17. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks to the Department of State1
1366. USNST. For the Secretary from Ambassador Kampelman. Subject: Vorontsov Conversations.
1. Secret—Entire text.
2. Dear Mr. Secretary:
3. I have spent the weekend reviewing my impressions of the talks with Vorontsov and where I think they leave us after his return to Moscow. My conclusions are strengthened by two dinner conversations with Jeane Kirkpatrick, who stopped in Geneva en route home from her Moscow trip of last week.2
4. Substantively, the Soviets have made no significant moves at the negotiating table. There is, however, an insistence on both form and procedure designed to create an atmosphere and a mechanism which will permit forward movement.
5. In INF, there has been much detailed probing of issues. Though the Soviets have pressed for development of a joint text as in the other two groups, Mike3 continues to feel that such a joint text is less useful to him than a side by side tabulation of agreements and disagreements. Vorontsov has expressed annoyance at this, arguing that the joint text approach can just as easily reveal the fundamental differences and that a “framework agreement” between ministers and heads need not include all the details that are properly to be in a treaty. Mike, however, feels that exclusive focus on a joint text may paper over differences and is not appropriate to this stage of the INF negotiations; moreover, producing a joint text can be quickly done if needed for high level meetings. Mike gave him a set of 14 questions to which he was not obtaining responses from the Soviet delegation. Vorontsov agreed to try to obtain Moscow’s responses, though he asked whether these questions would be followed by others and suggested they were intended to stall the negotiations.
6. In START, the focus is now where it belongs, on the sublimits. Vorontsov understands that all forward movement toward agreement [Page 78] requires the resolution of that issue. He requested a memo, which Ron4 prepared, to show that our requirements are based on U.S. military needs and will affect us as well as the Soviet military structure. He left for Moscow implying that the Soviets may accept figures close to ours on the 4800 ballistic warheads and 3300 ICBMS, but would want us in return to give up the ban on mobiles and our 1650 limit.
7. Defense and space is far along on a framework agreement but with brackets on all the important questions. The atmosphere is quite businesslike and, at the heads of delegations level, constructive. Both sides are making efforts at resolving less important and nonsubstantive differences. Vorontsov informed me his delegation is unfamiliar with our private exchanges. He is returning to Moscow with my strong recommendation that he look at a seven-year non-deployment mutual pledge as a significant step forward, to be followed by new negotiations at a next stage following treaty ratification. He is indicating Moscow will also require restaints on the testing of space based “weapons” albeit not on sensors.
8. There is no doubt that due to news stories from Washington, Vorontsov returns to Moscow with less optimism than when he came here. He said Gorbachev is convinced that the President has decided to go “broad” on the ABM Treaty and to move to early deployment. The decision, he continued, to make those moves now, in the face of Moscow’s messages to us that they want to come to agreement with the Reagan administration and will be flexible, is a clear rebuff to Gorbachev which he cannot ignore. In Vorontsov’s discussions with Ken Adelman in my home on Wednesday evening,5 he again sharply expressed discouragement and, as he left, repeated his question as to whether the negotiations any longer served a real purpose. I, of course, responded that the Washington deliberations are based on the premise that there is no Geneva negotiating result at this time. Should our Geneva talks produce a treaty, that would then become the supreme law of the land and govern our behavior. He responded with great skepticism, saying that the “military-industrial complex” seemed to have the upper hand in Washington and that those who did not want an agreement with Moscow were prevailing. This, he said, would strengthen the hand of those in Moscow who either did not want an agreement with Reagan or felt it was unattainable. Gorbachev, he said, would have to consider these new factors and make a decision.
9. I do not know whether a Geneva agreement in our interest is attainable on its own merits, although I believe it may well be if we [Page 79] want it. If it is not—and we should know it by the summer—our bona fide negotiating positions will lessen the prospect that we and SDI can be blamed. We can then with justification proceed with our SDI testing and an early deployment decision. On the other hand, were failure at the Geneva talks to follow a U.S. decision now to be “broad” or to proceed to early deployment, this would give the Soviets an overwhelming propaganda opportunity and reinforce allied and congressional views that the President’s desire to force an SDI decision on his successor is the reason why we lost the 50% reduction opportunity. It is not in our interest to put the President in this position and thereby burden his last 22 months, particularly since it is unlikely to achieve our SDI objectives.
10. In this connection, I am influenced by Admiral Crowe’s testimony of January 21 before the Senate Armed Services Committee where he said that we should not act as if SDI is “in the parking lot and we don’t know where to put it.” He expressed his personal view that a decision to deploy could not be made this year and that we still had many unanswered questions before we had an SDI “system.” He concluded that it would be premature now to make an early deployment decision and that one now need not be made.
11. It is, of course, possible that Gorbachev’s desire for an agreement will lead him temporarily to forego a propaganda opportunity and proceed with our Geneva talks seriously, seek a ministerial meeting, and go on to a Washington summit. In the event of a Presidential decision not to wait until the summer before deciding on early deployment and going broad, we should try to minimize the negative impact on our negotiations. The optimum would be to see if serious negotiations with the Soviets, can be continued. I believe this would require an early constructive letter from the President to Gorbachev. If this is not possible, we should at least try to sustain the Geneva operations so that they remain publicly credible, although the allies will be indignant no matter how many emissaries we send to explain and the Congress will proceed to cut SDI funding and restrict its program.
12. The Congress will examine whether we are abandoning the legislative criteria of feasibility, survivability, and cost effectiveness at the margin. Allies will want to know if we’re still committed to the ABM Treaty (and will probably not be entirely reassured by an affirmative response).
13. The Soviets, in their customary hard-headed approach, will want to know what the new policy factually means as to our testing program. If we have specific tests in mind, can we be specific so that it does not look like an open-ended assault against the ABM Treaty? Can we reassure them that our commitment to a period of non-deployment remains? If we want to do this, a Presidential letter to Gorbachev is [Page 80] probably required. I am concerned, however, that such a letter, in the context of allied, congressional and press criticisms, may require that we give the Soviets more to chew on than is necessary now. In any event, if a letter is to be sent, I would like my hand to be involved in its formulation.
14. I am sorry to burden you again with my reactions to current developments as I see them. I don’t want to sound like a broken record, but I know you want honest rather than popular reactions from me.
15. Congratulations on a good television performance on Sunday. I just saw it. I thought Sam Nunn was quite restrained. I am sending a similar message to Frank Carlucci.
- Source: Department of State, C. Max Kampelman Files, Lot 89D56, Mink. Secret; Immediate; Special Encryption; Nodis; Mink. Drafted and approved by Kampelman. Additional correspondence related to Kampelman’s negotiations with Vorontsov are ibid.↩
- Kirkpatrick was in Moscow as part of a Council on Foreign Relations delegation.↩
- Reference is to Maynard “Mike” Glitman.↩
- Reference is to Ron Lehman. No memorandum has been found.↩
- February 4.↩