Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

99. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 25, 1985, 2–6 p.m.

• US PARTICIPANTS

  • Secretary Shultz
  • Assistant to the President McFarlane
  • Assistant Secretary Ridgway
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Ambassador Hartman
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • DAS Palmer
  • Interpreter Zarechnyak

• SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • Assistant to Minister Chernyshov
  • Minister Counselor Sokolov
  • MFA Advisor Tarasenko
  • Interpreter

Shevardnadze opened the meeting by stating that he hoped it would be productive and continue the dialogue which he had started with the Secretary in Helsinki.² In his many meetings this week, all of his interlocutors have brought up the summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in November and had expressed their keen interest. People everywhere attach big hopes; this is the major event not only of this year but perhaps of recent times. That is at least what people want. The meeting today is a significant part of the preparations for the two leaders’ meeting. They would probably not manage today to discuss everything as there are so many questions. Shevardnadze said he was grateful for the meeting he would have with the President as well as the subsequent time he would have with the Secretary.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his welcome and noted that as it happens the Soviet Mission is just a few blocks from the place where he was born. So he felt at home. He also noted that now that Shevardnadze had seen New York City he would understand why the Secretary decided to live in California. Shevardnadze said that he had not seen anything because of all his meetings. The Secretary said that in fact New York was a great city, with the best and the worst of everything. He agreed that everyone wants to talk about the meeting between our leaders in November; but mostly others want to tell us what we should do. There are high hopes. The President and he share these hopes. It is the job of Shevardnadze and the Secretary to do what they can so that these hopes are fulfilled. He had agreed with Ambassador Dobrynin’s suggestion that we start on security matters and then turn to regional and bilateral issues. We should see these meetings as a continuum; where we end here, we can pick up in the next one. The Secretary knows that Shevardnadze intends to leave Saturday afternoon;³ he had arranged his schedule so that he could be available Saturday morning if this turns out to be useful and necessary. He was also prepared to have a private meeting about fifteen minutes before the end of their session today.⁴ After they had reviewed the various arms control areas, beginning with the NST talks, perhaps they could spend a little time on arrangements for the November meeting if there are some things to say.

Shevardnadze noted that there had already been much discussion of these Geneva matters and we can always continue to work on the details. He would give Secretary Shultz the opportunity as guest to speak first. He recalled that in Helsinki he had gone first and covered all items at once and perhaps this had caused problems. The Secretary said that perhaps they could establish here that they take one subject at a time, go back and forth and have a conversation on it and then go on to the next subject. Only then can we understand each other and move ahead.

The Secretary then noted that the Geneva negotiations are of central importance to the relationship. He noted that in Shevardnadze’s address to the UNGA, the Soviet Foreign Minister had praised the concept of deterrence for its role in avoiding nuclear war and that deterrence at a lower level of forces was better than at a higher level.⁵ The Secretary said that we agree. Shevardnadze also had questioned whether current technological and weapons developments were not threatening to upset deterrence. We agree that it is important to retain a stable deterrence, although we may have different views about what is upsetting deterrence. It is good for us to discuss this subject because it goes to the heart of what we want to do in the Geneva negotiations.

The Secretary continued that we did agree in January that our grand objective is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that a stable deterrent is threatened for two classes of reasons. First the assumptions on which SALT I and more particularly the ABM treaty were based are being called into question. If defense was to be constrained, we had agreed that offensive systems would have to be brought down and kept down. Each of us now has far higher levels than was assumed at the time. We also assumed that in the ABM treaty we had identified certain systems and limits that would be critical barriers on the way to prevent any breakout.

The other class of developments that threatens a stable deterrence stems from scientific and technological developments. We see the development of offensive weapons that have an accuracy which is astonishing to laymen; we also face MIRVed and mobile systems. It is therefore increasingly difficult to identify and count systems.

The Secretary noted that the American proposals in Geneva address these problems in keeping with the agreement reached in January. We see these problems as interrelated. If we want to get to the point where there are no nuclear weapons, then we have to make major reductions. He and Shevardnadze had used “radical” reductions. That is a step which would get both sides towards zero and also get us back to the assumptions of 1972. It also would mean that we have greater confidence at those levels. So we have proposed in Geneva sharp reductions to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads, and we have proposed to eliminate altogether intermediate range missiles. Or if this is not desired, then limiting these intermediate range systems on a worldwide basis. Obviously if we get down to some level like that we would want to look not just at ourselves but also at the French, British, and Chinese because they have nuclear weapons. These are not large in number but they become more important as we move down. We presume we would want to go to others and go down to zero together with them. All of this highlights the importance of the non-proliferation regime. We have worked well together in this area. We will need to strengthen it if the great powers are to give up nuclear weapons. We don’t want to see others get them.

This leaves us nevertheless with the present situation as it will take a long time to deal with the problems of mobility and accuracy. At the same time we see in technological developments that we may have some answers with regard to defense. We have taken a leaf out of your book. You have always been more defense oriented. You deployed a system of ballistic missile defense and have long had a research program. So we have been slow but the light has gone on a bit. We want to describe our concept. We have been trying to engage you in Geneva in two ways. First there has been an erosion of the ABM treaty. Second we want to tell you about our conception of an ABM defense which is being conducted in the framework of the ABM treaty. We want to discuss how it should be carried out if it proves technically feasible and why we think this would be the right way to proceed.

The Secretary continued that we were pleased the Soviet side in Geneva had received a briefing from General Abrahamson.⁶ One can say that we have an experience with deterrence based on equal offensive capabilities. There is a stability to that but technological and scientific changes are making this more and more problematic. We also can describe a situation in which there would be a greater element of defense on both sides and how this will raise the quality of deterrence and make it impossible for each side to believe that it can gain from a first strike. Instability comes if one side or the other understands how to do strategic defense and proceeds unilaterally to deploy such a system. This creates a situation in which one side is tempted to proceed without the other. Then instability is created.

For that reason President Reagan had said that if it is found that such a defense measure is possible, then we would have to negotiate so it came about through a process of discussion and not unilaterally. We want to preserve the deterrent. Some have said that if the US discovers this first, it is fine for President Reagan to have said that he would do it cooperatively but how can this be trusted. The Secretary pointed out that this is not a question of trust. It is not in the interest of the United States to cause instability that might be overwhelmingly negative for the Soviets and therefore dangerous for us both. So we are for a negotiated transition. We want a deterrent that is at a better qualitative level and takes into account the problems caused by changes in offensive capabilities.

This is the basis for our proposals for radical reductions and what we have said about defense. If we can find a basis to give our negotiators in Geneva a chance to move ahead that would be good. We welcome the statement in Shevardnadze’s address that he has proposals to put forth to us.

The Secretary then said he would like to ask Ambassador Nitze who was present at the creation of all this and Mr. McFarlane who chairs the interagency group on this subject to make any comments they might have.

Ambassador Nitze said that the Secretary had made a clear presentation which set forth the President’s and our thinking. He did not believe it was necessary to add anything.

Mr. McFarlane said that this had been an eloquent presentation, the core of which is President Reagan’s thinking that the need for strategic defense was brought about by Soviet programs over the last ten years. Also that this would provide us a more stable basis for deterrence and to do so in a way which would be stable; through discourse and phases.

Shevardnadze said he would like to raise several issues in connection with what the Secretary had said and to state the view of his delegation. The Secretary was right in pointing out that the focal point should be preparations for the meeting of our leaders. The Soviet Government and people attach paramount importance to that meeting and proceed from the assumption agreed in Helsinki that the two sides would work for a constructive meeting with results, for solutions particularly to the central problems. He agreed that matters of security are the centerpiece for work over the time remaining before the meeting. It was the Soviet wish that both sides would continue to give active consideration to the issues and above all those that would contribute to the success of the meeting.

Shevardnadze continued that while we are doing these preparations we will have to reckon with the general background that is being created for the meeting. He would like to speak candidly today. In scanning the horizon of US-Soviet relations there were unfavorable trends. If one assesses the situation these negative trends had even increased in some ways. He was not talking about distinctions being made in principle about differences between the two societies. He follows American speeches and statements closely and knows that these matters are being discussed. These differences do exist and will continue. But he had said in his address to the UNGA that work must proceed within the framework of coexistence and be built on a basis of realism. This realism presumes renunciation of any drive for military superiority.

If one analyzes what has been done concretely in the last several months by the Soviet Union and the United States, then the conclusion is not in favor of the US. Just citing facts, the US refused to stop tests of nuclear weapons, refused to stop INF deployments, refused to stop its test of an anti-satellite system. He could make the list longer but he was not raising this to make polemical points. The US side is aware of the unilateral steps taken by the Soviet Union and the Soviet proposals. The most important thing he wanted to stress is that the Soviet leadership believes it is not too late to make up for the things which have been missed in the relationship.

Shevardnadze said he would now like to turn to the Geneva negotiations. He and the Secretary had touched on this in Helsinki and had made their views known there. Solution of the tasks facing the delegations in Geneva would be of paramount importance. This is an elementary truth, but it is true nonetheless. But if we do not succeed, we will get dragged into a military confrontation and it will be impossible to get out of it. In his view even if we put aside science, self preservation alone should motivate us. There is an acute necessity to give an impetus to the negotiators. He would like to be clear that the Soviet side was fulfilling its side of the agreement which had been reached. These matters had been analyzed at the highest level and they take the view that new steps are possible with regard to the upcoming meeting. But in order to achieve anything both sides must move.

Of key importance, Shevardnadze continued, is agreement on a full and complete ban on space strike arms. To give their assessment, the differences are great indeed. The Secretary had just now been trying to explain the American view about some defensive umbrella. But we Soviets call a spade a spade. These are space strike weapons. The Soviet side is not advancing a ban on space strike arms as a precondition. To present a picture of the Soviet Union trying to block production in nuclear weapons is simply untrue. The Soviet side is for an interrelated consideration of all three issues: space, strategic and intermediate weapons. This should be done simultaneously but not in favor of one side. You cannot sabotage the talks on space arms. The line taken by the US is to undermine the ABM treaty; it is not designed to avert the militarization of outer space. The US had been saying that somebody was violating the ABM treaty; but the Soviet side proceeded from the fact that the ABM treaty is a pillar of the stability between us. Intentional discrediting and devaluing of legal undertakings binding the US and the Soviet Union would not bring anything good. He would like to say most seriously that the ABM treaty serves the interest of strategic stability.

The Soviet Union has not done anything and is not doing anything that contravenes this treaty. This is not stated for propaganda reasons but to stress that they will not be the first to put weapons in space. The US test of an anti-satellite weapon on a live target in space ignores this readiness of the Soviet side to ban space strike arms including anti-satellite weapons which are in existence. They cannot but term this as a step designed to whip up the arms race in space. The US side admits that this system is closely linked to development of components banned by the ABM treaty. In this connection we see unfounded assertions by certain statesmen that development of space weapons and testing are not banned by the ABM treaty; that just deployment should be discussed with the Soviet Union. He presumes that his partners here at the table know the provisions of the ABM treaty—not to develop, test or deploy.

Shevardnadze said he would like to repeat what he had said from the rostrum of the UN; that the Soviet Union is against a new spiral in the arms race. They propose to renounce development and deployment of space strike arms once and for all. Without resolution of this problem, reductions of offensive arms are impossible. The Soviet side does not want to exaggerate. They just want to preclude any misunderstanding. Agreement on space arms is of key importance for radical reductions in offensive arms. So far the Soviet side had not seen a businesslike approach by the US Administration; that was true not just with regard to space but also offensive arms. The US side was proclaiming a lot about reductions. But its program would involve a further buildup including in the level of nuclear arms in Europe. These infringe unilaterally on the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. This problem can only be resolved on the basis of equality and equal security. They had made their move on that (INF) and would wait for our move. So this is their general concept.

Shevardnadze wanted to stress that we must proceed from the fact that approximate parity now exists. Any other basis would not work. The US says that the Soviet Union ran way ahead; some say two to three times ahead. But science shows that there is approximate parity. This parity hinges on the ABM treaty. The scheme which the US proposes would erode and destroy the whole system of strategic equilibrium.

Shevardnadze had asked allies of the United States whether this was a peaceful or a military program. They didn’t reply but we know that it is a military program with new types of space strike weapons. The Soviets had been told that they did not understand that science cannot be stopped. But they had not said that scientists could not go on. They know that scientists will continue. They were very proud of their own country for its high standard in fundamental research. The question was how to understand the substance of research. Comrade Gorbachev had made the point explict and clear. One thing is when a research scientist has something in his head or in a laboratory. But it is another thing when there are mockups, field tests and subsequent deployment; and that is what the US envisages. Shevardnadze was grateful that the Secretary had listened to their speech in the UNGA. Shevardnadze had said that they should not repeat the mistake of 1946 when Soviet and American scientists had warned that we should not use atomic energy for weapons.⁷ The Soviet side is ready to cooperate.

Shevardnadze also had said in his UNGA address with good reason that the Soviet delegation returns to Geneva with solid luggage. They were ready for compromises and mutual concessions but not to the detriment of mutual security.

Korniyenko said that he would like to touch on two or three problems. The Secretary said that strategic stability and deterrence had been weakened because offensive weapons had grown more than was envisioned and that this was the alleged rationale for new space weapons. Then the question arose—the eloquent statement about the development of accuracy and the appearance of MIRVed and mobility of offensive arms. But suppose we proceed to your proposal for drastic reductions. We are also for sharp reductions of offensive arms, but how are we to understand what you mean. On the one hand you are saying let’s get rid of what happened with regard to offensive arms at least in terms of quantity. But you intend to keep the effect; that is strategic defense is a sacred cow which cannot be touched at all, or even mentioned.

Korniyenko continued that what the US suggests in its various models of reductions is that the Soviet Union reshape its offensive forces in accordance with the US model. The US wants to have 2,500 warheads on its ICBMs and for the Soviet Union to have the same number. But you would not limit cruise missiles. You would have the freedom here to have 5 or 10 thousand. The Soviet Union was supposed to take the path where everything is done according to the US pattern. You are planning to create a space based ABM system and you propose that when you are ready and have proved that you are ready, then you would have negotiations with the Soviet Union so that it would do the same thing. And here again you consider your plans to be a sacred cow.

But the United States must think that people are very naive on the other side if it thinks that they would sit idle and wait until the US proves the possibility or impossibility of such a system, Korniyenko continued. It is clear that the other side would do the same, or not necessarily the same and you would have an uncontrolled race.

Korniyenko continued that the Secretary had mentioned that as the United States and the Soviet Union reduced towards zero the question emerges of third countries. This is so. As reductions in the number of the two sides’ weapons take place, the relative weight of other countries’ weapons rose. Would it be right to adopt the same approach not just for strategic but also INF weapons; that is British and French weapons. The United States proposes zero for the US and the Soviet Union but forgets those for Britain and France.

(At this point Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary wanted a break as two hours had elapsed. The Secretary said he would raise his hand if he needed a break.)

The Secretary said that maybe we are getting somewhere. He wanted to make a few random comments and asked Nitze to make a few points on some questions the Soviets had raised and then ask a question. On the nuclear weapons test moratorium, the United States is worried about verification and made some proposals. We call them to the Soviet side’s attention again. We are prepared to appoint someone to privately go off and explore with them the nature of the President’s proposal to be sure that the Soviets understand it. This would be done without any obligations. The Secretary noted that the Soviet side had said INF deployments were a problem. But the decision had been made in 1979 at the urging of the Europeans in response to Soviet weapons deployments—their SS–20s. We didn’t begin; this was an answer.

The Secretary continued that as for the test of our ASAT, we have observed many of the Soviet tests; a number something like 20. So the Soviets have a system which has been tested and deployed. It seems odd to the US that the Soviets are criticizing us for doing even just our first test. We think ours is better than yours, but a test is a test. He did not want to go through and nitpick.

The Secretary did want to mention two positive things. Perhaps there was some chance of motion. Shevardnadze had said that he did not intend to use the space talks to block the other two groups, while preserving the relationships. We welcome that. It may be that there is something to work with in what Korniyenko had said with regard to reshaping Soviet forces and that we were not prepared to discuss cruise missiles. If those represent blocking points, the Secretary wanted to say that we fully recognize that we start from different configurations and that we must come down in a manner that doesn’t reconfigure, but that comes down on the basis of equality. Senator Tower is prepared to talk about this and also about ALCMs. So maybe there is room for maneuver there based on correcting that impression.

Korniyenko said that he was not talking about air-based but about sea-based cruise missiles.

The Secretary said that he heard Korniyenko but maybe they could have a side meeting and Korniyenko could tell him how to verify sea-based cruise missiles.

Korniyenko said that the Secretary had mentioned non-proliferation and that we both value the NPT treaty. But can we indeed verify the obligation of the parties not to transfer elements of nuclear bombs to other parties. No we cannot. But nonetheless we don’t consider this just a piece of paper as we have a self-interest in it. In the same sense if we have an interest in not starting an arms race in space, verification would not be a problem. This is not to say that there would be no verification at all as in the NPT. The key thing is for the sides to have an interest not to develop these weapons. Similarly if you are interested in banning sea-based cruise missiles, maybe not a 100% certainty but certainly some and in any case not the 100% lack of certainty as in the NPT. Nonetheless we value the NPT.

The Secretary said that the US is very careful about any nuclear materials leaving the United States, and we believe the Soviet Union is also. Full scope safeguards do provide a reasonable way for verification. If we could get down to zero then the sense of discrimination on the part of other NPT members would disappear. Verification is of extraordinary importance as Shevardnadze had said in his address. We must be prepared to put technical equipment on the other’s territory or for challenge on-site inspections to ensure confidence. As you said, we have to look for good verification. Otherwise we will have endless distrust.

Shultz/Shevardnadze Memcon (September 25)—Part II

Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviet side was interested in verification, but that this issue should not be taken to the point of absurdity.

Shultz said that he would like to ask Professor Nitze to lecture on the ABM Treaty from the point of view of what is permitted and what is prohibited from the U.S. point of view.

Ambassador Nitze stated that he would like to start with a different area—space strike weapons.

Shevardnadze interjected with a smile that the audience was not really an appropriate one for a “lecture”.

Nitze said that he would like to begin by recalling what Minister Gromyko had said on January 8 concerning the definition of space strike weapons. He had said that space strike weapons were systems in space which were designed to counter objects in space and on earth, as well as systems on land which were designed to counter objects in space. This kind of definition presented a great deal of difficulty for the U.S. side, since it does not believe that Treaty limitations should be based on intent. This is too subjective a criterion. The U.S. side believes that limitations should be based on capabilities which can be deduced from observation of characteristics or testing. If we look at the systems with inherent ASAT capabilities, this would include the Soviet Golosh system, all ICBM’s, as well as SS–20’s and Pershing II’s. Most ballistic missiles have inherent ASAT capabilities. It was not clear, moreover, that tests needed to be conducted against objects in space to assure such a capability. It might be possible to run the test with a computer simulation. Beyond that, any satellites in space which are maneuverable have an inherent possibility to be placed next to another satellite. So it would be difficult for the U.S. to see how there could be concepts of verification of deployment of systems with a capability of countering objects in space. The U.S. has not been able to solve this problem, but if Soviet negotiators in Geneva have any suggestions about this range of issues, indicating not design criteria, but practical views about determining inherent capabilities so that realistic judgements could be made with regard to verification, the U.S. side would be very interested in hearing such a proposal.

Nitze went on to discuss the question of research and testing under the ABM Treaty. He stressed that the word “research” does not appear in the Treaty. In his testimony before the Supreme Soviet, Defense Minister Grechko said that the ABM Treaty, although significantly limiting the deployment of ABM’s, nevertheless permits research aimed at protecting the country.

Nitze continued that when Shevardnadze outlined those things which were to be prohibited, he listed certain steps which could be observed, such as testing of prototypes. The question remains, however, “a prototype of what?” The articles of the ABM Treaty limit systems and components. The components are defined in Article 2 to be those things which can be used in an ABM mode, as interceptors or launchers. The negotiators of the Treaty were not interested in limiting subcomponents, such as computers, chips or sensors. Article 5 of the Treaty limits systems and components which are space-based, and land-mobile, air-mobile, or space-mobile ones.

Nitze continued that agreed statement (d) foresaw the creation of systems and components which could substitute for ABMs using other physical principles in the future. This agreed statement limits the deployment of such systems which could be used as substitutes for ABM components unless there has been prior agreement between the two sides on the basis of Article 13 and agreement on the basis of article 14, which concerns amendment of the Treaty. What the U.S. side has proposed is in compliance with the procedures as outlined by the negotiators.

Nitze indicated that there was an impression that the Soviet side was saying that to propose the things that the U.S. side is proposing is undermining the ABM Treaty. But this is not so.

Nitze said that he would like to touch upon one or two points made by Minister Korniyenko. Korniyenko had suggested that all new developments were begun by the U.S. side. This was not so. It was clear that the first ABM system was deployed around Moscow before the U.S. deployed its system, and that the U.S. MIRVed its missiles because of the threat which it foresaw from broad scale Soviet ABM deployment.

Nitze said that he would like to touch upon British and French systems in the INF context. The U.S. side does not accept the Soviet assertion that British and French SLBM systems, which have the same capabilities as Soviet SLBM strategic systems and U.S. SLBM strategic systems, are medium-range systems. Such systems were brought into the INF negotiations on the basis of the theory of the Soviet Union that they should be taken into account in order to assure equal security from the point of view of all military factors, including geographical and political ones. The U.S. would be prepared to take them into account if all other factors were taken into account, including political, geographical and other military factors. But this was not accepted by the Soviet side.

Shultz said that perhaps the point of all this was that in Geneva, each negotiating group, recognizing the interrelationship between them, and recalling the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, should think about a radical reduction of offensive weapons.

Shultz continued that regarding space or ABM weapons, the Soviet side had indicated that it liked the ABM Treaty. The U.S. side felt the same way, and both sides should explore in detail what each thinks that the ABM Treaty says, so that there is clarity about what the treaty permits and what it does not permit.

Shultz indicated that with regard to the doctrine of deterrence, he would re-read Shevardnadze’s statement and comments carefully, and would ask Shevardnadze to look over the notes which his side had taken when Shultz had replied to what Shevardnadze had said, to see if progress could be made at the Geneva negotiations on this basis. This should be done in a spirit of cooperation to move things along, not just to argue.

Shevardnadze said that he was not a specialist in this very complex area, and joked that he would be glad to hear another lecture on it, but there was no time for it. He then quoted one phrase from the Treaty to the effect that it is the responsibility of both sides not to develop, test or deploy ABM space-based systems. Shevardnadze agreed that this question needed to be discussed by experts, but unfortunately such discussions in Geneva had given no results, despite the fact that there were competent specialists there on both sides. He agreed with Shultz that in principle a new impetus should be given to our negotiators in Geneva to work on getting good results. There needs to be agreement in principle that militarization is militarization and that new types of space strike weapons are militarization of space, and we need to work against such militarization.

Korniyenko interjected that this was what was agreed to in January.

Shevardnadze stated that if there was an agreement in principle on this, we should go farther, and should not create weapons which would lead to the militarization of space.

Shevardnadze hoped that the aim of the two sides was to help the leaders of the country find such basic solutions of global issues. If the two sides come to an agreement on space weapons, the Soviet side, as Shevardnadze had already indicated yesterday and today, would not come with empty hands, and would offer a radical reduction of offensive strategic weapons.

Shevardnadze pointed out that in the area of medium-range missiles, the Soviet side had a specific program which it has often proposed, and which he hoped would be a basis for a good compromise solution. It was Shevardnadze’s hope that there would be discussion and agreement on basic issues. If the two sides were to begin to argue who was at fault, we would again get back to 1946.

Shultz asked Shevardnadze when we would hear the Soviet proposal.

Shevardnadze replied by asking when the Soviet side would hear the U.S. proposal about space weapons.

Shultz said that he had attempted to describe the U.S. approach today, and the same had been done at the negotiations in Geneva. The U.S. welcomed the Soviet side’s statement, made a while ago, that, recognizing the interrelationship between the subjects, they should be taken individually and worked out individually. Shultz had thought, on the basis of Shevardnadze’s comments, that he was ready to make a proposal, but this apparently was not the case.

Shevardnadze stated that the Soviet side had made proposals in all three of the groups at the negotiations in Geneva, i.e., space weapons, strategic weapons and medium-range weapons. Shevardnadze understood that the second area was a very important one for the two sides, and the Soviet side was prepared for radical reductions here, but the U.S. side had said nothing about space weapons, even of a general nature.

Shultz pointed out that Mr. Sokolov had been going to the Congress and to the press indicating that the Soviet Foreign Minister was coming with a big proposal. Shevardnadze had made indications to this effect in his statement and Ambassador Karpov had told Ambassador Kampelman to get ready for a big proposal this week. When would such a proposal be made? Would it be made to the President?

Korniyenko interjected that the U.S. side should tell Kampelman to make proposals on space weapons.

Shultz replied that Kampelman had attempted to do this.

Shevardnadze said that general assertions were made about perhaps a 20, 30 or 80 percent probability of a proposal, but would the U.S. side give its proposal on space weapons? The January statement contains an assumption of a cessation of the arms race in space.

Shultz stated that the concept of “radical reduction” caused difficulties for him. He said that he plays golf, a game which Shevardnadze probably does not know, and in that game a small ball is used, and there is a green of nicely cultivated grass which has many undulations which the ball needs to traverse to get to a hole. A golfer needs to calculate how much the ball will break. If he does not know the green, then someone, in this case the caddy, can help him. As Shultz was playing the other day, it was difficult for him to figure out the green, and he asked the caddy how much it would break. The caddy replied, “not as much as you think”. This gave Shultz pause. And he had the same difficulty with the concept of “deep cuts”.

Shultz indicated that he had a question in the area of space weapons. Did the Soviet Union wish to abandon or change the ABM Treaty, or keep it and live with it?

Shevardnadze replied that the Soviet side had indicated many times that it considered the ABM Treaty to be the basis not only of the strategic balance but of global relations in general.

Shultz stressed that this was why he proposed that the two sides should carefully explore how each understood the ABM Treaty, since there are very obvious differences in the interpretations of the two sides. For example, (and Shultz did not wish to pursue this at length), the U.S. side feels that the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar is not consistent with the ABM Treaty, whereas the Soviet side thinks it is. This implies that there is a difference of interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Shevardnadze said that this was not a new issue, and that it had been mentioned in Helsinki, where Shevardnadze had explained the aim of the radar. He had also mentioned U.S. violations of the Treaty, which he would not list at this point.

Shevardnadze realized that there was concern about such matters on both sides, and the Standing Consultative Commission had been created in order to eliminate such unjustified concerns. Both sides had qualified specialists who understood all the details of these issues. The SCC would be able to remove mutual concerns in all these cases.

Shultz indicated that he had two comments. The first was that Shevardnadze had spoken about the intention of that radar, and Shultz wished to return to Ambassador Nitze’s comments concerning capability. The other point was that it was one thing to have a discussion of whether or not a given action was in violation of the treaty. This goes on in the SCC with various degrees of success. Shultz was proposing that in light of the reverence which the USSR had for the ABM Treaty, and in light of the U.S. indication of its adherence to that Treaty, perhaps our negotiators in the space and defense group in Geneva, not in the context of determining violations, but in the context of determining the meaning of the Treaty, should sit down to clarify it. This could be an avenue in which progress could be made.

Shevardnadze indicated that he would like to return to his first thought, i.e., that it was the task of the two sides to help the leaders of the two countries to prepare for their meeting, and the sides were getting farther away from this task.

Shevardnadze said that Shultz knew the history of the Treaty better than he did. This also applied to the SALT I and SALT II Treaties. The attitude of the U.S. to the latter and the fact that it was not ratified was well known. Unfortunately, there were many such examples. Shevardnadze thought that we should not have an additional precedent of the violation of the basis of our relations, especially in the area of strategic arms. All of these things could be studied, but Shevardnadze thought that there was no basis to review the principles of the ABM Treaty.

Shultz replied that he agreed with this. He indicated that he was baffled by the fact that the Soviet side was talking about the non-militarization of space, since space had already been militarized by the Soviet Union and others. There were military satellites in space and space already had other military uses, e.g. ballistic missiles went through space, so space was already a militarized area. Many of the satellites in space are useful to both sides for verification.

Shultz continued that the sides needed to have a way of resolving operational questions related to the outcome of the Summit meeting in Geneva, and talk of “non-militarization” is not the way to handle this.

Shultz indicated that he would like to turn the floor over to Mr. McFarlane.

McFarlane indicated that he thought it was ironic that all of our time had been devoted, in the discussion of strategic defenses, to the U.S. program, which was only in its beginning phase, and had ignored the Soviet program, which had been quite substantial for a number of years. Did this imply that the Soviet side denied that it had such a program? McFarlane said he would like to ask if it is the Soviet position that present Soviet activity in the area of laser weapons, particle beams, directed energy and conventional surface-to-air ballistic missile defense did not exist, or was the Soviet side proposing to cease all such activity?

Shevardnadze said that Ambassador Nitze had quoted Grechko’s statement made thirty years ago (Dobrynin corrected Shevardnadze that this was said at the ratification of the ABM Treaty), but the statement made by Sokolov two or three months ago was a clear reply to the question now being discussed.⁸

Shevardnadze continued that the USSR does have systems which are permitted under the Treaty. The U.S. is aware of this and the USSR has never denied it. General Secretary Gorbachev had indicated that the Soviet Union is conducting basic research in this and other areas. Shevardnadze wished to say that the Soviet side is in favor of reaching agreement and achieving compromise, but, as he had stated before, would not allow anyone to achieve superiority over it. The Soviet side was not imploring the U.S. for anything, but was proposing a reasonable and acceptable approach for stopping the arms race and not letting it get into space. As Korniyenko had said, if the U.S. makes new weapons, the Soviet Union makes new weapons.

Shevardnadze had indicated that there were incompatible contradictions in U.S. statements. In some it was stated that the Soviet Union had two or three times more arms than the U.S. In others by equally respected individuals it was stated that the USSR copies or steals U.S. technology. There was no logic to this. If the USSR copies technology, how can it be ahead?

Shultz indicated that he thought that the points which McFarlane wanted to make was that the Soviet Union considered that its research program was consistent with the ABM Treaty, and this is essentially the approach that the U.S. takes with regard to its research. So, why is there objection? The two sides should be clear about what is permitted and not permitted under the Treaty. Perhaps such examination was a way to handle the question which Shevardnadze had stressed.

Korniyenko interjected that Article 1 of the ABM Treaty indicates that each side is obligated not to deploy an ABM system for territorial defense of its country and not to create the basis for such a defense. But the U.S. President has said that the aim of the U.S. program was the creation of such a defense system, not only of a territorial nature, but of a global one. This was not something that the Soviet side had thought up. These were official statements, indicating violation of U.S. obligations under the Treaty.

Shultz stressed that what he was trying to get at was not to debate individual issues, but to achieve progress. The question is, what is being done, and what is the meaning of “development”? Similar questions need to be asked with respect to other aspects as well.

Shultz said that the U.S. side could think about the things that the Soviet side had said at the meeting, and the Soviet side could consider what the U.S. side had said. The President also had his thoughts on the subject, and perhaps Shevardnadze had something to convey to the President. After that, Shultz and Shevardnadze would meet, and additional time would be allotted, if necessary. There were many items on the agenda, and only one of them had been discussed.

Shevardnadze indicated that he thought the time had not been spent in vain.

Shultz agreed.

Shevardnadze indicated that this was a difficult question and approaches to it had been developed over many years. The fact that the discussions had been frank was a positive one, and the two sides should make changes and try to think about how to find points of contact. In this regard, there are a number of issues which could probably be agreed, which could be presented to the leaders of the countries. As he had stated before, Shevardnadze indicated that he did not feel that U.S. and Soviet interests were destined to collide. If the two sides really wanted to, a basis could be found for acceptable solutions to help improve the situation in the world.

Shultz said that he had noted some of the words which Shevardnadze had used, which could be used to characterize the meeting to the press. Shevardnadze had said that the meeting was a useful one, and Shultz agreed. Shevardnadze had indicated that the atmosphere was frank, and Shultz wished to add that they had found it easy to talk to each other without difficulty.

Shultz also indicated that he would tell the press that the time had been spent largely on the discussion of the security area and the material being discussed at the Geneva negotiations. Shevardnadze had indicated that we had looked for points of contact in our positions and for areas of mutual understanding. Did we find agreement? No, but we continued to work towards it. Were there any new proposals? No, but we carefully described our positions. This would be the general nature of what the U.S. side would propose to say to the press.

Shevardnadze replied that he had no argument with such an evaluation of the situation, and recalled that in Helsinki the sides had spoken in a similar way about the results of the meeting. It had been useful and frank.

At this point, Shultz and Shevardnadze went off to the side for a one-on-one meeting with interpreters.

Shevardnadze first wanted to thank Shultz for the fact that he had come to listen to his speech. The relationship between them could be called a frank one, and this would let them help their leaders to find wise solutions. The sides should not be afraid of dispute, for truth is born of dispute. The main thing is to look realistically at the world.

[Omitted here are the notes of the private meeting. See Document 100.]

1. Source: Department of State, EUR/RUS Special Collections—Russia, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 00D471, Shevardnadze Visit, New York 9/25/85, Washington 9/27/85. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original.
2. See Document 71.
3. September 28.
4. See Document 100.
5. For Shevardnadze’s speech to the UN General Assembly, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXVII, no. 39 (October 23, 1985), pp. 5–9. An excerpt of his September 25 speech was printed in the New York Times, September 25, 1985, p. A8.
6. Telegram 6338 from the NST Delegation in Geneva, July 3, reported that the “Defense and Space group hosted a post-plenary meeting on June 27 which consisted of a luncheon for Soviet counterparts, followed by a post-plenary discussion during which an SDI briefing was held.” The briefing was “given by Major Liesveld; follow-on questions, as noted below, were answered by LTG Abrahamson.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850471–0546) The SDI briefing was transmitted to the NST Delegation in Geneva in telegram 196560, June 27. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850451–0784)
7. Presumably a reference to the Baruch Plan of 1946, a U.S. proposal to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, calling, among other things, for the elimination of atomic weapons and establishment of effective safeguards to protect complying states against violations. The Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan.
8. In a July 1985 New York Times article, Nitze quoted Grechko’s 1972 statement on ABM research: “Marshal Grechko told the Supreme Soviet, the nominal parliament, that the treaty ‘imposes no limitations on the performance of research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against nuclear missile attack.” (Hedrick Smith, “Nitze Details U.S. Charges Soviet Has Own ‘Star Wars,’” New York Times, July 12, 1985, p. A6) See footnote 9, Document 97. In a May 5 interview, Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov asserted that U.S. SDI research was a threat to peace and denied that the Soviet Union was researching a space-based anti-missile system. (“Kremlin’s Military Chief Calls ‘Star Wars’ a Threat to Peace,” New York Times, May 6, 1985, p. A12)