Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

209. Paper Prepared by the Interagency Group on Yugoslavia¹

Washington, undated

U.S. SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE FOR YUGOSLAVIA

Conclusions of the Interagency Group on Yugoslavia

In accordance with NSDD–54 of September 2, 1982 (United States Policy Toward Eastern Europe), which provided that Yugoslavia be treated in a separate NSDD, an Interagency Group reviewed the implementation of U.S. policy toward that country.

The group agreed that the U.S. should maintain its policy of support for the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia, and should continue to encourage Yugoslavia’s gradual liberalization. It was agreed that Yugoslavia is an important obstacle to Soviet expansionism in southern Europe and that an independent, economically viable, stable and militarily capable Yugoslavia—able to resist pressures from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact—serves Western and U.S. interests. The Group noted also that an independent and economically viable Yugoslavia is a useful reminder to other countries in Eastern Europe of the advantages of independence of Moscow and of friendly relations with the West.

The Group reaffirmed that the U.S. Government should continue to employ a combination of political, economic and other measures in the implementation of our policy. The Group noted the value of high-level visits and discussions and agreed that the U.S. Government should seek to expedite progress in those fields of cooperation already underway. With respect to security assistance, the group noted that the White House Memorandum of June l, 1981 to the Secretary of Defense, reaffirming U.S. arms transfer policy toward Yugoslavia, provided a basis for further progress in the area of military cooperation.

With respect to Yugoslavia’s economic situation, the Group concluded that vigorous implementation of a U.S. policy of support for Yugoslavia will be particularly important during the current period of Yugoslav economic and financial weakness. The Group noted the impression that the Government of Yugoslavia has that a major rescheduling could have serious domestic political consequences within Yugoslavia and for Yugoslav foreign policy. It was the Group’s view that a protracted Yugoslav economic crisis could undermine Yugoslavia’s capacity to withstand Soviet pressures and Yugoslavia’s constructive relationship with the West.

The Group affirmed that other Western countries also have a major stake in preserving Yugoslavia as an independent entity on NATO’s southeastern flank and as an alternate model for the communist world. The Group agreed that the Senior Interagency Group for International Economic Policy will serve as the coordinating body for cooperative efforts by U.S. Government agencies in international financial assistance measures to assist Yugoslavia.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) Records, NSDD 133 3/14/1984 (2). Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the paper.