Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

100. Notes of a Private Meeting Between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze¹

New York, undated

Shultz/Shevardnadze Tete-a-Tete

In the private tete-a-tete between Shevardnadze and Shultz at the end of the meeting, Shevardnadze indicated that he had been instructed by Gorbachev to pass on a letter to President Reagan.² Shevardnadze said that he wished to tell Shultz confidentially that this letter was one of substance in which Gorbachev expressed his thoughts on U.S./Soviet relations and on preparation for the Summit. One might call this a general concept of the Summit meeting.³ In the letter, Gorbachev indicates that as a result of the Summit, the sides could agree on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, bearing in mind that such a mutual recognition should be accompanied by practical measures to limit the arms race.

Secondly, Shevardnadze indicated that the sides should think about and agree on the possibility of having a final document after the Summit.⁴ Shevardnadze indicated that he felt that Shultz was an action-oriented person, as was the President, and the Summit should have a logical conclusion. Shevardnadze recalled that the question of a final document had been discussed in Helsinki and Shultz seemed not to have any objections to such a concept.

Shultz replied that one would first need to see the content of such a document, and hope and work to produce an appropriate content to give meaning to the document.

Shevardnadze indicated that he was just about to come to that. If there were an agreement in principle to have such a basic document, it could consist of four basic parts: Security issues, especially any points of view which would have been agreed to, regional issues and bilateral issues; in these three areas there could be expression of general agreed common understandings, as well as any specific concrete agreements which would have been worked out before the meeting. The final parts i.e., the fourth one, would consist of an outline of tasks for the future.⁵ Shevardnadze stressed that the sides should think about whether such an important meeting should end with a serious final document and repeated that the peoples of the world had great hope for this meeting. The outline which he had given would allow formulation of agreements in appropriate language.

Shultz replied that he had no objection in principle to such a document, but indicated that the wisdom of having one would depend on its content. If it would be only an empty vessel, it wouldn’t serve much purpose. But if meaningful results were achieved, it could be helpful to highlight them. Shultz indicated that he would look at what Shevardnadze had said. He was not in a position to say that the U.S. side could agree with the proposal, but would consider and work on it while Shevardnadze was in the U.S.

Shultz also indicated that he and Shevardnadze would have to make arrangements to continue work on the present meeting and that both he and Shevardnadze would need to spend a great deal of time on this, and perhaps meet again before the Summit in November.⁶

Shultz indicated that Shevardnadze’s outline did not touch on the subject of human rights.⁷ He was not sure that this topic should be included in a public document, but the topic was an important one in our relationship. Apparently things happen in this area when the Soviet Union decides they should happen, and does not feel any pressure in this regard from the U.S. Shultz gave the example of the Pentecostalists.⁸

Shultz said that Ambassador Hartman would be giving Minister Korniyenko a list, as is the custom, of divided families involving American citizens. Jewish emigration would also be included.

Shultz indicated that for one reason or another the subject of Human Rights was related to trade, and although he did not believe in linkage, the U.S. would be prepared to discuss trade in items which are of interest to the USSR, which have not been traded recently. That subject and the subject of human rights could be discussed in a private meeting of one representative from each side. Shultz would nominate Ambassador Ridgway to be the U.S. representative at such a meeting.⁹

Shevardnadze replied that he was not against discussion of human rights even at the Summit, and if a basis exists for legally helping people, the appropriate decisions could be taken. However, he indicated that U.S. and Soviet concepts of human rights differed. He indicated, however, that the question of trade needed to be given some thought.

Shultz stressed that such a meeting between the two sides would be very confidential.¹⁰

Returning to Gorbachev’s letter, Shevardnadze indicated that he would give the letter to President Reagan, and relate its basic contents, emphasizing certain elements for clarity. This would probably be more acceptable than simply to have the President read the letter, since it was not a short one.

Shultz indicated that what Shevardnadze was proposing could be done in several ways. If he wished, Shevardnadze could give Shultz a copy, perhaps tomorrow, and Shultz could pass it to the President and to others so that they could read it and be better prepared to discuss it.¹¹ But Shevardnadze could certainly take whatever approach he would choose.

Shevardnadze indicated that he preferred to give the letter to Reagan personally, and that Gorbachev was not expecting an immediate reply.¹² Gorbachev’s main point was that he would like to avoid unexpected questions or proposals at the meeting in November, and he was ready for a serious meeting.

Shultz said that he would tell the President that Shevardnadze would pass to him a substantive letter from Gorbachev, whose outline had been just discussed.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Shevardnadze and Reagan/Shevardnadze at the UN and in Washington September 1985. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the notes. Although undated, this tête-à-tête took place immediately following the formal September 25 meeting at the Soviet Mission; see Document 99.
2. See Document 84. An unknown hand underlined “letter” in this sentence.
3. An unknown hand underlined “a general concept of the Summit meeting.”
4. An unknown hand underlined “a final document” in this sentence.
5. In this sentence, an unknown hand underlined “four basic parts,” “Security,” “regional,” “bilateral,” and “future.”
6. An unknown hand underlined “perhaps meet again before the Summit in November.”
7. An unknown hand underlined “human rights” in this sentence.
8. See footnote 2, Document 38.
9. In this paragraph, an unknown hand underlined “Human Rights was related to trade,” “a private meeting of one representative from each side,” and “Ridgway.”
10. In another copy of these notes, the next line read: “Shevardnadze agreed.”
11. An unknown hand underlined “give Shultz a copy.”
12. An unknown hand underlined “preferred to give the letter to Reagan personally.”