Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

182. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

5269.

Bucharest, July 13, 1988, 1359Z

SUBJECT

• U.S. Should Distance Itself Somewhat Further From GOR.

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. Summary: As the Romanian Government’s domestic policies look more and more awful, its “good” foreign policies less and less unique, and its responsiveness on issues of interest to U.S. (e.g., emigration) less helpful, the U.S. has adopted a cooler, more distant posture toward the GOR. After examining the arguments against further distancing—the effect on human rights and emigration; on Romania’s independence vis-a-vis the USSR, the Warsaw Pact, and CEMA; and on our present and future access to Romanian society—we conclude that some additional distancing is the correct course.

3. Thus we would see it proper for U.S. spokesmen at home, in international fora and on VOA to be more openly critical of GOR policies and of the plight of the Romanian people. We would favor adopting a somewhat cooler tone in bilateral dealings, emphasizing our concerns over Romanian policies toward the U.S. and the Romanian people, and paying less attention to Romania’s international role. We would think twice about sending or receiving emissaries to discuss broad foreign policy issues. We would hold off the annual meeting of the inter-governmental economic commission until justified by specific U.S. economic interest. We would be more sparing with ambassadorial consultations at MFA on international matters.

4. At the same time, we would want to make it clear that the U.S. retains an interest in Romania’s future, that we are sensitive to and interested in the welfare of the Romanian people, and that we have not “written off” the Romanian state. We would maintain a vigorous Embassy program of contacts with all levels of society, including mid-level governmental officials and potential future political leaders, and use these contacts to emphasize our interest in a prosperous, independent Romania. End summary.

5. The deterioration in Romania’s image is plain to all. Ceausescu’s misguided domestic policies are getting worse, while those in most of the “socialist world” are getting better. In foreign affairs the positive elements in Ceausescu’s policy become less unique every day. The negative elements—CSCE, Hungary, MFN renunciation, etc.—stand out more clearly. GOR performance on matters of specific concern to us has deteriorated. The USG has already reacted to these developments by a somewhat cooler posture toward the GOR—through our public statements, our diplomatic contacts, and our postponement of reception of a high-level envoy, but logic seems to call for even more distancing.

6. The arguments against this course have determined U.S. policy over the past 10 to 15 years. We felt that friendly relations—and specifically MFN—would bring human rights concessions. This worked, on modest scale. There was very little progress in the past 12 months, however, and the MFN lever is now gone. Emigration approvals jumped after MFN was introduced in 1975, and have fallen off markedly since the GOR renounced MFN. They are still running at a rate of about 1,000 per year. They might very well drop further if we follow the course of “cooling” relations. That is a disadvantage of that course.

7. Romanian independence in foreign policy, Warsaw Pact, and CEMA matters was a principal motive for our positive attiude toward the GOR, but it was not the result of our attitude. Some of Romania’s foreign policy stands have become less significant as other countries (including the USSR) have adopted some of them and Ceausescu’s international weight has dropped. U.S. aloofness will not decrease Ceausescu’s opposition to a centralized CEMA and to having Soviet troops on his soil. The question is whether it will materially reduce his ability to maintain his independence. We would say, “somewhat, but not very much.” The U.S. relationship was a real boost to Ceausescu in the late 60’s and the 70’s. But he has already lost his special position with the U.S., including MFN, and it has been obvious for several years that the U.S. heartily disapproves of his domestic policies. Ceausescu’s ability to resist the Soviets depends much more on the strength of his internal position and the restraints on Soviet actions, measured against his growing economic dependence on the USSR, than it does on his tattered U.S. relationship.

8. Our access to Romanian society depends on GOR acquiescence. Even the radios can be jammed. This access has decreased in some areas in recent years—Fulbrights, IV’s big exhibits. It is still considerable. A significant further cooling of relations could lead to further restrictions on cultural contacts. The VOA and RFE, our principal means of communication, would remain under all but the most hostile relations (due to the expense of jamming, among other things). Our exhibits, Amparts, and the library would be vulnerable; we doubt the library would go unless relations get really bad, but entry to it might be further restricted. Embassy contacts in Bucharest and outside it could be limited further. All this would make it harder to reach people with our message. If channels of influence were cut off, it would make it more cumbersome to build up programs under a new regime.

9. We conclude therefore that a significant cooling of relations from our side would have costs, but we do not think they are sufficient to outweigh the obvious advantages—in terms of opinion in the world, the U.S., and Romania itself—of further distancing ourselves from a reactionary, repressive regime which is driving its economy to ruin and its people to despair.

10. Therefore we recommend a continuation, even some strengthening, of the current trend to cool our relations with the GOR. We believe U.S. spokesmen should be more openly critical of Romania—be it the VOA, in CSCE, the Human Rights Commission, or the U.S. press. We sould adopt a somewhat cooler tone in our private bilateral meetings, emphasizing our concerns over Romanian policies and converting our “appreciation for Romanian independence” into concern that Romania’s isolation could reduce its real independence through loss of Western support.

11. We would think twice before sending or receiving emissaries to discuss foreign policy issues. Thus we would not seek to activate exchanges of experts on the Middle East or Africa, or to bring U.S. arms control negotiators here. We would even counsel against trips to Bucharest to consult on the UNGA, preferring lower-visibility talks by the Embassy here and the delegation in New York. We would be more sparing with Embassy briefings on consultations at MFA on international affairs, and normally conduct them below the ambassador level unless we wanted to make a particularly significant point, e.g., a major UN vote.

12. We would continue our annual naval visits, but not seek to increase them. We would avoid top-level military visits. We should tell the Romanians that lower-level military exchanges will depend on greater openness and accessibility to Romanian military installations, equipment and personalities. Our standard should be the kind of access which is now emerging in other Pact countries (specifically the USSR).

13. We would avoid scheduling the annual intergovernmental economic commission meeting, explaining to the GOR that we see little point in it unless there is a marked Romanian effort to increase imports from the U.S., move forward on major commercial transactions of interest to us, and improve the treatment of U.S. business.

14. In pursuing this distancing policy, it is essential that we make it clear that our disapproval does not mean the U.S. is “forgetting about Romania,” a very strong fear of those Romanians who are most sympathetic to U.S. objectives. We would pursue our programs to inform the Romanian public about the U.S. and its policies through USIA activities, Embassy travel, and representational functions. We would continue to seek Embassy appointments with government ministries to investigate, report, and represent. In short, we would try to maintain a regular, active—but not showy—Embassy program to show that there is an American (and Western) alternative to Ceausescu’s policies, that the U.S. retains a strong interest in Romania’s future, and that we are determined to maintain as broad contacts throughout Romanian society as possible. Our disapproval of Ceausescu should not lead to the withdrawal of the USG human and material resources we need to convince those Romanians who will make up a transition or successor government that the United States has an active engaged policy in this country.

Kirk

1. Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Subject File, Romania—Bilateral 1988 (1). Secret; Priority. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Paris, Vienna for the delegation to the CSCE, the Department of Commerce, USIA, and Eastern European posts. Perina forwarded the telegram to Ledsky under cover of an undated note that reads, “Nelson: I agree w/ attached. We should keep in mind & use sometime, because Tom Simons will never implement. Rudy.” (Ibid.)