Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

136. Message From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

6523.

Washington, April 1, 1985, 1535Z

SUBJECT

• Meeting with President Ceausescu (U).

1. (C) Ambassador Funderburk and I met with President Ceausescu on 30 Mar for about an hour. There were no surprises in Ceausescu’s themes, and he appeared reasonably candid and willing to listen. The range of topics was similar to that of earlier meetings with Minister of Defense Olteanu and Foreign Minister Andrei—arms reductions, elimination of mistrust among nations, particularly between the United States and Soviet Union, defensive nature of Romania and its goal to remain independent, state of US-Romanian bilateral relations, and the militarization of space.

2. (C) After a brief discussion of my itinerary, his reelection,² and my talks with his Ministers, I conveyed President Reagan’s greetings to Ceausescu, and expressed appreciation on behalf of the President for Ceausescu’s letters of early March.³

3. (C) From the outset, Ceausescu stressed Romania’s independence and the dedication of the armed forces to the maintenance of its sovereignty—a task which was defensive in nature. He pointed out that his country’s policies were directed toward the preservation of peace. I noted that our objective was preservation of peace for the world, and liberty for our people and allies.

4. (S) Ceausescu went to considerable length in laying out his views on disarmament. He urged that we and the Soviets make accommodations that would make nuclear war impossible. He noted that he was a soldier himself and that military men should be the first to cry out against nuclear warfare. He emphasized that disarmament and peace were fundamental problems of our time. I agreed that the danger of nuclear war was a critical issue and said that Americans don’t want nuclear war—or any other war. I pointed out that when we signed the ABM Treaty with the Soviets⁴ we thought the next step would be drastic reductions in offensive weapons systems, but I noted that such reductions hadn’t occurred and that Soviet capabilities had grown considerably, particularly ICBM capabilities. I reiterated what I had told his Ministers—that the United States has built a force which makes clear that we have no plans or intentions to attack anyone, but that we want to make sure that any potential enemy knows that if he attacks us, his attack will not succeed.

5. (S) With respect to arms reductions, Ceausescu said that the Soviets do want to reduce their weapons and Gorbachev would like to reach an understanding that will permit a sizeable reduction by both sides. Ceausescu reiterated Soviet views on a moratorium to help reduce mistrust and serve as a first step toward a general agreement on arms reduction. I indicated that I was pleased to hear that the Soviets want to reach an arms reduction agreement. I told him that nations of the NATO alliance were concerned about the Soviet offer of a moratorium.⁵ I pointed out that the Soviets have rushed to deploy 414 INF missiles, while NATO has deployed only a handful. I added that the Soviets had just completed modernizing their ICBM force, while the United States had only started to modernize the ICBMs of its nuclear deterrent. I stressed that we seek equal security between ourselves and the Soviets, and that on the face of it, the moratorium suggested by the Soviets appeared to jeopardize the security of NATO and the United States. I told Ceausescu that we would take every Soviet offer for serious negotiations in good faith, and expressed the hope that we and the Soviets could reach an agreement. As a final note, I said the President had appointed expert negotiators and given good guidance to them for reaching an agreement in the interest of peace.

6. (S) Ceausescu agreed with me that mistrust among nations was the major deterrent to peace. He said that there must be more trust between the Soviets and United States in addressing arms reduction proposals. I told Ceausescu that we would look seriously at every proposal, but suggested that every time an opportunity arises for progress, the Soviets give us some reason to be distrustful. I said that Radio Moscow was playing up the death of our liaison mission officer as a great spy incident, rather than facing the matter in an honest way. I ran through for him the litany of incidents against our liaison mission personnel and our restraint against misdeeds by theirs. Ceausescu commented that such incidents are regrettable, but should not be seen as major issues in the overall scheme of things. I went on to highlight other areas where Soviet deeds had led to distrust, e.g., Afghanistan and Kampuchea. I agreed with Ceausescu that we shouldn’t allow ourselves to become distracted from major issues concerning peace, but made clear that Soviet actions in the world affect the background in which we conduct negotiations.

7. (S) Ceausescu spent a good deal of time addressing the need to prevent the militarization of space. Drawing on reports of antinuclear scientists, he commented that war in space could lead to the destruction of planets and life on Earth. With some reflection of humor, he said that “the stars should remain what they are so lovers can enjoy them.” I summarized current Soviet military activities in space and mentioned the considerable Soviet research underway in laser and particle beam weapons. I drew his attention to earlier speeches by President Reagan and Chernenko in which both agreed that attacks of Earth from space were a danger to mankind. I then outlined the objectives and characteristics of our SDI, and stressed President Reagan’s desire that our research seek non-nuclear means to defend against ICBMs carrying nuclear weapons.

8. (C) Ceausescu noted that our bilateral relations were good, but could be better. He suggested that my visit was a positive development in the relationship, but outlined two areas in which progress would help strengthen it—industrial cooperation and general economic interaction. He raised the control data where the Soviets had penetrated nations and turned that technology to their advantage. I assured him we would examine every application carefully and try to find mutually beneficial solutions, consistent with our security concerns.

9. (U) This message has been coordinated with Amb Funderburk.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Romania—Correspondence (7). Secret. Sent for information to the Department of State, Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Embassy in Bucharest, U.S. National Military Representative for SHAPE, and the NSC. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. Ceausescu was reelected in March.
3. See Document 135.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 282.
5. See Document 134.