102. Memorandum of Conversation1

D&S EXCERPTS—GENEVA MINISTERIAL

Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting, November 24, 5:05–5:40 pm

Shevardnadze said there was cause to congratulate the leaders, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev and President of the United States Ronald Reagan, on an important and momentous occasion. It had begun with them at Geneva, and they had carried it on at Reykjavik. Their contribution had been decisive, in Moscow and Washington. He was truly pleased and happy that we had reached the final stage; we were witnesses to a momentous occasion.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his words, and said he agreed with them. One of the things the sides had seen in the past two years was how difficult it is to translate what the leaders had agreed into a treaty. But it was now a done thing. Now the sides should move on to a bigger task. There was less time this time, before the Moscow meeting. But perhaps we had acquired practice and a sense of competence that we could confront the problems. He valued his relationship with Shevardnadze and their ability to work together. Reykjavik had also been the first place General Akhromeyev had appeared, and when the Secretary had heard he was to be here he had taken it as a good sign.

Akhromeyev and Shevardnadze both thanked the Secretary.

The Secretary went on to say he and the Minister had discussed how to proceed over lunch. They had exchanged thoughts on how the issues in strategic arms and space could be put forward, including on how to arrange discussion at the summit. After the group had heard what the minister had to say, the ministers would continue their private discussion, and then they could all reconvene later in the afternoon.

Shevardnadze said our peoples had certain differences, even divergences. But they also had certain things in common, having to do with their national characters. One was that they were never satisfied with what they had done, never stopped, but always kept going. The two of them had solved an important problem that day, and they were already thinking of even more important, responsible tasks. He wanted [Page 588] to recall what the General Secretary had said on numerous occasions: that radical reductions in nuclear arms were the crucial element of the current stage in international relations. The groundwork had been laid at Reykjavik. He wanted to share some comments, some elements of the Soviet side’s vision of what the structure of a future agreement should be.

What are the specific provisions they have in mind?, Shevardnadze asked. Building on the joint statement at the last summit meeting, they had in mind instructions from our leaders to our negotiators. The first priority was to define what areas these should cover. He needed to stress a few things.

First, Shevardnadze went on, if the U.S. had any doubts that fifty percent reductions should have a place, it should say so now. This was a fundamental principle agreed at Reykjavik. The instructions must contain the main landmarks agreed there. It had been agreed that there should be non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. In Washington there had been agreement in principle that its provisions should be adhered to as it was signed and ratified. That was his understanding, Shevardnadze said. The agreement had to include the provisions agreed to with the U.S. side. Here he had in mind the 1600 delivery vehicles and the 6000 warheads on them. They had not disagreed on this.

As for the main provisions of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, Shevardnadze went on, the instructions could include agreed levels for each element of the triad. He understood additional work was required on this, but the General Secretary’s statements to the Secretary in Moscow had an importance that the Soviet side was ready to record. They took account of U.S. concerns, if not fully.

Further, Shevardnadze continued, limitations on SLCMs should be included in instructions to negotiators. He wished to stress that the issue was one of fundamental importance to the Soviet side. It had been discussed at Reykjavik; there it had been agreed that limits must be established. We could not afford not to set out the main parameters.

Further, it would not be redundant to mention certain details, Shevardnadze went on. This meant procedures for reductions and for verification. These would be main features. There were also the unilateral obligations agreed on: the Soviet approach of reducing heavy launchers to 154, and the obligation to reduce ICBM/SLBM throw-weight by approximately 50 percent. They had debated this at various times.

Further, Shevardnadze said, on the ABM Treaty, the time-frame must be reflected in the instructions. The Soviet side favored a specific time-frame of at least 10 years, in accordance with the principle agreed to at Reykjavik. It would be advisable to record the main fundamental landmarks for the delegations, the steps the side would take—10-year [Page 589] non-withdrawal and follow-on negotiations, to take account of the developments in the strategic environment, as the Soviet side had stressed in various negotiations.

Finally, there should be a common approach to compliance. The two sides should tell their delegations to explore the list of devices which it would be prohibited to put into outer space. These devices would be listed irrespective of the purposes for which they had been designed. He thought it important to stress that. Such a clarification would be important.

That was all he had wanted to say, Shevardnadze concluded. The Soviet side had a rough draft paper on how it saw the instructions to negotiators. After discussion of the conceptual approach, their colleagues could work on a first reading of it. They would not of course finish, but a first exchange of views would be helpful. It would prepare the dialogue in Washington and the decisions to be made at that level. Shevardnadze asked if anyone had anything to add.

The Secretary said he had a few comments to make, although he would not go into detail. As at Geneva two years before, the U.S. side agreed with the basic notion of 50 percent reductions in strategic arms. But numbers had been mentioned, and there was one important concept which had not been described as we felt it had been agreed, and that should be mentioned in any instructions. The 1600 vehicles and the 6000 warheads had been mentioned. Shevardnadze had mentioned the number 154 with regard to heavy launchers. This had been translated in our discussion into 1540 warheads; the two sides should seek to keep to warhead counting. With regard to the reduction in throw-weight, the U.S. side felt it should be codified, be made part of the agreement, so that it would not come back up. There was also the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik; it was an essential element of this picture. With regard to SLCMs, this was an important weapons system. But there was no agreement on how to verify it; it was extremely hard to handle. The suggestion had been made of declarations on each side. But verification was elusive.

He wished to correct one point, the Secretary continued. Shevardnadze had mentioned a number of times that a 10-year non-withdrawal period had been agreed at Reykjavik. That had been in the context of a proposal which the President had made, and the Soviet side had rejected; it had then come off the table. The U.S. side had a different proposal on the table now. The proposal the President had made was to reduce all ballistic missiles over a ten-year period, and in that case to have a non-withdrawal period of the same duration. It had thus been heavily conditioned. The whole proposal could not be picked apart. Our present position was for a non-withdrawal period to 1994, which amounted to seven years beginning with the current year. It did [Page 590] not float forward. After that either side would have the right to deploy if it so chose.

The Secretary went on to say that it would be worthwhile if they could find a way toward agreement on sublimits in this meeting. The General Secretary had proposed some in Moscow. Some aspects of what he had proposed were totally out of accord with the U.S. force structure. Others were intriguing, as he had told the General Secretary. He wished to stress the desirability of agreement on a limit of 4800 for ballistic missiles warheads. This was a number which we believed sensible. In some ways it was derived from suggestions the Soviet side had made.

The Secretary said we had noted that in the General Secretary’s proposal 3000 and 1800 added up to 4800; we had done the arithmetic. We hoped they added up to that. Karpov said they did not. Different people were saying different things. We said that what Shevardnadze and Akhromeyev said across the table was what counted. What others said was just talk, although it was interesting.

The General Secretary had mentioned an ALCM sublimit of 900, or of 800 to 900, the Secretary continued. We were assuming that the Soviet side had bombers. The fact that the Soviet side was developing them had led us to believe the 4800 limits was in the Soviet interest as well as ours. If it were acceptable to the Soviet side, we were prepared to be flexible on other sublimits. We had many times said there was a basic difference between ICBMs and sea-launched missiles, in accuracy, in warning time. Hence we had always stressed ICBM’s.

These were just initial reactions, the Secretary said. He suggested that the arms control group make an initial run-through, and then perhaps some of the group could reconvene upstairs. We might then see where we should go. It was important for the two leaders to have a fruitful discussion on these topics, and not just to repeat previous positions.

The Secretary asked Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny whether they had additional comments. They did not.

Shevardnadze said that limits on long-range SLCMs were important to both the U.S. side and the Soviet side. There were ways to verify them, although that was another question. One could limit the types of submarines on which they would be deployed. U.S. and Soviet scientists had interesting ideas on how to verify. They could meet to share them, even before the summit. What was important was to agree on the principle that there should be limits.

On the 10-year period, Shevardnadze said both he and the Secretary had been at Reykjavik. The period had not been conditioned as the Secretary had described it. He would remember that the Soviet side [Page 591] had started at 20, and then come down to 10. In the last proposal it had been agreed that there would be a non-withdrawal period of 10 years. In Washington it had been mentioned as agreed. Of course that did not give the delegations the right to back away from it.

On sublimits, Shevardnadze went on, an important step had been taken when the General Secretary outlined limits on the various elements of the triad in Moscow. This ought to be discussed in detail, the entire set of issues, building on the experience the two sides had gained; by this he meant in INF. We had a body of experience, and should use it. We had showed a readiness to search for common ground, to make concessions taking the concerns of the other side into account. Agreement could be reached in a short period, on the assumption, of course, that the ABM Treaty would be preserved.

Akhromeyev added that the rest was details. The group should study what Shevardnadze had said and report to the ministers. Shevardnadze suggested the group start its work. Akhromeyev said both sides could present their concerns. Shevardnadze commented that the material had to be agreed on by the summit. The Secretary asked Shevardnadze when he planned to leave. Shevardnadze replied that night. The Secretary joked that their colleagues would have to talk fast.

  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Geneva—11/23–24/87. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from a draft copy. No final version was found. The meeting took place in the First Floor Conference Room at the U.S. Mission.