Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

137. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1988, 9:05–11:05 a.m.

SUBJECTS

• Summit Dates, Southern Africa, Iraqi Scuds, Afghanistan, Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Gen. Powell
  • Under Secretary Armacost
  • Amb. Ridgway
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
  • Amb. Bessmertnykh
  • Amb. Karpov
  • Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov
  • Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
  • (For Portions)
  • Amb. Murphy
  • Amb. Adamishin
  • Amb. Alekseev
  • Amb. Polyakov

Summit/Ministerial Dates

THE SECRETARY suggested the ministers start by focusing on dates for the Moscow summit. They had exchanged information the night before. Sen. Baker was now getting the President’s views.² Did Shevardnadze have anything to add to what he had said the previous evening?

SHEVARDNADZE said he had spoken with the General Secretary since then. Moscow had been under the strong impression that the week of May 30 would be acceptable to the U.S. In practical terms, it appeared that Shevardnadze’s idea that it might be possible to postpone the Supreme Soviet meeting scheduled for the week before would not work. Thousands of deputies had already been notified; it would be unprecedented to change plans so late in the process.

As for a mid-May meeting, the General Secretary felt this was too early. Based on the previous day’s discussions, it was not yet clear what the substance of the summit would be. There was a lot of work to do. It might even be necessary for the two ministers to meet in mid-May to complete preparations for the summit. The General Secretary therefore preferred the period from May 30 to June 15. Any dates during that period would be acceptable to the Soviet side.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Powell call this information to the White House.

On a possible May ministerial, the Secretary said it had always been his view that such a meeting would probably be necessary. He had not, however, wanted people to rely on the ministers to solve all their problems. But they would probably have to, in the end. The only dates that would not work for the Secretary were May 9 and 10. The best place for a May meeting would probably be in Washington, although if it made sense the ministers might meet with delegations in Geneva. Some issues, however, were best done in capitals.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that, if the summit took place in the time frame he had proposed, the ministers plan to meet in the final third of May. Shevardnadze had no preference as between Washington and Geneva; that depended on the situation the ministers faced at the time. Shevardnadze agreed that for the moment the ministers should not “advertise” that there would be a meeting to their experts.

Southern Africa

Turning to regional issues, the Secretary said the ministers could be joined by Murphy and Polyakov when they got to the Middle East. There had been much discussion on Afghanistan, and perhaps Armacost and Adamishin could brief on their talks.

The ministers had had a brief discussion of southern Africa Monday evening.³ We believed there was some fluidity there, and were prepared to work in parallel with Moscow. We thought that national reconciliation should be encouraged in Angola. Savimbi was ready; other African leaders seemed to be in favor as well. If it were possible to reach agreement on a schedule for Cuban troop withdrawal, we could credibly engage South Africa on getting out of both Angola and Namibia. The U.S. had reengaged with South Africa, although our relations remained strained. So we would like to work along these lines. This was a case where the U.S. and Soviet Union should be able to work in parallel.

SHEVARDNADZE said the ministers should also talk about the Iran-Iraq war.

THE SECRETARY agreed, noting that there was a particular part of that problem he wanted to raise—Iraq’s extension of the range of Scud missles provided by the Soviet Union. The ranges now being displayed by Iraq’s Scuds brought them into the category of missiles covered by the INF Treaty. This could emerge as an issue in the U.S.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow had raised the Scud issue with Iraq. Baghdad had replied that these were “not your missiles,” and had said Iraq was capable of developing its own missiles. More seriously, Shevardnadze intimated, the Soviets had information that the Scuds’ capabilities had been enhanced with the help of some of the U.S.’s allies.

THE SECRETARY said that, if that was so, he didn’t know about it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it was not a difficult problem technically. He reiterated that Soviet information was that U.S. friends had quietly helped Iraq do the job.

THE SECRETARY said he was only flagging a potential problem, i.e., the fact that the missiles had been shown to be convertible to ranges covered by the INF Treaty. Scuds had not in the past been counted as Treaty-limited.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would not rule out that that might be a problem. POWELL noted that critics of the INF Treaty could make it an issue.

SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that that might happen, pointing out that U.S. systems not covered by the Treaty could also be up-graded. That was why there were rigid verification provisions. Iraq’s actions could not be considered a precedent.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed, but pointed out that the latest reports of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons underscored the incredible cruelty of the war with Iran. That made it vitally important to move on a second UN resolution. It was a nightmare.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed it was a nightmare. There was cruelty on both sides. He asked if the ministers should take up Afghanistan.

After checking with Powell, who indicated that the White House would call when there was a reaction from the President on summit dates, the Secretary agreed.

Afghanistan

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze would like to lead off.

SHEVARDNADZE opened by observing that the situation at the Geneva talks was not good. As for the remaining issues, the question of how to describe the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was a bilateral one between those two countries. It was up to them to resolve; Shevardnadze hoped they could do so. The question of a “so-called” coalition government seemed to be on the road to resolution, now that Kabul had accepted Cordovez’s efforts to continue his mediation efforts after signature of the Geneva accords.

That left the question of arms supplies. Shevardnadze had stated the Soviet position on that question clearly in his initial one-on-one with the Secretary. Adamishin and Armacost had subsequently discussed it for four hours. Perhaps they could summarize their conclusions.

ADAMISHIN said that he could summarize the talks in five points.

First, the Soviet side had proposed an understanding that both sides would observe those obligations arising from the Geneva accords. Whatever was not a subject of negotiations in Geneva could not be discussed, nor could it be an issue with respect to implementation.

Second, the Soviet side had expressed the view that, if the U.S. continued arms supplies, the Soviet Union would criticize such actions, even as it criticized them already. But that criticism would not extend to accusations of non-compliance with the Geneva accords.

Third, (Adamishin noted this was not agreed) the U.S. side believed that the Soviet Union should not criticize Pakistan for violating the accords under certain conditions. The Soviet side had made clear that it could make no guarantee on this point, because it would undermine the essence of the Geneva accords themselves, and of international law.

Fourth, there seemed to be agreement that, were it possible to come to a U.S.-Soviet bilateral understanding on the matter of assistance, each side would explain to its own public its interpretation of that understanding. There would be no agreed bilateral statement.

Fifth, Adamishin had undertaken to convey to Shevardnadze a U.S. proposal for a moratorium on assistance to any party in Afghanistan, but had made clear in doing so that such a proposal would be unacceptable from the Soviet standpoint.

ARMACOST said that was a fair summary of his and Adamishin’s discussions.

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze agreed with Adamishin’s assessment on the last point.

SHEVARDNADZE said the idea wouldn’t work. Given the sensitivities involved, the maximum the Soviet side could accept was the proposal which he had outlined Monday evening. The decision to withdraw, he emphasized, had not been an easy one.

THE SECRETARY said he understood this. But a lot of progress seemed to have been made. We were close, but not quite there. For our part, we worried about the position a solution along the lines Shevardnadze had described would put Pakistan in.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not believe Pakistan would be uncomfortable. Pakistan had been a party to the Geneva negotiations for seven years. The accords which had been worked out protected Pakistan’s interests, but also imposed certain obligations on both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Each side would have to abide by the obligations it undertook.

THE SECRETARY asked how Shevardnadze understood the word “mercenary” as used in the Geneva documents. The term did not appear to apply to those currently opposing the Kabul regime, who were not fighting for pay.

SHEVARDNADZE, after consulting with Alekseev, read aloud relevant passages of the draft Geneva accords, which he interpreted as signifying that, in effect, conditions would be created for the return to Pakistan of all refugees. This would eliminate both the need and justification for any groups operating from bases in Pakistan. Pakistan, under those circumstances, obviously could not hire people to interfere in Afghanistan. If the resistance lost its reason for being, there would be no justification for interfering in Afghanistan’s affairs.

THE SECRETARY said he had raised the question of defining “mercenaries” because it might provide a solution to the problem of military assistance. The seven resistance groups in Pakistan could not be considered mercenaries. Perhaps it would be possible to describe a situation which had little operational relevance in a way which Pakistan would feel comfortable with. If it were possible to agree on how to describe “mercenaries,” Pakistan would not be vulnerable to allegations that it was violating the Geneva accords, and it might be possible to consider the kind of statement Adamishin had proposed.

ADAMISHIN pointed out that what was at issue was a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with provisions for verifying compliance. If Pakistan violated the agreement, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union could complain. It would be a mistake to try and agree on an interpretation of the Geneva accords before they were agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE emphasized that the important thing was what crossed the border. Respect for the border was the most important thing. Any bands now in Afghanistan would not be able to cross the border once the agreement went into effect.

THE SECRETARY asked if the Soviet side saw any difference between “mercenaries” and those now resisting the Kabul regime. Could the U.S. tell Pakistan that Moscow recognized such a distinction?

SHEVARDNADZE said that there were two different categories to be considered. First, there were the refugees. They should return quickly to Afghanistan. The Geneva accords would create the conditions for that. Who would remain? One could not rule out that Pakistan would hire people to interfere in Afghanistan. It was not clear what their nationality would be.

THE SECRETARY said that those people would be “mercenaries.” But those who were already fighting could not be considered mercenaries. If the U.S. could say that to Pakistan, it might help.

ARMACOST explained that we understood the Soviet side was seriously trying to deal with the supply problem by arguing that Geneva did not deal with it. Our concern was that Moscow could subsequently interpret the Pakistani-Afghan bilateral agreement in such a way as to hold Pakistan in violation for doing something from which the U.S. was not itself barred. In the event we were obliged to exercise our right, we did not want to put Pakistan in a situation where it could be accused of violating an international agreement.

ADAMISHIN said he had proposed the day before that the Geneva accords be implemented as signed by all parties. What was not addressed in the accords could not be prohibited. It would be a mistake, however, to get onto the slippery slope of seeking to interpret the agreements. The U.S. wanted the Soviet side to accept its interpretation in advance.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that the matter should be handled on the basis of what had already been agreed.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the two sides say something like the following:

—Both agreed that they should be bound only by those obligations covered by the Geneva agreements;

—We asserted that, since there was nothing in the agreements on continuing military assistance, we had a right to do so, just as there was no bar to the Soviet Union’s continued provision of military assistance to the Kabul regime;

—The Soviet side would criticize the U.S. for continuing its assistance; we would criticize the Soviet Union for the same thing.

—But there would be agreement that neither set of actions constituted a violation of the Geneva agreements.

If, in addition, it were possible to say to Pakistan that it would be criticized by the Soviet Union, just as the U.S. would be, but that Soviet criticism would not extend to alleging a violation of the accords, it might enable Pakistan to endorse an understanding along these lines. The key would [be] whether we could agree that only provision of assistance to “mercenaries,” strictly defined, was prohibited.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the question was different for Pakistan. Pakistan undertook certain obligations as a direct party to the Geneva accords; the U.S. had different obligations as a guarantor. If there were no change in Pakistan’s policies as a result of the accords, why was a document needed? If agreement were reached, Pakistan would be constrained from interfering in Afghanistan’s affairs, just as Afghanistan would be barred from meddling in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s biggest problem, Shevardnadze emphasized, was the return of Afghan refugees. The Geneva accords provided means of ensuring this happened. There were mechanisms—via the UNHCR—to guarantee this. This was all in Pakistan’s interest. Why should Pakistan have as well the right to give weapons to those wishing to interfere in Afghanistan?

THE SECRETARY pointed out that it was the U.S. which was asserting the right to supply arms. The weapons were ours. But perhaps, he ventured, a somewhat different track might be a more productive way to deal with the matter.

The point of departure for such a track would be our recognition of the importance the Soviet Union attached to maintaining its commitment to provide arms to the current regime in Kabul. We were also aware that there would be a window between signing of Geneva accords and their entry into force, during which there would be no restraints on military assistance. Another element was Shevardnadze’s reaffirmation Monday evening that the Soviet intention was to complete its withdrawal by the end of the year—in effect, somewhat more than six months from the present.

Both sides, the Secretary continued, wanted a stable situation in Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. Cordovez’s chances of success would be greatly enhanced by stable conditions. The discussion thus far had established that both the U.S. and Soviet Union had rights to continue military assistance after entry into effect of the Geneva accords, and would assert them. But there was also a common desire to maximize chances for a negotiated settlement.

The Secretary thus proposed that, during the withdrawal period and for three months thereafter, both the U.S. and Soviet Union observe a moratorium on the supply of military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Both would be able to continue humanitarian assistance, which would be needed. Both would retain their rights to supply aid, but would, in effect, suspend them out of a desire to create a positive atmosphere within Afghanistan. The moratorium would be short, limited, and without prejudice to the rights of the guarantors. The Soviet side would be able during the period between signature and entry into effect to ensure that the Kabul regime was adequately equipped. Soviet motives could be explained to the regime in terms which they could accept.

The Secretary noted that this approach differed from the proposal Armacost had made the day before for a three-year moratorium. It was shorter, more limited, and consistent with what Shevardnadze and other Soviet spokesmen had said about the possibility that Afghanistan could acquire neutral status after Geneva accords were signed. In this context, we had noted Najib’s recent statement of his regime’s intent to pursue a policy of neutrality. The U.S. and Soviet Union could describe their joint moratorium on military assistance as a confidence building measure designed to give Cordovez the maximum chance for success. It would, at the same time, preserve the rights of all parties.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Secretary was again talking about two different things. One was the Soviet Union’s supply of weapons to the Afghan government; another was the U.S. supply of forces fighting that government. The Soviet Union did not challenge the U.S. right to supply arms to Pakistan, which was a sovereign state like the U.S. Moscow’s relations with Afghanistan were on the same basis. Any retreat from the principle would be a violation of bilateral treaties with Afghanistan. This would not be understood.

Shevardnadze reiterated that the Soviet Union was not challenging U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. It even understood that the U.S. felt a moral obligation to the groups it had supported. The Soviet side had made a proposal which addressed that problem. This had not been an easy decision. Shevardnadze had told the Secretary Monday that the ideal solution for Moscow would be for the U.S. to terminate its assistance. The second alternative he had outlined—that the U.S. not be a guarantor in Geneva—was undesirable. The U.S. was an important country with influence in Pakistan. Thus, the formula Adamishin had outlined was the best compromise, albeit not the most desirable from the Soviet standpoint.

After a brief whispered exchange with Adamishin, Shevardnadze said that perhaps an alternative would be a gentleman’s agreement of the sort Adamishin had outlined, with the understanding that the problem could be revisited in the future. But Shevardnadze’s view was that there was a document to be signed. He could assure the Secretary that there would be no one for the U.S. to provide assistance to. They would all go home to Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY said he hoped so. SHEVARDNADZE said he was convinced of it. An acceptable government would be found—acceptable both to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze was proposing a gentleman’s agreement along the lines of what the Secretary had described. SHEVARDNADZE said, “no.” He had only meant to suggest that, in the future, the two sides could consider whether it was necessary to continue to provide weapons.

THE SECRETARY said that the discussion had been informative, and suggested that it be resumed after Shevardnadze’s meeting with the President.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed to this, but stressed the need for a decision before he left Washington. It was pointless to sit forever in Geneva. There were other options. The Soviet Union could resolve the problem without a formal agreement. But it would be better to proceed on the basis of what had been agreed.

Middle East

After Ambassadors Murphy and Polyakov had been summoned, conversation turned to the Middle East. THE SECRETARY noted that there were a number of things to discuss. He would be happy to clarify what the U.S. was proposing and to brief on his recent trip to the region. He would be interested in Shevardnadze’s reactions.

The Secretary said that he might begin by stating the obvious: this was a region of the world where there were major problems. These problems had the capacity to blow up, and to involve not only the countries of the region itself, but a wider circle of countries. So if it were possible to move the peace process along, that would be desirable. But progress came by inches; it was hard to get people to engage realistically.

With this preface, the Secretary handed over a number of documents: copies of letters to Shamir, Hussein and Assad; a statement the Secretary had written in response to Shamir’s arguments against the U.S. proposal; and a copy of the statement he had made to Palestinians during his trip to Jerusalem.⁴ If Shevardnadze had any questions with respect to the U.S. proposal, the Secretary said, he would be happy to provide clarifications.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that, after Ambassador Murphy had briefed him in Moscow, he had had the opportunity to meet with a number of representatives from Arab states. There had been delegations from the “seven,” and from the Arab League. Several foreign ministers had been included among the delegations, along with representatives of the PLO. The Jordanian Prime Minister had also visited Moscow for lengthy consultations. So it had been a period of interesting, substantive discussions on all aspects of the Middle East problem.

Shevardnadze said that, on the basis of his contacts, it was clear that the situation in the region was very complicated. The task now was to formulate a common, comprehensive approach between the U.S. and Soviet Union. On some issues, the two sides could already find common ground. Shevardnadze had told Murphy that he welcomed the Secretary’s active involvement in Middle East affairs, including his travels to the region—even if he didn’t envy the Secretary the task. He had asked Murphy for some clarifications of the U.S. approach, which he hoped would be forthcoming. For his part, Shevardnadze was prepared to share Soviet thinking in some detail.

First, with respect to the U.S. willingness to use an international conference as the means of achieving a settlement, Shevardnadze felt that the most important thing was to arrive at a clear understanding of the role of a conference. He did not exclude the possibility of arriving at a common conceptual formulation during his visit to Washington. If this proved impossible, agreement might be reached on certain elements of the concept.

Murphy’s briefing had not, in the Soviet view, been sufficiently clear on the role of a conference, This was natural, as the U.S. position was still evolving. Nor was this simply a Soviet concern. All of the Arab spokesmen with whom Shevardnadze had recently consulted had stressed the need for clarity on the substance and roles of a conference. For its part, Moscow believed that the task of a conference should be to help find solutions on the basis of a balance of interests among those concerned. How this should best be done needed to be considered.

Shevardnadze noted that, upon returning from the Middle East, the Secretary had made some important remarks about the character of an international conference. As the Soviets saw it, a conference should be a continuously functioning forum which would address the disposition of the occupied Arab territories, security for all countries of the region, and a final solution to the Palestinian problem. It appeared that the U.S. shared the view that a conference should be a continuously functioning body. Shevardnadze looked to the Secretary for confirmation.

THE SECRETARY signaled that the minister should proceed, noting that that was not, in fact, the U.S. conception.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow felt that the legal basis of a conference should be acceptance by all participants of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.⁵

THE SECRETARY said that was very much a part of the U.S. approach. Moreover, we envisioned that those resolutions would not only govern attendance at a conference, but provide the context for bilateral negotiations. That meant we did not accept that the reference to “territories” in 242 was satisfied by the return of the Sinai; the West Bank and Gaza were also covered.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that, in his dealings with Arab representatives, they invariably pointed out that there were other UN resolutions. Some had insisted that these be mentioned.

Another point Shevardnadze wanted to touch on was the rights of the Palestinian people. The U.S. proposal referred to “legitimate rights” of the Palestinians. Moscow understood this to mean self-determination. This was something Shevardnadze had raised with Murphy.

THE SECRETARY said that “self-determination” in the Middle East peace process context was a term of art signifying an independent Palestinian state. We rejected that notion. We didn’t think it fit. We were thus unwilling to use the words, “self-determination,” although, broadly speaking, we supported the concept.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that “self-determination” was the only formula acceptable to all the Arab countries. Many would prefer a more explicit recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to their own nation. This was not the way to try to find a common language.

THE SECRETARY said he didn’t know what the Arabs were telling Moscow, but they were telling him in private that they were opposed to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. It would be too fragile, too exposed.

SHEVARDNADZE said that that was not, in fact, what he was being told. The Palestinians could not be ignored.

As to who should participate in a conference, Shevardnadze continued, Moscow had in mind: the five permanent members of the Security Council; Israel; the Arab countries involved in the conflict (which he preferred not to list, since even the Arabs could not agree on this point); and the PLO. The UN Secretary General should convene the conference. As for the permanent Council members, their role should be to create a positive environment for the conference, making collective or individual recommendations for mutually satisfactory solutions. It was the Soviet assumption that all five members would, in fact, participate.

Structually, the Soviets had in mind three distinct levels. Plenary meetings would be held with some degree of regularity. Multilateral working groups would deal with problems of interest to all or most participants. Bilateral working groups or committees would address isses affecting particular Arab countries and Israel, but not at the expense of third parties. The Soviet side was not against interim steps, as long as they were taken within the context of a conference framework and linked to a comprehensive settlement. The current U.S. plan recognized the need for such a link. In this context, it might be possible to consider a transitional period in the West Bank and Gaza.

These, Shevardnadze concluded, were some areas in which the U.S. and Soviet Union could work to bring the parties together. Moscow was not entirely happy with the present U.S. position, because the concept of an international conference was not fully prepared. This was not an easy question: even among the Arabs there was no clear consensus.

With respect to next steps, Shevardnadze suggested that certain points could be included in a joint statement to be issued at the conclusion of their meetings. For their part, the Soviets expected to have further contacts in the period ahead with the Arabs and Palestinians. The Secretary would probably agree that the Palestinian problem was the key. What was needed was intensive and systematic consultations with all the Arab players. As for Israel, it was harder to assess prospects. The Soviets had not talked to the Israelis, and Shevardnadze would be interested in any insights the Secretary might have.

Shevardnadze said he thought his presentation suggested that a basis existed for more active U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the search for a Middle East settlement. Moscow was not saying that, since the U.S. plan was already in play, the Soviet Union was prepared to simply stand aside. The key was to focus on how to resolve the real issues through the efforts of all involved—the U.S., the Soviet Union, the Arabs, Israel. The Soviets were ready to roll up their sleeves to work with the U.S. or any other parties to find appropriate forms of cooperation.

THE SECRETARY said he appreciated Shevardnadze’s careful description of Soviet views. Those views, it appeared, were sharply at variance with those of the U.S., even though there did seem to be some points of intersection at the conceptual level.

The Soviet side appeared to see a conference as the centerpiece of the peace process. For the U.S., the centerpiece had to be bilateral, face-to-face negotiations between Israel and its neighbours. A conference was, in effect, something which could be convened to set bilateral negotiations in motion, and to be reconvened in some manner to hear reports. We foresaw no substantive role for a conference beyond the fact that the condition for participation would be acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations. Thus, we had totally different perceptions as to where the center of efforts to achieve a settlement should be.

The Secretary said the U.S. agreed that the Palestinian question was a central element. As Shevardnadze could see from the statement the Secretary had handed over, we believed they had to be included in the process. But we felt they should be included in the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, not given an independent seat at the table. This was because we believed negotiations should be between states, and because the legal/administrative structure in place on the West Bank and Gaza was Jordanian. We could not concur in those territories becoming an independent state; they must in some way be attached to states which already existed. Some years before the U.S. had put forward the idea of confederation of these areas with Jordan, but that was really a question to be addressed in bilateral negotiations.

Thus, the Secretary had listened carefully to what Shevardnadze had said. But it appeared the two sides’ basic concepts were sharply different. As the Secretary had said earlier, we saw the process as proceeding by inches. The constructive steps which had been taken to date in the region had come as a result of bilateral negotiations. Our concept was a comprehensive one, but its essence was in bilateral negotiations, not an international conference as such.

The Secretary said he would like to pose a few questions. First, if Jordan agreed to the U.S. plan, would the Soviet Union support a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation?

SHEVARDNADZE replied that neither the U.S., nor the Soviet Union, nor Jordan could answer that question. The Palestinians would have to be consulted, and in a serious fashion. Any attempt to ignore their rights, the rights of the PLO, would doom any plan to failure. So the Palestinians would have to have a voice in decision on the forms the process might take, just as any settlement would have to consider the legitimate rights of Israel.

Shevardnadze, in summary, confessed he could not answer the question, because he had not consulted with the Palestinians. He had spoken with the Jordanians, who seemed to appreciate the need for close consultations with the Palestinians. As to the specific issue of Palestinian participation in a joint context with Jordan, Moscow did not rule out an alternative—an Arab-Palestinian delegation. Jordan did not rule out the idea, although it preferred a Jordanian-Palestinian arrangement.

The question of transitional arrangements, Shevardnadze continued, was among the more difficult under study. The form which Palestinian self-determination might take was the source of serious differences among the Arabs themselves, especially since the uprising. Much would depend on contacts and consultations between the various parties, including the U.S. and Soviet Union. It was hard to find common denominators in this area; Shevardnadze was less optimistic on this point now than before his talks with Arab representatives in Moscow.

Shevardnadze briefly ran through areas on which the Soviet side believed U.S. and Soviet views coincided. First, both sides believed that this was a time for intensifying efforts. Second, both recognized the need to convene an international conference, even though they had different concepts of the role of such a conference. It might ultimately prove possible to narrow these differences. Third, there was mutual recognition of the need for a comprehensive settlement.

Shevardnadze said he thought it might also be possible to say that the two sides agreed that an international conference would function on a continuous basis. He understood the Secretary had said something of this sort to Congress. If that remained his view, that would be a fourth point of common ground.

The Secretary had also referred to the “legitimate rights” of Palestinians. While the Soviet Union might express it differently, there seemed to be agreement that both sides favored an equitable solution to this problem. They were also in agreement on the importance of Resolutions 242 and 338.

So, Shevardnadze stressed, there were points of common ground. It was important for the Middle East states to perceive that the U.S. and Soviet Union were moving from a confrontational approach to a search for a settlement in the area.

Moscow was prepared to continue the search. The U.S.–Soviet dialogue in this area was only beginning. The Soviet side felt there was a good basis for continuing the discussion. Shevardnadze did not rule out that experts might work together on a continuous basis to be in a better position to advise the ministers. Noting that Ambassador Murphy knew the issues of the region better than some local leaders, Shevardnadze said that both sides had good experts. They could meet on a more frequent basis; their meetings in Washington on the margins of the ministers’ discussions should not be the end of the story. As they travelled to and from the region, a good rule would be that they consult with one another before and after. Because, if the U.S. and Soviet Union did not combine efforts, there would be no settlement.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed, but had a few comments. It was good that we had contacts, and they should continue. But it seemed to the Secretary that the two sides’ views were so far apart that it would be necessary to strain to find common ground. We were prepared to work at it. Maybe progress could be made. But the differences in strategy which the ministers’ discussion had revealed would be difficult to bridge.

Summit Dates

THE SECRETARY asked if Powell had heard from the White House on summit dates.

POWELL said that the President had been able to rearrange his commitments. He could agree to a schedule which had him arriving in Moscow May 29 for an initial meeting May 30. The President would depart June 2.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was fully acceptable. Were there any further questions?

POWELL said there were none.

SHEVARDNADZE said the visit would be a short one.

THE SECRETARY observed that, when Shevardnadze met with the President, the press would ask during the initial photo op whether dates had been set. POWELL suggested that the President and Shevardnadze simply acknowledge that they had been and mention the dates. SHEVARDNADZE agreed.

The meeting concluded without further discussion.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Shultz’s outer office.
2. Reagan met with Bush, Senator Baker, and Griscom in the Oval Office at the White House from 9:01 to 9:11 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
3. March 21. No memorandum of conversation of this discussion has been found.
4. None of the documents cited has been found.
5. See footnote 4, Document 44.