I know you have been given a great deal to read as you prepare for your
meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. Nevertheless, I would urge you to read this brief
essay on Gorbachev’s longer-term
strategy and the perspective with which he views the Summit. It was prepared
by my deputy, Bob Gates, a career
Soviet specialist, who talked with you prior to the Geneva Summit and has
helped prepare
[Page 592]
for the past half
dozen or so US-USSR summit meetings. I think you will find it both interesting
and useful.
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence (Gates)3
Washington, November 24, 1987
SUBJECT
-
Gorbachev’s Gameplan: The
Long View (S)
The December Summit and INF Treaty are
important achievements for the Administration and for Gorbachev. Yet, while there is
substantial uncertainty about the US
strategy toward the USSR beyond 1988,
Gorbachev’s gameplan
potentially can be played out over a prolonged period—thus giving him
and the USSR a significant advantage.
His long range strategy is an important backdrop for the Summit.
Understanding it is essential to maintaining perspective during and
after the meeting and to identifying both pitfalls and opportunities.
(S)
Domestic Imperatives
There is general agreement among the Soviet leaders on the need to
modernize their economy—not so much for its own sake or to make Soviet
citizens more prosperous but to strengthen the USSR at home, to further their own personal power, and to
permit the further consolidation and expansion of Soviet power abroad.
They differ as to the pace of change and whether economic modernization
also requires a loosening of political controls. Gorbachev thinks so; many on the
Politburo either disagree or harbor serious reservations. (S)
There is also general agreement in the Politburo that economic
modernization requires a benign international environment. The Soviets’
need to relax tensions is critical because only thus can massive new
expenditures for defense be avoided and Western help in economic
development be obtained. The roots of Gorbachev’s dynamic foreign
[Page 593]
policy are to be found at home and in the need for
a prolonged breathing space. (S)
Foreign Policy Consequences
The elements of foreign policy that spring from domestic economic
weakness are a mix of new initiatives and longstanding policies.
1. Gorbachev wants to establish a
new and far-reaching detente in the late 1980s to obtain technology,
investment, trade and, above all, to avoid major new military
expenditures while the Soviet economy is revived. Gorbachev must slow or stop American
military modernization, especially SDI,
that threatens not only Soviet strategic gains of the last generation
but which also, if continued, will force the USSR to devote huge new resources to the military in a high
technology competition for which they are ill-equipped. The Soviets know
that detente in the early 1970s contributed significantly to downward
pressure on Western defense budgets, nearly halted military
modernization, weakened resolve to counter Soviet advances in the Third
World, and opened to the USSR new
opportunities for Western technology and economic relations. (S)
2. A less visible but enduring element of foreign policy—even under
Gorbachev—is the continuing
extraordinary scope and sweep of Soviet military modernization and
weapons research and development. Despite Soviet rhetoric, we still see
no lessening of their weapons production.
And, further, Soviet research on new, exotic weapons such as lasers and
their own version of SDI continues
apace. Virtually all of their principal strategic weapons will be
replaced with new, more sophisticated systems by the mid-1990s, and a
new bomber is being added to their arsenal for the first time in
decades. Their defenses against US
weapons are being steadily improved, as are their capabilities for
war-fighting—command, control, communications and leadership protection.
As our defense budget declines again, theirs continues to grow, slowly
but steadily. Gorbachev is
prepared to explore—and, I think, reach—significant reductions in
weapons, but only in ways that protect existing Soviet advantages, leave
open alternative avenues of weapons development, offer commensurate
political gains, or take maximum advantage of US unilateral restraint or constraints (such as our
unwillingness in the 1970s to build a limited ABM as permitted by the treaty). (S)
3. The third element of Gorbachev’s foreign policy is continued protection of Soviet
clients in the Third World. Under Gorbachev, the Soviets and Cubans are now providing more
than a billion dollars a year in economic and military assistance to
Nicaragua; more than a billion dollars worth of military equipment was
sent to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the first six months of this year;
more than four
[Page 594]
billion dollars
in military equipment has been sent to Angola since 1984. And, of
course, Cuba gets about five billion dollars in Soviet support each
year. At a time of economic stress at home, these commitments speak
volumes about Soviet priorities. (S)
4. The fourth element of Gorbachev’s foreign policy is new and dynamic diplomatic
initiatives to weaken ties between the US and its Western allies, China, Japan, and the Third
World; to portray the Soviet government as committed to arms control and
peace; and to suggest Moscow’s interest in diplomatic solutions to
Afghanistan and Cambodia. In Europe, Gorbachev through INF
is trading a modest military capability for what he sees as a
significant political gain. We can and should expect new and bolder
initiatives including conventional force reductions—possibly
unilateral—that will severely test Alliance cohesion. Similarly, new
initiatives with China and Japan will be attempted to overcome bilateral
obstacles to improved relations and to exploit problems between them and
the US. And, in the Third World, they
will seek to take advantage of any relaxation of US vigilance or constancy. (S)
Conclusions
There clearly are great changes underway inside the Soviet Union and in
Soviet diplomacy. Yet, it is hard to detect fundamental changes,
currently or in prospect, in the way the Soviets govern at home or in
their principal objectives abroad. The Party certainly will retain its
monopoly of power and the basic structures of the Stalinist economy will
remain. A major purpose of economic modernization—as in Russia in the
days of Peter the Great—remains the further increase in Soviet military
power and political influence. (S)
These enduring characteristics of Soviet governance at home and policy
abroad make it clear that—while the changes underway offer opportunities
for the United States in arms control, Afghanistan and other
areas—Gorbachev intends
improved Soviet economic performance, greater political vitality at
home, and more dynamic diplomacy to make the USSR a more competitive and stronger adversary in the years
ahead. (S)
Westerners for centuries have hoped repeatedly that Russian economic
modernization and political reform—even revolution—signaled an end to
despotism and the beginning of Westernization. Repeatedly since 1917,
the West has hoped that domestic changes in the USSR would lead to changes in Communist
coercive rule at home and aggressiveness abroad. These hopes, dashed
time and again, have been revived by Gorbachev’s domestic agenda, innovative foreign policy
and personal style. (S)
While Gorbachev arrives in
Washington after a serious political setback, at 57 he can afford to
take the long view: he will likely be in
[Page 595]
power long after his adversaries at home and
abroad have moved off the world stage. His domestic needs and foreign
policy initiatives offer the United States significant opportunities but
they must be seized with an appreciation of Gorbachev’s long range perspective and strategy as well
as with realism (particularly with respect to our very limited ability
to influence internal developments in the Soviet Union). And, somehow,
amid the inevitable media extravaganza of the Summit, a sober—even
somber—reminder of the enduring features of the regime and the still
long competition and struggle ahead will be needed. (S)
