Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

61. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Nadi¹

Washington, July 17, 1985, 2149Z

219113/Tosec 130580. For the Secretary From Rick Burt. Subject: (S) Information Memorandum: Our Strategy for the Summit (ES Sensitive 8520824).

1. S—Entire text.

2. This memorandum provides our initial thoughts on how we might best manage the period between now and the summit. It examines the public, congressional, allied, and Soviet dimensions of managing both expectations and preparations. The memo also outlines what we should try to accomplish in the summit itself. I look forward to discussing all this with you upon your return.

Managing the Summit

3. The history of summitry is a complex one. Summits bring with them the possibility of pitfalls as well as progress. We should not allow ourselves to become mesmerized by the May 1972 experience; success can be achieved on a more modest scale.² More common were summits which may have set back U.S. interests. The 1961 Vienna summit was one such meeting, where we not only had open disagreement but a possible Soviet misunderstanding about the President’s resolve, which in turn may have contributed to Khrushchev’s decision to put the missiles into Cuba.³ The 1967 Glassboro summit demonstrated another danger—it created major expectations which then led to a big letdown when results were not soon forthcoming.⁴ Most important to avoid is another summit along the lines of 1973, when a weakened President sought to create an illusory sense of progress and accomplishment only to communicate a sense to the Soviets that we needed success more than they.⁵ The lessons are clear: We do best when we are well-prepared, when we do not appear to need a summit more than the Soviets, and when we do not go about promising more than can be delivered.

4. Our ability to put these lessons into practice is in part affected by Soviet behavior. As usual, predicting Soviet behavior is difficult, as is fathoming Soviet objectives. A key factor this time around is that we have a new Soviet leader establishing himself. Gorbachev is clearly more active and is busy creating the impression of new vitality on the Soviet domestic scene. Announcement of his summit meeting with the President together with his October trip to Paris and other steps is the international counterpart to his domestic “vitality”.

5. On the international stage, and in the context of the summit, we believe Gorbachev may be pursuing a two-track policy. One element of his strategy is to try to use the summit to get concessions from us. The Soviets are working on the Europeans and the Asians to try to persuade them that it is possible to work out a better relationship with the Soviet Union. This is not because the Soviets have written us off, but because they probably want the Europeans and the Asians to work on us prior to the summit. This tactic also corresponds with movements and blandishments directly addressed to the United States—hints about SDI and START.

6. The cumulative effect of these moves in arms control and with the allies, the Chinese, and others is to try to create the impression that there is real potential for results from the summit, that the Soviets are showing “goodwill”, and that the only question is U.S. willingness to change its existing positions. SDI and U.S. “inflexibility” on arms control more generally is certain to receive considerable attention as the key obstacle to progress. In other words, they are trying to create a situation in which the rest of the world and domestic opinion in the U.S. will believe that it is incumbent on us to produce in Geneva.

7. The reason that this is a two-track approach is that the Soviets cannot be sure it will work. They thus may believe that they need a fallback, one of a long-term strategy of working more closely with the Europeans and the Asians. In a sense, this would convert a pre-summit tactical approach into a post summit element of Soviet foreign policy, one through which Moscow would seek to weaken alliance bonds and anti-Sovietism in both Western Europe and Japan. Development of Soviet relations with these two partners could thus become an end in itself and an alternate mid-term strategy to dealing principally if successful would leave the USSR positioned far better to deal with us, in that our key alliances would be diluted as would be the threats the Soviets would face to their immediate west and east.

8. Our goal ought to be to frustrate this likely Soviet attempt to place us in a defensive position both across the table and at home and among our allies with an offensive strategy of our own. We should emphasize that we see November’s summit as the first in what we hope will be a more regular pattern of meetings, that we are prepared to discuss the full range of issues and are ready to make agreements wherever possible, but that in all cases the new Soviet leadership must be prepared to demonstrate that it is not simply younger but also more flexible and reasonable. We must also consult and use the media so Moscow realizes we cannot be pressured through the back door of our allies or domestic opinion.

9. An important factor determining the summit’s outcome could well result from which country or leadership needs a successful summit more. Although Ronald Reagan has passed his last election and thus is more immune to pressures than earlier Presidents have been, the United States is at a structural disadvantage here. Because of our open, democratic society and because of our allies’ expectations, pressure is greater on us than on the Soviets. A Soviet leader probably could survive an unproductive summit more easily than most Western leaders. Gorbachev will score points simply by being himself. The world is hungry for signs of reinvigorated Soviet leadership. That said, while Gorbachev has moved quickly to consolidate his position, he is still a new leader and does have to face a party congress in February. He also needs to prove his mettle; people will be on guard after being so ready to praise him during his visit to London. Indeed, we should work to ensure that Gorbachev does not receive a second uncritical free ride.

10. Ultimately, though, the key to a successful strategy for us becomes the interplay between managing expectations here at home and with our allies, and on the other hand managing substantive preparations with the Soviets. The best possible combination is to work to increase the chances for progress as we move toward the summit, while keeping expectations low and pressures on us for producing results low. Conversely, the worst possible outcome would be to fail to keep down expectations, to place ourselves under considerable pressure, and to have little happen at the summit.

11. Between now and November our priority within the bureaucracy and with the Soviets is to work for meaningful results. This does not mean great breakthroughs. It would be unrealistic to expect a summit on the order of May 1972 with its major arms control and political statements. At the same time, we should recognize that an austere, get-acquainted only, no results meeting is almost certain to meet with criticism and cause strains within the West and place us under pressure to meet Moscow more than halfway on any new occasion. We should therefore aim for something in between. Thus, I recommend that we concentrate on modest but concrete steps which are possible in each of the four areas of our agenda, and that we seek to institutionalize the summit process, possibly by getting the Soviets to agree to follow-up summits in Washington and Moscow.

12. Dampening expectations will be no small challenge in light of the four months remaining before the summit and the intense media interest that is sure to emerge. We need to pursue the same rhetorical stance which you took in your press conference immediately following the announcement of the summit. While not ruling out results, we should emphasize the intrinsic benefits of the two leaders getting to know one another, of a serious substantive exchange, and of their providing guidance for future work. We should indicate that if we can achieve something in Geneva so much the better, but that it is an accomplishment by itself for the leaders of the major nuclear powers to get together. We should also emphasize that this meeting need not solve all outstanding problems between the two countries, but rather that this meeting is part of a larger process of negotiations and other meetings.

13. Getting these themes across will require considerable effort over the next four months. Your initial presentation was helpful, but repetition will be vital. We need to bring in the allies and other elements into this process of political and public management. For example, at your meeting with the allied Foreign Ministers at Helsinki we think it would be important for you to set out our approach. This would be strengthened when you meet again with your allied counterparts on the margins of the UNGA early this fall and through letters from the President to allied heads of state. Your press conference in Helsinki and other contacts with the media will also be important in this regard. And we will want at an appropriate time to discuss this approach with key members of the Congress.

The Agenda

14. We should strive for the optimal substantive outcome of the summit as the focus of our activities over the next few months, remembering to prepare ourselves and public opinion for a lesser outcome. In your recent meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, you outlined our substantive approach.⁶ Our more detailed ideas on what might be accomplished at Helsinki and Geneva and in-between are given below.

Arms Control:

15. Regardless of what can be accomplished on other agenda items, the centerpiece of discussions at the summit will inevitably be the major arms control issues now under discussion in Geneva. Gorbachev said in his June 22 letter that “arms control has been and will be the central issue in our relationship and in the development of the entire international situation.”⁷ There is a lot of hyperbole in this, of course—it is an old Soviet line designed to pressure us and we need to ensure that our entire agenda is addressed. But, there is some truth in Gorbachev’s statement and it is certainly perceived that way world-wide. We are discussing ideas that could lead to some progress on these issues by the summit, although no one expects anything like a Vladivostok-type agreement.⁸ I am working with Paul Nitze on developing suggestions in this area. We do not deal with it in this memorandum.

16. Beyond the Geneva talks, there is some possibility of movement at CDE that could be codified at the summit. You suggested to Dobrynin that we move on to the drafting stage in the CDE process as a way to focus our work. We believe you need to discuss this personally with Bud so that you will be able to be more specific with Shevardnadze in Helsinki. The next step after that would be for Jim Goodby to engage the Soviets in detailed discussions during a visit to Moscow in early September and to go over what may emerge with our allies before the reconvened CDE session later in September.⁹ With drafting in the fall session and your meetings with Shevardnadze to nudge the process forward, we may be able to announce some of the elements of an agreement in the summit communique.

17. There seems to be some new interest and activity on MBFR issues in Europe, and we are assessing what it means for our position. However, the problems of moving forward in this area are substantial given the bureaucratic obstacles here and differences among the allies. Also, if we make an effort on the more promising CDE issues, we risk overloading the circuit if we push simultaneously on MBFR.

18. Profound differences over verification have kept our discussions with the Soviets on a chemical weapons ban at the CD in Geneva from any progress. In the Helsinki and summit context, there may be other more promising avenues in the CW field. For example, we believe it would be useful to try out with the new Soviet leadership our two earlier invitations: to observe the destruction of our CW stockpiles, and to send a team to Moscow to discuss the use of CW in the Iran-Iraq War and the more general question of CW proliferation. We will also work with ACDA to come up with some language on CW non-proliferation that might appear in a summit communique. The Soviet response to date on CW actions outside the CD has not been encouraging, but it is conceivable that in the context of summit preparations, the Soviets will be more flexible.

19. The Soviets were generally positive on Dick Kennedy’s suggestion for a statement on nuclear non-proliferation, but owe us a formal response.¹⁰ I raised it again with the Soviets this week and you should give it another push at Helsinki. Ideally, Dick and his Soviet counterpart could issue this before the NPT review conference beginning August 27. We could then build on this statement in a summit communique.

20. On nuclear testing, you have approved the draft of a Presidential letter which inter alia offers a calibration visit to our Nevada site, this time without reciprocity, in contrast to the President’s 1984 UNGA offer.¹¹ With Shevardnadze, you can review the President’s offer and also renew your earlier proposal to Dobrynin and Gromyko for a side understanding involving reciprocal calibration testing which would allow us to move ahead to ratification of the TTBT and PNE treaties. The Soviets also may be considering a move of some sort on testing in the next couple of months. The current speedup of their testing program may be part of a planned limited moratorium on testing that would be announced before or during the review conference. (We are doing a separate memo for you on this subject with suggested responses.)

21. At your meeting in Helsinki and again at the summit, we will want to put forward the other CBMs listed in the President’s Strasbourg speech—exchange of observers at military exercises, high-level contacts between military leaders, and a permanent military-to-military communications link.¹² Military-to-military contacts are worth continued effort, and with Gromyko out of the direct operational chain of command, the Soviets may show some new interest. You should also talk with Bud and Cap about setting a new time—well before the summit—for us to host the postponed Incidents at Sea meeting in the U.S. This should be on your Helsinki agenda to be used in conjunction with an approach on military-to-military contacts.

22. Finally, while it is unrealistic to think we can resolve compliance issues in the near future, it is important that you and the President lay out our concerns to Shevardvadze and Gorbachev. In both presentations, we will want to emphasize the importance of resolving these issues to progress on arms control.

Regional Issues:

23. We must be particularly careful in managing expectations on regional issues before and at the summit. There will be no major breakthroughs on these issues, and we should make that clear early on. The emphasis, as in the past, should be on the importance of discussing these issues to avoid miscalculation and confrontation.

24. You have laid out for Dobrynin our positive view of the regional discussions at the Assistant Secretary level and the possibility of future talks on East Asia and Central America. It would be useful to have had both sessions before the summit; you could agree on dates and ground rules for the East Asian talks with Shenardnadze in Helsinki. We believe it might be valuable to use the summit to routinize our discussions of regional issues, taking the mystery out of them and reducing the political freight they have been forced to carry. If you agree, the ground for this could be laid at Helsinki and the concept noted in the joint communique.

25. We will want to keep Afghanistan to the fore during this period. You and the President both should press the Soviets hard for movement toward a negotiated settlement. Progress will be difficult in the short term, but getting our message through in this formative period of Gorbachev’s policy is critically important. Our theme should continue to be that the Soviets cannot wait out the Mujahideen (or their friends), the time for moving toward a negotiated settlement is now, and the U.S. only wants the Soviets to get out, not to humiliate or bleed them in Afghanistan.

26. We are talking with Bob Oakley about possible ways to open a constructive dialogue with the Soviets on the terrorism issue, but I am skeptical. Our limited exchanges to date have not been particularly useful, but some believe the agreement to use the Hotline in the event of a nuclear terrorism incident and events surrounding the release of the TWA hostages suggest this topic may be worth looking at once again. Shevardnadze himself had a particularly bad hijacking incident in Georgia a couple of years ago and may be more sensitive to the problems than Gromyko. In looking at this topic, we should be aware of the downsides to any such discussion: the talks are unlikely to achieve much, the Soviets have supplied terrorists and their friends against us, and they will have their own agenda in any discussion (e.g. the Contras, training camps in the U.S., separate memorandum on whether to pursue this subject with Shevardnadze.)

27. In our view, it would also be useful to engage Shevardnadze in a discussion of the seeming Soviet propensity to resort to force rather than diplomacy, either as a government preference or through lack of adequate political control over the military. The Nicholson case, Berlin air corridors, and KAL all would come into such a discussion. A recent example of the same problem is the buzzing of U.S. oil exploration rigs in the Navarin Basin by Soviet aircraft.¹³ This subject is primarily for discussion with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, not for a communique.

Human Rights:

28. You will want to emphasize to Shevardnadze that progress in the area of human rights should be part of the preparatory work for the summit, and the President should stress their centrality to any relationship geared to resolving concrete problems. Gorbachev is pursuing a different approach than Gromyko—he no longer refuses to discuss human rights, but goes on the offensive when the subject is raised. There is every indication that Shevardnadze will come to Helsinki similarly primed to strongly defend Soviet human rights practices and to counter-attack with their standard themes against human rights practices in the West. You should try in Helsinki to use their new willingness to “discuss” human rights to see if we can shake loose the establishment of a more formal mechanism for discussions with them on human rights issues on a consistent basis.

29. Also in the Helsinki meeting, you will want to emphasize that steps by the Soviet side leading up to the Geneva summit will improve the atmosphere for the meeting and could lead to further steps on our side. You can repeat the linkage you made in Vienna between movement on commercial issues that interest the Soviets and progress on human rights matters.¹⁴ You should reinforce your points with Dobrynin that we are not trying to negotiate the human rights issue with the Soviets—we want results that the Soviets can produce quietly on their own. The draft Presidential letter takes this line and suggests a focus on clearing the decks of longstanding divided-spouse and dual-national cases and making headway on Jewish emigration by the summit.¹⁵ Such steps to improve the atmosphere before the summit have precedents in the past, and we should try to maximize the Soviet incentive in this period to show results unilaterally.

Bilateral Issues:

30. Progress on bilateral questions cannot carry a summit, but they remain the most promising area for movement in the period leading up to it. You laid out clearly for Dobrynin the need to resolve the Pacific air safety/civil aviation/consulates issue and finish up the exchanges agreement before the summit. Dobrynin’s comments on the need to have agreements to sign at that time suggest we may be able to speed up the process appreciably in this period. The first test will come in a meeting this week in Tokyo on the Pacific air safety issue. If the Soviets are ready to sign a basic agreement (which will provide for technical implementing agreements negotiated among air control specialists), we will do so at that time. Provided Aeroflot also convinces Pan Am it can do some business if it resumes service to the USSR, we could then move on to the civil aviation and consulates discussions. You can give these and the exchanges negotiations a boost in Helsinki and perhaps resolve outstanding problems in New York.

31. The recent buzzing incident with the oil exploration rigs points to the need for another round of Pacific maritime boundary talks. The last talks were in July 1984, and at the very least another round would encourage Soviet “competent authorities” to moderation. At best, it could produce agreement: the directness of our proposed solution (a 50/50 split) might just appeal to Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. We should probably have our delegations get together again between now and November to see if any progress is possible. As you know, these talks have become controversial as a result of a campaign about the settlement’s effect on the status of Wrangel Island (which the U.S. has never claimed).

32. Our efforts to reinvigorate the various bilateral agreements are moving forward. We have had joint commission meetings on trade and agriculture, Secretary Pierce is planning a meeting in September, and EPA Administrator Thomas is scheduled to be in Moscow at the time of the summit for a joint commission meeting on the environment. This area can use some additional thought; we will review what else might be done in this period consonant with our overall approach to these exchanges.

33. Finally, there is the area you described to Dobrynin as a “bundle of non-strategic trade issues.” Along with a statement in the communique supporting increased non-strategic trade, we will want to include something about non-discriminatory access to the Soviet market. We should encourage the Soviets to demonstrate their willingness to fulfill the promise they made to Mac Baldrige about non-discriminatory treatment by signing some major deals with American companies in the pre-summit period.

The Procedural Outcome:

34. The range of substantive choice is therefore wide, but no single issue is easy. We cannot expect to move along on all fronts equally, nor forecast at this time that there will be agreements ready to sign by November. The Soviets are not going to accept all our ideas and it is all too easy to become bogged down in the specifics.

35. We should recognize therefore that the substantive package we can put forward as the outcome of a summit may well be small. Depending on how the meeting goes, it may turn out that the major accomplishment of the meeting could be announcement of additional summits in Washington in 1986 and Moscow in 1987; or to emphasize the continuing process involved, in the spring in Washington and the fall in Moscow—thus holding two summits in 1986. To the extent we achieve substantive results in Geneva, there will be impetus for further progress at these later meetings. To the extent that we do not, there would be important incentives for both sides to hold earlier and regular summits to obtain more substantive progress.

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow. Drafted by Pascoe, Simons, and Haass; approved by Armacost, Burt, Palmer, McKinley, and Pace. Shultz traveled to Perth and Canberra for the ANZUS Ministerial meeting July 13–16, then traveled to Nadi, Fiji, on July 16 to meet with Prime Minister Mara.
2. In May 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev met in Moscow, where they signed the SALT I and ABM Treaties. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 257–302.
3. Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna in June 1961. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. V, Soviet Union, Documents 82–89.
4. Johnson met with Soviet Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey, in June 1967. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Documents 228–236.
5. In June 1973, Brezhnev came to Washington for a summit with Nixon. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Documents 123–129.
6. See Document 55.
7. See Document 46.
8. In November 1974, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev met in Vladivostok, agreeing to the basic framework for the SALT II agreement. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 90–93.
9. See footnote 5, Document 55.
10. In telegram 1671 from Helsinki, April 17, the Embassy reported that Ambassador Kennedy passed a draft statement on non-proliferation in the form of a non-paper to Petrovsky during a plenary meeting in Helsinki on April 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])
11. Regarding the draft letter, see Document 64. For Reagan’s offer in his UNGA address, see footnote 14, Document 28.
12. See footnote 2, Document 27.
13. In telegram 219395 to Moscow, July 18, the Department reported that “Burt called in Soviet Chargé Sokolov July 16 and delivered a strong protest of yet another instance of Soviet harassment of U.S. off shore drilling operations in the Bering Sea.” On July 14, “a Soviet DC3 type aircraft circled a U.S. drilling platform” at a “very close distance.” The telegram reported similar incidents on June 26 and July 3. Burt stressed this type of “aggressive use of force by the Soviets” made it “difficult for us to proceed with a constructive dialogue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850509–0063)
14. See Documents 28 and 29.
15. No draft letter on human rights was found.