Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

184. Telegram From the Mission in West Berlin to the Department of State¹

2904/Depto 4012.

West Berlin, October 11, 1988, 1209Z

SUBJECT

• DepSec-Ceausescu Meeting—Bilateral Issues.

1. Confidential entire text.

2. Deputy Secretary’s two and one half hour October 10 meeting with President Ceausescu began and ended with mutual expressions of intention to improve bilateral relations, which both sides agreed had deteriorated over the past 2–3 years. The DepSec reviewed US concerns, including human and religious rights, commercial and cultural problems, and urban and rural reconstruction. Ceausescu rejected all of the DepSec’s concerns, saying they represented interference in internal affairs and were in any case based on a false understanding of Romanian realities. He said MFN loss had hurt business and he hoped the DepSec would work to lay the basis for resumption of MFN without conditions. He expressed a desire for continued collaboration with Boeing, GE, and Control Data.

3. Despite the virtually total absence of any meeting of minds on the DepSec’s specifics, the tone of the discussion was calm and constructive. Ceausescu seemed in good physical and mental shape. He was accompanied by Ambassador Kirk. The discussion on international matters is reported septel.² End summary.

4. After the initial pleasantries, the DepSec noted that the Reagan administration’s policy was to treat each Eastern European nation as an individual country, with its own history and pride, and to seek to improve relations with it. When he asked President Ceausescu in 1986, on his first visit to Romania,³ whether the President was interested in joining the US in taking steps to improve relations between the two, Ceausescu had said he wished to do so. Both had recognized that the US and Romania had differences, especially on human rights, but also that they agreed on many international problems. They identified narcotics and terrorism as two areas where they could work closely together. The DepSec said his second visit, in February of 1988,⁴ had been a disappointment to both sides; the US felt there had been insufficient progress on human rights issues, and President Ceausescu had chosen to renounce MFN.

5. DepSec said he was arriving on his current visit wondering where our relations were headed. We have many remaining concerns, and we have not made the progress we had hoped. We had made very satisfactory progress in our relationships with other Eastern European countries, and had made outstanding progress with some. While President Ceausescu felt that we were meddling in Romania’s internal affairs by raising human rights issues, our history has given us very strong feelings about human freedoms, and we choose our friends from among those with similar standards. We had not found much understanding in Romania on human rights issues. We were concerned about the nearly 40 percent drop in approvals for emigration for family reunification, the backlog of marriage cases, and a handful of adoption cases. We continue to be concerned about religious issues such as the availability of religious literature and new church construction.

6. We were also troubled, the DepSec said, by the restrictions on our journalists. There had been no journalist visas issued to our correspondents recently, no appointments had been made for them, and they occasionally had their film confiscated. In addition, we, like other nations, had been concerned about the Romanian Government’s rural and urban reconstruction program, including reports that homes were being destroyed on a regular basis and their occupants forced to move to other quarters.

7. Turning to cultural exchanges, the DepSec said we have tried to develop programs for exchanges of professional, scientific, and cultural groups. We regretted the Romanians closing down our Film-making in America exhibit⁵ and their unwillingness to accept our Design in America exhibit. Both had been well received in other East European countries. The number of American Fulbright professors in Romania had dropped from 6 to 2, and no Romanian professors were allowed to come to the US under this program.

8. In the economic arena, the DepSec said, we have not had the progress we would have liked. The trade is imbalanced; Romania exports about four times as much to us as we do to Romania. Decisions on major business deals such as Boeing aircraft and GE turbines take a long time. No US company has invested in Romania in recent years, and there have been a series of disappointments for the one US company which has a joint venture—Control Data. Meetings of our Joint Economic Commission have not been successful; there have been no tangible results from them.

9. Concluding his presentation on bilateral matters, the DepSec said he expected President Ceausescu had a similar list of issues where he was not satisfied. The DepSec would like to return to a question he had asked two years ago. Do you want better relations? If we do, there is a lot of work to do and a lot of subjects to be worked on. The DepSec then turned to international questions (septel).

10. Once the DepSec finished his entire presentation, Ceausescu paused to reflect and said he would like to ask a question, having in mind the nature of the DepSec’s presentation. Had the DepSec come to give an inventory of the areas where we disagree and to conclude that there were no good prospects for an improvement in our relations? The DepSec said no, he had come to improve our relations.

11. Ceausescu then reviewed the history of US-Romanian relations since World War II, concluding that our relations had been especially good under Presidents Nixon and Ford, even though Romania did not have MFN at the time. In the latter part of the Reagan administration, relations developed more and more negatively. According to the U.S., this was due to Romania, but this did not correspond to reality. Emigration, which the US claims is the core of the human rightrs issue, is an example; it had been much smaller under Nixon and Ford, but no one considered that a problem in our relationship. US political conceptions have changed since earlier Republican administrations; the US now feels it has the right to interefere in Romania’s internal affairs. The anti-communist feelings of the Reagan administration contribute to this, as does the administration’s feeling that countries like Romania should be governed by the ideas and principles accepted in the US. There are demonstrations daily around the world against US interference in areas such as the Philippines, Greece, Asia, Africa, and Europe, not to speak of Iran.

12. It is a fact, Ceausescu said, that US [garble] rather than improved, over the last 2–3 years. The negative balance over the course of the Reagan administration is not due to Romania. Romania has not violated human rights. There has been a continuous improvement in the standard of living, and culture, of the Romanian people. The US should base its policies on a realistic appraisal of the situation in the countries with which it deals, not on a false image. The US Embassy, with its large staff, should present a realistic picture. The entire Romanian people supports the government’s policies. There are a few insignificant persons who are not happy with some things, and it is with them that the Embassy deals. Ceausescu had spoken during his trip the day before⁶ with a number of farmers who told them they supported his policy. These few farmers were worth incomparably more than the people with whom the Embassy dealt. The US should not base its view of Romania on a few people of ill will. The situation in Romania is much better than it was in the period when Nixon and Ford were President; workers’ income is two and one half times more now; meat consumption has tripled; there are over 10 million people in new housing. What the DepSec said about emigration for family reunification, as it has in the past, even though it does not favor emigration. He would not even refer to the DepSec’s points on religious questions as they were contrary to reality and, if made public, would increase anti-American sentiment among the Romanian people.

13. The Romanians are proud people, Ceausescu said. They like true friends, but not those who come with declarations of friendship and insult us once they leave our country. Good relations between nations cannot be built upon insults. The DepSec was in Romania twice. It is very hard for the Romanian people to understand why a US representative would make anti-Romanian statements in a neighboring country. DepSec probably thought, Ceausescu said, that this would please his hosts but this is the wrong way to behave, not just with Romania, but with any country.

14. Ceausescu said he did not understand what relation urban and rural reconstruction—mentioned by the DepSec—had to do with US-Romanian relations. Washington and Philadelphia do not look as they did 100 or so years ago. This did not mean human rights had been violated, although in this case it was true that many Indians’ homes had been demolished. Romania was reconstructing its cities to raise the people’s standard of living. Ceausescu knew the DepSec had gone the day before to see new rural housing that was built by the people, not the government. They should not have to ask US officials for permission to build. On the nationalities question, the DepSec should read the letters from the National Council of Hungarian Workers, a firm, simple people, or study the statements of the Chairman of the Christian Democratic Group in the European Parliament, who had just visited Romania. Romania is trying to improve the life of its people as much as possible. Ceausescu did not understand why this was an issue in US-Romanian relations.

15. Ceausescu said Romania wanted good economic relations with the US and had tried to find ways to cooperate with US companies despite the loss of MFN. Romania had no problem with General Electric, though discussions on payment questions continue. Romania expects 8–10 years of cooperation with GE, and longer in third-country markets. Control Data’s problems are ones of licenses, which depend on the US. Romania is agreeable in principle to continue close cooperation with Control Data. The problems with Boeing are financial ones which are under discussion and will be resolved. There is no political problem. Romania wants to expand its cooperation with Boeing under the new situation. Negotiations are proceeding to this end. The trade imbalance is a consequence of Romania’s debt repayment program. Once the debt is paid, Ceausescu hopes that imports and exports with the US will increase.

16. It was true that Romania had renounced MFN, Ceausescu said. He viewed this as a temporary situation, expecting that the US administration would find a way to grant MFN without conditions. Romania had therefore agreed with the US not to give MFN renunciation any publicity. Romania had respected that agreement. The loss of MFN hurt trade, even though it was not a tragedy. Ceausescu said (with a smile) that he had hoped the Deputy Secretary’s main proposal on this visit would be to study how to restore MFN so the next administration could have a clear picture of the way to do this.

17. Ceausescu concluded his comments on bilateral relations by saying it was a pity that historians would say that the Reagan administration had been responsible for a deterioration in US-Romanian relations rather than an improvement in them. The Romanian side was strongly in favor of finding ways to encourage the steady improvement of relations with the US. Even recent experience had shown that we get good results when both sides show good will.

18. After Ceausescu’s presentation on international matters (septel), the DepSec said he was glad to hear Ceausescu’s comment that our recent difficulties are a temporary phenomenon and that we can find ways to restore the good relations the US and Romania have enjoyed in the past. Part of the problem might be that Americans were very frank; they said what they thought. Ceausescu said Romanians do also. The DepSec stated that good relations have to be based on the willingness of both sides to be friends with each other, even if they do not agree. Ceausescu said Romania was ready to discuss anything, but actions should not be taken to harm relations. The Romanians had proposed a round-table, and discussions between legislatures.

19. The DepSec said we must meet and discuss; that clarifies problems and makes progress. We have been able to do that with the USSR. We would like to be able to do that with Romania as well. Ceausescu said US-Romanian problems are different than US-Soviet problems. The DepSec agreed that we had no arms control problems with Romania. Other issues, such as human rights and economic questions, were similar.

20. After a brief discussion of the Middle East (septel) the meeting concluded with a statement by the DepSec that we would continue to work for improved bilateral relations and a response by Ceausescu that Romania would also work for good relations and would welcome US efforts to that end.

Gilmore

1. Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Subject File, Romania—Bilateral 1988 (2). Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bucharest.
2. Telegram 2903 from West Berlin, October 11, reported the discussion between Whitehead and Ceausescu on international issues. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880903–0141)
3. See Document 148.
4. See Documents 172 and 173.
5. See footnote 4, Document 166.
6. October 9.