Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

137. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

No. 1143–AR

Washington, July 31, 1985

(U) ROMANIA: TOUGH CHOICES AHEAD

(C) Summary

The Ceausescu regime faces many tough choices, most of them arising from the necessity of shoring up a badly faltering economy, battered by a devastatingly cold winter and besieged by hard currency debts. The US Congress soon will consider renewing Romania’s most-favored-nation status and will be looking closely at the regime’s questionable human rights record during its deliberations. To gain MFN renewal, Ceausescu may be compelled to give his citizens greater freedom, at the risk of losing control of his regime.

The Soviets meanwhile may use Romania’s growing economic dependency upon Moscow as a means of forcing Bucharest to toe the bloc line more dutifully. Should Ceausescu be compelled to be less independent of the Soviets in foreign policy matters, he risks losing the little respect his countrymen accord him and what little legitimacy his regime has in their eyes. But to reject the US and Soviet demands and forgo their economic help may mean pushing his country into bankruptcy.

Finally, the Romanians may have to make a decision in Ceausescu’s absence—about who will succeed him. Ceausescu is rumored to be seriously ill; deciding who will succeed him promises to produce a nasty struggle.

* * *

Domestic Affairs

(C) Severe Winter Weather. This year the Romanian people suffered through their most miserable winter since World War II: rivers frozen, power plants closed, and food shortages worse than ever. The government as usual responded with draconian measures: banning the use of private cars, terminating construction projects, furloughing workers without pay, and drastically reducing electric power to plants and homes alike. Relief came only with the warmer weather.

(C) The disastrous winter only emphasized the steady downward trend of the Romanian economy over the past several years. Yet there is no indication that Ceausescu intends to deviate from his allegiance to the centrally planned economy or attempt those economic reforms pursued successfully by Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria.

(C) Ceausescu, a Man for All Seasons. Nicolae Ceausescu, age 67, was elected to his fourth five-year term as General Secretary during the 13th Party Congress last November. His propagandists churned out the requisite personality cult prose for the occasion—including a biography entitled A Man for History, A Man for Eternity. The fulsome accolades have had little impact: Most Romanians resent the dreary, repressive regime and are increasingly dissatisfied with the steadily declining standard of living.

(S) Although Ceausescu is rumored to have serious health problems (prostate-related), he gives no sign of being willing to surrender power, nor has any likely successor surfaced. Over the years, Ceausescu systematically has demoted, rotated in and out of offices, or forced into retirement virtually anyone who might have challenged his rule.

(C) His son Nicu was elevated to a candidate membership in the ruling Political Executive Committee at the last party congress, raising speculation he is being groomed as a successor. Whether this would take place is problematic; the Ceausescu family cult is unpopular with party and populace alike even though there appears to be no organized opposition.

Foreign Affairs

(U) Opposition . . . The Romanian communist party issued its “declaration of independence” from the USSR in 1964. In 1984, the government refused to follow the Soviet lead in boycotting the Los Angeles Olympic games and was the only Warsaw Pact country to participate. In the intervening years, Bucharest has charted a relatively independent foreign policy course while it has remained within the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Deviating significantly from positions adopted by the Soviet Union, Romania:

— established diplomatic relations with the FRG (1967) without coordinating with other Pact members;

— refused to break diplomatic relations with Israel in the wake of the 1967 war;

— refused to participate in the 1968 Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia;

— endorsed the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty;

— refused to join the rest of the Pact in condemning China; and

— endorsed Western amendments at the Madrid CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) meeting.

(C) Recently, Ceausescu reportedly obstructed and delayed the Warsaw Treaty renewal proceedings by advocating a much more limited extension period than the original 20 plus 10 years.

(U) . . . or Facade? Critics of the regime charge that Romania is by no means independent of Soviet control. They maintain that given Ceausescu’s orthodoxy at home and the stability of his regime, the Kremlin regards his foreign policy aberrations as relatively innocuous. According to these critics, it serves Soviet purposes to allow Ceausescu to play the world statesman—it bolsters his standing at home and placates Romanian nationalistic sentiments without perceptible damage to Soviet interests.

(U) However one interprets the foreign policy interplay between the Soviets and the Romanians, the growing economic problems in both these countries might well determine the evolution of their relationship. In particular, Romania’s faltering economy, its weak financial standing with the West, and its desperate need for energy supplies may intensify economic dependence upon Moscow. That in turn could presage greater political dependency.

Human Rights

(U) Romania’s human rights record was heavily attacked at the recently concluded CSCE Human Rights Experts Meeting in Ottawa. That same record was criticized in the US press and in the Congress during the hearings in June on the renewal of Romania’s MFN trading status.

(C) Although the regime steadfastly defends its behavior, it occasionally has been responsive to criticisms about particular human rights and dissident cases, primarily because of the potential foreign policy consequences of failure to respond. Currently, that incentive is especially potent.

(C) The Romanian economy is tauter than ever and extremely vulnerable to shock, be it from a bad harvest or sharply declining terms of trade. Romania’s exports to the United States in 1984 totaled $897 million. Without MFN status the value of these exports could fall considerably, and the resultant loss of hard currency could worsen Romania’s debt-payment capacity.

(C) Bucharest is well aware that congressional approval of its MFN status hinges in large measure on the evidence of Romania’s human rights record. Thus its usual heavy hand with dissidents and human rights activists has been somewhat restrained in recent months. Passports finally were issued to dissident writer Dorin Tudoran and to dissident priest Father Calciu, both just before Congress resumed MFN deliberations on July 23.

(C) Ceausescu’s Choices

If the Ceausescu regime is to survive it needs help from both East and West, especially the US and the USSR. It will be under pressure from the US Congress to lessen its domestic repressiveness in exchange for MFN approval. But if Ceausescu chooses to allow his people more freedom he may jeopardize his hold on his regime.

The Soviets, for their part, probably will insist that Ceausescu follow bloc policies more strictly—in exchange for a new trade and aid package which the regime desperately needs and in line with the efforts of Gorbachev to tighten controls over his Warsaw Pact allies. If Ceausescu chooses to go along with Soviet demands—and the sad state of the Romanian economy almost compels him to comply with even these tough new Soviet trade terms—then he must give up some of his independence in foreign policy matters. But over the years it has been Ceausescu’s occasional deviation from the Soviet foreign policy line which has commanded the respect of his countrymen and, to them, has given his regime at least some legitimacy.

The help Ceausescu needs from the US and the USSR to save his country’s failing economy will be personally costly; he simultaneously could lose both control and legitimacy. But if Ceausescu chooses to reject these US and Soviet demands, he risks bankrupting his country.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Romania—Cables (5). Secret. Drafted by Edwin Booth; approved by Mautner.