Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

99. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 23, 1987, 5:30–6:15 p.m., 6:50–7:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting, November 23 Afternoon

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Colin Powell, National Security Advisor-designate
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State, EUR
  • Jack F. Matlock, Ambassador to Moscow
  • Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, EUR (notetaker)
  • Dimitry Zarechnak (interpreter)

• USSR

  • Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister
  • Anatoliy Adamishin, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Sergei Tarasenko (part), Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister
  • Sergei Nagradov, Soviet Mission, Geneva (notetaker)
  • P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

Shevardnadze began by saying that it was possible he would interrupt their conversation in 7 to 10 minutes in order to talk to Moscow. The Secretary said that was perfectly understandable.

The Secretary said they had two alternatives for beginning their discussion. First, they could discuss aspects of summit planning not touched on that morning. Second, they could hear Ambassador Ridgway and Minister Adamishin report on their discussions. Shevardnadze said he preferred to begin with the program, beyond the meetings with Members of Congress. He recognized that the Congress was the main thing for the American side.

The Secretary said he would like to give our thought about the visit as a whole. He would like to go through it and explain it. Shevardnadze said that was fine with him; he would compare it with what he had. The Secretary said he would go down his schedule.

The Secretary continued that we understand the General Secretary will arrive on Monday² at 4:25 p.m., at Andrews Air Force Base. He himself would be there to meet him. Shevardnadze said the time he had marked was 4:40 p.m., and asked about 5:00 p.m. The Secretary said the Soviet side should let us know. Shevardnadze said he had 4:40 p.m. marked, but that might change; there was not much difference.

The Secretary continued that he would escort the General Secretary to his hotel, and nothing further was planned for that evening. It would be late in Moscow time, and we assumed that he would wish to rest up.

Shevardnadze said the only additional detail he had was that the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev would like to invite the Secretary and Mrs. Shultz up to tea at that point; Gorbachev had asked him to convey the invitation on his departure. The Secretary said that would be most gracious. Shevardnadze added that he had just talked to Gorbachev, who asked him to convey his best wishes to the Secretary. The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze.

The Secretary continued that the official arrival would take place the next morning. The way these things worked was that the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev would drive to the White House, arriving at the Ellipse, which was in a sense behind the White House. There would be photographs, and, assuming the weather was nice, the band would play, there would be a salute of guns, soldiers in Revolutionary uniforms would march, the national anthems would be played. The President would make remarks which would start the visit; the General Secretary would make some remarks; and they would then go inside and start their meetings.

Shevardnadze said he had that marked for 10:00 a.m. The Secretary said they would try to start punctually, and by the time it was over, with interpretation, it would probably be about 10:30. Shevardnadze said this meant remarks lasting about five minutes. The Secretary said that was the usual thing, and that remarks usually touched on the outlook for the meetings. We would provide the Soviet side with copies of previous remarks by others.

The Secretary continued that they would then go into the White House. Mrs. Reagan wished to host Mrs. Gorbachev and other spouses for coffee on the State Floor. Mrs. Gorbachev could stay as long as she chose; usually the period was about half an hour. In the meantime the President and the General Secretary would start their meeting. We expected this to last about an hour and a quarter or so. It would be an initial meeting. There were questions about format. In the history of our summit meetings there were several. Some, as at Geneva, had included just the two of them plus interpreters. Some, as at Reykjavik, had begun with the two of them, and then the Secretary and Shevardnadze had been called in. Sometimes there had been as many as six or seven on a side. They would want to get some idea of how the subject matter would flow. We recognized that as they talked they might wish to stay together longer.

Shevardnadze said he had some ideas about subject matter; he could outline them later.

The Secretary continued that we had thought that since this was the initial day, rather than having an official lunch that day each leader could have lunch with his own people, a relatively brief lunch. The President would then welcome the General Secretary back at 1:30 p.m. Shevardnadze said that assuming the first talk began at 10:30, they had planned, if the President agreed, that it would conclude at about noon. Lunch would last until 1:00 p.m.; 50 minutes should be enough for it. The Secretary said this would be no problem. The real point was to reconvene at about 1:30. Then the event would be at 1:45, the signing of the INF Treaty. They would then move to a larger room at the other end of the White House, the State Dining Room where Shevardnadze had had lunch, and there each leader would give a television message, basically on INF, arms control and the like. This would be the first treaty ever reducing nuclear arms, and that was worth remarking on. The messages would be relatively short, to the American and Soviet peoples.

The Secretary continued that they might then move on to another meeting, in the West Wing, in the President’s offices there. We were looking at about an hour and a half, or perhaps longer, but it would be useful at some point to end the meeting, to allow time before the dinner, with some discussion of the developments of the day. We would need to consider how to handle the press. They would have plenty of event footage that day, but we should consider what to say about the content of the meetings. We were thinking of starting the White House dinner at 7:00 p.m.

Shevardnadze said he had something a little different. The signing was marked for 1:30, concluding at 2:15. Adamishin pointed out to him that his program included fifteen minutes for arrival and signing; he asked about the television messages. The Secretary said he was allotting half an hour for that; it could perhaps be condensed to allow more time. He asked if the Soviet side wanted the signing at 1:45, after the General Secretary arrived. He pointed out that it usually took about fifteen minutes to arrange the people, but it was a good question as to whether the signing would take a half hour. General Powell said it would probably not; the White House would walk it through and see.

The Secretary continued that the meeting could take longer, but suggested that the sides try to see how long the signing would take. The U.S. side had figured that the messages would take half an hour together, with translation time. We had thought of concluding the broadcast at 2:45, but it could take longer. Shevardnadze asked if the signing could be at 1:30, with the event, including the messages, concluding at 2:45. Adamishin said this should be thought about.

The Secretary reiterated that we would walk through the ceremony, and try to have events concluded by 2:45. He did not wish the General Secretary to feel constrained; if he had things to say he should say them. Shevardnadze said he thought a fifteen-minute message should be enough. However, after the signing the U.S. seemed to want a meeting; that was not in the program he had.

The Secretary said he would explain our rationale. The essence of the visit would be the discussions between the President and the General Secretary. We wanted to allocate sufficient time for that. It was important for them to have as much time as possible together the first day. The reason was that out of their discussion would come questions that others would need to work on: Shevardnadze, himself, Powell, Ridgway, Akhromeyev. That was why there was a lot of meeting time the first day.

Shevardnadze asked when the second conversation would begin. The Secretary said it would begin whenever the General Secretary and the President and whomever they wished to have with them walked to the working side of the White House, along the colonnade Shevardnadze would remember, to the Oval Office or the Cabinet Room. This would begin as soon as the messages were over, he thought around 2:45. The working party would leave, and they would get back to work.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets’ problem was that at 4:00 p.m. they were planning a meeting with scientists and intellectuals. He thought there should be a way to accommodate that. The Secretary said he wondered if the Soviet side would consider having that meeting in connection with the meeting the Vice President wished to have Thursday morning,³ where they might be invited. We had thoughts on that, he said. Shevardnadze said they already knew they would be invited, and there were 50 or 60 of them. He asked how long the second meeting between the leaders would last.

The Secretary said that assuming it began as soon as possible after 2:45, we might agree to end it around 4:30. In that way the Soviet side could schedule the intellectuals for 5:00 p.m. The General Secretary would not get to take much of a deep breath for the White House dinner, however. Shevardnadze said that was a question for the Soviet side, whether he was strong enough. The Secretary said we knew he was strong enough. Shevardnadze said that was okay, then, from 2:45 to 4:30.

The Secretary said he would next like to describe how our State Dinners proceeded. Guests began to arrive at 7:00 p.m.: the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and his wife, the Ambassador. He, the Secretary, would greet them and take them up to the Family Quarters, which Shevardnadze would remember from his meeting last September. Shevardnadze said he did remember.

The Secretary continued that the President and Mrs. Reagan would thus host four or five people on the Soviet side and perhaps the same number on the American side until about 7:30. At that point they would go down to the East Room. The two pairs would come in together, and the guests would be gathered to be received by the four. After that they would proceed into the dining room, where about 120 people would be served. There would be tables of eight, with an American host at each: the President and Mrs. Gorbachev at one, Mrs. Reagan and the General Secretary at another, the Secretary and Colin hosting others, with Soviet dignataries scattered around to give them a chance to talk.

The Secretary recalled the Strolling Strings who had played for Shevardnadze on his last visit. At the State Dinner a larger group would play at dessert time. The President would then give a toast, and then the General Secretary would give a toast. These would be televised; the columns would lift and the cameras would be there. This would be an occasion for formal prepared statements broadcast to both the Soviet Union and the United States. This would be the fourth such occasion during the day: arrival, the signing, the post-signing TV statements and the toasts. They would then get up from the tables, have coffee and liqueurs for about fifteen minutes, and then there would be entertainment in the East Room, singers and the like. The President would then escort the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev to their departure, which would take place around 10:45 p.m.

Shevardnadze said this was all acceptable, but he had one request from Gorbachev: that it all be completed by 9:00 p.m. The Secretary said that would be almost impossible. The first meeting in the Presidential living area would be for only a few people. It was a warm and friendly atmosphere, which would help things move along. Then there would be the receiving line. That would take time; there was always some character who wanted to talk. Armand Hammer⁴ would probably be there. Shevardnadze joked that ten minutes would not be enough for him.

The Secretary continued that the dinner and toasts would come next. Possibly the entertainment could be curtailed. But the President and the First Lady enjoyed offering it; there was a pace about it. He could give the message to the White House that the General Secretary wanted the dinner shortened. Perhaps the reception and the entertainment could be made shorter. But he doubted it would be possible to depart before 10:30 at the outside. He had been to many dinners. After the senior guests left there was dancing. He himself would go home. General Powell would probably stay.

General Powell said he too would be going home. The U.S. side would, however, shorten the event. Shevardnadze said that would be desirable. It was after all the first day. The Secretary pointed out that it would include two substantive discussions, four occasions for saying or doing something publicly, on television. It was a very full day, and the General Secretary in addition would be meeting with intellectual and academic people.

We did not have a clear idea of what Mrs. Gorbachev wanted to do, the Secretary said. We were anxious to work on this, to make sure that she was paid attention to properly. Shevardnadze said he would have some suggestions, but it was important to discuss the main program first.

The Secretary continued that that morning the U.S. side had laid out notionally what might happen Wednesday morning, beginning with Congress and going on to a meeting with the President lasting roughly an hour. Shevardnadze said the Soviet side had reserved the time between 9:00 and 11:00 for that. He was not sure; perhaps that meant a meeting between 11:00 and 12:45 with the President. The Secretary said we would like to persuade the Soviet side to start earlier, at 8:00.

(At that point Shevardnadze was notified of his call. In response to his apology, the Secretary repeated his assurances considering appropriateness, and accompanied him to his car. The meeting resumed at 6:50 p.m.; the Soviet side was joined by Shevardnadze’s special assistant Sergei Tarasenko.)

Shevardnadze suggested they proceed to the December 9 schedule. The Secretary said he wished to return first to the State Dinner. They had discussed its length. We would not want to drop things that are customary. People might say for instance that there is usually an entertainment, but we had not had one for the General Secretary. But we would try to compress it. Shevardnadze replied that this was fine, and we should tentatively say 9:00 or 9:30; fifteen minutes did not make much difference. The Secretary replied that 9:30 was early. But we would do our best. He suggested they turn to December 9.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. side had suggested we start early, at 8:00. This was partly because it would be afternoon in the Soviet Union, partly because it would allow for a very extensive program and still a morning meeting with the President. Shevardnadze asked what time the meeting with the President would begin. The Secretary said we were thinking of shortly after 11:00. His schedule showed 11:10. He would expect the General Secretary to be with the Senators for over an hour. This would be a discussion-type meeting. It would not be easy to bang the gavel. But it took only ten minutes from Capitol Hill to the White House. We were thinking of a meeting of about an hour.

Shevardnadze said his schedule showed a meeting with the President from 11:00 to 1:00 p.m., in the Oval Office. It was fine to begin at 11:00 if that was alright with the American side. The Secretary said we could try to begin at 11:00 a.m., and to discipline the meeting with the Senators to end at 10:45. Shevardnadze said the meeting should therefore be from 11:00 to 12:45.

The Secretary continued that he then hoped to host the General Secretary at the State Department for luncheon. Normally this lasted about two hours. There would be a receiving line, the luncheon, toasts. He thought two hours would leave time for the General Secretary to get to the White House for the afternoon meeting. Shevardnadze said his schedule showed the State Department luncheon beginning at 1:30; at 12:45 the meeting with the President ended, he would then go to the Residence, and then come to the State Department at 1:30.

The Secretary said that would be late. Luncheons usually started at 12:30. If it began at 1:30 it would end about 3:30, making it hard to schedule the meeting with the President. He would have had a full morning, and would perhaps need a deep breath. Shevardnadze suggested that the meeting with the President begin at 10:30 and also end early, permitting the State lunch to begin at 1:00. The Secretary said it could start anytime. But the long events we had talked about were important. If the Soviet side accepted the schedule they had talked about that morning, it would have a certain pace.

Shevardnadze said that with regard to the Congress they might have a chance to talk about it the next morning. But if the meeting with the President began at 10:30, and lasted two hours, the State luncheon could begin at 1:00. The Secretary said then it would probably end at 3:00. Shevardnadze suggested that it might be shortened; two hours was a long lunch. The Secretary said he would try. His receiving line would be longer. He might be able to remodel the meal events, but one function of the lunch was to allow a lot of people to meet the General Secretary. He was thinking in the neighborhood of 200 people. They would be people from the business and academic communities, and Congress, as well as from the Executive Branch. The General Secretary might want to address them, have something personal to say. That was what could be accomplished at an event like that.

He was also envisaging a group that was sort of fun. This was a chorus from Yale University, the Secretary continued. This hurt him, because he was from another university, a rival, but the group had a repertoire in Russian. He thought that might be a nice touch. But this was the sort of thing he could lop off. No one would be the wiser; it was not something usually done at State. But if the General Secretary heard the group and then went around Yale singing, he would feel right at home. Still, he would try to shorten the lunch a little.

Shevardnadze said then another meeting with the President was contemplated. The Secretary replied that this was right. Shevardnadze said he had it down for 4:00. The Secretary had it for nearer 3:00, but sometimes one needed time to communicate with Moscow. He asked about a meeting from 3:45 or 4:00 with the President.

The Secretary said he thought that could be done. Mrs. Reagan had the idea of inviting Mrs. Gorbachev for tea, starting at 3:45 or 4:00. This could also begin later. Her idea was that it would be a nice touch for the President and the General Secretary to join the ladies for tea, and for the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev to leave from there. So whatever the time the meeting ended, that would last about 15 minutes. Shevardnadze said that was good.

General Powell pointed out that that would compress the time to the Soviet dinner to something over an hour, with travel time. The Secretary said that would make it harder for the Soviet hosts. He had the dinner listed as from 7:00 to 9:00. He thought the Soviet side had gotten this from the U.S. side. If the U.S. side had different ideas, he would like to hear. Shevardnadze said no, that was how the Soviet side had planned it. What they could do as hosts in Washington was limited. The Secretary said he knew they would do very well. Shevardnadze said it had been easier with Dobrynin, since he had such a good voice. The Secretary said we were entirely in Soviet hands.

General Powell noted we expected the General Secretary would wish to go to the Embassy after the luncheon at State, before meeting with the President. Shevardnadze said that was true, but all these things were close. Both leaders would make brief remarks, toasts, at dinner. The Secretary said that was true, and they would be public, televised. He had thought that two of the best statements at Geneva had been the dinner toasts, made extemporaneously. Afterwards he had suggested that they say to each other what they had said the night before, but they said they could not remember what they had said.

The Secretary continued that the next day the Vice President had wished to host the General Secretary for breakfast. But he was agreeable to meeting at the Soviet Embassy if the Soviet side wished. It could be either way. We had thought it would be interesting to the General Secretary to have a little prepared discussion, about the world outlook. In that connection he had a list of people, to give a little of the flavor of what we had in mind. In addition to U.S. Government people we had put down some people in so-called private life.

First there was Walter Wriston. He was the retired head of Citicorp. During his tenure there he had had as much influence as anyone on the world of finance. And he continued to think about the impact of technology on financial markets. He had developed the concept of the information standard, the idea that we are not living under the gold standard or anything like that, but under the information standard.

Then there was Ralph Gomery. He was the chief scientist at IBM Corporation. He had a very fertile mind; he was not just an engineer, but also a thinker. Then there was Arnaud Penzias. He was in charge of research at Bell Laboratories, one of the world’s great laboratories. Shevardnadze said he had heard of him.

Then, the Secretary continued, there was Doctor Mary Wood, of the American Chemical Society. She was knowledgeable about materials, fiber optics, ceramics and the like. It was a reality that the materials of the future, or even of the present, were very different from those of thirty years ago. Then there was Dr. Frank Press. He was President of the National Academy of Sciences, and a strong advocate of U.S.-Soviet scientific exchanges. ( Shevardnadze nodded.) Then there was Harold Brown. He had been Secretary of Defense in the Carter Administration, and would be well known to Shevardnadze. ( Shevardnadze nodded again.) He was extraordinarily bright; he was a one-time President of the California Institute of Technology, one of our top schools.

The Secretary continued that he thought this was a group which, if needled, could have a good discussion with the General Secretary. He would be willing to do some of the needling. He thus had in mind more than a pleasant breakfast. He had tried to identify people the General Secretary might wish to continue to be in contact with.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary: these were interesting people; he had heard of some of them. The Secretary said that if that kind of meeting took place, they would probably want to spend about an hour and a half together; it took some time to get a good discussion going. He thought that pointed the General Secretary toward a wrapup meeting with the President starting at 9:45 or 10:00, somewhere like that. They could take stock of what they had accomplished; examine the work of the working groups; shape up some kind of joint statement. That could flow into a working lunch at the White House. Then we would see a windup event, at which they could issue whatever had been agreed on, after which each leader could make a statement.

The Secretary continued that we understood the General Secretary would want to do a press conference, and then to meet with leaders of business and industry. There would be time for that. He could then depart at 7:00, or something on that order.

Shevardnadze said their schedule had Gorbachev inviting the Vice President at 9:00 a.m. It could not be earlier. If it lasted an hour and a quarter, that would mean a meeting from 10:30 to 12:00 with the President. If that was incorrect it should be corrected. Then they had been told there would be a working lunch in the Family Dining Room, with a group to be determined. The Secretary said that would be a small group, composed of the immediate close associates of both men.

Shevardnadze said he understood. There would then be the departure ceremony. He did not know how the Secretary visualized the meeting. It looked like 12:00, with a departure ceremony at 2:00. The Secretary said it would be something on that order, around 1:30 or 2:00. The scenario went as follows. They would be adjacent to the State Dining Room. At the other end, perhaps in the East Room, things would be arranged for the departure ceremony. It was likely to be cold, and it was better to do it inside than outside. Perhaps it could go as in Geneva: a departure statement could be read out, and then the President and the General Secretary could make remarks, with all of it televised. The President would then escort the General Secretary to his automobile and, when he was ready to leave, see him off. General Powell noted that the Vice President intended to see him off at the airport. The Secretary noted he would like to be there too.

Shevardnadze said we were therefore looking at 2:00. The remarks would be brief, perhaps 3–5 minutes. The meeting with business leaders was all planned. Then, at 5:30, there would be the press conference, at the Soviet complex. The General Secretary also had interests there of an internal nature; he would be meeting there with the people at the Embassy. Concerning departure, 7:00 was probably too early. The Soviet side was asking for 8:00, if that would not be too much of a problem. The U.S. side had wanted 9:00; the Soviet side was asking for 8:00. Both the Secretary and General Powell said that would be alright.

The Secretary asked whether the meeting with businessmen would precede the press conference. Shevardnadze said it would; they wanted all events to be concluded before the press conference. General Powell noted they had spoken of this earlier; Shevardnadze said that had been taken into account. Powell said we hoped the event would take place at our press center. Shevardnadze said that since the General Secretary had decided he wished to meet with staff of the Embassy, he wanted to combine the two events. They were thinking of about 400 press. He had not seen the new Soviet building, and would like to.

The Secretary said that meant the press conference would be in the Soviet quarters, and not in the press center. General Powell noted that because of the numbers involved, we had thought the press center would be an appropriate place. The Secretary said there would be thousands of press involved, struggling to find a place, from all over the world. If the General Secretary came to the press center we would set up, there would be television cameras, reporting facilities. This was something to consider. The General Secretary would have greater access to the press pool. 400 was not a bad number, but there would probably be 3000 people covering.

Shevardnadze said the Soviet side realized they could not accommodate everyone. The Secretary said it would still be desirable to accommodate as many as possible, and where they were. Shevardnadze said they had taken a firm decision on this: the General Secretary wanted to see the Soviet community, see the building, and have his press conference. The whole thing would take about two hours. They had equipped a room in their club for the press conference.

The Secretary said that if that was what the Soviet side wanted, that was it. What was now open was the question of Wednesday, of Congressional contacts, and the Soviet side would give us its ideas the next day. Shevardnadze recalled that he had said earlier, and justifiably, that this was a serious problem, with many nuances. They could talk about it the next day. The two sides should not dramatize the problem; they would find a way to resolve it.

General Powell said the joint session had been just one idea among many. They had been working on these ideas for two weeks. It was important to resolve the issue quickly; not to do so was to risk the U.S. press concentrating on it, and putting on the heat. The Secretary said they would resolve it the next day.

Shevardnadze said he would say one thing: the U.S. side had decided there would be no joint session, that it would not happen. The Soviet side would give the U.S. side its formal reply the next day. The Secretary replied that he would only say that there were various patterns for such things. Visitors go to Capitol Hill in different ways. They meet groups in various ways. What the U.S. side had outlined was not typical; it would be a unique pattern of events. Some guests met Members of Congress in hotel rooms. That would not lend itself to reaching out to the Congress in the same way.

Shevardnadze reiterated that he would tell the Secretary the next day. He did not see it as a tragedy if there were no joint session. The Soviet side could give up its contacts with the Congress. The main thing about the visit was the treaty. He would be talking to Moscow that night, and give the Soviet reply next day. The Secretary said that the great bulk of the Members of Congress wanted to see and have contact with the General Secretary. What some people were doing and saying was not typical of the rest. Shevardnadze noted that the General Secretary had already met and talked with most Members of Congress, in Moscow. They would discuss these problems, and the sequence, the next day.

Summing up, the Secretary said that at dinner they could hear how the people working on the INF treaty were doing, where we were and what needed to be done; next day he would hear Shevardnadze’s thoughts on Congressional contacts, and give his thoughts; and he hoped there would be time for discussion of strategic arms. The U.S. side wanted forward motion, so that in their many meetings the President and the General Secretary would be prepared, would not start cold. He also hoped to turn to regional issues, bilateral issues, human rights issues.

There were a couple of outstanding issues on the bilateral side, the Secretary went on. They had talked about them before, and we hoped to resolve them. One was the number of temporary people, the other guests of embassies. On temporary workers we could accept the number of 50, suggested informally by the Soviet side, if he understood from Shevardnadze that if we had a need for surges the Soviet side would look on that in a sympathetic way. On guests we would like to see the sanction removed. We had no parallel sanction. Tom Simons could talk about these things endlessly, but we preferred to get them done.

Shevardnadze said that when the Soviet side came to Washington, if the two of them were able to it might be a good thing for them to sit down with their ambassadors on this. He knew they would be busy, but it would be good to sit down with the ambassadors and resolve all the issues of interest to their embassies. They could meet for perhaps 30–40 minutes and discuss all the issues. He did not see any reason why they could not be resolved. The Secretary said he agreed to do it that way.

The Secretary said he had two additional things to raise on the summit. The first was the sequence; we would need to take that up. The second was who the Soviet delegation would be. They had mentioned Shevardnadze and Akhromeyev. He had made a point of having Carlucci meet the Defense Minister in Moscow because he was aware of what was happening to him. There had been recent exchanges of cables between ministers of defense. He and Shevardnadze had agreed that the ministers should carry more of a load.

Shevardnadze interjected they should not do so by fighting. The Secretary said no, by working out problems. They had two relatively new ministers, and if both the Minister of Defense and Akhromeyev came, they could meet with Carlucci and our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Crowe. We had been thinking of setting aside some bloc of time, for some program of discussions. On Wednesday morning the General Secretary would probably be in contact with Congress, so the two might go to the Pentagon. No special effort was necessary.

Shevardnadze said he found the Secretary’s arguments convincing. The Soviet side had been thinking along the same lines. But it was just not possible for Yazov to come. They were in favor of contacts between the ministers, but this time they could just not arrange it. What the form of those contacts could be Akhromeyev could discuss, as well as others.

The Secretary said the U.S. side would like to use the occasion of the leaders’ meeting also for other meetings. He was sure Crowe would like to receive Akhromeyev even if Yazov were not there.

On composition, Shevardnadze said, he thought that of the Soviet side had been conveyed to the U.S. by cable. It would be the General Secretary, Shevardnadze, CPSU CC Secretaries Yakov’lev and Dobrynin, Akhromeyev, the General Secretary’s chief of staff Chernyayev, and Kamentsev, now Deputy Prime Minister responsible for all foreign economic relations. Kamentsev was an interesting man; he knew a great deal. Ambassador Ridgway said he had been an old fisheries counterpart of hers. Shevardnadze said jokingly Kamentsev was a great fisherman.

The Secretary suggested they break for dinner. It would take 20 minutes to get to the site, so they might meet there at 8:30. Shevardnadze joked in conclusion that they could then sit till morning.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Geneva 11/23–24/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on November 24.
2. December 7.
3. December 10.
4. American businessman associated with Occidental Petroleum, and friend of Reagan, Armand Hammer, (1898–1990), who was known for his close ties to the Soviet Union.