Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

57. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Secretary of State Shultz in Bangkok¹

Washington, July 8, 1985

WH 3145. Please deliver the following message from Bud McFarlane to Secretary Shultz Eyes Only in a sealed envelope at opening of business.

Subject: Odds and ends.

1. Secret entire text.

2. With apologies for interrupting your trip, I wanted to give you some thoughts on issues which will be upon you soon after your return and seek your reaction in the next week or so. The first is the Helsinki trip. Over the weekend, as I devoted some time to the directions our relationship with the Russians is taking, I was more and more drawn to the conclusion that the role of the Helsinki meetings has become very different from what it was two weeks ago. First, we have seen the Russians introduce their percentage proposal at Geneva.² This is not so striking for its substance as it is for the apparent intention it may represent to use Geneva for serious purpose. Time will tell, but taken with the fairly flat turndown they gave us on the concept of a private channel, there seems to be a fairly clear signal that Gorbachev is not yet ready to deal with the issue himself. Even more importantly, however, their lack of pick up on our signal raises for me a caution that we ought not be introducing new ideas before they have shown at least some interest in the channel itself. To do so contains the real risk of our appearing overly anxious, a position which all of us recognize is to be avoided. Then, too, there is the very valid requirement for Shevardnadze to get his feet on the ground and for you to establish your relationship with him. At a setting with that purpose you certainly don’t need the appearance that someone from the White House is looking over your shoulder. Consequently, I am beginning to think that my presence would be gratuitous and perhaps inadvertently harmful to your purpose. Finally, there is my growing concern that we will have more than enough to do back here in shepherding the terrorism work of the VP’s task force and the near-term work on Libya. I hesitate to be away at that time. All this is to the point that I am beginning to believe that I ought to stay here. I haven’t mentioned it to the President and would appreciate your thoughts before doing so.

3. Dobrynin. Dobrynin has invited me to lunch this week. I don’t hold any particular brief for doing it. As I indicate above, I don’t think we want to be offering new arms control positions right now. I could go over the President’s thinking on his expectations for the meeting in November, but you have done that and there really aren’t any late-breaking issues which need to be treated before he goes back. But if you see some value in it please let me know.

4. Libya. At the last NSPG on terrorism, a consensus was emerging that we needed to continue to pursue the Salvadoran option but also explore making a serious effort toward Libya.³ You will recall that part of the concept which John Poindexter’s CPPG has worked on is to engage Mubarak to see what degree of interest there might be in playing a role, if only to be a cheerleader at the right moment. The work is continuing—Mike may have updated you—but it seems to me important that we engage Mubarak soon; I would think within the next two weeks. Consequently, I would like to propose that we work up talking points for the presentation of the concept as a basis for drawing the Egyptians out on what they are willing to do. It seems to me that the demarche ought to be done by someone from the White House. An undertaking of this magnitude clearly requires that the diplomatic, military and intelligence aspects be presented. The plan overlaps State, Defense and CIA areas of responsibility. Then too, given the Carter legacy on this issue with Mubarak, it will be important that he see it as clearly having the President’s backing. My candidate for the mission is John Poindexter. In addition to fulfilling the several criteria mentioned above, John has been the linchpin of the plan’s development, working with Mike and reps from DOD and CIA. I would appreciate your thinking this over and letting me know within the next few days.

5. Otherwise things here are relatively quiet, what with the Congress just getting back. The VP reported today on his European trip.⁴ He found them less anxious on SDI, generally supportive on the need to counter terrorism (but here more willing to speak quietly than to take action), and pleased with the SALT II announcement and the setting of the date for the meeting with Gorbachev.⁵ Separately we have reached an impasse on the budget resolution conference and are working on some kind of compromise which will still yield $50 billion (plus) first year reductions, although Dave Stockman and everyone else acknowledge that only about $35 billion (most of which is Defense cuts) will yield real savings. I will try to send a word or two each day to keep you informed on comings and goings here. I hope your meetings in Kuala Lumpur go well.⁶ Please let me know if we can be reinforcing from here at any point.

Warm regards, Bud

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant I, June, July, August 1985 NP. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. “Return for certified destruction” is written across the top of the message in an unknown hand. This message was sent via “Privacy Channels.” Shultz was in Thailand from July 8 to 10.
2. In telegram 6370 from the NST Delegation in Geneva, July 5, the delegation indicated that the Soviet “percentages proposal” was discussed in detail during a July 1 meeting of the head NST negotiators. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850475–0678)
3. A record of the July 3 NSPG meeting on terrorism, which examined the TWA Flight 847 hijacking as well as terrorism in El Salvador and Libya, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989.
4. Bush traveled to Europe from June 23 to July 3.
5. On June 10, Reagan made a statement on U.S. and Soviet compliance with arms control and sent a report to Congress. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, pp. 743–745; see also footnote 2, Document 41.
6. Shultz attended the ASEAN Post-Ministerial meetings in Kuala Lumpur from July 10 to 12.