Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

183. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, January 8, 1989, 2:30–4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting with Shevardnadze

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Secretary of State George P. Shultz
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European & Canadian Affairs
  • Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
  • Charles Redman, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
  • Nelson Ledsky, NSC Staff
  • Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, EUR
  • Alexander Vershbow, Director, EUR/SOV (notetaker)
  • Gary Crocker, INR/PMA (CW briefing only)
  • Jay Castillo, CIA (CW briefing only)
  • Sue Biniaz, L/OES (signing ceremony only)

• USSR

  • Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Ambassador Viktor Karpov Head, MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Administration
  • Yakov Ryabov, USSR Ambassador to France
  • Teimuraz Stepanov, Aide to Shevardnadze
  • Vadim Perfiliyev, Deputy Spokesman, MFA
  • Mr. Ryabinkov, MFA Treaty and Legal Department
  • Vasiliy Sredin, Deputy Director, USA Department, MFA (notetaker)

Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons

Shevardnadze said he thought the CW conference was going quite well and was being conducted in a good atmosphere.

Secretary Shultz agreed that the conference was proceeding in excellent fashion. He had listened to Shevardnadze’s speech and considered it very good.² Shevardnadze had reiterated some things we had heard before and this was reassuring. We were especially pleased with the emphasis on inspections of alleged violations and with Shevardnadze’s statement that the UN Secretary General should have the authority to conduct investigations with no country able to refuse an inspection. All of these positions, the Secretary said, had been well put.

Shevardnadze said he had read the Secretary’s speech³ and believed it also contained many interesting things. If we were to move in the direction indicated, a convention banning chemical weapons was within reach.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Turning to the formal agenda, the Secretary noted that there was not much time and the Ministers had some interesting documents to sign at the end.

Shevardnadze agreed it was unfortunate they had little time, but having worked together for 3½ years he wanted to say once again how gratified he was by what he and the Secretary had done together. 1988 had been a very interesting year, a turning point in overall U.S.-Soviet relations. Great impetus had been provided by the meetings in Washington, Moscow and New York. It was striking to compare the atmosphere at those meetings with that of the 1985 Geneva Summit (which was already very good). Shevardnadze said he appreciated the Secretary’s personal contribution to the positive developments in U.S.-Soviet relations and he hoped that this meeting, their 31st, would be useful and fruitful. He did not know whether any fundamental issues could be resolved today or any new agreements reached, but it was still a meeting of some importance.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed that many important things had happened over the last year. It was indeed a turning point in our relations and in world developments. There was a different atmosphere, reflecting a greater ability to solve problems—southern Africa being a good example. The Secretary recalled that it had been a very striking experience for him to sit at the UN and sign the documents bringing into effect the Namibia/Angola accords.⁴ He was very pleased to have been able to say that it could not have come about without the cooperative, supportive relationship between the United States and Soviet Union. In fact, the parties could not have done it without our help.

Continuing, the Secretary said he was very grateful to Shevardnadze, who had been a fine partner and a good friend. Of course, the leadership of Chairman Gorbachev and President Reagan had been key to the process of improved U.S.-Soviet relations. The two Ministers could not have done what they had done without a push from the top. Thus we owed our leaders a debt of gratitude. The Secretary added that he hoped and trusted that President-elect Bush and Secretary-designate Baker would seek to ensure continuity. He knew that they also saw the importance of our relationship and wanted it to remain creative and constructive.

Shevardnadze said the Secretary had just said something important. It was very important to preserve the dynamism and the atmosphere that we have shaped. On this basis we should further expand U.S.-Soviet relations for the benefit of international security. This was not, he added, just a slogan, but a real policy. Based on what Bush and Baker had said, as well as the comments of other members of the incoming team, he believed there was a very sincere desire to preserve continuity and to expand cooperation further. This was because it was in the interest of both our countries. As for reminiscing, Shevardnadze said that one day he and Secretary Shultz would have the opportunity to do so at a place where they could relax—perhaps in the United States, Georgia or Siberia—since they had a lot to reminisce about. He added that while many colleagues from previous ministerial meetings were not present on this occasion, these were good people with whom the Soviets had debated and he wanted Secretary Shultz to pass on his regards and words of appreciation to all of them.

Secretary Shultz said he would be glad to do so. Regarding the agenda for this meeting, he wanted first to make some points about the Vienna CSCE meeting. He also had some material to pass along about the Armenian earthquake and he wanted to brief Shevardnadze on the Libyan chemical weapons plant. At the end he wanted make a brief mention of our new embassy problem. Shevardnadze said he agreed and asked the Secretary to go first.

Vienna CSCE Meeting

The Secretary said that he had two topics he wanted to mention in the context of bringing the Vienna meeting to a rapid conclusion. He hoped we would be able to finish promptly so that he could personally participate in the closing ceremony.

His first point, the Secretary said, concerned the U.S. decision to agree to a Moscow human rights conference as one of the follow-on meetings to Vienna. This was a decision that he and the President felt was the proper one. We were moving ahead on the basis of what we regarded as immense changes in the Soviet Union; we felt good about the fact that these changes were based on the Soviets’ own conclusions about what was good for their country. This provided a very solid foundation. As Shevardnadze knew, we had not been able to resolve all the issues we had raised in connection with the Moscow conference. Recalling what Ambassador Matlock had said in passing along the Secretary’s recent letter,⁵ it was very important that the progress continue. This would be very critical to us in cementing political support for our decision. That decision was a controversial one but the Secretary said he did not mind standing up for it.

The Secretary went on to note that Chairman Gorbachev’s speech to the United Nations contained references to changes in the Soviet Union’s legal arrangements and the rule of law.⁶ We had read with great attention this passage because the institutionalization of change was very important to us. It was something we would be looking for in the future. The Secretary added that there was a fair number of refusenik cases still outstanding and we wanted to work our way through these as well. There were two people in particular on peoples’ minds in the U.S.: Sergey Petrov and Georgiy Samoilovich. Any news on these cases would be most welcome.

Continuing, the Secretary said there was also a question about how we would review various cases. We have a procedure with respect to psychiatric cases. For criminal cases in which there may have been a miscarriage of justice, we have agreed there will be a procedure to review them one by one. For example, the U.S. would like to see as much as possible of the court records. It was important that we get the details of this procedure pinned down, since this would be very important to maintaining political support for our decision on the Moscow conference. But the Secretary reiterated that the decision had been made; we were comfortable with it and would proceed with it. At the same time, it was obvious that if there were some major move back to old conditions it would be impossible for any Administration to go to Moscow. But we have full confidence that this will not be the case.

Shevardnadze said that he now believed we could say with confidence that the Vienna meeting would be completed within the proposed timeframe of January 17–19. This was certainly desirable. There still were differences over the geographic zone for conventional arms talks; here he was referring to the position of Greece, since the Soviets and Turks had found a solution to their differences. There were also some other obstacles but the Soviets believed all of them could be overcome. Shevardnadze added that many participants, including himself, hoped that Secretary Shultz would be able to attend the conclusion of Vienna, since this was only fair and right. It should be possible to complete the meeting in time so that he and the Secretary could have another meeting and see the Vienna woods together.

The Secretary remarked that we would not be able to have a “walk in the woods.” Shevardnadze said that in any case their meeting could be accompanied by the music of Johann Strauss. Secretary Shultz quipped that, in that case, they could have a “waltz in the woods.” Karpov commented that the U.S. should have no reason to worry about a “waltz in the woods” now.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to convey the Soviet Union’s gratitude for U.S. support of the idea of a Moscow human rights conference. The Soviets believed that the idea itself was appropriate in view of trends, not only in the USSR but also in other countries. The U.S. decision was of fundamental importance. The Soviets understood the process involved in formulating the U.S. position and they knew as well of Secretary Shultz’s personal contribution. For this they wanted to express special appreciation. In recognition of the Secretary’s role, Shevardnadze believed he should attend the Moscow conference as a guest of honor; he would be sent the first invitation. Shevardnadze added that he expected the conference would be an interesting forum. There would be a lot to say and a lot to show. Moreover, in the intervening period the Soviets planned to do a lot to implement their plans and intentions. Thus the Moscow human rights conference would be an important event.

Continuing, Shevardnadze said that if we succeeded in finishing the Vienna meeting, the next stage will be to begin negotiations on conventional arms. While this was an issue for the new Secretary of State, the Soviets believed it would be good if we could decide that both of the new conventional security negotiations should begin at the level of Foreign Ministers. This would emphasize the negotiations’ importance, while also providing an occasion to discuss other issues.

Further, Shevardnadze said, the Soviets believed we should consider a meeting at the Summit level of European countries plus the U.S. and Canada to review the initial results of the conventional negotiations. Shevardnadze added that he wanted to emphasize the importance of the unilateral reductions in conventional forces announced by Gorbachev in New York. These opened up possibilities for a major breakthrough in reducing the military stand-off in Europe. He repeated that it would help the negotiations if we were to begin them with a meeting at the Foreign Minister level and later on—during a subsequent stage—at the summit level.

Returning to the Vienna endgame, Shevardnadze said that, as a practical matter, it was important that we push for solutions involving as few amendments as possible so that we could finish by January 17. In the Soviet view the draft concluding document of the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries was consistent with the interests of the West and the East. The Soviets had no objections to the document in its present form. It was, of course, a compromise reflecting the interests of all participants. The GDR had had some problems but these had now been taken care of. The Romanians also had some problems. Perhaps, Shevardnadze suggested whimsically, the U.S. should work on the Romanians and the Soviets on the Greeks.

Secretary Shultz responded that the U.S. agreed the language in the NNA draft was pretty good, although we believed it needed strengthening in two areas. The most important of these was human rights monitors. Here we would like to see some specific reference to the right to form such groups. We noticed that in Gorbachev’s UN speech he had used words that supported this concept; perhaps this could provide the basis for a solution.

Regarding the Greek problem, the Secretary said he frankly did not know how this would be resolved. The Greeks were very stubborn and the dispute was not an East-West issue but a reflection of tensions over Cyprus. Perhaps the Greeks would change their minds as in Stockholm, or perhaps they would opt out, in which case we would have conventional stability talks among 22 rather than 23. Alternatively, the Greeks might refuse to sign the concluding document but participate in the negotiations. In short, we were struggling with the problem. These were some possible solutions to which he simply wanted to call Shevardnadze’s attention while we waited to see how our discussions with the Greeks evolved.

Shevardnadze said this was clearly a problem that could not be resolved today but he suggested that the two ministers ask their delegations to work intensively with the Greeks and the Romanians. He added that he also understood that Canada had some hesitation about the Moscow human rights conference. This also would need to be addressed if we were to meet the goal of completing Vienna before January 20.

The Secretary replied that he could tell Shevardnadze privately that the Canadians would be agreeing to the Moscow human rights conference the following week. He was more concerned about the Greek problem than about any other. There were ways we might conclude the Vienna meeting without resolving this problem; while it would not be satisfactory to exclude Greece from participating in the conventional talks, we might have to accept this.

Returning to the Moscow human rights conference, the Secretary reiterated that the more we see clear indications that progress is continuing, the stronger the support will be for the conference. Thus to the degree that the Soviets were able to find things they could do in the near term, it would help us a lot.

The Secretary said that one other issue on which the U.S. still had problems was the number of follow-on conferences. We hoped that the number could be reduced from 11 since we were reluctant to see a proliferation of conferences. Assistant Secretary Ridgway said the U.S. believed that 8 or 9 were sufficient and we were willing to have one additional meeting in the East apart from the Moscow human rights conference.

Shevardnadze said he did not believe there were going to be problems on this score. He noted that while the Czechs had asked to host an economic conference, their Foreign Minister had told him the day before that Prague would agree to remove this proposal from the agenda. Secretary Shultz said that he agreed that this issue would probably fall into place.

Shevardnadze said that he would be meeting with the Greek Foreign Minister the following day. While he would not take full responsibility, he would try to persuade the Greeks to drop their objections to the geographic solution worked out between the Turks and Soviets. He added that he had had a very good meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister, whom he had found in a very good mood. The Secretary commented that the Turkish Foreign Minister was always in a good mood, but this did not affect the substance of the Greek problem.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to say a few words on some specific cases the Secretary had raised in the past. Regarding the “list of six” (the last six cases remaining on the President’s list, presented to Gorbachev in New York), there had been some further consideration and some positive decisions. Kosharovskiy had been allowed to emigrate; there were no longer any obstacles to the emigration of the Stolar family; Lukyanenko had been pardoned; the Barats had been allowed to have their Moscow residence permits restored; and Mrs. Gordiyevskaya had made no request to leave. Shevardnadze said he had additional information on other cases, but given the limited time he thought it would be best to provide this to Ambassador Matlock in the coming days.

Shevardnadze went on to emphasize that the Soviet Union was embarked on perestroyka—a revision of structures that would lead to the establishment of a state based on law. This could not, however, be done overnight. Nonetheless, some laws had already been promulgated and work will be completed by the spring. Draft legislation had first to be discussed by the people. The end result of this process would be a new Soviet constitution. Shevardnadze added that, with the completion of the Vienna concluding document, there would be more guarantees that human rights problems in all countries would be addressed in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act.

Secretary Shultz said Ambassador Matlock would be ready to talk with anyone Shevardnadze might designate on other cases, since human rights issues were high on our agenda.

Shevardnadze suggested that it would be Bessmertnykh, Adamishin or himself. The Soviet side was ready to discuss any question raised in a substantive way. Regarding Secretary Shultz’s points about an arrangement on legal questions, Shevardnadze said the U.S. idea had been favorably received and had been discussed with the Soviet law and order agencies. These agencies had agreed to the approach, and it was now necessary to discuss practical arrangements for a mechanism to sort out the facts on disputed cases. Secretary Shultz commented that this was a positive statement.

Following consultation with Sredin, Shevardnadze said that the two cases Secretary Shultz had raised (Petrov and Samoilovich) both still involved security objections, but the review would continue. It was possible that some cases would not lend themselves to a solution, but having a joint forum to discuss these issues could help produce results.

Secretary Shultz said that we believed that it would be advantageous to have Foreign Ministries involved even if the legal agencies had a dominant role in this review process. We have found that the presence of MFA people can be helpful.

Shevardnadze replied that this was certainly going to be the case. The Ministry of Justice, the Procurator General, the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs would all be involved on the Soviet side, along with the MFA. In addition, there was already a parallel arrangement between the Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress and this too could be helpful. Thus we should be able to sort out these cases.

Armenian Earthquake Assistance

Secretary Shultz said he wanted to say a few words about Armenia. We knew that the earthquake situation was entering a new stage. Immediate relief efforts were over and the Soviets were now turning their attention to reconstruction and related matters. We appreciated how many problems the Soviets faced, and thus we had been thinking about various ways in which the U.S. could help. The Secretary then handed over papers listing areas in which U.S. government agencies and private groups might be prepared to contribute (attached).⁷ He added that he thought Shevardnadze’s comments in his CW Conference speech about outside aid to Armenia had been very generous in their thanks for outside aid. The Secretary then asked DAS Simons to present copies of letters from the heads of U.S. agencies to their Soviet counterparts providing further information on the kinds of activities that might be possible.

Shevardnadze said that he would like to say on behalf of the Soviet leadership and people that the USSR was very grateful to the President, Vice President, Secretary Shultz and all Americans for their generous support—moral, psychological and material—following the Armenian tragedy. This was the opinion of all Soviet people and U.S. aid was deeply appreciated. The new offers the Secretary had presented would be carefully considered with the understanding that the U.S. government was pursuing a policy that would contribute to the further humanization of international relations. This showed how we have entered a new phase of international politics, and much of the warmer climate can be credited to the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Shevardnadze repeated the Soviet Union’s warm and cordial gratitude. There were indeed many problems in Armenia—some towns simply no longer existed, as U.S. citizens participating in the relief effort had seen. The Soviets would consider the U.S. offers and be in touch. [FYI: Subsequently, Assistant Secretary Ridgway and DAS Simons stressed to Sredin in private that the material presented illustrated the kinds of cooperation that might be possible but did not embody specific offers requiring a reply by the Soviet side. END FYI.]

Shevardnadze noted that members of the U.S. scientific community and the Soviet Academy of Sciences had already taken steps to pool their efforts in forecasting natural disasters. Both our countries have had many painful experiences, and there was considerable potential that had been largely untapped. Other countries too, such as Japan, have had their achievements in responding to natural disasters. Against this background, Shevardnadze suggested that it would be good if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to develop a joint initiative for pooling international efforts in this area. Of course there already were some international activities of this kind ongoing, but these could be broadened.

The Secretary replied that this struck him as a good idea with some potential. As a Californian he was aware of the problem of earthquakes. We also had to worry about other kinds of disasters such as hurricanes; Bangladesh had recently had three quarters of its territory covered in water, and the U.S. was helping evaluate that country’s plans for responding to the crisis. The Secretary said he agreed that we should look for ways we can cooperate in predicting and lessening the effect of natural disasters since this was important to all nations.

Shevardnadze suggested that he and the Secretary ask their people to think together about what could be done bilaterally, multilaterally, and in the UN framework. Some organizations were not functioning efficiently enough, particularly in the UN, and the U.S.–USSR could be the initiators of efforts to revitalize these organizations.

Libyan Chemical Weapons Program

Secretary Shultz said that time was running out and he wanted to offer Shevardnadze a briefing on the Libyan chemical weapons plant. He noted that the Libyan plane incident of the previous week⁸ was one in which, from our standpoint, U.S. pilots had acted in self-defense. The carrier from which they were operating was nowhere near Libya and the planes were nowhere near the suspected chemical works. The aircraft had made five efforts to disengage and only fired when the Libyan fighters had engaged in the kind of close pursuit suggesting hostile intent. At the UN, we had shown films of what our pilots saw and we believed this made our case clear.

Turning to the CW plant the Secretary said that it is not yet finished and we do not believe it is ready to go into full production. We had raised the question because we would like to see it prevented from becoming a CW producer.

Shevardnadze said that, based on the material the Soviets had seen, they continued to have a negative attitude about what had happened with the Libyan aircraft. He had not seen the films or talked with the U.S. pilots, but he believed it was an extremely unpleasant incident. There was a very substantial military presence in the region including forces of the U.S., the Soviet Union and others. The region was oversaturated with arms and thus any incident could have disastrous consequences. This was why the Soviets had reacted so sharply.

As for the alleged CW plant, Shevardnadze continued, the Soviet Union had people in Libya, including military advisors and engineers helping in the construction of military installations, but they had no personnel at the facility in question. Soviet relations with Libya were normal and they had no information about a plant capable of producing CW. The U.S. had made accusations that were very serious even in the case of a country headed by an objectionable regime. It was wrong to make such accusations without corroboration. Once such charges were raised the issue should be investigated in a serious way. Even if the Libyans had decided to develop CW, we all knew their level of technical know-how: they could not do this by themselves. Thus we needed to go to the source to find those guilty of helping.

Shevardnadze went on to say that there had been talk about Iraqi CW use and now there were accusations about Libya; in the future there would be accusations of other countries. His principled position was that investigations should take place into what was happening. Groundless accusations were not what the Soviets stood for. The Libyans themselves had categorically denied they were building a CW plant. Moscow had no data to confirm that they were, although perhaps Soviet intelligence services had not paid sufficient attention. Thus he was glad to see the U.S. information but he repeated that the U.S. should go to the source and the UN Secretary General should have the authority to investigate in such cases.

The Secretary replied that he welcomed Shevardnadze’s statement. It meant that, if there were a chemical weapons plant in Libya, then Shevardnadze would be upset. He was glad Shevardnadze wanted to know all the facts. When the subject had arisen at the Governors Island meeting,⁹ the Secretary recalled that he had said the U.S. would be glad to brief on what it knows. Thus he had asked Mr. Crocker to provide a briefing for Shevardnadze, recognizing that this was not as thorough a briefing as might be given to intelligence specialists.

Shevardnadze said that he did not object to the briefing although he could not be a fit opponent for Mr. Crocker. Secretary Shultz said that, in any case, Crocker’s presentation was not meant to be definitive. (Crocker and Castillo then joined the meeting.)

Crocker briefed on the technology center at Rabta, referring to line diagrams that had been prepared in Russian for today’s meeting. He noted that there were two main areas at the facility, a metal fabrication plant and a chemical plant. We knew a lot about the former since the Japanese had given us a lot of information—that it could produce both large and small precision metal pieces including artillery shells, bombs, and other weapons capable of delivering chemical weapons. Moreover, there was a plastics area that could make the special plastic parts needed to hold CW. In building this part of the facility, Crocker explained, the Japanese had obtained the assistance of 12 companies from different countries. These had also spoken with us and, thus, we were convinced that this part of the facility had a military purpose. The entire facility in fact had a very high security aspect, being surrounded by a double fence and, more recently, by extensive air defenses and troops. It had been well protected from the very beginning (we had been watching since 1986).

Crocker said that we knew less about the chemical plant since no one admitted to having helped build it. The construction was carried out covertly and we believed that given its large size it could produce many tons of chemical agents. The key building was the large production area in the center. It had a high capacity air system on the roof, which meant that the building below could handle very toxic materials. There was also a remote control center at one end which had been very solidly built, plus large storage tanks. The chemical weapons facility was well protected, having been built into a mountain side.

Crocker noted that the Japanese had initially been told by the Libyans that it was a desalinization plant but no Japanese technicians had been allowed in. Qadhafi now was saying the plant’s purpose was to produce pharmaceutical chemicals. We had our doubts, however. Of course the facility could produce many things; it was by definition multipurpose. But our evidence on Qadhafi’s chemical weapons program was not limited to watching this one facility. Crocker explained that Qadhafi had started his CW program around the same time as Iraq and Syria. He had not been as successful as those countries, however, since some of the countries from which Libya had sought to buy chemicals and equipment had cooperated with us. The Libyans had originally tried to produce CW at Tripoli but after the U.S. bombing had moved the project to the facility at Rabta.

Continuing, Crocker stated that we knew there were currently precursors for mustard gas and nerve agent at Rabta. We were concerned that if chemical agents were produced, the Libyans would use them in view of the fact that we already had evidence of Libyan CW use along the Chad border and signs that the Libyans may have given CW to Somalia; there was, of course, the additional risk that Qadhafi would provide CW to terrorist organizations.

Crocker, concluding the briefing, reiterated that we did not believe the plant was yet producing CW since there had been some serious problems in August, 1988. Thus there was still some time to prevent the plant’s use. Crocker noted that if Qadhafi would like to prove that Rabta was not a chemical weapons plant, there would have to be elaborate inspections along the lines we were discussing in the Geneva CW talks.

Shevardnadze asked whether the Soviets could keep the diagrams and Crocker agreed. Shevardnadze asked his colleagues if they had any questions.

Karpov commented that what Crocker had just shown was a workshop, and no one could say what this workshop could produce.

Shevardnadze noted that the Soviets had asked Qadhafi about the facility (it was their moral duty to do so in view of Moscow’s cooperative relationship with Libya) but he and all other Libyan leaders had denied it was a CW plant. Moreover, Qadhafi had said he was ready to accept inspectors and Shevardnadze had heard that reporters had been invited to the plant. Karpov added that the Libyans had said the plant was not yet operational, but that they would allow inspections once it was functioning.

Secretary Shultz said it was interesting what Qadhafi had done with the reporters, and asked Redman to elaborate. Assistant Secretary Redman explained that the reporters, after three days’ wait, had been taken on a bus trip to the plant. The trip, however, took place after dark and the bus did not stop moving, so the reporters were unable to see anything.

Secretary Shultz said that, in any event, a one-time inspection would not be a satisfactory solution—otherwise we would not be working so hard in Geneva. There would have to be a capability for surprise inspections and for repeated visits. The Secretary added that he recognized that today’s presentation was the first information Shevardnadze had heard about the Rabta plant and he appreciated the spirit in which it had been received. We did not believe this should become an issue between us since it was one in which we had a shared interest. He welcomed Shevardnadze’s statement that he would continue to put questions to the Libyans. If they were genuinely prepared to show the facility, perhaps the Soviet Union could get its experts there. This would be constructive.

Shevardnadze replied that he was not a specialist in chemistry. Perhaps Soviet experts would look at the plant and perhaps they would find something; it was hard to judge just by a diagram. The important thing, however, was to find the truth of the matter. The Soviets would ask questions officially and maybe do something unofficially. Both sides had an interest in not having the production of chemical weapons anywhere. On this he could say that the Soviet Union had an unambiguous and definitive position: chemical weapons should not exist, and there should be no channel for circumvention through any other country, be it Hungary, Korea or Germany.

Shevardnadze said that he could not say that the U.S. experts had persuaded him about the Libyan plant. Secretary Shultz replied that we recognized that Shevardnadze could not make a judgment on the basis of this brief description, but we wanted to show the Soviets that we had approached the question seriously and that our charges were not frivolous ones designed simply to needle Qadhafi. We had a lot of information, some of which we could disclose and some of which we could not. All of our analysts—who tend to be skeptics—were in this case very comfortable with the assessment that the intention of the Rabta facility was to produce CW.

The Secretary added that we agreed the Libyans could not build or operate such a facility on their own. Part of our task was to find out where the expertise and the precursors were coming from. He reiterated that the U.S. did see precursors for CW at Rabta. These substances had been obtained in a clandestine way and evidence like that generally made one suspicious.

Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union received all kinds of information from various sources, but he tended to treat such information very warily and gingerly. Very often data whose accuracy had been checked and double-checked later proved to be erroneous. Nonetheless, he appreciated the U.S. information and the Soviets would do what they could to determine what the facility is all about. But he wanted to ask the Secretary one question: What was the U.S. intention? Was it to achieve a stabilization and normalization of the situation or to see it become more grave? He noted that after the aircraft incident Libya and other Arab countries had been asking this question of the Soviets and thus it was very important to know U.S. intentions. The aircraft incident was in the past; what about the future?

Secretary Shultz replied that we intended to continue our diplomatic efforts to call attention to the Libyan CW project and to do everything we could to prevent its maturing into a CW plant. This was why we were talking to the USSR and our allies, and why we were trying to identify the sources and call people to account. We hoped this effort would be successful. Regarding Libya more generally, the Secretary continued, our problem was Libyan behavior. When Libya behaved normally, we would have no objections to normal relations. But Qadhafi’s behavior was beyond the pale and as a result we had no formal diplomatic relations. The Secretary reiterated that U.S. planes had been in no way aggressive and he was sure Shevardnadze would understand that any pilot must defend himself. That self-defense was the objective was shown on the films.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to separate the two questions. He agreed we should look into the circumstances surrounding the aircraft incident, but he was particularly worried about future U.S. actions regarding the CW plant. The Soviets had bitter experience in the past: the U.S. had carried out attacks involving the killing of people. If this were repeated it would be quite unacceptable. The U.S. should first investigate the facts of the situation.

The Secretary said that we hoped that the plant would not come into being as a producing CW facility. If we and the Soviet Union both saw that it was producing CW, then we would have a serious problem on our hands. For our part, we would clearly want to stop it from operating. This was why we were making so much noise now: to prevent this from coming to pass.

Shevardnadze said that if the Soviet Union saw that it was a CW plant, it would cooperate and consult with the U.S. But the Soviets were not sure that it was a CW plant, and he believed we should look at the problem without fanning tensions.

The Secretary replied that this was good. At his press conference he would say that the U.S. had provided information to the Soviets about the Libyan facility and, while the information was not of sufficient depth for the Soviet side to make a judgment, the sides had agreed that they both would deplore any new CW facility and that Shevardnadze had agreed to look into the problem.

Shevardnadze said this was fine, but it would also be necessary to say that the Soviet Union opposed production of CW in any country, including Libya. This could be said with all responsibility. It would also have to be stated that the Soviets had asked Libya about the plant, but the Libyans had denied it was for CW. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union would take note of the U.S. information. In a private aside, Karpov urged Shevardnadze to add that the issue should be resolved only by peaceful means; Shevardnadze told him that this was another question. (Crocker and Castillo then departed.)

Moscow New Office Building

Secretary Shultz said that the Ministers had two agreements to sign. Before finishing the meeting, however, he wanted to say a word on our Moscow Embassy building. Just how the question would shake down was not clear. The President had decided that the new office building should be torn down and rebuilt. This decision would now be reviewed by Congress. In the meantime, there had been a suggestion by some American businessmen of the possibility of buying the NOB. They had told us that the Soviets would be prepared to provide another site in Lenin Hills for a new U.S. building. Ambassador Matlock has subsequently asked whether this was in fact the case. The Secretary said that the U.S. would be interested in knowing if another site would be available, without saying that this is necessarily the course we would want to follow. In any event, we would need to renegotiate the 1972 agreement in order to change the mode of construction in a way that would put it more fully into our own hands. He wanted to flag this as an issue that was going to be coming up.

Shevardnadze said that he was aware of this question, as it had indeed been raised by Ambassador Matlock and others. It was not a simple problem. He had personally wanted to buy the NOB for the MFA—after all, it had a good setting and good eavesdropping equipment. Seriously, though, the question was a complicated one and he could not decide at this time. However, the Soviets would look into the whole range of possibilities.

Afghanistan

Shevardnadze said he wanted to make a few comments on Afghanistan before they proceeded to the signing ceremony. Perhaps Mr. Armacost could work more actively with respect to an internal Afghan dialogue. The U.S. and the USSR had had good contacts but things were not working out well between us. Ambassador Vorontsov had been very active, meeting with the Pakistanis and the resistance, but these groups did not want to talk about national reconciliation. They believed that the current Afghan President would just pack up and go to Washington or Moscow following the departure of Soviet troops; this, however, was unrealistic. The only reasonable solution is reconciliation on a solid and sincere basis, with regard for the interest of all groups. The Soviets did not want to violate the Geneva Accords, Shevardnadze said. They had signed those accords and would fulfill them. But he just wanted to raise this issue with Secretary Shultz.

The Secretary said he welcomed Shevardnadze’s last statement. We agreed that it would be desirable to establish an interim government so as to avoid a chaotic situation. As far as we can see, however, it was hard to see a blend of Najibullah and Mujahidin ever jelling. We were continuing to talk with the Mujahidin and the Pakistanis. The Paks were also convinced it would be desirable to have an interim regime and we would continue to work on it. But the Secretary reiterated that we did not believe it would possible to marry these two groups. On his return he would talk to Armacost, who works actively on the question, as does our Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley.

Signing Ceremony

The Secretary proposed that they proceed to the signing ceremony. He commented that the two agreements showed that our work is continuing. It was possible that the Basic Sciences Agreement could provide a framework for cooperation on dealing with natural disasters. Shevardnadze replied that this was something he was going to say. The Basic Sciences Agreement provided a framework to explore things like that. Shevardnadze said these agreements were very important. We were getting used to signing things. While it may seem ordinary, the signing of agreements was still an important event.

The two Ministers then proceeded to the next room where they signed the Agreement for Cooperation in Basic Scientific Research and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation to Combat Illegal Narcotics Trafficking.

Following the exchange of documents Secretary Shultz said he welcomed the opportunity to record a significant pair of achievements, one dealing with the control of drugs the other with scientific research. Shevardnadze said he agreed these were very important agreements and another important step in the building of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The signing ceremony concluded at approximately 4:05 p.m. and was followed by a brief coupe de champagne.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting Paris, January 1989. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Ridgway, Creagan, and Collins. An unknown hand initialed for Creagan and Collins. The meeting took place at the Soviet Ambassador’s Residence. Shultz traveled to Paris January 6–8 to attend the Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
2. In telegram 657 from Paris, January 8, the Embassy reported highlights of Shevardnadze’s speech earlier that day. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
3. Reference is to Shultz’s January 7 address before the Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 1989, pp. 4–6.
4. Reference is to the protocol of Brazzaville, signed by the United States, South Africa, Cuba, and Angola on December 13, 1988. For the White House statement, Crocker’s remarks, text of the protocol, as well as Shultz and Reagan’s December 22 statements, see Department of State Bulletin, February 1989, pp. 10–12.
5. In telegram 1031, January 4, the Embassy instructed Matlock to present to the Soviet Foreign Ministry Shultz’s letter to Shevardnadze on the proposed Soviet human rights conference. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N890001–0025). Matlock responded in telegram 205 from Moscow, January 4, that he had delivered the letter to Bessmertnykh, who “read the letter, expressed his initial understanding that it indicated the U.S. had ‛decided to participate in a Moscow human rights conference,’ and said he would inform the Foreign Minister of its contents.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N890001–0031)
6. See Document 178, footnote 6.
7. Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Armenian Earthquake Disaster: Prospective U.S. Government Cooperative Efforts.”
8. On January 4, two U.S. F–14s shot down two Libyan MiG–23s over international waters in the Mediterranean Sea.
9. See Document 181.