Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

97. Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹

Washington, September 24, 1985

CONTINGENCY PLANNING AGAINST POTENTIAL SOVIET
ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS (U)

INTRODUCTION. The attached paper was produced by the Arms Control Support Group to respond to the Presidential tasking at Tab I.² Per instructions, the special access compartment OWL was created to handle this and related papers. This paper will be handled only within OWL channels. (C)

QUESTION 1 (U)

How would we evaluate on its merits, and in light of national security requirements we face today and will likely face in the future, a Soviet contingency proposal to basically accept the U.S. START and INF positions in return for limiting SDI to research only? (TS/O)

a. What systems, numbers and counting rules (considering both strategic and INF forces) would the Soviets likely propose under such a contingency? (TS/O)

The DCI’s representative’s guess as to the details of Soviet proposals that the Soviets could claim accept the U.S. START and INF positions is at Tab A.³ One of these offers would be laid out over the next two months. Even the offer on the table in mid-November will have some give in it. (S/NF)

In addition, an even simpler Soviet proposal which potentially could be stressing to the U.S. would include the following elements:

—offer whatever reductions the U.S. can accept in strategic offensive forces;

—propose a ban on SLCMs, ASAT, nuclear testing, and a freeze on INF deployments; and

—propose a joint statement by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to reaffirm the ABM Treaty.

This approach could have more political value to the Soviets than the more detailed concepts provided at Tab A. Under either approach, the Soviets will continue to press for close linkage between progress in START and INF and restrictions designed to constrain SDI. (S/NF)

The content and timing of how the Soviets will lay out their proposal for future strategic force reductions will likely be evolutionary. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will lay out the basic direction and goals of the Soviet approach. He probably will avoid giving a specific numerical limit for weapons until counting rules for weapon loadings on ballistic missiles and bomber aircraft are discussed. The Soviet Foreign Minister also will be seeking to gauge U.S. reactions, will, sincerity and purpose, so that he can report comprehensively to the politburo. The following week, the Soviet NST delegation will also address Soviet goals and lay out more details of the Soviet proposal. In November, General Secretary Gorbachev may well seek some kind of an understanding with the President, such as a joint statement to guide the negotiators in the future, perhaps similar in concept to the Vladivostok framework.⁴ What the Foreign Minister and General Secretary describe to the U.S. will be an arrangement that favors Soviet positions and that they almost surely would be prepared to accept. However, it will not be their final offer. (S/NF)

The possibility also exists that General Secretary Gorbachev might offer in November a comprehensive arms control package with strategic nuclear forces as its center piece. Tab B outlines what the DCI’s representative thinks such a package might include. (S/NF)⁵

In any case, the Soviets will continue to make proposals (in public and, on occasion, in private), as well as attempt more broadly to influence the U.S. and European publics and governments, in an effort to appear reasonable. Soviet initiatives likely will incorporate efforts to downplay or hide the anti-U.S. thrust and benefits to the U.S.S.R. In addition to its intended impact on U.S. policy and programmatic decisions, this will set the stage for blaming the U.S. if progress is not achieved and if the Soviets decide to walk out of the negotiations again. (S/NF)

b. Assuming such a Soviet proposal, can we envision achieving an offensive balance at lower overall force levels, with a vigorous SDI research program protected, as being in the long-term U.S. national interest? Would we be assured of being able to maintain sufficient force under such conditions to maintain deterrence and implement our national military strategy, if required, with reasonable assurance of success? (TS/O)

This question has two important parts: (1) would offensive forces alone (even with Soviet acceptance of meaningful, verifiable reductions, but forswearing SDI deployment) be adequate to meet our long-term national security needs; and (2) if not, could we work from a Soviet proposal as suggested in Tab A without seriously endangering our future defensive force options? (TS/O)

Can we rely on offensive forces alone over the long term? Our ability to rely exclusively on offensive nuclear arms to meet our long-term deterrent requirements vis-a-vis the Soviet Union has been eroded over the last decade. The Soviet offensive build-up continues apace. The U.S. strategic modernization program, if funded and executed, would provide sufficient forces to implement our national strategy for at least the near-term against known and currently forecast Soviet offensive forces. However, public and Congressional attitudes call into question our ability to maintain necessary full funding of this critical program. (S)

What is more, Soviet defensive activities (which are largely unmatched by the U.S.) are beginning to call into question the capability of those offensive forces we do have to perform their assigned functions—and, thereby, to ensure deterrence. The U.S.S.R.’s aggressive pursuit of active (e.g., air and ballistic missile defenses—involving both traditional and more exotic technologies) and passive (e.g., leadership protection, civil defense and means of enhancing the resiliency of their offensive forces, such as hardening, mobility and deception) measures, in the aggregate, threatens significantly to degrade our deterrent’s credibility over time. (S)

In short, there is reason for considerable concern that we will be unable to meet the full range of our national security requirements were we to continue to rely on offensive forces exclusively. Even if we were to succeed in reaching agreement with the U.S.S.R. on sharp, meaningful and verifiable offensive arms reductions, in light of the numbers and capabilities of Soviet offensive forces likely to remain, and in view of existing and projected Soviet defensive activities, it appears that our long-term security needs will require us to preserve the option to deploy defenses which meet our criteria for such defenses. (TS)

The aforementioned reality argues strongly for us to reject Soviet efforts aimed at obtaining an explicit US commitment to forego permanently strategic defensive deployment options. The President has made quite clear his determination to resist such ploys. (TS)

Impact of Offense/Defense Trades on Future U.S. Defensive Options. What is perhaps more worrisome is the danger that we will be asked instead to accept a Soviet proposal which merely implies a willingness to give up future applications of the SDI. Such a proposal could take several forms. Examples are described at Tab A. Another could be an additional commitment of limited-duration not to violate or not to exercise our option under the ABM Treaty to withdraw from it. As innocuous as such options may appear, and however much they may seem to be compatible with our stated policy of not violating the ABM Treaty, we must be under no illusion about the common danger they pose. They all create a political and programmatic climate which will inexorably prejudice our ability to exercise future US options for SDI deployments. Critics of SDI in the Congress will seize upon a new US-Soviet undertaking not to undo or otherwise depart from the ABM Treaty as an invitation to and pretext for eviscerating the SDI program. Similarly, the arguments of friends of the program will be undermined. If the Congress consequently were to act to curb the SDI program, this could be accomplished by funding cutbacks and/or legislative restrictions which would quite likely preclude the realization of the feasibility assessment SDI was created to perform. (S)

In sum, we believe that a truly “vigorous SDI research program” cannot be adequately “protected” in an environment where offensive force reductions are made contingent on new U.S. commitments relating to defensive forces—commitments which seriously prejudice U.S. ability to sustain the SDI program and, as appropriate, to exercise future U.S. defensive options. (S)

JCS Military Assessment. Under a proposal such as those suggested at Tab A, the United States would not have sufficient strategic forces to execute current U.S. military strategy with reasonable assurance of success, while we judge that the Soviet Union would have the minimum required forces to achieve targeting objectives. The DCI’s representative is skeptical that the Soviet Union would, in fact, be able to achieve all of their objectives under such proposals. (TS)

—The proposals at Tab A would reduce weapon levels below those permitted by the current U.S. START proposal. It should be noted that there is some military risk in the U.S. START proposal. That risk would be present even considering full execution of the President’s strategic modernization program. The military risk has increased as the number of Peacekeeper missiles has been decreased from 200 to 50. Under the postulated Soviet proposals, modernization would be further curtailed in that the Trident D–5 missile and the small ICBM would be prohibited. Also, there would be problems with and inequities in LRINF warheads which would be contrary to the 1979 NATO guidance. (TS)

—A proposal at these low levels of strategic weapons would weaken the U.S. strategic deterrent far more than that of the U.S.S.R. The U.S. must be able to attack about twice the number of targets in the Warsaw Pact countries as the Soviets have to attack in the U.S. and NATO. At the low levels of strategic offensive weapons in the Soviet proposals at Tab A, the U.S. would be several thousand weapons short of its needs, while the JCS judge that the U.S.S.R. would possess approximately the number required and a minimum reserve. (TS)

—With regard to INF, the proposals would leave the U.S. with a four-to-one disadvantage in LRINF warheads in Europe and an eight-to-one disadvantage globally. A freeze in Europe could be seen as giving tacit compensation for UK and French systems. The absence of global limits would make the unequal European levels even more unbalanced and would disadvantage our Asian allies. A freeze at the November 1985 levels would probably result in a Dutch decision not to deploy, with the possibility of substantial political ramifications. (TS)

Conclusions about Question 1b. In short, a Soviet proposal along the lines suggested at Tab A would not provide a basis for an acceptable agreement that would be in the long-term U.S. national interest. Provisions that would adversely affect our security include the following: (TS/O)

—Constraints on SDI. The Soviets will press for restraints on research now permitted by the ABM Treaty, a recommitment to the ABM Treaty, and specifically an explicit or implicit commitment not to withdraw from or abrogate the ABM Treaty in order to deploy an SDI system. Such restrictions would curtail important parts of the planned SDI research program as well as add further major obstacles to deployment, both of which would undercut support for sustaining the program. (S)

—ASAT Ban. This would leave the Soviets with a monopoly in fully tested ASAT systems and would also adversely affect the SDI program. (TS)

—Offensive Reductions. A Soviet proposal along the lines indicated at Tab A would not permit the U.S. to maintain sufficient forces to execute our current national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. In addition, such a Soviet proposal makes no distinctions between missile warheads and more stabilizing bomber weapons, force drastic cuts in our own bomber force, and rule out modernization of the SLBM force with the Trident D–5 missile. Such a Soviet proposal would be designed to have less impact upon Soviet forces. The Soviets could continue to maintain a substantial force of large ICBMs. (S)

—Verification. Elements of the Soviet proposals at Tab A cannot be verified or perpetuate verification ambiguities of past agreements. Unverifiable elements include the SLCM and ASAT bans. Continuing problems include: ambiguity concerning “new types” of weapons, counting mobile systems; and, depending upon the nature of counting rules, weapons limits. Verification measures that the Soviets might propose will likely not resolve these problems. (C)

c. What would be the scope and character of SDI research that we would want to protect and maintain under such a contingency? Would we need to renegotiate the ABM Treaty in order to maintain such a program of SDI research? If so, what modifications and when would be required? (TS/O)

The foregoing dictates that the ability of the SDI program to reach and validate conclusions about the feasibility of providing an effective and robust strategic defense for the United States and its allies is among our highest national priorities. As such, we should conduct that research, testing and development necessary to provide the basis for sound and considered full-scale development and deployment decisions. (S)

The U.S. SDI program is presently designed to be compatible with traditional interpretations of the ABM Treaty’s limitations, recognizing that this commitment has cost and schedule implications for the program. At present, it is believed that—having paid those costs—sufficient work can be conducted within these interpretations to permit reasonable feasibility judgments on full scale development and deployment to be made. However, several important caveats to this statement are in order.

(1) As the SDI program proceeds, technical difficulties may be encountered which invalidate this assessment.

(2) A more restrictive view of the ABM Treaty’s limitations is held by some who believe that some of the work we now have in train, which we assert is legal, actually violates the Treaty. This view may prevail.

(3) Finally, the Soviets and/or the Congress may press for agreements to “tighten” the loopholes of the ABM Treaty and define grey areas which would severely complicate—if not make impossible—the SDI’s mission. (S)

On the other hand, new questions have recently been raised about the validity of some of our traditional interpretations to the effect that they have been unduly restrictive and, in any event, of a wholly unilateral character. If a more lenient interpretation is adopted by the Administration, the OSD representative believes that it will almost surely permit us to sustain for quite some time to come our current declaratory policy of strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty while conducting the full range of research, testing and development work necessary to reach our feasibility assessment objectives. Some others believe that such an interpretation would not be sustainable and, therefore, could undercut support for the SDI program. (S)

Conclusions about Question 1c. In short, it is probably impossible, pending further clarification of the aforementioned caveats and conditions, to make an accurate assessment of the exact impact of the ABM Treaty on the SDI program. Similarly, we cannot at present identify exactly what and/or when changes to the Treaty might be necessary to allow the SDI to accomplish its mission objectives. What can be said is that based on our knowledge today, no changes to the ABM Treaty are necessary to allow the U.S. to reach a decision on whether to go beyond research into currently prohibited development provided that:

[(1) the “traditional approach” to interpreting the ABM Treaty (as reflected in the Administration’s FY 1985 Report to Congress) is maintained;]⁶

(2) the ABM Treaty restrictions are not expanded; and

(3) additional restrictions on ASAT testing are not imposed. (TS)

QUESTION 2 (U)

If the answers to the questions associated with question 1 indicate some possibilities, how do we evaluate them relative to the current U.S. course of action? (TS/O)

Based on the answers to the questions associated with question 1, we need not address question 2 and its associated questions. However, questions 2a and 2b do suggest some useful observations. (U)

a. If such a Soviet proposal were offered, what response should the U.S. make to channel any subsequent discussion into relatively more acceptable circumstances or conditions? What must the U.S. immediately exclude from discussion and subsequently avoid? (TS/O)

The foregoing analysis dictates that any proposal the Soviets might make which entails either an explicit or implicit commitment on the part of the United States which prejudices the ability of the U.S. to pursue future strategic ballistic missile defense options should be eschewed. Our analysis indicates that we should avoid being drawn into discussion based on the Soviet proposal and endeavor to channel any discussion onto the proposals the U.S. currently has on the table. (S)

b. What precautions would we need (e.g., types of limits, counting rules, verification measures and safeguards) to ensure that promised Soviet reductions would actually result in the types of real reductions that would be required to protect U.S. and Allied interests? (TS/O)

In addition to meeting our other basic requirements for such an agreement, any additional strategic arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union should: increase openness; incorporate the most rigorous and, if necessary, intrusive verification provisions so as to ensure prompt and effective detection of Soviet non-compliance activity; and prompt the Executive Branch (in cooperation with the Congress) to create safeguards to deter violations and provide for prompt U.S. reactions should they occur. (S)

The DCI’s representative has provided the short paper at Tab C which suggests examples of additional verification measures and associated safeguards.⁷ (S)

As a general proposition, the lower the levels of strategic forces permitted, the greater the incentive for Soviet attempts to cheat and the more militarily significant any such cheating is likely to be. Consequently, it is particularly important that regimes entailing sharp reductions like the US START proposal and the notional Soviet proposals at Tab A have as integral parts verification mechanisms going beyond National Technical Means (NTM) of verification as necessary. These mechanisms must be available to provide maximum confidence not only that the terms of the agreement are being observed with respect to dismantlements, but also that the forces remaining conform, over time, to the treaty limitations. (S)

At the same time, the best verification regime in the world will be worth little if it is not accompanied by a credible compliance policy. The likely or assured detection of Soviet violations is demonstrably inadequate to prevent such violations from occurring. In any future strategic arms control regime—as with existing treaties—the United States must be perceived as being willing to respond appropriately and meaningfully to Soviet non-compliance activities. (S)

QUESTION 3 (U)

If the answers to the questions associated with Question 1 lead to unacceptable conclusions, how could we best handle such an offer if presented by the Soviets? (TS/O)

a. Given U.S. objectives, as well as the inherent flexibility built into our current, sound negotiating positions, are there steps that we could take to reduce our vulnerability to such a Soviet proposal? If so, how could such steps be implemented? (TS/O)

We should seek to reduce our vulnerability to such Soviet proposals in a number of ways. (U)

—We should publicly and privately stress the key problems and pitfalls in the Soviet positions. In doing so, we should develop a handful of simple, catchy characterizations of these problems and of the virtues of our approach for public use. (U)

—We should develop for public release a study of the Soviet propaganda campaign and political offensive against SDI. This could appear before or after the Reagan/Gorbachev meeting depending upon tactical timing considerations. (C)

—We should consider having the President present at the UNGA, or using some other appropriate platform, a formulation of our position in a way that can capture attention. For example, one possible approach could be to propose a “concrete plan/calendar for offensive force reductions” identifying specific percentages of reduction in selective categories and time frames. A paper describing such an approach submitted by the ACDA representative is attached at Tab D.⁸ (S)

Among the most effective things that the United States can do to reduce our vulnerability to a Soviet proposal purporting to reject the value and desirability of strategic defenses would be a campaign aimed at more effectively publicizing the Soviet Union’s all-encompassing pursuit of precisely such defenses. Particularly when combined with an authoritative critique of the incompatibility of some such Soviet activities with their arms control obligations, this line of attack can serve both to undercut their hypocritical propaganda effort and bolster the case for our own, prudent SDI program. (U)

A carefully orchestrated campaign of this kind could employ numerous tools: closed session briefings to the Senate and the House of Representatives, timed to coincide with the release of the new White Paper on Soviet Strategic Defense; briefings to the Allies in capitals (perhaps building upon the planned compliance tour); more aggressive public speaking in domestic and foreign forums along the lines of the speech made by Paul Nitze in Chautauqua and the presentation made by DASD Frank Gaffney to SIPRI;⁹ and a more dynamic media offensive both here and abroad. A continuing review should be conducted to determine if more classified information on this subject can be made available for public consumption. (C)

Another strategem we might usefully employ is to shift the public discussion of the November meeting’s agenda away from the arms control focus central to Soviet propaganda efforts and onto grounds which are both more appropriate to such a meeting and more supportive of U.S. objectives. For example, we could take the tack that while arms control should take its appropriate place, to make the most fundamental progress on arms control, the heads of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should focus on the root causes of retaining the arms: differences on basic bilateral and regional issues. Having done this, we might also look for some common problem, world-wide in scope, which the two leaders could use to build trust and cooperation through common action as allies. Some believe that issues like world hunger, regreening drought striken Africa, research on cancer, etc. could be considered. However, selection of such a topic would require detailed study to ensure that the second or third order consequences of such a proposal can not be manipulated by the Soviets to be made contrary to fundamental U.S. interests. (S)

b. What should be the direct U.S. response to such a Soviet offer? And, in such a situation, what reinforcement can we give at the negotiating table or through public diplomacy in support of our current, sound positions? What alternative proposals (if any) should the U.S. be prepared to consider? (TS/O)

It will be important in any U.S. response to a Soviet proposal to ensure that public, Allied and Congressional support is maintained for the key elements of Western deterrence: strategic modernization, support for conventional forces, protection of SDI, and preservation of the cohesion of our alliances.

The question addresses two elements: the immediate U.S. response and the consideration of a counter offer. (U)

With respect to the nature of the immediate U.S. response, as the answer to Question 1 makes clear, we do not want to work from the Soviet proposal. We should avoid expressing an interest in “studying” any Soviet offense-for-defense trade-offs proposal. Doing so would only whet the appetite and raise the expectations of those who want us to take the next logical step and accept some version of the Soviet cap on defenses. Rather, our response should:

—focus on our proposals while noting, in the context of our proposals, any acceptable elements of the Soviet offer;

—address those elements of the Soviet offer that we find unacceptable (e.g., constraints on SDI research and deployment, no distinction between missile warheads and bomber weapons, retention of an excessive ICBM force, curtailment of important U.S. offensive modernization programs like Midgetman and the Trident D–5 missile, ASAT ban, inequitable LRINF constraints, verifiability, etc.) and explain why such provisions cannot be the basis for an equitable agreement;

—stress that with respect to our SDI research program, we will not accept restrictions or limits beyond those already existing in the ABM Treaty, but we will continue to conduct our SDI research program in compliance with that Treaty; and

—note that it is essential that the Soviets come into compliance with existing obligations, particularly by correcting the Krasnoyarsk and telemetry encryption problems. (C)

In considering a U.S. counter to a Soviet offer along the lines of Tab A, we should seek to achieve the following objectives:

—Strategically significant reductions of a nature and magnitude that, coupled with ancillary measures permitting appropriate unilateral efforts, will permit us to improve the survivability of our land-based forces.

—Protect and support a vigorous SDI program to determine the feasibility of new defenses that would permit us to base our security more on defense of the United States and its Allies and less on the threat of retaliation.

—Support and promote the necessary measure of public and Congressional backing to sustain our defense program, particularly the strategic modernization program.

—Broad appeal that lends itself to effective public diplomacy to counter Soviet propaganda initiatives. (C)

Some believe that we could test Gorbachev to see if there is any willingness to engage in serious give and take behind their propaganda facade—specifically by exploring the possibility of agreement on basic elements which could serve as guidelines for our negotiators. Under this approach, the elements we would need are listed below:

—Soviet commitment to strategically significant reductions in offensive land-based, ballistic missile forces.

—Acknowledgment that the ABM Treaty permits SDI research, including clarification of the demarcation between permitted and prohibited activity.

—Lay down markers to preserve the option of a cooperative transition toward greater reliance on defensive systems—and ultimately toward complete elimination of nuclear weapons—should future research demonstrate the validity of such an approach.

—Treatment of INF in a way that meets U.S. and Allied concerns.

—Satisfaction of our verification and compliance concerns, including the Krasnoyarsk radar and telemetry encryption. (S)

The current Soviet line—that offensive reductions must follow a ban on SDI—is clearly out of the question. Some believe that we could explore the possibility of simultaneous discussion of offense and defense under which strategically significant reductions would complement the ABM Treaty. The new limits on offensive nuclear arms and already existing limits on defensive systems would be mutually contingent. (S)

According to this view, to be strategically significant, reductions must be of a nature and magnitude that, when combined with unilateral steps (mobility, multiple shelters, etc.), they would enhance the survivability of land-based deterrent forces. An example would be reductions in ballistic missile warheads by about 50% to a level of about 4500 on each side, of which no more than 3000 would be on ICBM warheads, with collateral limits on throwweight and warhead weight and provisions for mobility and multiple shelters. In this context, we could agree to associated limits on ALCMs and SNDVs. These constraints would be incorporated in an agreement of indefinite duration, with the initial reductions implemented over 10 years. (S)

Supporters of this view believe it would have the following advantages:

—It would meet our objectives of deep and strategically significant cuts in offensive systems and reversal of the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime.

—It would explicitly allow the current, vigorous SDI research program and explicitly preserve the option of a cooperative transition to greater defense reliance.

—Moreover, it would preserve the option for a non-cooperative transition, because we would not cede our right, pursuant to Article XV, to withdraw from the Treaty if required by supreme national interests.

—If the Soviets reject it, this initiative would get us off the defensive and enable us to deal much more effectively with Soviet propaganda, without prejudicing our positions in Geneva. (S)

Others believe, however, that any linkage of offensive reductions to the reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty through any of the alternatives discussed above, will have the political effect of placing an even greater impediment in front of any transition to an increased U.S. reliance on defenses. This consideration is key to SDI’s future. If the research proves out, such a transition may well prove impossible. Even before that time, such a linkage could reduce support for SDI as the desirability of a “no-defense” world would be reaffirmed and the basis for aggressive pursuit of defensive options would consequently be attenuated. Historically, the justification of needing a hedge against Soviet programs has not proven sufficient to sustain meaningful levels of research activity needed to provide real deployment options. (S)

The OSD representative holds the view that a frantic effort to compete with the Soviets proposal-for-proposal should be studiously avoided. It should be self-evident but it is, nonetheless, worth noting that we are permanently disadvantaged in such a competition because we—unlike the Soviets—must be able to live with the substance of our proposals. We do not have the luxury of demagoguery bereft of responsibility, self-effacing allies or state-controlled legislature or press. History is replete with notorious moments when it seemed like a good idea for the United States to advance hastily or unilaterally arms control proposals of little—if any—intrinsic merit; in fact, it rarely worked to our advantage. It is almost certainly not going to work to our advantage now if we appear to be engaged in a frantic bidding-war with the Soviet Union, attempting to persuade all comers that we are more “serious” about arms control than they are by virtue of having made the most recent—albeit fleetingly so—proposal. The OSD representative also feels that it would be profoundly ill-advised if we were to consider making a move—if for some reason, not obvious at present, it were deemed desirable to do so—in response to Shevardnadze’s opening gambit. (S)

QUESTION 4 (U)

Should the existence of such an evaluation leak, how could the U.S. best limit potential damage? Are there additional steps that we should take to position ourselves against the danger of such a leak? (TS/O)

Simple press guidance should be prepared indicating that as a matter of standard practice the USG analyzes all possible options—especially those which the Soviets can be expected to advance in light of existing, clear Presidential guidance on this general area. The fact that analysis of this kind is routinely performed is not, in and of itself, an indication of a favorable US disposition toward such likely Soviet proposals and should not be confused therewith. (U)

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985 NP. Top Secret; Owl; Noforn. Handle via Owl Channels. McFarlane sent the paper to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman under a September 27 covering memorandum, indicating that Reagan would like to receive observations on the paper. Weinberger forwarded the JCS response on September 30; see Document 104. Casey provided a response on October 2. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Summit—Geneva [3 of 3]) Nitze provided a response on October 3. (Ibid.) See also Document 91.
2. See Document 92.
3. Tab A, an undated paper entitled “One Guess at Soviet Strategic Arms Control Package, that Encompasses US Proposals,” is attached but not printed. The paper begins: “If the Soviets were to address the US proposals (e.g., which would limit each side to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads), they would propose counting rules that would credit their MIRVed ballistic missiles with fewer warheads than they are capable of carrying. They would also demand a very low overall weapon limit and count all US cruise missiles and short-range air-to surface missiles to ensure that US bomber weapons were severely limited. They would continue to insist on a package that links closely reductions in offensive forces to constraints on space-based defenses.”
4. In November 1974, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev met in Vladivostok, agreeing to the basic framework for the SALT II agreement; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 83–95.
5. Tab B, an undated paper entitled “What if the Soviets Table a Comprehensive Arms Control Package?” is attached but not printed.
6. Brackets are in the original. On January 23, 1984, the President sent a message to Congress on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 159, footnote 11.
7. Tab C, a September 24 paper entitled “Precautions the US Should Consider,” is attached but not printed.
8. Tab D, an undated paper entitled “20–Year U.S.-USSR Strategic Plan for Arms Control,” is attached but not printed.
9. In his June 28 speech at the Chautauqua Conference on Soviet-American Relations, Nitze described in detail the Soviet program of research in anti-missile defense. (Hedrick Smith, “Nitze Details U.S. Charges Soviet Has Own ‘Star Wars’” New York Times, July 12, 1985, p. A6) Gaffney’s presentation to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has not been found.