49. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
8769. Subject: Soviet Fall-Back Options in the Nuclear and Space Talks. Ref: (A) Moscow 6824,2 (B) Moscow 8120,3 (C) Moscow 7398,4 (D) Moscow 8052.5
1. S—Entire text.
2. Summary. In view of the unyielding Soviet negotiating position in the Nuclear and Space Talks, a discussion of possible changes in their stance may give the impression that Embassy officers are “smoking something.” In recent weeks, however, officials of the Space Research Institute have floated some unorthodox ideas with foreign visitors:
—An agreement to reduce nuclear arms which would be invalidated if the United States “deployed SDI.”
—The impossibility of banning SDI research.
—The possibility of expanding the ABM treaty to allow additional ground-based defensive sites.
3. To explore whether other informed Soviets would express interest in these ideas, an Embassy officer visited Arbatov’s USA/Canada Institute. His interlocutors acknowledged the difficulty of banning SDI research, but stuck to the official line that the pursuit of SDI makes nuclear arms reductions impossible. They also foreswore interest in expanded terminal ballistic missile defenses.
4. We conclude that knowledgeable Soviets regard a ban on SDI research as unrealistic, in spite of the ethical demand for one. Since [Page 183] Soviet specialists are willing to grant that a research ban could not be effectively verified, this aspect of the official position is likely to change at some point. As alternative thresholds at which the Soviets might propose to stop SDI, Soviet experts have mentioned “the development of systems” and “testing in space.”
5. Although the USA Institute analysts would not endorse the other ideas of their colleagues from the Space Research Institute, these proposals may constitute fall-back options under study by Soviet officialdom. We speculate that both ideas hold some attraction for the Soviets, and that Space Research Institute officials would have discussed them with Soviet officials before floating them with foreign visitors.
6. A nuclear reductions agreement contingent upon non-deployment of SDI, for example, would express the interrelationship of offense and defense as well as the current Soviet demand for a prior ban on “space weapons” before nuclear reductions. A proposal for a contingent agreement would allow the Soviets to call for specific, deep, and publicly attractive reductions in nuclear weapons. At the same time, such an agreement might effectively block any U.S. decision to deploy the fruits of SDI research because of the consequent loss of the reductions in offensive arms.
7. Similarly, the idea of permitting expanded ground-based terminal ballistic missile defenses may appeal to Soviet officials. Militarily, such expanded defenses could reduce the increasing vulnerability of Soviet ICBMs and command centers. Politically, such a proposal could be portrayed as an attempt to meet the United States half-way, while preserving the basic aims of the ABM Treaty.
8. Although we assume the Soviets have fall-back positions under consideration, they of course, have given no sign of eagerness to change their negotiating approach. When and if they ever do, however, the proposals discussed here could receive official sponsorship. End summary.
[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850461–0299. Secret. Sent for information to USNATO, NST Delegation Geneva, and Secretary of Defense.↩
- In telegram 6824 from Moscow, May 23, the Embassy reported that Sagdeyev “has floated with an Italian visitor the idea of offensive arms reductions contingent on no deployment of ‘SDI.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850365–0086)↩
- In telegram 8120 from Moscow, June 17, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Fritz Ermarth, NIO who was visiting the Soviet Union, and officials at the Space Research Institute on June 14. The Embassy noted “somewhat unorthodox ideas” such as “SDI research cannot be banned, but testing in space could be; the ABM Treaty might be modified to allow more than one land-based ABM site; Soviet air defenses are unneeded, but institutional inertia preserves them.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850426–0405)↩
- See footnote 6, Document 43.↩
- In telegram 8052 from Moscow, June 14, the Embassy reported on a Pravda article by Andrei Kokoshin criticizing SDI and a limited space-based ballistic missile defense. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850423–0084)↩