Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

172. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

Depto 1044.

Bucharest, February 6, 1988

SUBJECT

• A Hard Message to Romania.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. My message to the Romanians these past 24 hours was a stark one. I told them that I thought there was less than an even chance that MFN would be renewed past June. State must make a recommendation to the President by May 1, he decides by June 3, and then Congress has 90 days to object. I told everyone I spoke to that I thought there would be trouble at each stage of the process for two reasons: Romania’s human rights record is miserable and their economic policy is oppressive.

3. I started the day by spending two and one-half hours in the Foreign Ministry, first with my counterpart and then with Foreign Minister Totu. I gave them ten specific examples of why we thought their human rights record was below standard, including their emigration figures (they hotly dispute our numbers), their continuing discrimination against religious groups and the Hungarian minority, our long lists of unsolved cases (which I handed over), and their decision to close a very successful USIA film-making exhibit late last year.² Their answers on most of my examples were weak, and I got a full blast of the “don’t interfere in our internal affairs” lecture. I responded, as I have in all of my visits in Eastern Europe, that as a sovereign country we have a right to choose our friends, and one of the ways we do so is by judging how they treat their people. The Foreign Minister and I also reviewed the international scene. He is just back from Israel and thinks Shamir is serious about trying to find a way out. He didn’t have much good to say about the Soviet Union. They couldn’t be clearer in their call for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and other areas where Moscow is making trouble, and I will commend them publicly for that at my press conference.

4. I then spent three difficult hours with Ceausescu. Although he seemed less vigorous than a year ago, he was no less stubborn. I began by giving him the letter from the President,³ which, in a friendly way, highlights the looming problem with MFN. As he listened to the translation, Ceausescu became obviously irritated, and his frowning and his sighing increased throughout my opening presentation. When I had finished—and I made comments on more than just our human rights concerns—he launched a bitter attack on the President’s letter, saying that we were meddling in their internal affairs and that he would never accept MFN on these conditions. He talked non-stop for an hour. He termed our reference to the discrimination against the Hungarian minority a “hostile act against a friendly country,” and reiterated that, since Romania meets the letter of Jackson-Vanik, it is unacceptable for us to complain about anything else. Oddly enough, he then moved on to discuss ways we could improve U.S.-Romanian relations, and told me again how much he would like the President to visit on his way to or from Moscow. He then gave a routine description of his foreign policy objectives.

5. I was a bit feisty in return, even a bit confrontational. He started to back away from his more extreme positions, but all through he was snide and almost rude. It was an unpleasant and disappointing meeting, and I intend to say so at my press conference. I will focus my disappointment on him, and not on the Romanian Government or people.

6. Just after my meeting with the President, I attended a reception hosted by Roger Kirk so that I might meet some of the most prominent religious figures in the country and hear their stories. Invitees were told by the police not to come. Many stayed away. Some of those who did arrive, including an 85-year-old former Prime Minister, were harassed on their way down the street. A former Ambassador to the U.S., who has recently been critical of the government, was prevented from coming at all. I am sending Tom Simons to try to see him this morning to show our solidarity. All of those I talked to have some kind of trouble with the government. They are courageous people, and I told them so. They are very glad to have a connection with the U.S. Embassy here. We know we stand for freedom, but it is often only in a group like that that we get the chance to really feel it.

7. I leave here disappointed. There is so much change apparent in countries like Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Here, Ceausescu is so astonishingly isolated that he told me with a straight face that the national income of his people had risen 5 years in a row. He is blinded by his sycophants. We agree with so much of what they say on international issues, but their internal policies are reprehensible. The balance of our interests has always convinced us that it was worth keeping a dialogue going, and I think that is still true, even in the face of my conversation today. Perhaps my press statement today will shock them into some action. Even though they say it isn’t, MFN is important to them (it will affect about $300 million of their $800 exports) and we want to try to get them to start cleaning up their act between now and June. In doing so I realize we are taking a calculated risk. Separating us from Ceausescu is one thing, but he may well retaliate—at least temporarily—on some of the very people we are trying to help. I think it is a risk worth taking. But we will need to watch the results, and keep flexible as we go along.

Kirk

1. Source: Department of State, Records from Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Lot 03 D 256, Chron February 1988. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Grossman.
2. See footnote 4, Document 166.
3. See Document 171.