Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

91. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 30, 1987, 3:40–4:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summitry, INF, Embassy Moscow, Regional Issues

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • National Security Advisor Carlucci
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Ambassador Kampelman
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • DAS Simons (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Zarechnyak (Interpreter)

• USSR

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • DepFor Minister Bessmertnykh
  • Ambassador Dubinin
  • Ambassador Karpov
  • Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov
  • Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE said they should begin by putting Karpov on the carpet.

THE SECRETARY said he would first like to make a few comments on the Summit. For the Summit meeting to go off well, the two sides needed to prepare all the details carefully. They needed a program showing what would happen, all the events, and establishing the way work would be done.

In their meetings the two ministers had been stressing content, and that was of course central. But we knew from previous experience that the Soviet side had excellent advance and security people. They need to work with our team. Teams are needed that consist of substantive people, event managers and security people. The two sides needed to put them together. The Soviet side should get their people here as soon as they are designated. On the substantive side, Tom Simons would be responsible for us. It was important not to let the event-managers take over completely. The two sides could also be in touch through their ambassadors, but the Soviets should identify their people. When they did, we would be ready to work.

CARLUCCI noted that we now have a White House Planning Group set up. He had spoken with them, and Roz Ridgway had participated in their work. The sooner the Soviets designated a point man the better off the two sides would be.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed that the preparatory and organizational work requirements should be studied now. On the Soviet side Bessmertnykh in the MFA would be in charge overall, responsible for the planning and the arrangements. Of course the Embassy would also be involved. The Soviet side would probably send an advance group, which would include security people. They would arrange these things as soon as he returned to Moscow, and inform us through our Embassy in Moscow. A detailed program would be needed; Bessmertnykh would be in charge, and he would be looking in on it. The Secretary had raised an entirely appropriate question.

THE SECRETARY recalled that on our side all such things were in Roz Ridgway’s domain. He suggested that the ministers then hear a report on INF.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed they should listen.

NITZE said Karpov and he had discussed INF that morning. Karpov had had a list of 36 items, he had had a list of 28. The point was not the number of issues, but that neither side considered progress in Geneva to have been satisfactory. They had discussed how the situation could be improved, but had not reached a consensus on that. He would describe some of the issues.

First, the U.S. side felt the need to inspect some facilities for the SS–25, even though it was distinguishable from the SS–20. Viktor Karpov did not feel such inspection was appropriate. The Soviet side for its part still had problems with our final assembly procedures.

Second, on non-circumvention, the U.S. proposal for a commitment not to undertake any international obligation that would be in conflict with the Treaty, was not satisfactory to Karpov. He felt it was too narrow, that something broader was needed; no solution had been reached.

Third, the Soviets had made a proposal concerning agreed follow-on negotiations. We had explained why it was impossible for us to raise this with the British and French; this included dual-capable aircraft.

A fourth issue concerned inspection of facilities on Allied territory, Nitze went on. We had said that some such inspection might be possible, but it had to be limited to bases for which we retained responsibility, and should involve limited numbers of inspection, not concentrated against any one country.

Nitze concluded that issues like these were significant. They needed to be resolved, and fairly promptly.

KARPOV said Nitze had described the more important issues.

The Soviet side considered the question of inspection of SS–20 bases an artificial issue, Karpov went on. The ostensible purpose was to guarantee that the first stages would not be used for the SS–25. The Soviet side was willing to accept verification of the absence of production of the SS–25, and also of the SS–21 and 23. Hence it had proposed verification of production of SRF and INF. The issue could be surmounted. Inspectors could verify that no items like missiles and warheads were leaving the production facilities, which would be designated. They thus agreed on system verification. In the Soviet Union systems had distinct production characteristics: they were all assembled in factories and put whole into containers. In other words they were not disassembled. When production of the SS–20 was stopped, production of its first stage was also stopped. It had a similar but not the same first stage as the SS–25; to show that it could not be used for the SS–20 inspection at the point where it leaves the factory would suffice. The container could be opened, say from the top and the sides, to show this. Verification at operational bases was not necessary. There was no hidden agenda, no “chemistry,” as the Russian saying went, about this.

The two sides also differed about the cessation of GLCM production, Karpov went on. They were similar to SLCMs, and the Soviet side wanted assurance that the U.S. had stopped producing GLCM’s. The Soviet side was willing to accept absence of production by inspection at the point where they left the factory. It thought this was fair. It thought additional impetus should be given to this in Geneva.

The Soviet side was concerned that the U.S. position on non-circumvention created an extra burden in the negotiations, Karpov went on. There were examples and precedents in both bilateral U.S.-Soviet and multilateral agreements where the U.S. had accepted such obligations. U.S. arguments against them were not persuasive. That day the two sides had discussed a formula concerning pledges not to undertake obligations, official or unofficial, inconsistent with the Treaty. One question was when these would be effective, i.e. if they were only effective when the treaty came into force, could one side undertake such obligations before then? A second question was what form the obligation could take: would it be formal, or would it be informal, under a program of cooperation. There was food for thought here.

With regard to follow-up negotiations, Karpov went on, there had been arguments for and against. The Soviet side wanted to hear U.S. arguments; the process should go on. They had talked about a clause concerning further discussion of medium-range and shorter-range systems, particularly aircraft. The U.S. had pointed out that there were other forums for such discussion. The exchanges on this should continue.

With regard to inspections on Allied territory, Karpov went on, the U.S. declared itself for inspections on its territory, but it also had bases on Allied territory and in other countries. If one adopted the U.S. position that as soon as a base ceased to exist inspection would stop, the result would be an unequal position. Soviet territory would be open to inspection, but U.S. and Allied territory would be closed. There should be a compromise under which bases in third countries should be open to inspection. A solution appeared to be emerging in Geneva. A solution would give the two sides practical confidence that nothing was being done against the Treaty.

There were also technical questions, Karpov concluded. The Soviet side was trying in Moscow to develop positions that would remove these, but not everything depended on the Soviet side. It thought the U.S. side was overcomplicating some of these questions. It thought they could be solved in simpler ways, without compromising the effectiveness of elimination and verification of the systems.

THE SECRETARY asked Shevardnadze to comment. SHEVARDNADZE said he had listened, but things had not become clearer for him. The question was whether they should take decisions or wait.

NITZE said that Karpov had stated some points more clearly than before in their discussions, and we would need to consider what had been said, and get back to the Soviet side. On other questions the situation was clearer than Karpov had suggested, for instance on the question of an “unequal” approach. The U.S. side was ready for inspection in Allied countries, but once we were gone suspect-site inspection should be terminated; there could be a close-out inspection, but there should be no more.

Kampelman said that when we had left Moscow the week before we had seen that some issues were unresolved. What disturbed us was that issues we had then thought were resolved by the Vorontsov statement were still not resolved. An hour before he had heard from Geneva of one such example concerning inspection. It concerned the issue of when the inspecting party notifies the inspected party of the place and time of inspection. Vorontsov had said that the time of notification should be at the time of entry into the inspected country. The U.S. side had thought the notes of the meeting indicated agreement on this. Now, an hour ago, he had been informed that this was not so. The Soviet Delegation in Geneva now held that notification should take place before the point of arrival in the country. This was not unimportant. Short notice should be short notice, in order not to permit the inspected side to make changes. This was just an example, an illustration. Our own negotiator had pleaded with us to make the point that resolved issues should not be reopened. This did not answer Shevardnadze’s question on how to expedite things, but it was clear they would not be expedited by reopening resolved questions.

NITZE said another such example concerned the point at which both sides reach equality. It had been 70% of the reductions; now the Soviet side had reopened it and was saying 80%. We had thought this was settled.

SHEVARDNADZE asked what was going on.

KARPOV explained that the Soviet side had proposed 70% on the assumption of a 5-year schedule; now, with three years agreed, they were proposing 80%. The Soviet side was proposing 29 months for the first stage, the U.S. 25 months.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested jokingly to the Secretary that perhaps the two of them should move to Geneva and go to work.

THE SECRETARY said he had a suggestion to make. Karpov, Nitze, and Kampelman had discussed these things. Some issues were better articulated now. He suggested the ministers ask them to go through the issues carefully before Shevardnadze left Washington, and then the ministers should be in touch with their Geneva negotiators on the basis of that screening, and impress on them the need to get rid of the chaff. He had been told about an issue, defined as an issue because it was in brackets, which suggested resistance to settling.

Then, the Secretary went on, they should do what they had agreed to do in Moscow. They should take careful stock—perhaps on Wednesday evening and Friday evening—and keep their people in touch in some manner, keep pushing along. He was not necessarily talking about going to Geneva. They had to keep confidence in their negotiators. But they needed to push along, to speed things, to identify issues. For instance there was the issue of whether information learned by inspectors could remain confidential. The U.S. said no; the Soviets said only if both sides want it to. He could not understand why there could not be agreement on that. They should get rid of issues like that.

The issues that had been talked about here were more significant, the Secretary continued. He asked Shevardnadze to remember that most of them had to do with verification. This was a tremendously important topic, they both agreed. The U.S. side would ratify the Treaty. There would be great commotion, but it would be ratified. But the questions raised during the ratification process would all be about verification. Today’s statement had conditioned people to think in terms of a strategic arms agreement. Everyone knew that verification of such an agreement was going to be even more difficult. We were walking on INF; we would have to run on strategic arms. So, when in doubt, the two sides should lean a bit in the direction of verification provisions.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that in this set of issues, two or three would require political-level decision, decision at the ministers’ level. Perhaps they should be left aside for that. In addition to letting the delegations work, perhaps the ministers should encourage them to practice tradeoffs, to speed things up, not to resist. The Secretary and he should tell them to practice tradeoffs and leave two or three things for their level or for the summit level.

THE SECRETARY said strongly that none should be left for the summit level. They needed to get it done, so it could be signed.

SHEVARDNADZE said of course he agreed. He suggested that in the remaining two to three weeks, he start receiving Matlock. If there were U.S. concerns, he would work on them. He would similarly ask the Secretary to receive Dubinin. They should use their ambassadors, as well as their negotiators, since the ambassadors had direct access to the ministers. In 15–20 days things should be resolved.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. He liked Shevardnadze’s putting it in terms of days. If there were tradeoffs, this was the time to make them. He thought the two of them had done what they could on that topic.

NITZE asked what time he and Karpov should meet. SHEVARDNADZE asked where the 35 questions had come from; they should be removed by tradeoffs and by leaving the more difficult ones to be settled at ministerial level through the ambassadors. THE SECRETARY said Nitze and Karpov should arrange a time to meet.

The Secretary said he had one request to make on behalf of some Senators. This was the Senate Observer Group, which took an interest in arms control, and was on the whole positive. Senator Stevens had written him, and suggested that he and his colleagues visit Moscow before the Summit. They wanted to visit Shevardnadze and, through that, to develop a point of contact for discussion as they consider ratification of this treaty. If Shevardnadze were prepared to receive them, Roz Ridgway could follow up. This would be helpful. Shevardnadze had met with them before, and they were constructive.

SHEVARDNADZE said that in principle he was ready to meet with them. He would communicate with the Secretary on when and how it would be done once he returned to Moscow.

THE SECRETARY asked Ambassador Ridgway whether there were a report concerning the Persian Gulf. AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY said she would check. (Nitze and Karpov were arranging their meeting, which did not take place due to Shevardnadze’s subsequent decision to take off that night at 10:00 p.m. for Moscow.)

THE SECRETARY told Shevardnadze that while they were waiting for the report he would like to give Shevardnadze a gift. He thanked Shevardnadze on that occasion for the gift the latter had left him and his wife. Shevardnadze had noted the paperweight on the President’s desk. The Secretary had given it to the President, who had kept it. It bore the seal the Secretary had shown Shevardnadze on the Eighth Floor. He wanted to give Shevardnadze the same paperweight. He had also given Gorbachev one. SHEVARDNADZE expressed appreciation.

THE SECRETARY suggested they touch on bilateral issues. There were two points still unresolved: temporary duty people and guest visas. Shevardnadze had told Matlock these should be resolvable. The Secretary appreciated that. He wanted to register that living conditions for our people were an important topic. He invited Simons to comment.

SIMONS addressed the remaining differences concerning repair workers for existing office buildings. The Soviet side had offered 40, and mentioned 50, with an assurance that requests above this would be favorably considered. We did not wish to bump up against the number, and felt we needed 75, although this included guards as well as repair workers as such.

SHEVARDNADZE said 50 sounded reasonable. As he had said before, he would be willing to meet with Matlock, after the holidays; the Secretary should also meet with Dubinin. BESSMERTNYKH added this was something that should be resolved taking into account both sides’ wishes.

Ambassador RIDGWAY reported that no report from Perez de Cuellar on the Gulf situation had been received.

THE SECRETARY said that on the Gulf he hoped that both sides would be able to move strongly in support of positive trends, if that were what Perez de Cuellar reported. If Iran was not forthcoming, we would need to move quickly to language showing other countries our resolve. He hoped we would be able to move strongly together, and not be separated.

SHEVARDNADZE said Vorontsov was currently on a trip to the area. He had met with the Iraqis, was meeting with the Kuwaitis, would be in Tehran that day or the next. He had asked Vorontsov to feel out the situation, to see if there were any new elements that deserved attention. He did not think everything had been done to develop the possibilities inherent in the resolution that had been adopted. He thought the Secretary General could be more active; this might involve trips to the region and the like. Even if there were sanctions he would need to be active, of course without postponing things to a remote future. When Vorontsov returned to Moscow, if he had something to report, Shevardnadze would be in communication with the Secretary.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed that the Secretary General should continue to be active whatever happened. But his efforts needed strengthening. We thought so, and so did he. And strengthening them included mandatory sanctions.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the two ministers think about it; peace might have been declared that day without their having been informed.

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze wanted to raise further questions.

SHEVARDNADZE said it appeared to him that the two main tasks were now organizational arrangements for the Summit and accelerating efforts at Geneva. He would be personally involved, and knew the Secretary would too. If instructions were needed, he would be prepared to give them. The Soviet side would have an integrated group looking at these problems.

Turning to a regional topic, THE SECRETARY said he and Shevardnadze were agreed that Armacost and Vorontsov had had a good meeting. Shevardnadze had commented that if something good could emerge on one regional issue, that would be a positive addition to the Summit agenda. The U.S. side thought perhaps it would be good for Armacost and Vorontsov to have another meeting the week of November 16 in Geneva.²

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed. Vorontsov’s presence in Geneva was also desirable for INF; it would be good for Kampelman to be there too.

KAMPELMAN said he agreed. He had told Vorontsov he was willing to meet with him, although he understood Vorontsov’s busy schedule. He would be pleased to go.

SHEVARDNADZE said it was therefore agreed that Vorontsov would go to Geneva on the 16th and meet first with Armacost and then with Kampelman. THE SECRETARY said that was all right with him.

The Secretary reported the exchange on Iran-Iraq to Carlucci, who had been out of the room; he noted Shevardnadze would be reporting to him on Vorontsov’s return. CARLUCCI asked if the November 16 meeting was to be announced. SHEVARDNADZE said it should not be announced immediately; he would discuss it on his return to Moscow. THE SECRETARY said he would note in public that our regional experts on Central America would be meeting October 28 in London, and that we were working toward an Armacost-Vorontsov meeting on regional issues in general before the Summit.³

SHEVARDNADZE said the two sides needed a whole program. He would discuss this on his return to Moscow. He thought that day’s meeting had been extremely useful. They should have more such productive days. THE SECRETARY recalled what he had said in the Cabinet Room: he was willing to work personally on these matters, though that did not necessarily mean more meetings elsewhere. SHEVARDNADZE said that was his approach too.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in Shultz’s office at the Department of State.
2. A description of this conversation was transmitted in telegram 12119 from Geneva, November 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870009–0485)
3. Shultz raised the matter of the Armacost-Vorontsov meeting in his press conference after this meeting. (Department of State Bulletin, December 1987, pp. 71–73)