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ROMANIA: THE BLOC’S “MAVERICK” INCREASINGLY ISOLATED
Rigid internal control has long been the essential precondition for Ceausescu’s relative independence from Moscow—and consequently, his ability to play the maverick to win favorable attention in the West. But the Romanian leader’s human rights record and nearly [Page 504] pathological efforts to eliminate outside influence from the country leave him increasingly out of step with both East and West.
His decision this spring to press ahead with Sistematizarea—the destruction of rural villages and construction of urban agro-industrial complexes in their place—precipitated a breakdown in relations with neighboring Hungary and generated a groundswell of negative reaction from Western European governments and publics; it may yet trigger organized internal opposition to Ceausescu.
Offensiveness is the best defense
That the rural-restructuring program will destroy much of the physical evidence of Hungarian culture in Transylvania was not lost on the Hungarian public, which was already sensitized to the plight of ethnic minorities in Romania. But the Hungarians were not alone in protesting; Bonn also reportedly weighed in heavily with respect to ethnic German enclaves.
The unprecedented demonstrations in Budapest that followed seem only to have stiffened Ceausescu’s resolve. He closed the Hungarian consulate in Cluj, in effect forcing the Grosz leadership to back off. Ceausescu may have believed that an escalation of tensions would force the Soviets, who have no sympathy for the Romanian leadership or its policies, to take the line publicly that the issue was an internal affair between two Pact members.
Aware of increasing internal discontent over his policies, the Romanian leader may believe that a frenzy of rhetoric against the “irredentists” in Budapest will bolster flagging support at home. That gambit could backfire: there is evidence of growing differences within the party leadership over Ceausescu’s policies. Sistematizarea itself seems to win no friends among ethnic Romanian party officials, many of whom trace their roots to villages Ceausescu is razing.
Tensions with Hungary reinforce hard line in Vienna
Bucharest has so far single-handedly blocked agreement on a final human rights document at the CSCE conference in Vienna. A skilled practitioner of consensus politics, Ceausescu wants to forestall proposals that would provide for external verification of human rights compliance. But other CSCE signatories are becoming increasingly exasperated by the Romanian behavior in Vienna—and progressively less circumspect about criticizing Romania’s human rights performance.
Bucharest has in the past, and may again, run interference for Moscow and the rest of the bloc in staking out a hard-line position in CSCE in an attempt to water down “intrusive” features of human-rights provisions. But Ceausescu now is certainly going it alone (though he [Page 505] may hope to win sympathy from hard-liners elsewhere in the bloc). The Soviets want to get European conventional arms negotiations started, and an agreement on human rights concerns must be reached before the CSCE can move to that issue.
Opting out of CEMA’s “unified” market
Bucharest has always balked at Soviet efforts to encourage closer CEMA economic integration. Now Ceausescu seems to be digging his heels in further in the face of changes proposed by Moscow and backed strongly by Hungary and Poland. Others are less enthusiastic, but at the 44th CEMA session held in Prague early this month, all except Romania nonetheless endorsed proposals to accelerate economic integration and freer movement of goods and lead, eventually, to a “unified market.”
The Romanian regime fears that Gorbachev’s push for direct links between enterprises and research organizations will lead to greater direct Soviet influence. Also, restructuring CEMA would entail such moves as limited currency convertibility that would dilute each national leadership’s power and privileges.
- Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Subject File, USSR—Internal 1988 (1).↩