Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

58. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 10, 1985

SUBJECT

• Recent Soviet Policy Moves: An Emerging Strategy?

1. You should be aware of a number of recent moves by the Soviets which, taken together, suggest they may be positioning themselves to exert greater pressure on us, particularly on arms control, as we enter the fall run-up to the summit. End summary.

2. In the START negotiations, Karpov has told Ambassador Tower that the negotiations are now at a point where there can be discussion “in principle” of reductions and models of agreements, to which both sides can agree when space arms issues are resolved. Their ideas may resemble, in some respects, the State Department “common framework” approach of imposing dual constraints on aggregate launchers and warheads with certain sub-ceilings. The Soviets have begun to outline their START position, introducing a “percentage” scheme.² Although Soviet descriptions of this scheme have been conflicting, it appears to be that within a nuclear weapons aggregate, no more than a certain percentage of the weapons could be on any one leg of a side’s triad. In addition, in his last post-plenary discussion with Ambassador Tower, Karpov suggested that the Soviets might be prepared to accept thirty to forty percent reductions in existing levels of strategic weapons and launchers, and invited Tower to suggest a percentage. (Of course, by strategic weapons the Soviets have in the past meant gravity bombs and SRAMs as well as RVs and ALCMs; our START position has not limited gravity bombs and SRAMs, only bombers that carry them.)

3. Since the Soviets have resisted our delegation’s efforts to pin down precisely what percentages they have in mind, our delegation does not consider that the Soviets have submitted a genuine proposal, and has told the Soviets so. The Soviets have countered that they do indeed have a proposal. Should they wish, they can publicize it as such at the end of the round. It is a scheme that could excite considerable interest on the Hill and among the allies. They could also add numbers at any time.

4. On the question of space arms, Gorbachev has put an interesting new twist on the Soviet position in his latest public statement—a letter to the American Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).³ As part of a standard recitation of Soviet negotiating aims and criticism of the U.S., Gorbachev called on the U.S. to join the USSR in reaffirming the ABM treaty in a “binding form.” (A UCS letter to Gorbachev called on him to agree to such a reaffirmation.) The concept is designed to suggest to the UCS, which has strongly opposed SDI, that the Soviets are flexible and more ready than the U.S. to cut a deal in Geneva. In the same letter, Gorbachev called for a ban on SDI testing and development but did not explicitly mention research. While the press has played up this new formulation, it is still possible that Gorbachev’s statement reflects the Soviet tendency to subsume “research” under the rubric of “development” or “creation.” It is thus too early to say with any certainty that the Gorbachev statement signals greater Soviet flexibility on this point. There are other Soviet hints of interest in expanding the ABM treaty to allow more ground-based deployments. Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev hinted this recently to Egon Bahr.⁴ So did Space Research Institute Chief Sagdayev, in a talk with CIA USSR NIO Fritz Ermarth.⁵

5. On INF, the Soviets, as you know, have maintained a particularly sterile, unconstructive line in Geneva. They have not abandoned their 1983 position of zero U.S. LRINF deployments in Europe and equal numbers of Soviet and British/French forces. Here too, however, there is the potential for Soviet mischief-making as we head up to a summit. Although the Soviets so far have shown little interest in playing the Dutch card, today’s intelligence suggests that they are continuing to convert SS–20 bases (for the SS–25); this raises again the possibility that the Soviets could be down to below 378 SS–20’s deployed at bases before the Dutch decision in November on U.S. deployments (current figures are 432 operational missiles, 396 at bases). In a move that may relate also to Soviet strategy toward the PRC, the Soviet INF negotiator is now implying that the Soviets might make a freeze in Asia dependent on U.S. actions there, but not necessarily on Chinese forces as well.

6. Outside the arms control field, the Soviet-Hungarian communique of July 8, issued after Shevardnadze’s meeting with Hungarian Foreign Minister Varkonyi, also contains some interesting if still inconclusive variants on standard Soviet language.⁶ It called for a radical change in East-West contacts and an effort to “revive and strengthen” the process of detente. According to the communique, this can best be done by developing relations between countries with different social systems and a constructive dialogue based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

7. Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev have all endorsed “detente,” but “revive and strengthen” is the strongest formulation so far, and will have appeal in Western Europe. It will complement the active diplomacy the Soviets are now pursuing toward Western Europe, e.g., the Gorbachev-Mitterrand summit and overtures for greater EC-CEMA cooperation. The communique also called for “an early beginning” at CDE for substantive talks to adopt “major” and “concrete” CBMs in “the political and military field.” This more “positive” general line was mirrored in the authoritative Pravda international review Sunday. Since the text is usually reviewed personally by the Foreign Minister before publication, it may bear Shevardnadze’s first footprint in his new job.

8. On Shevardnadze, the Israelis are expressing cautious optimism about prospects on issues of interest to them, and this is based in part on reports from Jews of Georgian origin that portray him as someone who has been understanding and helpful in assisting Georgian Jews to emigrate to Israel. One Israeli official who emigrated in 1971 and claims to have known Shevardnadze personally describes him as “a great friend of the Jews.” We would note in corroboration that Moscow Embassy officers visiting Tbilisi in the late 1970’s were told by local refuseniks that Tbilisi University was one of only two places in the USSR where Hebrew language is officially available.

9. Implications: At this point these are so many straws in the wind. With regard to Shevardnadze in particular, he will take his cues from Gorbachev and the collective leadership, and there are no good indications that leadership policy on human rights in general or Soviet Jews in particular is softening or about to soften.

10. On the other hand, the straws seem to be pointing in one direction as far as arms control policy is concerned: the assembly of a broad Soviet package that could include increasingly explicit hints of deep cuts on strategic arms, a call for a reaffirmation of the ABM treaty intended to undercut SDI, and perhaps steps in other arms control areas such as CDE, all wrapped in a generally conciliatory public line toward the West, particularly Western Europe. The result could be considerable pressure on our negotiating position at Geneva as we move towards the summit. We will need to think hard about how to handle and perhaps take advantage of such a Soviet strategy both in Geneva and in our public diplomacy.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D92, Exdis July 1985. Secret; Exdis. Sent through Armacost. Drafted by Tefft; cleared by Nitze, Hawes, Palmer, Simons, Burton, Dunkerley, Courtney, and Timbie. Neither Burt nor Armacost initialed the memorandum; however, a stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.
2. See footnote 2, Document 57.
3. The July 6 letter is printed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXVII, no. 27 (July 31, 1985), p. 5. The letter is also printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 376–378.
4. In telegram 18920 from Bonn, June 28, the Embassy reported on a conversation between Rowny and Egon Bahr, during which Bahr stated that “when he had raised the matter of defensive systems with General Akhromeyev during Willy Brandt’s recent trip to Moscow, he had had the impression that the Soviet Union might be willing to talk in Geneva on cooperation on defense, albeit only on how to prevent the introduction of weapons into space.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850458–0652)
5. See footnote 3, Document 49.
6. In telegram 9230 from Moscow, July 9, the Embassy reported on meetings between Hungarian Foreign Minister Varkonyi and Shevardnadze in Moscow from July 7 to 8, stating that “the reported results of the visit included the predictable congruence of views on bilateral relations, socialist bloc ties, economic issues and an array of European and international issues.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850482–0809) On July 9, the Washington Post quoted a portion of the communiqué: “Despite the complexity of the existing international situation, there were real possibilities to curb the forces of imperialism, bring about a radical change in the course of developments and revive the process of détente.” (“Soviet Policy Statement,” Washington Post, July 9, 1985, p. A12)