Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

62. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 18, 1985

SUBJECT

• Agenda for Your Helsinki Meeting with Shevardnadze

Issues for Decision

How to structure your July 31 meeting with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, what issues we should address, and who should participate from our side.

Essential Factors

The Soviets have agreed to your meeting with Shevardnadze from 2 to 5 PM July 31 in Helsinki but said a busy schedule precluded the informal luncheon you offered and a possible follow-up meeting the next day.² Since time will be short, we have urged the Soviets to agree to simultaneous translation.

Given the time constraints, the introductory nature of the meeting, and your previous session with Dobrynin on the issues to consider in the runup to the summit,³ we see your meeting with Shevardnadze falling into two parts:

—a brief assessment of relations since Vienna [but not another detailed tour d’horizon], which includes a restatement of our overall approach to the summit; and

—a discussion with Shevardnadze of specific issues that could constitute our preferred summit agenda.

I. Opening Exchange of Views on the Relationship and Our Approach to the Summit

Since you will be the host in Helsinki, it is appropriate to begin by giving the floor to Shevardnadze, while making some graceful comments about Gromyko and your desire to develop a candid and constructive relationship with Shevardnadze. You will also want to obtain his agreement to a specific discussion of issues after brief opening statements.

Your response to Shevardnadze’s introductory comments will, of course, depend in part on whether and how he reacts to the ideas you presented to Dobrynin. I believe strongly that you should at least recapitulate briefly our philosophy about a summit. The Geneva meeting should provide the President and Gorbachev the opportunity to get to know each other and hold a discussion covering the range of issues in our bilateral relationship. We do not require that concrete agreements be reached in Geneva, but if there is a possibility for progress in any part of our relationship we will be prepared to seize it.

In briefly reviewing post-Vienna developments, on the positive side you should underline our agreement on the summit and also note the conclusion of two new understandings in the SCC⁴ and our agreement to revitalize agricultural cooperation as fresh evidence of our ability to do business. You should also stress the importance of the President’s decision on interim restraint as evidence of our willingness to promote progress in arms negotiations.⁵

But you will also want to cite obstacles to progress beyond small steps—our continuing concerns resulting from the Nicholson case; the Berlin air corridors, as a case which still has dangerous potential; the bleak human rights picture; Soviet pressures on Pakistan. As an example of mixed and unnecessarily ambiguous behavior, you could cite the combination during the TWA hijacking of welcome Soviet statements against terrorism with inflammatory propaganda about US intentions. In raising Nicholson and more recent incidents in the GDR and the Bering Sea, you may also want to repeat the points we have made earlier about the seeming Soviet propensity to resort to force rather than diplomacy, either as a Government preference or through lack of adequate political control over the military.

II. Discussion of Specific Issues

In discussing with Shevardnadze the specific issues that could constitute our preferred summit agenda, you may again wish to use the “headline” approach to cover much material quickly. Consistent with the summit strategy memo I recently sent you,⁶ I would suggest you make the following points on key issues in our agenda:

A. Arms Control: Geneva Talks: The second round has closed with the Soviets maintaining their tight linkage of an agreement on offensive arms to US renunciation of SDI. While they have also shown no flexibility on INF, they have, as you know, presented some new ideas in the START group [informal suggestions about the possibility of percentage reductions and limits on strategic arms—an idea in the direction of the “common framework” concept]. I will be working with Paul Nitze to develop further suggestions in this area, so that we will be prepared to demonstrate our readiness to move forward at the summit on this central issue. Should Shevardnadze raise their START “model,” you will want to probe for further clarification of these ideas. If he hints at a possible softening in the Soviet stance against SDI research, you will want to again press for specific details.

B. Other Arms Control: Four topics are worth touching on, as we look toward the summit.

—With regard to Stockholm CDE, you will want to reiterate the point you made to Dobrynin that we should begin drafting a concluding document combining concrete CBMs with political understandings on non-use of force. We would also want to try for agreed elements to put in a summit communique. Goodby has accepted his counterpart’s invitation to visit Moscow at the beginning of September, and that would be the time to explore how to proceed when the CDE reconvenes later in September.

—On nuclear non-proliferation, you should ask whether the Soviets are prepared to make a joint statement as Dick Kennedy proposed in April.⁷ Oleg Sokolov was generally positive when I raised this on July 15, but time is running out if we are to issue a statement before the NPT review conference beginning August 27. We could then build on this statement in a summit communique.

—On chemical weapons, I believe it would be useful to try out again with the new Soviet leadership our proposals: to observe the destruction of our CW stockpiles and to send a team to Moscow to discuss the use of CW in Iran-Iraq and the more general question of CW proliferation.

—On nuclear testing, you will want to ask Shevardnadze for a response to the President’s unilateral offer to send a team to the Nevada Test Site to measure a nuclear test. You can also renew your earlier proposal to Dobrynin and Gromyko for a side understanding involving reciprocal calibrations tests which would allow us to move ahead to ratification of the TTBT and the PNE Treaty.

C. Regional Dialogue: You will want to emphasize that we found the recent regional talks on southern Africa and Afghanistan useful for clarifying positions, but were disappointed at the lack of Soviet readiness to tackle central issues. You could reaffirm US readiness to discuss guarantees of an Afghan settlement if the Soviets were prepared to discuss a timetable for withdrawal. You told Dobrynin July 3 that your meeting in Helsinki might well be the time to agree to a round on East Asia. I would like to talk with you and Paul Wolfowitz about this possibility on your return from East Asia. You will also want to raise Cambodia, Vietnam and any other issues you have promised our friends in the region that you will discuss with Shevardnadze.

D. Human Rights: It is quite possible that Shevardnadze will not take Gromyko’s approach of refusing to talk about human rights. He may well come back at you and refer to supposed US human rights failings. This may not be all bad; while we don’t want to get into harsh, sterile polemics, you may be able to turn his willingness to talk into a dialogue on the issues of concern to us. You will want to emphasize to Shevardnadze our overall approach on human rights: no desire to intervene in their internal affairs or to do anything against their laws, but there are practical steps they could take. Progress on human rights should be part of the preparatory work for the summit, and that steps by the Soviet side leading up to the summit will improve the atmosphere for the meeting. Following up the latest Presidential letter,⁸ you should focus on clearing the decks of longstanding divided-spouse and dual-national cases and making headway on Jewish emigration. You will want to refer to your Helsinki speech, in which you mention other prominent cases such as the Sakharovs and Shcharanskiy.

E. Bilateral Issues

—Steps in Economic Relations: It would be worth making a reference to Baldrige visit follow-up, noting our efforts to lift furskin embargo and need for them to give US firms a better break in contracts, and encourage him to focus on further steps.

—Pacific Air Safety Measures: If this month’s third round in Tokyo does not produce basic agreement, you should urge rapid conclusion that would permit us to move on other bilateral issues.

—Civil Aviation: Reiterate that once we reach a basic Pacific air safety agreement and Pan Am is satisfied that conditions are right for resuming service to the USSR, we will be prepared to move rapidly through renegotiation of our civil aviation agreement to provide for this. [Aeroflot is sending a delegation to Pan Am in mid-July to try to nail this down, and we will know the result of those talks as well as the third Pacific air safety round by the time you meet.]

—Exchange Agreement Negotiations: You have our status report on the talks.⁹ You stressed to Dobrynin July 3 that TV appearances are important and exhibits at previous level are essential. You may wish to make the same points to Shevardnadze, and invite him to agree that negotiators should move promptly through remaining issues.

—Consulates in Kiev and New York: Suggest both sides prepare to announce this at the summit.

—Reinvigorating bilateral agreements: You can note that we have had joint commission meetings on trade and agriculture and our satisfaction that Secretary Pierce will be traveling to Moscow in September and that EPA Administrator Thomas will be in Moscow at the time of the summit for a joint commission meeting on the environment.

Participation

You have told Dobrynin we would have Bud and Paul there, and I suggest that you also field the rest of the Geneva/Vienna team: Art, me and/or Roz Ridgway and Jack Matlock as notetaker. If the Soviets have one more than we, as they did in Vienna, I suggest we again insert Mark Palmer; this will provide some EUR continuity. We have identified a better interpreter for the Helsinki meeting. The new man interpreted for a CODEL meeting with Shevardnadze in Georgia in 1979. We are making arrangements for you to meet with him before Helsinki.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize us to proceed with preparations and talking points on the basis of the framework and the issues above.¹⁰

2. That you agree to meet with Paul Wolfowitz and me to discuss whether to propose a regional experts meeting on East Asia.

3. That the basic team you had in Vienna also accompany you to Helsinki for the meeting with Shevardnadze.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union July. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Armacost. Drafted by Tefft and Simons; cleared by Burton, Pascoe, and Palmer. A copy was sent to Ridgway. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. All brackets are in the original. On July 18, Roz Ridgway was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs and Richard Burt became Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. In a covering note to Shultz, Armacost wrote: “Mr. Secretary, The participation question needs urgent attention. I’ve talked to both Roz and Rick. Roz is keen to go, feels—since confirmation is behind her—she should get on with the job, and, in that connection, would find Rick’s presence a bit awkward. She will, of course, adjust to whatever decision you make. Rick recognizes that Roz must be there as a full participant, would like to go along, but will likewise abide by your wishes without making a Federal case of it. Given the fact that both are confirmed, that Roz will have follow-on work, and that the meeting is an initial encounter with a new man, I would give precedence to Roz.” Shultz responded in the margin on July 22: “Roz should go and take part in the meeting. GPS.”
2. In telegram Tosec 130500/216653 to the Secretary, July 16, Burt reported that on July 15 he met with Sokolov, who gave him a “non-paper conveying Shevardnadze’s agreement to meet with you in Helsinki July 31 from 2 to 5 pm. As you will see from the non-paper which follows, Shevardnadze also said that a busy schedule prevents him from accepting either the informal lunch you offered or a second meeting on August 1.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])
3. See Document 55.
4. In telegram 201655 to all NATO capitals, Canberra, and Tokyo, July 2, the Department reported that the 28th session of the SCC resulted in the signing of two common understandings between the United States and Soviet Union. The first was that both sides “agree to refrain from concurrent operation of ABM components or ballistic missile reentry vehicles with air defense components at ABM test ranges.” The understanding provided an exception for when air defense was necessary. The second “clarifies the responsibilities of the parties under the 1971 agreement on measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war in the event of a nuclear incident, or threat thereof, involving unknown or unauthorized individuals or groups.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850465–0326)
5. See footnote 2, Document 41.
6. See Document 61.
7. See footnote 10, Document 61.
8. Not found.
9. No status report was found; however, negotiations on the exchange agreements were ongoing, as referenced in telegram 8777 from Moscow, June 29. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850461–0417)
10. Shultz did not initial his approval or disapproval of the recommendations.