Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

181. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, December 7, 1988, 1:40–3:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The President’s Luncheon with Chairman Gorbachev (S)

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The President
  • The Vice President
  • Secretary of State George P. Shultz
  • Kenneth Duberstein, Chief of Staff to the President
  • Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State, European and Canadian Affairs
  • Ambassador Jack Matlock
  • Thomas W. Simons, Jr. (Notetaker)
  • Nelson C. Ledsky, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• USSR

  • Chairman M.S. Gorbachev
  • Aleksandr Yakovlev
  • Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Anatoliy Chernayev
  • Anatoliy Dobrynin
  • Yuriy Dubinin
  • Viktor Sukhodrev (Notetaker)
  • Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Department Head, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

President Reagan warned Chairman Gorbachev that they would again be facing five waves of newsmen and photographers. (S)

As the first wave entered, Chairman Gorbachev said he had just been told about the earthquake in Armenia. On the ferry over to the island, he had had a telephone conversation with Moscow. The earthquake had also affected Azerbaijan and Georgia, but with many fewer casualties. In Armenia there had been vast destruction. The earthquake had registered 8.0. Yerevan had not been hard-hit, but elsewhere in Armenia there was lots of destruction, much loss of life, and extensive casualties. Chairman Gorbachev said he had talked to Ryzhkov, who said one village had just disappeared. While he had been in the house on the island, he had written a telegram to the people of Armenia. A government commission had been set up to assist people. This is of course the way life is—good and bad mixed together. (S)

The President said that with tragedies like this, you sometimes get the feeling of being warned. The United States had recently had an earthquake in California, but it had been mild, with no loss of life. (S)

The Vice President asked if there was any estimate of lives lost. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev said he had not yet seen an estimate, but he had heard it was at least many hundreds. (S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze commented that if a whole village was destroyed, there would be lots of casualties. (S)

The President asked if it were really true that a village had just disappeared into a hole in the earth. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said it was. Relief work would begin with the military forces that were already in the area. Eventually all medical services would be involved. (S)

A media representative asked the President what he thought of Gorbachev’s troop cut proposal. The President replied that it was not a proposal, but a decision that he heartedly approved of. Another press representative asked if the President would be doing the same thing. The President replied that some adjustments might be called for if what Gorbachev had announced left us with superior forces in some areas. However, we don’t see the situation that way, since even with the Soviet cuts, their forces would be vastly superior in Europe. (U)

A media representative asked the Vice President for his view. The Vice President said he supported what the President had said. (S)

Amid laughter, Chairman Gorbachev said that was one of the best answers of the year. (U)

As one group of pressmen left, the Vice President commented that at least we could all now hear what was being said. In the quiet that followed, Chairman Gorbachev said that the press would probably say the company was not very talkative. (U)

The Vice President commented that he had seen Chairman Gorbachev’s UN speech on TV, and he seemed to have had a full house, with every seat taken. (U)

Secretary Shultz said those in the hall had been very attentive. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev said he had also noticed the quiet when he was speaking, and had asked himself whether it was a good or a bad thing. It was unusual for him to have quiet when he talked. In the years of perestroika, he had gotten used to having a response to everything he said. (S)

The President said he had had the same experience recently, and then remembered that people were listening to a translation through earphones. There was bound to be a delayed response. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied that he had thought the same thing during his address. (S)

The Secretary commented that when Chairman Gorbachev had finished, the burst of applause was genuine. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev said he wanted to stress that he was committed to what he had said at the UN and in front of the house as they were coming in. If we had succeeded in moving forward in these last three years, it was only through common efforts, and that was the only way for the future too. (S)

The final wave of media departed, and Anatoliy Dobrynin commented jovially that that probably meant that the dinner was over. (U)

President Reagan said he would like to begin the lunch discussion with a few remarks about the development of our relationship since the meeting in Moscow in June.² There had already been some discussion of the things that had gone into “the changed relationship” of recent years in the private meeting in the other room. The President said he and the Vice President had made it plain that they approved of these changes and were pleased that we had continued to make progress together since Moscow on all four points of our agenda. The President also noted, he had not said “dovieray no provieray” once during the meeting. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied that when people come to study the President’s time in office, someone should try to count up how many Russian proverbs the President knew. Those he had heard from the President showed he had selected them very carefully. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev went on to say that in the Soviet Union people were so busy that they had no time to analyze things, but in a larger context the President deserved some kind of merit award for his knowledge of Russian proverbs. People in the Soviet Union remembered the President’s visit to their country very well. (S)

The President said he remembered his visit too; he had come back home with only warm feelings for the Soviet people. (S)

Turning to regional issues, The President said the Soviet Union played an important and welcome role in negotiations to secure Namibian independence and the removal of foreign troops from Angola. The President expressed the hope that our two countries could work on other regional issues in the same cooperative spirit. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied that it might be important for him to recall a conversation he had had with Secretary Shultz on the eve of one of the Secretary’s visits to the Middle East. He had said to Secretary Shultz that it was good that the US had decided that the Middle East problem could not be solved without the participation of the Soviet Union. Now that the US had reached that conclusion, the Soviets could make a constructive contribution in the Middle East. The Soviet Union favored constructive cooperation on all problems, including regional problems. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said he wanted to make a second general point. He wanted the US not to be suspicious of the Soviet Union on regional issues. The Soviet Union was not intriguing against the US. It was a good moment to make that point with the Vice President present. When the Soviets talk about Asia and the Pacific, or did something there, it was not to harm the US. If they did something in Europe, it was not to create difficulties for the US or to weaken its links with Western Europe. Gorbachev said that if both sides just continued as they had for decades, working against each other, nothing good would come of it. (S)

Neither country acted as some kind of saint, Chairman Gorbachev continued. There were also real contradictions between the two countries. At the same time, the two countries had real interests in common. The problem was what to do—what conclusions to draw from this situation. Chairman Gorbachev said his conclusion was that the two sides should continue along the same track they had been following. The Soviets saw no advantage to themselves in weakening US security. They saw no advantage in causing an upheaval in the world economy. That would be bad for the US, but it would be bad for the Soviet Union too. “Let us therefore move beyond the subject matter and the conditions of the 1940’s and 1950’s,” Gorbachev said. We have been able to achieve something, and looking at both the President and the Vice President, he could say that “continuity” was the name of the game. “Let us not build castles in the air. Let us not operate on the basis of illusions, but of real policy.” (S)

We should therefore be able to work together on all regional problems in a constructive way, Chairman Gorbachev continued. If the next President has some remarks or questions on these issues, he would like to hear from him. He might respond with some remarks or questions of his own. He especially supported the President’s comment, favoring continuation of the tradition that Shevardnadze and Shultz had been able to establish between themselves. He hoped no one would be offended if he said that the relationship he wanted Secretary Baker to establish with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was one that bureaucrats by themselves could not accomplish. All the forces we have at our disposal should be deployed to improving Soviet-American relations. Chairman Gorbachev added that he understood the Vice President’s statement to mean that he too understood the importance of the relationship between our two countries. (S)

The President noted that there were still major differences between us. The radar at Krasnoyarsk, for instance, was unresolved and remained a serious concern. We also need to keep on working in Geneva for an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied that he thought he had put an end to the Krasnoyarsk problem. The installation had been transferred from the military to the scientists. This had been done to make life easier for the next President. Secretary Shultz has already spent so much time on this problem that the Soviet side had decided to turn the matter over to the scientists. (S)

Secretary Shultz said he had listened to the portion of Gorbachev’s address concerning Krasnoyarsk and noted that the word Gorbachev had used had been translated as “dismantle.” (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied with a smile that he bet the Secretary had written that down. He said he could confirm the translation. It was another victory for the Secretary. The important thing was to make life easier for the next President. (S)

The Vice President interjected that there were other areas he could use some help on, if that was what the Soviets had in mind. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev responded jocularly that the Vice President was probably now thinking of what else he could ask for. (S)

Secretary Shultz suggested helping end the US budget deficit. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said the Soviets could not solve the US budget deficit. The US could not solve the Soviet deficit. But working together, we could help each other with both deficits. (S)

Returning to chemical weapons, and referring to the upcoming Paris Conference, the President said that he believed the two sides could cleanse the whole world of these weapons if they stood together against them. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied that he had to say the Soviets had gained the impression that the US seemed a little cool toward solving this problem. This had been of concern. If the President was now saying that the US would cooperate on this issue, that was an important statement. The Soviets were ready to work together with us, and such cooperation would be extremely symbolic. (S)

The President said he had seen some TV footage on the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. He would never forget the picture of the dead mother with her dead baby, killed by poison gas. The world did not need such things. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev asked the President if he knew where that gas came from. (S)

The President answered that we did not. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said the Soviets didn’t either. After Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had discussed the issue some time ago, the Soviets had asked their intelligence people to find out where the chemical weapons had come from. They had also asked them the same question concerning modernized ballistic missiles. Here, they had learned that it was a Western country that had supplied the weapons. (S)

The President said we had intelligence which indicated that a number of smaller countries were developing these weapons. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied that the Soviets had found that Asians and also some Latin American countries were helping increase the range of missiles, but it was mainly countries in Western Europe who were involved. (S)

The President said we needed to work on those issues. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev agreed and said it would be good to have bilateral consultations on non-proliferation of both missile technology and chemical weapons. If Secretary Shultz has not yet packed his bags, he still had time to consult with the Soviet Union on these issues. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that during the election campaign the Vice President had expressed himself as forcefully as anyone on the subject of chemical weapons. It had been the Vice President who had tabled our treaty draft in 1984. (S)

The Vice President confirmed his great interest in this subject. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev acknowledged the Vice President’s interest in eliminating chemical weapons, but asked if he was not somewhat less enthusiastic about a 50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons. (S)

The Vice President said Gorbachev had it half right: he was indeed enthusiastic about curbing chemical weapons, but he was equally interested in a 50% strategic reduction if we could get the problems worked out. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said both issues were part of the same big complex of arms control negotiations. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev then said he would like to drink to the President’s health, in the Russian fashion. (S)

The President responded that he would be doing so with California wine. The President then recounted that he had been asked what he would recommend that Chairman Gorbachev see in New York. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev asked what the President had replied. “California,” the President said. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said that required no translation. (S)

The President continued that our intelligence indicates that Qaddafi is building a chemical weapons plant so big that it can satisfy Libyan needs and supply other users on a commercial basis. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied that he could not say anything about that. The Soviets did not have such intelligence. US information might be accurate. The Soviets would look into it, because they did not want proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or missile technology. (S)

Secretary Shultz said we would be pleased to brief members of the Soviet government, experts, anyone Chairman Gorbachev wished to designate, on the information we have. We could also do it through Ambassador Matlock. Chairman Gorbachev nodded his agreement. (S)

The Vice President said he did not think anyone had much influence on Qaddafi. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said there was an element of truth to that, but that at the same time agreeing to a chemical weapons convention with strict implementation could influence many States. We should get on with such a convention without delay. (S)

Secretary Shultz said he had come across two facts recently that had impressed him deeply. There existed an area in France that was still roped off because of contamination from chemical weapons during World War I. He had not known that before. It also turned out that the cleanup of the Shatt al-Arab following the Iran-Iraq war was going to be a tremendous job, and one reason was that there were still unexploded chemical weapons in the waterway. Experts said they would be difficult to deal with. So both sides in the war had ended up contaminating their own historic waterway. (S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze recalled that Gorbachev, in his UN address,³ had called 1989 the decisive year for movement against chemical weapons. He was pleased to note that the US side was taking a vigorous stand against such weapons. (S)

The President said he hoped Vice President Bush was listening. (S)

The Vice President said the trouble with chemical weapons was that they could be built by anyone—even in small garages. Verification was a really hard problem. We had differences with our Allies and some of the Soviet’s friends as well on this issue, not on the desirability of eliminating chemical weapons, but on how to verify their elimination. We need to move on this issue, but it was one that would be very difficult. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev agreed there were difficulties, but this should make us re-double, not abandon our efforts. Similarly, he knew that in working with the US on 50% reductions in strategic arms, the Soviet side had not persuaded the US that both space weapons and sea-launched cruise missiles had to be dealt with. (S)

The Soviet Union was in an unfortunate position, Chairman Gorbachev joked. There was a lot of naval influence in President Reagan’s Administration. Shultz had been a Marine, for example. There would now be even more naval influence with President Bush. He knew that Powell was an Army general, but he called him Admiral anyway. Things just seemed to get ever more complicated. (S)

Returning to chemical weapons, President Reagan said he only wished to point out that we were the two big kids on the school ground, and that if we worked together, we could bring the world closer to eliminating chemical weapons. Here was an area where the big boys could have influence. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said he agreed with what he called the President’s profound statement. Working together to pressure others would improve the chances for concluding a chemical weapons convention. And since the President-elect had been involved for many years, and had tabled a treaty draft in 1984, he hoped he would speak out vigorously on the issue. (S)

The Vice President said Gorbachev had himself a deal. (S)

With regard to Gorbachev’s comments on the Army, the Navy and the Marines, the President confessed that he had not succeeded in his dream of restoring the horse cavalry. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev smilingly replied that the Soviets could have helped on that in a practical way. When he had lived and worked in the Caucasus, he had found that there were many breeds of horses there. For instance, there was the mountain horse, a unique breed that felt as well in the mountains as we do in the city. The Soviets provided them to the frontier guards. Also there was the largest stable of Arabian horses in Europe. Many were sent to America, for as much as $1 million apiece. (S)

The President said Arab horses were a big business in this country. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev noted that they were the liveliest horses in the world. (U)

The President said Arab horses were the progenitors on one side of all the English thoroughbreds racing in the world. Every English thoroughbred in the world traced its heritage back to one of three Arab horses of King Charles—Dolphin Barb, Byerly Turk and one other. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev said he understood the President was a good horseman. (U)

The President replied that he had been a Reserve Officer in the Cavalry. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev recalled that when he had been a young boy living in a village, he had dealt with both horses and oxen, and his favorite thing had been taking the horses to water. They had ridden them without saddles or bridles, and it had been great. Now he no longer knew which side of a horse to approach to mount. Maybe horses had changed in the meantime. (U)

The President said there was an amazing phenomenon with horses in the world, including in the US. Handicapped children were being brought to horse facilities for therapy. Not just children were involved, but mainly children. They rode around rings, and the help they received was amazing. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev said he knew there was scientific data showing horseback riding was useful to health. It was especially good for kidney disorders. (U)

The President said he had heard from one man who ran such a stable that a father had asked why riding was good for his handicapped child. He had replied that the minute the horse takes its first step, every muscle in the child’s body responded. The President said he had checked this out the next time he had ridden—and it was true. (U)

Aleksandr Yakovlev interjected that it had not always been so. In 1970 Governor Reagan of California had received a group of Soviet journalists, including Yakovlev, in Sacramento. He had arrived ten minutes late, was limping a little, and had explained that there had been a contest with a horse and the horse had won. He asked whether the President had forgotten this incident. (S)

The President said he remembered the meeting. The problem was with legs, which were important in horseback riding. It was difficult to hold a horse when one had a thigh problem. The President said he had a thigh bone that had been broken in six places, not in a riding accident but in a ball game. When it was pressed too hard, it was possible to irritate his thigh. The President added that he rode regularly and thought it improved his health. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said he regularly rode in a car. (U)

Secretary Shultz said the President had not yet given up on the cavalry. (U)

The President recalled the old cavalry saying that there is nothing so good for the inside of a man as the outside of a horse. The President then observed that the conversation had not yet touched on Gorbachev’s reforms within the Soviet Union. We were very supportive, and the President asked the Chairman to say a word on where he thought the reform process stood. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev asked whether the President was also undertaking reforms? Did he believe everything was fine in the US, or was simply leaving problems to the next President? The Chairman continued by saying that he thought it was appropriate for the US to watch closely what was happening in the Soviet Union. The United States needed to understand what was going on. The Chairman then said that he had heard that the new President was getting advice from both the right and the left in the United States. Experts on the right were saying that with the Soviet Union so involved in reform, with its economy so weak, with its ethnic strife so severe, the moment had clearly come to create an upheaval and perhaps destroy the country forever. He could only say to the Vice President what he had said many times already to President Reagan: we two would not be able to move forward and build a new relationship if we frame policies on illusions or mistaken views. It was unrealistic for either side to hope or expect that the other could not function at home or abroad. Let us be realistic, and base our policies on realism. (S)

Perestroika is our business, Chairman Gorbachev continued, whether anyone likes it or not. It is what we need. As to the question of whether the Soviet Union would emerge stronger or weaker from current policies, the Chairman said he always replies that if he did not expect his country to be stronger—politically, economically, and socially—he would not have embarked on reforms. The Soviets had no secrets from anyone. They wanted to be more successful, to become a more dynamic and confident society. At the same time, they expected to maintain their commitment to peace, to disarmament, and to their cooperation with the US. (S)

The President protested that he had meant only that he had heard reports of opposition to perestroika. As he had said to Gorbachev in the other room, we supported Soviet policies. There are a small group of Americans like those Gorbachev had just described, but a recent poll showed an overwhelming majority of Americans, over 80%, liked what had been going on between our two countries. There would always be a fringe, but most Americans liked what had been happening. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev rejoined that some on that fringe said the goal of perestroika was to deceive this President and especially the next President. (S)

The Vice President replied that no serious American, no faction, Democrat or Republican, right, left or center believed that. (S)

The President explained that our freedom allowed people to sound off even in favor of ridiculous views. There was a fringe that still believed Hitler was a nice guy. (S)

Secretary Shultz said, “Nobody I know.” (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said that in any big country it was possible to find any number of fringe groups. But the masses, the majority in the Soviet Union, the overwhelming majority, pinned its hopes and plans on perestroika. It is our revolution and it will endure. Everyone accepted this. The real difficulties begin as we implement our policies. They demand real change by everyone—from Politburo members to ordinary workers. People see new things which they don’t like or understand. (S)

Concerning Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is always easy to talk about ethnic problems. They are certainly present. Some Armenians ask for greater autonomy because of an accumulation of problems. The former Azerbaijani government had not been active enough in dealing with these problems. It had allowed them to fester, rather than resolving them. (S)

But did anyone think that a government as big as ours could not solve the problems of 130,000 people who live in a Baltic republic? Chairman Gorbachev insisted that this was not the problem. In these and other republics, perestroika threatened certain individuals—those who are corrupt or take bribes. Of course, no one admits to such acts. Instead, people start to howl about ethnic problems rather than put their own house in order and move against corruption. People had to abandon their old ways and learn to live in accordance with the law. Those who refuse to do so inject foolish slogans in an effort to cover-up their misdeeds. (S)

This was only one of the problems with perestroika, Chairman Gorbachev continued. The government was also reducing the numbers of officials and those being reduced certainly did not applaud perestroika. Nonetheless, a majority of people were for a renewed society. They wanted forward movement, and a process was underway which just could not stop. (S)

The President commented that we have more in common than he had realized. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied that he had been told the same thing by the American economist, John Kenneth Galbraith. Galbraith had asked why the Soviets were against the idea of convergence. Chairman Gorbachev said he had replied that he was not opposed to it, but that the two counties were simply different. Galbraith had said no, they had one thing in common—bureaucracies in both countries that could destroy them both. (S)

The President said that when he got home from Moscow, he was conscious of how much the people on the street there—even though he had, of course, had limited contact with them—wanted change. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said that even the opponents of perestroika now say loudly that they are for it. This was because it was impossible to be against it in any group of workers in the country. (S)

The President said bureaucracy just tends to grow in any country. In our country, we had made great economic gains through perestroika of our own. There were of course critics, who wanted to get back in charge of the bureaucracy, so they could start issuing instructions to the people again. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said Prime Minister Thatcher had told him how hard it had been when she had begun perestroika in the United Kingdom. She had advised him to forge ahead. (S)

The President said he had come to believe that bureaucracy everywhere lived by one cardinal rule: protect yourself. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said that seemed to him an international rule. To summarize, Chairman Gorbachev said, the process of perestroika was expanding, and its strong side was that democratization would be introduced in all areas of Soviet life. But demagogic and extremist elements were taking advantage of existing difficulties. The Soviet Union would defend democracy; it would deal with these people, forcefully if necessary. It was in a sense a dialectical process, which had to be pursued. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev then said he wished to introduce a topic that he wanted the next President to think about. This was whether we would also be able to develop closer commercial and economic relations with one another. (S)

The Vice President repeated that no serious group in America wanted perestroika to fail, or the Soviet Union to fall apart. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev responded that we should not try to make each other similar. We were different and would continue to be different. (S)

The Vice President suggested that the real question was not whether people wanted perestroika to fail. The question was rather whether or not it would succeed. This was a question for economic groups, business people with money to invest, or those who might be interested in joint ventures. They needed to have confidence that Soviet economic policy would succeed. One was glad to hear Gorbachev say that these policies would continue. No one in this or the next Administration wanted them to fail. But would they succeed—that was the essential question. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said that not even Jesus Christ could answer a question like that. All he could say, and he could say it firmly and confidently, was that the Soviet Union had embarked on the path of change in all areas—economic, political, cultural, humanitarian—as a matter of firm choice. There would be headway made; there would perhaps also be some backsliding. It was a matter of struggle. It was a complicated process. But the process would continue. (S)

The President said he had asked the question precisely because we were totally behind the process. We knew how complicated it was; we had some of the same problems. (S)

Since this would be his last meeting with Gorbachev while he was in office, The President continued, he wished to raise a glass to what Gorbachev has accomplished, to what they had accomplished together, and to what Gorbachev and the Vice President would accomplish together after January 20. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said he could join in that toast, and asked whether the Vice President did too. (S)

The Vice President said he did. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said jovially that that was their first agreement. Chairman Gorbachev continued that he wished to thank the President, the Vice President and all their colleagues for responding to his suggestion of a final meeting. They had said more to each other during this meeting than during some negotiations. That showed there was a new atmosphere, and even a new rhythm, in our relations. There was no need to probe for each other’s position; now we just went to work. He thanked the President once again for his hospitality. (S)

The President reminded Gorbachev of the importance of continuing and expanding exchanges of people between the two countries. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said he well remembered their first handshake at Geneva. (S)

The Vice President asked Gorbachev what he should properly be called: Chairman, President or General Secretary. Chairman Gorbachev said “whatever is easiest.” (S)

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, December 1988 Governor’s Island. Secret. The meeting took place in the Commandant’s Residence at Governor’s Island. Drafted by Ledsky and Simons. Paul Schott Stevens sent the memorandum of conversation to Levitsky under a January 9, 1989, memorandum, indicating that it was a “revised” and “reformatted” draft of the President’s luncheon with Gorbachev, which is the version printed here. (Ibid.)
2. See Documents 156–163.
3. See Document 178, footnote 6.