18. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin
The Soviet ambassador came to my office with his interpreter for a 30-minute conversation. He made general remarks about Gorbachev’s internal reforms and said they coupled with new directions in Soviet foreign policy. I interjected that, in that context, you and your administration felt very strongly about human rights, and that human rights issues were involved in the larger quest for a peaceful, more stable world. Dubinin said we could quarrel over the way we define these values, but that Soviet society was moving toward ever more democracy. I said all Americans were keenly interested in Soviet internal developments and welcomed any liberalization of the Soviet system.
When I asked him about new directions and initiatives in Soviet foreign policy, the ambassador reviewed Gorbachev’s public initiatives since Geneva 1985. He said Reykjavik had been full of positive potential, and asked—the most important question, as he put it—whether it was [Page 81] now possible to move ahead with your Administration during the next two years. I replied that your Administration was negotiating seriously now and prepared to move ahead. I reiterated your determination to explore the possibility of a more stable strategic environment based on life-sparing defenses and reductions of nuclear forces. I said that negotiating approaches which seemed aimed at killing the SDI program, by imposing constraints beyond the ABM Treaty, were not promising. I then noted that at one time the Soviets had shown interest in delinking some offensive agreement from difficult space issues. I asked the ambassador to clarify the present Soviet position.
Dubinin emphasized that the USSR did not aim to kill SDI as a research program, and repeated the point to assure that I did not misconstrue Soviet tolerance as going beyond research. He expressed concern about what he was hearing regarding SDI and other US military programs. I noted that you were reviewing a range of issues naturally arising from progress in the SDI program, but that no deployment decisions were being made. In response to my question about the Soviet view of linkage, he noted that both sides were proceeding in general terms from the formulae of Reykjavik and that, as Gorbachev had stressed many times, they represented a “balance of mutual concessions” in which everything was related.
I concluded by saying that I would characterize the visit as a courtesy call. Dubinin expressed full agreement.
- Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Chron Files January–February 1987 (4). Secret. Sent for information. Copied to Bush. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.↩