Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

208. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

DEPARTMENT OF STATE POSITION PAPER: YUGOSLAVIA AND THE QUESTION OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

The Department of State disagrees with a number of the key assumptions and judgments in the Department of Defense’s memorandum of March 15 on military technology transfer to Yugoslavia—in particular the inference that a credible basis is lacking upon which to assess Yugoslav intentions and capabilities to protect U.S. technology.

In describing Yugoslavia as having had “a long history of close ties to the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries” the DOD memorandum is misleading. In point of fact, while Yugoslavia has active economic ties and correct political relations with these countries, Belgrade’s posture toward the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact since the 1948 break has been rooted in distrust and wariness. Yugoslavia has no illusions that Moscow has reconciled itself to Tito’s establishment of a ‘‘renegade’’ and independent communist country, defiant of Moscow’s control. No Yugoslav leaders are known to favor accommodation to Soviet foreign policy goals. Soviet efforts over the years to seek special influence with the Yugoslav secret police have not borne fruit and are judged unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future (SNIE 15–83).² The Yugoslav military is loyal to the central government and, with its proud tradition as a successful partisan force during World War II, owes nothing to the Soviets. In fact, the Yugoslav order of battle is oriented to the north and east, not to the west.

We have no evidence that Yugoslavia has transferred sensitive U.S. weapons technology to the Warsaw Pact. Such transfer would in fact be against Yugoslavia’s own professed vital defense interests. Yugoslav political and military leaders have asserted to us that Yugoslavia has not and will not provide the Warsaw Pact—its most serious potential adversary—with information regarding sensitive Western items that are now or might someday be part of the Yugoslav military inventory. As the CIA evaluation of December 10, 1982 stated about the issue of future sensitive technology transfers to Yugoslavia: “It is our judgment that Belgrade would protect as best it could against unauthorized transfers to the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. They may even be more sensitive to these transfers than our COCOM partners, who have not always agreed with U.S. concerns in this area.”

This CIA evaluation, however, made no claim to having exhaustive proof of Yugoslav performance. On the commercial side, there is more that the U.S. could do—were travel funds available—under the terms of existing arrangements with the Yugoslavs in effect since 1976 to monitor end-use of non-military technology. That the military area is more difficult to monitor is a reflection of the determination with which the Yugoslavs safeguard their vital security. This concern to prevent penetration—aimed especially at the Soviets—is typified by a guarded attitude towards all outsiders, East or West. Even given the inherently closed nature of the Yugoslav military establishment, we disagree with the statement in the DOD memorandum that there is too little data to justify a judgment regarding Yugoslav intentions and capabilities. There is adequate empirical evidence to support the conclusion, based on abundant indications of Yugoslav concern for their own security, that Belgrade can and will safeguard our technology against its transfer to Soviet hands.

The Yugoslav need to replace aging Soviet equipment, matched by the U.S. view that a militarily capable Yugoslavia is a key element in preventing Soviet expansionism and hegemony in southern Europe, led the White House to reaffirm in a June 1, 1981 memorandum to Secretary Weinberger the U.S. arms transfer policy towards Yugoslavia.³ A central element of this policy is that the U.S. will be forthcoming in approving sales of arms and equipment required for Yugoslav defensive needs. The offer made during Secretary Weinberger’s December 1982 Yugoslavia visit⁴ to sell the F–20 aircraft was an important step in the implementation of this policy.

We disagree with the proposal in the referenced memorandum that further transfer of classified military equipment be made contingent upon Yugoslav acceptance of a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSMIA). The Yugoslavs regard such a general agreement as unacceptably intrusive and inconsistent with Yugoslavia’s nonaligned status. Belgrade’s break-away relationship with the USSR and its balancing act as an independent communist country between East and West place much greater constraints on Yugoslavia’s freedom of action in military cooperation with the U.S. than is the case with Sweden and Austria. These latter countries are neutral but not nonaligned, and their security situations differ fundamentally from Belgrade’s.

Yugoslav military representatives indicated to us in 1981 and 1982 fundamental opposition to a GSMIA, when this idea was broached. Insistence now by the U.S. on a GSMIA would be seen by the Yugoslavs as a reversal and a hardening in our arms transfer policy. If the Yugoslavs were to refuse to sign a GSMIA, as we judge likely, further military sales to Yugoslavia would be precluded and our bilateral political relationship would also suffer. While the Yugoslavs need and want our cooperation in the military area, they will not enter an arrangement which would appear to alter their formal stance of maintaining equidistance from the superpowers. Over a period of years it may be possible to bring Yugoslavia closer to the status of a Sweden or Austria, but in the meantime we will have to deal with Yugoslavia as it is.

We continue to believe that it is in the U.S. national interest to be forthcoming in approving sales of arms and equipment required for Yugoslav defensive needs. As with Secretary Weinberger’s offer regarding the F–20, any sale involving expensive and modern technology should be handled on a case-by-case basis, subject to reaching satisfactory financial arrangements for payment and appropriate technology safeguards for the particular transaction. Should Yugoslavia opt for the F–20, a first step would be to work out a mutually acceptable technical data transfer schedule.

We believe that the section of the draft NSDD relating to technology transfer adequately reflects the Yugoslav situation and the need for normal prudence, consistent with existing directives. Nonetheless, we would have no objection to expanding this section (on page 2) to read: “—The U.S. will seek, in accordance with our established arms transfer policy toward Yugoslavia, as reconfirmed in the White House Memorandum of June 1, 1981 to the Secretary of Defense, to expand military cooperation with that country. We will be forthcoming in approving sales of arms and equipment required for Yugoslav defensive needs on a case-by-case basis, subject to appropriate technology safeguards and financial arrangements. The U.S. will encourage Western European Allies to follow similar policies.”

In sum, the Department of State opposes revisions to the NSDD suggesting a need for extreme caution, questioning Yugoslav intentions or credibility, or requiring prior Yugoslav agreement to a GSMIA as a precondition for further transfers. Such revisions are not justified by the facts and could undercut U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia at a crucial time.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) Records, NSDD 133 3/14/1984 (2). Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper.
2. Available in the CIA’s Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, document number 0000273239.
3. See Document 191.
4. See Document 205.