Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

98. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 23, 1987, 10:15 a.m.–1:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Organizational matters, INF, summit planning

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Gen. Powell
  • Amb. Ridgway
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (notetaker)
  • Mr. Zarechnyak (interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
  • Marshal Akhromeyev
  • Dept. FornMin Adamishin
  • Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko (notetaker)
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by welcoming the Secretary and his party. He welcomed as well the Secretary’s initiative in suggesting the meeting at this conclusive stage of preparations for the summit. There was no question that the outstanding issues required the two ministers’ joint effort.

Shevardnadze took advantage of the opportunity to congratulate Gen. Powell on his nomination as National Security Advisor—an appointment which reflected the confidence the President and American people placed in him. Shevardnadze asked that his congratulations be passed to Powell’s predecessor, SecDef designate Carlucci, who, despite the brevity of his stay at the NSC, had “done good work.” It was good that the Soviet side had had the chance to get to know him.

Moving on to the program for the two minister’s talks, Shevardnadze noted the Secretary’s reference during the preceding photo-op to INF as being the first priority. This was indeed the starting point, and the Soviet side had the expertise available to deal with it, to complete the Treaty. Marshal Akhromeyev’s presence at the table testified to that.

Organizationally, Shevardnadze suggested that the ministers hold an initial plenary meeting with their full delegations to announce whatever order of work they agreed on, and to commission working groups. Perhaps delegation chiefs could brief the ministers on what progress had been achieved over the last few days, and what might still be pending. The ministers could then decide what to address themselves and what to delegate to experts. Akhromeyev would lead the Soviet INF working group. It might be wise as well to establish subgroups to expedite work in this priority area. Should any problems arise, the ministers could be called in to make decisions.

Shevardnadze thought it well also to set experts to work in non-arms control areas. The Soviet side had fielded a team headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin which was prepared to work on language which might be used at the summit—perhaps as a joint statement of some sort. Shevardnadze noted that he would have liked to have Bessmertnykh available for this task, but he was being kept busy in Moscow. Adamishin also knew the issues well.

Shevardnadze proposed that, after the ministers had run through INF Treaty-related issues, they could take up the schedule for Gorbachev’s Washington visit. They could then move on to questions relating to strategic offensive arms reductions and the ABM Treaty, as they pertained to instructions which the two leaders might give delegations at the summit. While the discussion would of necessity be of a preliminary nature, something might emerge from it. Regional and other matters could also be taken up as time permitted.

Thus, Shevardnadze suggested, the ministers could work until 1:00 or 1:30, then recess until 4:00, when they might resume work at the U.S. Mission. The Soviet side accepted with pleasure the Secretary’s invitation for dinner. The ministers would meet the next morning at 10:00, with lunch at the Soviet Mission.² There could be a second plenary meeting after lunch: if the experts had done good work, they could be praised; if bad, reproached. Of course, the INF team would have license to break in on the ministers’ discussions whenever it proved necessary. Perhaps there could be an initial report on their progress in time for the afternoon meeting. But more important than any formal arrangements was the need to make the best use of the time available, to make the necessary decisions.

THE SECRETARY said that the approach Shevardnadze had outlined paralleled that that the U.S. had in mind. The Secretary agreed that there was a need for flexibility in order to be sure the job got done. To state what Shevardnadze had said in a somewhat different way, the Secretary sketched his own view of how the ministers should use their time.

The first priority was clearly to complete an INF Treaty. So, after the brief plenary that Shevardnadze had suggested, it would be well to enlarge the ministers’ discussions somewhat.

On the U.S. side, we would add Glitman, Kampelman, Linhard and Nitze, who would lead our team. After a general exchange, the experts could be despatched to get to work on wrapping up a Treaty.

After they had gone, the ministers could move on to a discussion of the summit schedule. The Secretary had brought some detailed suggestions.

During the lunch break, each minister could meet with his working group to see what progress had been made. The Secretary expressed the hope that the INF Treaty could be completed that afternoon, so that some of the expertise being tied up in the effort could be devoted to strategic arms reductions. In the meantime, the ministers might talk about human rights, regional affairs and bilateral issues. This could be the basis for subsequent discussions by Ridgway and Adamishin on summit-related materials. The Secretary noted wryly that he had warned his experts that, if they were unsuccessful in resolving the remaining INF issues, he and Shevardnadze would get to work on START without them. He quipped that Akhromeyev would not like that.

AKHROMEYEV said that the experts would have to take a break from INF in that case.

After a brief discussion of dinner arrangements, the ministers adjourned at 10:40 am to join their full delegations.

[During a 25-minute plenary session,³ the two ministers went over the arrangements which had just been agreed to. The only additional element was THE SECRETARY’s suggestion that each side’s Geneva INF delegation be standing by to turn any agreements reached into Treaty language. SHEVARDNADZE agreed.

At the conclusion of the session, the ministers resumed their smaller group meeting, joined by the following: Nitze, Glitman, Kampelman, Linhard and Matlock; and Karpov, Obukhov, and ______.]

When the meeting resumed at 11:05, THE SECRETARY volunteered to lead off with a few remarks on INF. SHEVARDNADZE agreed.

THE SECRETARY prefaced his comments by noting that Kampelman and Vorontsov had had a good meeting the week before. They had found solutions to many items, but left some problems unresolved. At the end of their meeting they listed a number of problem areas, which the Secretary said he would take up in order, commenting briefly on each.

First, he indicated, was the problem of monitoring the non-production of weapons systems banned by the Treaty. Kampelman and Vorontsov had discussed a way to monitor what comes out of the SS–20/25 final assembly facility. The task now was to settle on how that would work, what means inspectors would have available to them, etc. There was no facility in the U.S. comparable to the facility in question for the SS–20/25, but the Soviets had given us a list of candidates for monitoring in the U.S., and the U.S. had chosen one plant. Now it was necessary to agree on perimeter/portal monitoring, on the facilities to be monitored, on the procedures to be used, and on the treaty language that would embody these decisions.

Another problem related to the basic inspection regime. This was of paramount interest with respect to prospects for Treaty ratification. A regime was needed which provided confidence in baseline data, in the elimination process, and in the continued absence of INF missiles. This meant we needed, on the one hand, an agreed concept of short notice inspections as they applied to verifying baselines and closeout inspections, and, on the other, a procedure which gave confidence that there would be no prohibited missiles in so-called suspicious sites.

Vorontsov had objected to Kampelman that our approach would allow very large numbers of inspections. We had therefore offered a ceiling on all short-notice inspections. There would be an initial phase of 20 inspections a year, during the drawdown period, when there would be a lot to observe. That would decline after 3 years to 15/year; and after 8 years to 10/year. So it was important to close in Geneva on the types and numbers of onsite inspections in the basic inspection regime.

A third general category involved suspect site inspections. This problem derived from the fact that the SS–20 and SS–25 were so similar, and shared such similar support infrastructures. We thus needed to pay special attention to the SS–25 sites, and had proposed the right to onsite inspections for SS–25 facilities. Vorontsov had suggested ways to enhance national technical means (ntm) which we found interesting.

The two sides also had to settle their differences over means for determining the range of missiles.

Then there was the question of how to deal with the fact that some of the missiles covered by the Treaty were based on third country soil. Both sides thus needed to find a way to inspect such sites. The U.S. had suggested a straightforward way to do so by an exchange of notes with the third country involved—a procedure which would both recognize the sovereignty of that country and satisfy the parties verification needs.

Finally, the delegations had exchanged a substantial amount of data, but the process was not complete. Some 200 non-deployed intermediate range missiles (IRM’s) remained unaccounted for.

These, the Secretary concluded, were the issues which had to be solved for there to be an agreement. The U.S. team was prepared to work with the Soviets to resolve them immediately.

SHEVARDNADZE thanked the Secretary for his presentation. He agreed that a good deal of work had been done by delegations. Kampelman and Vorontsov had also had a productive session. Shevardnadze did not want to enumerate the many problems which had already been solved—including those wrapped up through the efforts of the ministers themselves. But he did recall that some very tough, very complicated issues—notably the FRG P–1 problem—had been dealt with successfully. At the time, the ministers had thought that, once the P–1 issue was cracked, other details would be easy. The details had also turned out to be difficult.

Shevardnadze thought it logical that verification issues had now come to the forefront. Both sides wanted absolute certainty that the provisions of the Treaty would be observed. (AKHROMEYEV interjected, “everybody wants more verification.”) SHEVARDNADZE continued that the current phase of the INF negotiations were like a kind of academy, preparing the two sides for more difficult verification problems in the START context. (THE SECRETARY noted that this was an important point. It suggested that, where difficulties arose, both sides should err on the side of more, rather than less, verification.)

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, observing that he did not want to get into a comparison of which side had done more to ensure the success of the INF talks. What had been achieved thus far was the result of an integrated process, of joint efforts. What then, were the important outstanding issues?

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had already raised the question of verifying the end of production of INF missiles. The Foreign Minister had been encouraged by some ideas shared by the U.S. side on this point the previous day. They had contained some positive elements, which were welcome.

Another difficult issue raised by the U.S. was rocket boosters. The Soviets side frankly did not consider this issue integrally related to the Treaty. But recent developments had to some degree clarified the problem, and it might soon be possible to remove it from the agenda. The ministers probably did not need to address it.

Based on its analysis of the current state of play in the negotiations, Shevardnadze could tell the Secretary that the Soviet side would be proposing a comprehensive solution on all outstanding verification issues.

For example, the Secretary had correctly emphasized the importance to verification of data exchange. The Soviet side was prepared to agree that, in verifying baseline data, up to 10 inspections could be carried out concurrently.

The Soviets were also prepared to agree to inspection to establish the fact of elimination of banned systems. This applied as well to support facilities. Thus the elimination of operational bases including supporting structures could be verified.

Another question raised by the Secretary had to do with the annual quota of regular and suspect site inspections. The Soviet side was prepared to agree, during the three years of the elimination provisions, to a combined total of 20 regular and suspect site inspections. During the next five years, the number would be 15; during the final five years, 10. Shevardnadze asked for confirmation that this corresponded to the U.S. position.

After an exchange of clarifications, GLITMAN and THE SECRETARY said there appeared to be agreement on this point. SHEVARDNADZE stated that it should be recorded as resolved. THE SECRETARY agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE next took up the question of third country facilities. Noting that the matter was as sensitive to Moscow, because of its alliance relationships with the GDR and Czechoslovakia, as to the U.S., he recognized the political and sovereignty questions posed by the issue. The latest U.S. proposal, he stated, was that suspect site inspections should apply to all basing countries for the 13-year duration of the Treaty. The Soviet side was for its part prepared to agree that no more than 50% of the inspections provided for in any given year would take place in any single country. This appeared to provide the basis for an agreement. The lawyers could work out the precise terms.

THE SECRETARY expressed his agreement, subject to the proviso that inspectors should respect the laws of the country where the inspection was taking place. SHEVARDNADZE agreed emphatically that sovereignty had to be respected.

The Foreign Minister then took up what he referred to as a “less pleasant” matter—monitoring non-production. The Soviet side was for such verification on an equitable basis. As proposed by Moscow, verification means would be permanent, including onsite inspections of non-production of missiles eliminated under the Treaty. NTM—supplemented, as the U.S. had proposed, by non-destructive onsite inspections—would provide a reliable means of ensuring there was no production at former production facilities. The Soviet side had agreed as well to verification of non-production of launchers of all types of missiles to be eliminated, both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Here, however, the two sides’ positions parted company. The U.S. sought to apply different criteria to land based ballistic missiles than to ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM’s). Since all Soviet land-based INF missiles were ballistic, this meant that the U.S. proposal applied different criteria to Soviet and U.S. missiles covered by the Treaty. This was thus a fundamental question. Should the ministers address it, or turn it over to their experts for further work?

THE SECRETARY replied that the issue could and must be solved. In fact, however, it was two different issues. The first was: at those facilities which produced both SS–20’s and 25’s, what procedures could be developed to ensure that no SS–20’s were being built? Some of the things the Soviet side had said seemed to suggest that it might be possible to find a mutually satisfactory operational regime, but would have to be examined in more detail. The issue appeared to the Secretary, however, to be settleable.

The second issue had to do with those facilities producing launchers for U.S. missiles which would be banned by the Treaty. The Soviet side would be able to verify that such production had been shut down.

The Secretary continued that, during his discussions the week before with Kampelman, Vorontsov had recognized that there were no facilities in the U.S. which replicated the SS–20/25 joint production plant. Vorontsov had nonetheless expressed a desire for the sake of equatibility to obtain the right to monitor a facility which had some relationship to the production of systems banned by the Treaty. He had given Kampelman a list of five facilities from which to choose. We had now chosen one. When the Soviets monitored it, they would find the production of the components involved had ceased. But that, after all, was the point of the exercise.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that the situation between the SS–20 and 25 was analagous, from the Soviet standpoint, to that for the U.S. GLCM and SLCM. Any mutually acceptable solution had to take that into account.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the GLCM and SLCM systems shared the same missile. What was different was their launcher. GLCM’s could not function without their launch apparatus. That was why verification of non-production of GLCM’s had focused on launchers for those missiles. The U.S. was prepared to allow inspections of production facilities for GLCM launchers.

“Maybe so,” SHEVARDNADZE replied, but that did not mean that the issues could simply be forgotten. THE SECRETARY countered that the U.S. had proposed measures for verifying the elimination of GLCM’s which we felt met Soviet needs.

AKHROMEYEV explained that, in verifying non-production of the SS–20, the U.S. was able at the same time to monitor the number of SS–25’s produced, even though the SS–25 was not covered by the INF Treaty. The Soviet Union should have a reciprocal right to count production of SLCM’s, even though they were not covered by the Treaty.

THE SECRETARY reiterated that there were no differences between the GLCM and SLCM missiles. They could only be distinguished by those facilities which would make the missile involved usable as a GLCM. The U.S. had dealt with that to give the Soviet side confidence that the U.S. would have no GLCM capability.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the quantities of missiles involved were also important, as Akhromeyev had said.

THE SECRETARY replied that that was not the object of the inspection regime the U.S. had proposed. The object was to ensure non-production of the SS–20. The legitimate Soviet object was to verify non-production of the U.S. capability to have GLCM’s. The U.S. had given the Soviets a regime which achieved that.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the problem nevertheless remained on the agenda, as far as the Soviets were concerned. ICBM’s were not covered by the Treaty. Any solution had to be on the basis of reciprocity and mutual acceptability. The Soviet side had offered options for dealing with the problem. The experts could explore it further; perhaps they could present suggestions to ministers by the end of the day. Shevardnadze thought it best to let his experts describe the Soviet approach in detail.

As for monitoring launcher non-production, this should also continue to be discussed, Shevardnadze said. This was the best means of ensuring non-production, he thought. He emphasized that the Soviet side was prepared to accept a permanent monitoring presence at production sites.

But monitoring ICBM’s themselves was another matter. As Shevardnadze had said earlier, they were outside the framework of the Treaty. The Soviet side was nonetheless prepared to be realistic. Where the issue was the stationing of SS–25’s in former SS–20 bases, Moscow had agreed to verification. But outside of such a context, the U.S. had no claim on ICBM’s, except in a START agreement. Thus, experts should work on this obstacle as well. But it was up to the U.S. to remove it; there was no fallback position on the Soviet side.

THE SECRETARY explained that the U.S. sought only a regime which gave maximum assurance that there were no SS–20’s. That was the rationale for our insistence on inspecting facilities where they had once been deployed. (AKHROMEYEV pointed out that the Soviets had agreed to that.) THE SECRETARY added that another problem was that the infrastructure and training activities associated with the SS–25 were parallel to those for the SS–20. Thus, one could argue that there could be SS–20’s wherever there were SS–25’s—that training and infrastructure for the latter could be exploited for use with the former. These considerations were behind the proposals we had advanced. We did not take issue with the notion that the Treaty did not cover ICBM’s; but the similarity of arrangements for the SS–20 and 25 gave us problems. We hoped that the Soviet side would have some ideas in the working group for working on those problems.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Secretary’s comments on the SS–25 were similar to those he could make about SLCM’s. AKHROMEYEV said that the U.S. approach forced the Soviet side to raise the question of inspecting SLCM’s aboard ships.

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood the Secretary’s concerns with respect to Treaty verification. He pointed out (with a straight face) that Soviet legislative bodies would also take a hard look at the Treaty. Some were already interrogating Akhromeyev. Thus, there was a need for reciprocity in the Treaty. Perhaps the working group could approach the problem from this standpoint.

THE SECRETARY reemphasized that there was nothing in the Treaty which addressed SLCM’s. It did address GLCM’s, which had a launch apparatus different from that used at sea.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the Secretary had spoken about the parallel operational infrastructure for the SS–20 and 25. But the GLCM and SLCM shared the same production infrastructure. Instead of trying to make the problem harder, the two sides should be creative about trying to find solutions.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the issue be turned over to working groups. Their focus should be those elements which distinguish prohibited from non-prohibited items under the Treaty. For the SS–20/25, the distinguishing features were the size, weight, and other physical characteristics of the booster. For the GLCM/SLCM, the distinguishing features were their launching apparata. Distinguishing characteristics were the key to the problem. Perhaps the working groups could find a means of resolving it in an equitable way.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was nonetheless concerned about the question of differences and similarities. The question of the first stages of the SS–20 and SS–25 arose because they were similar. Looked at in this light, the GLCM and SLCM were also similar. But this was a question for the experts, Shevardnadze agreed.

THE SECRETARY underscored that the starting point for the U.S. position on GLCM/SLCM’s was that the missile involved was identical. The distinguishing characteristic was the launcher, and that was what had to be focused on.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had one other question to raise—the U.S. position on defining the maximum range of ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of less than 500 km. The Soviet side had proposed a clear and verifiable means of solving the problem: an exchange of detailed data in conjunction with the conducting of tests in the presence of inspectors. This was a reliable method. If the Secretary was not prepared to agree to this proposal, the issue could be turned over to experts, but Shevardnadze could not understand the reason for any objections. The night before, he had asked Karpov to assume the role of a U.S. negotiator in seeking to convince him. Shevardnadze had not been impressed by the arguments he had heard.

THE SECRETARY said he was surprised. Karpov was usually so persuasive. He suggested that the working groups withdraw to begin their work, seeking first to put into Treaty language those areas which had been agreed during the ministers’ meeting. After some discussion, the suggestion was adopted, and Nitze, Kampelman, Glitman, Linhard, Akhromeyev, Karpov, Obukhov and ______ left the room, and the discussion moved on to matters relating to the schedule for Gorbachev’s Washington visit.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Geneva—11/23–24/87. Secret. Drafted by Parris. All brackets and blank underscores are in the original. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission.
2. See Document 100.
3. No record of this meeting has been found.