enhanced the possibility that more and more Palestinians would favor a resort to terrorism despite Arafat’s own objections to such a course. Spiljak pressed strongly for “a solution to the Palestinian question” as the essential element to a stable and peaceful Middle East. While saying that a place for the Palestinian people “must be found,” he did not press explicitly for an exclusive role for the PLO.

6. Vice President Bush said that the Yugoslav analysis of Arafat’s strengths and weaknesses did not diverge from ours. He added that he understands that Arafat, in private, comes across as a far more moderate politician than his public image as a gun toting, unshaven, wild-eyed figure. He also drew attention to the fact that the Israelis, the Fez group, and the PLO had all found positive elements in President Reagan’s peace initiative. He made it plain that the next major step is up to the Palestinians, and to Arafat in particutar, to renounce the pledge embedded in the Palestinian national charter to “destroy” Israel.

7. Spiljak said that Arafat had told him he does not see what the Palestinians would gain from such a renunciation. The Vice President responded that there would be two very significant results, namely:

— a direct Palestinian dialogue with the U.S.; and

— a political standing and credibility in the U.S. which the Palestinians do not now have.

The Vice President emphasized that this step was admittedly Arafat’s last card but that the time hd come for him to play it. Until he does, it will be difficult to go forward with the peace process.

8. Lebanon. Moreover, the Vice President continued, the Lebanese situation was becoming so difficult that it too had become an obstacle to resolving the Palestinian question. The Vice President briefed President Spiljak on the military and diplomatic state of play, emphasizing the importance of withdrawal of all foreign forces, the reconstitution of a Lebanese government of national unity and security for Israel’s northern border region. He also pointed out the spoiler role which Syria had adopted since Israel had agreed to withdraw completely from Lebanon. Spiljak said he accepted the Vice President’s characterization of the Lebanese situation and agreed with the three objectives of U.S. policy, but said the Yugoslavs believe that the solution in Lebanon depends on the solution to the Palestinian problem. The Vice President responded that the Lebanese situation had become so acute that it must be brought under control first.

9. Soviet intentions. Asked about the Soviets, Spiljak said they are intent on preserving “their presence” in the area.

10. Iran-Iraq. Spiljak noted the succession of frustrating mediation attempts by the nonaligned, the Islamic Conference, and others. After the outbreak of the war, Yugoslavia did not take sides; it had promptly curtailed its military cooperation with Iraq. Nevertheless, Iran had seen Yugoslavia as favoring Iraq, and exploited documents stolen from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to accuse Yugoslavia of cooperating with the U.S. against Cuba during the 1979 Havana summit. It had taken two years to “normalize” Yugoslav-Iranian relations. Foreign Secretary Mojsov, at Spiljak’s invitation, presented the Yugoslav assessment that there are only slim chances that the war can be ended in the foreseeable future. The danger, said Mojsov, is that one side will collapse completely, producing a power vacuum and a regional conflict. The best hope, said Mojsov, is that both sides will become exhausted simultaneously and the conflict will dwindle away into a “propaganda war.”

11. Comment: Spiljak was obviously pleased with President Reagan’s invitation. He was his genial self throughout and listened intently to the Vice President, who clearly impressed Spiljak with his understanding of the intricacies of Middle East issues. Without being explicit Spiljak showed frustration over the behavior of several countries, including Syria, Libya, Iran, and Iraq.

Anderson

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, VP Bush Trip to N. Africa/E Europe 9/83 (4). Confidential; Immediate. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.