Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

90. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 30, 1987, 1–2 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The President
  • Secretary of State George P. Shultz
  • Howard H. Baker, Chief of Staff to the President
  • Frank C. Carlucci, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Kenneth Duberstein, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
  • Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State, European and Canadian Affairs
  • Robert E. Linhard, NSC Staff
  • Fritz W. Ermath, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
  • Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• USSR

  • Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh
  • Ambassador Yuri Dubinin
  • Ambassador Victor Karpov, Head, Arms Limitation and Disarmament Department
  • Teymuraz Stepanov, Senior Assistant to the Foreign Minister
  • Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Director, Foreign Ministry’s USA Department
  • Sergei Tarasenko, Head, General Secretariat (Notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

Following a welcome session in the Oval Office² and a brief photo-op on the portico, the President opened the meeting in the Cabinet Room by once again welcoming the Soviet Foreign Minister to Washington. He expressed hope that Shevardnadze could see something of Washington because this might help when Gorbachev visited. He teased Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz for their shuttle diplomacy, saying it made him and General Secretary Gorbachev look like two tennis players trying to keep two balls in the air simultaneously. Secretary Shultz said he and his colleague were literally in the air a great deal. (U)

The President said he had read the General Secretary’s letter,³ that he and his colleagues would study it further and respond to it, and that he regarded it as a very statesmanlike contribution to our dialogue, to progress in our relations, and to peace. He said the letter provided a sound basis on which to proceed. He noted that the two sides now seemed fully confident that they could complete the INF treaty and sign it at a summit in Washington in early December. He noted further that important details still had to be resolved in Geneva, speedily but carefully. This truly historic agreement, he said, had to stand the test of critical scrutiny and the test of time. The President added that between now and the summit, we would continue our dialogue and negotiations on all aspects of our agenda. He said he had been told that the morning’s meeting between Shevardnadze, Secretary Shultz, and Mr. Carlucci had been productive.⁴ He expressed delight that the two sides had agreed to a summit meeting in Washington. Then he asked the Soviet Foreign Minister for his assessment of progress. (C)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze opened by reporting that he had just talked with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev who had asked to have his warm greetings and best wishes conveyed to the President and the First Lady, especially his condolences on the death of Mrs. Reagan’s mother.⁵ He apologized for being a few minutes late for the meeting, noting that this was unusual but that the physical pace of movement in US-Soviet relations was becoming difficult to keep up with. He observed that Reykjavik and four ministerial meetings had brought substantial changes to US-Soviet relations. Guided by the General Secretary and the President, he said, tremendous work had been done. He wanted especially to note progress in the principal area, movement toward the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear arms. Gorbachev, he said, had described the dialogue at Reykjavik as having accomplished a “profound intellectual breakthrough.” (S)

Shevardnadze observed that we now had in hand an agreement on eliminating medium and short-range missiles. Some questions remained, but they could be resolved; it was “doable.” This meant that, during Gorbachev’s stay in Washington, this historic agreement could be signed. But, he continued, both the American and the Soviet people would not be satisfied with this. Therefore, the focus was now shifting to the key problem of our time, the task of achieving deep and radical reductions in strategic arms. During the Moscow ministerial of the previous week, Gorbachev had put forth new proposals regarding agreement on the structure of various legs of the TRIAD in terms of warhead numbers.⁶ This, he said, had moved the Soviet position closer to that of the United States. (S)

Today, Shevardnadze continued, the ministers had discussed the very important problem of assuring strategic stability after the INF and START agreements. Complete confidence in strategic stability was required. The most important mechanism for assuring that stability, he insisted, was the ABM Treaty. Major progress on this had been achieved today, he said, in his discussions with Shultz and Carlucci in that both sides had accepted the formula of pledging non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period. He said that, for the time being, there was no agreement on the the duration of that period, but that Gorbachev had expressed confidence that an acceptable solution could be found. Shevardnadze expressed satisfaction that both sides were taking into account the importance of the historically evolved structure of the other side’s forces, which put the dialogue on an objective, even scientific, basis. (S)

As to the further course of events, Shevardnadze said, the next step was to be the President’s meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. The two sides had agreed that a summit in the second week of December, starting on December 7, was mutually convenient. He anticipated events largely in the Washington area, involving meetings with the President and other officials and with elements of the Congress. He said that a definitive program could be worked out in bilateral channels and that the General Secretary wanted it to accommodate thorough talks with the President that advanced US-Soviet relations. The priority of this aspect of the summit was logical, he said. (C)

Shevardnadze said the next stage, as anticipated at the Geneva Summit in 1985, would be for the President to come to the USSR, an event the Soviet people looked forward to. It was vital, he continued, that all the Soviet and American experts work hard to complete for that visit an agreement providing for the radical, 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive forces. Without exaggeration, he said, this would be the most important breakthrough, the most historic event. Shevardnadze said that he and Secretary Shultz and Mr. Carlucci must launch preparatory work to assure that the Washington summit could produce agreement on the main elements and instructions for our delegations in Geneva on how to culminate such an agreement in Moscow. In Gorbachev’s view, this was the main task. (S)

Shevardnadze went on to say that the main channel of communication for moving ahead on this score would be through embassies and respective foreign ministries, with all involved agencies cooperating and working actively. After this meeting, he added, the parties had to sit down and think about practical options for accomplishing the tasks of the two summits, first in Washington and then in Moscow. This would involve a great deal of work. Reflecting on the Moscow ministerial of the previous week, Shevardnadze rejected the view that it had been a disappointment; he asserted that it had been useful and productive, making very important progress on very important issues. The meeting with Gorbachev had been very important. Now talks would continue on the whole agenda, nuclear forces, the ABM Treaty, regional issues, and also human rights so that the next summit would be successful. Much hope and trust had been invested in the prospect that the two leaders would live up to the challenge. (C)

Shevardnadze concluded by thanking the President for his time and attention, especially given the “nuances of the situation” (apparently a reference to the death of the First Lady’s mother). (U)

The President then asked Secretary Shultz to report. (U)

Shevardnadze interrupted to hand over the official copy of Gorbachev’s latest letter to the President which had been conveyed to the US side on the Foreign Minister’s arrival at Andrews Air Force Base. (U)

Secretary Shultz noted that a joint statement had been agreed upon and would be issued simultaneously at around 1400 hours Washington time in both capitals.⁷ Shevardnadze interjected that the Soviet side agreed with the text. (U)

[NOTE FOR THE RECORD: As of around noon, when the meeting of ministers broke up at the State Department, the passage in the joint statement regarding the commitment of the two sides to adhere to the ABM Treaty “for an agreed period” had bracketed language which continued “of ten years,” language the Soviet side insisted upon and the US side rejected. Between noon and 1300 hours, Shevardnadze evidently talked by phone with Moscow—he said, directly with Gorbachev—and was authorized to drop insistence on “of ten years.” This phone call apparently caused the slight tardiness of the Soviet delegation to the White House and concerned the disagreement over the duration of the period of pledged adherence to the ABM Treaty, both referred to by Shevardnadze above.] (S)

Secretary Shultz continued by noting that Shevardnadze had presented a fair summary of their earlier discussions. The Secretary wanted to highlight a few things. He appreciated that all involved had to make a major effort to complete the INF agreement so that the President and Gorbachev could sign it. This meant that the two tennis balls might have to be in the air a while longer. The Secretary said that he and Shevardnadze had made a mutual pledge to each other to get this done. They had promised together to work the hard issues before them, which was important both for the Washington summit and the Moscow summit. (S)

The second thing Secretary Shultz wished to highlight was the improved ability of the two sides to talk about such sensitive subjects as human rights. He and the Foreign Minister had agreed to charge deputy foreign ministers (to be named later) to review current status, resolve outstanding cases, and create a program for the future in the area of human rights. This would raise the matter to a higher level of attention and assure substantial progress. He looked forward to a day when not so much time had to be devoted to talking about human rights because the problems had been solved. He thought this could be done. He continued, saying that it would be a very positive development if the two sides could make progress on regional issues and permit this topic to be dealt with successfully at the Washington Summit. This would contribute greatly to progress on arms reduction because regional conflicts are such a source of tension and distrust which fuel the arms competition. Arms are the product not the cause of the tension. Resolution of regional conflicts would make arms control much easier. (S)

The third outcome of the ministerial so far, Secretary Shultz noted, was that we had achieved a very ambitious target in virtually completing the INF agreement and now were making a strong effort on START for the next summit. (S)

The President asked Mr. Carlucci if he had anything to add. Mr. Carlucci said he thought the two ministers had covered everything very well. (U)

The President thanked Shevardnadze and Shultz for their summaries and noted that he wanted to make several points on issues he considered most pressing. He said he agreed with the General Secretary that we must emphasize concluding an equitable and verifiable START treaty which provides 50 percent reduction in our strategic arsenals and does so in a manner that adds to mutual security and to stability. We should, he said, aim to complete such a treaty in the first half of 1988 and sign it in Moscow next year. That would assure, he continued, that the tennis game with the two balls in play would produce a win for both sides. (S)

The President went on to say that we are not reluctant to address the subject of Defense and Space. On the contrary, he had offered a number of proposals in this area. But, he emphasized, there should be no misunderstanding; he would not surrender the promise of a safer world offered by SDI. He expressed the firm view that the December summit could be used to give greater impetus to the negotiations to conclude treaties on both areas, START and Defense & Space. Formal, verifiable treaties should be our goal, he said, and we should not settle for anything less. (S)

The President said he looked forward to seeing Foreign Minister Shevardnadze again with General Secretary Gorbachev in December, when the two sides would conduct a thorough review of our entire agenda. He asked Shevardnadze to convey warmest regards from the President and Mrs. Reagan to Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev. He noted that the US and Soviet leaderships could by the wrong decisions precipitate disaster upon the world, but they could also take the decisions that avoided disaster and promoted a more peaceful world. (C)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze responded to this by recalling the great impact at the UN General Assembly of the results of the September ministerial in Washington where it had been agreed to eliminate two classes of nuclear missiles. It was his third participation in the UNGA and he found it difficult to describe how much the atmosphere had changed from previous meetings. There was no indifference to our achievement, he said; people were tired of living in fear of annihilation. We were on the true and right course, he said; we had a unique chance to move ahead and had taken important steps today. The Soviet side would do all that depended on them. He foresaw distinctly positive trends under the leadership of the President and the General Secretary. (C)

The President then adjourned the meeting to the Oval Office where an exchange of pleasantries continued until the President, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze repaired to the White House Press Room to make public statements.⁸ (U)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, President’s Meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 10/30/1987 (2). Secret. Drafted by Ermarth. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Green sent a copy of the memorandum to Levitsky and Sandall under a November 5 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. Reference is to a brief informal exchange between Reagan and Shevardnadze with the press prior to the meeting. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book II, p. 1255)
3. See Document 88.
4. See Document 89.
5. Nancy Reagan’s mother, Edith Davis, died on October 27.
6. See Document 84.
7. The joint statement declared that General Secretary Gorbachev would visit Washington in December. (Department of State Bulletin, December 1987, p. 70)
8. Reagan’s remarks and a question-and-answer session with reporters are printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book II, pp. 1256–1258.